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Boston University School of Theology, 2018
Major Professor: Mary Elizabeth Moore, Dean, Professor of Theology and Education
ABSTRACT
 This study argues that a comparison of human nature, divine grace, and theo-
logical virtue in the theologies of John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas provides resources 
for constructing iconic dignity as a vital theological perspective. Iconic dignity names a 
radiant-yet-reflected human worth rooted in the image of God, whose grace empowers 
response, transformation, and virtuous participation in God’s loving essence. The dis-
sertation responds to the absence of a focused analysis of nature, grace, and virtue in 
Wesley-Aquinas studies—a nascent field with only three major publications (on histori-
cal-moral theology, Christian perfection, and pneumatology). The project’s contributions 
to theological reflection and practice have become especially clear in our current context 
of social-existential fragmentation and bigotry.
 Iconic dignity begins with an intuitional methodology and proceeds with textual 
analysis, critically comparative construction, and practical contributions. These methods 
characterize iconic dignity as participatory, incarnational, relational, dynamic, encom-
passing, transformational, and loving. These characteristics embrace our inter/personal 
nature, our development in grace, and our work with God toward virtuous flourishing. 
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The dissertation’s explanatory power and generative potential capacitates constructive 
doctrinal reflection and practical embodiments of iconic dignity.
 After detailing “iconicity” and “dignity,” the theological comparison of Wesley 
and Aquinas traces general contours of their shared theological anthropology. As embodi-
ments of God’s image, humans possess intellect, will, and volitional liberty, which together 
establish our moral capacity. This holistic anthropology is then analyzed with respect to 
human acts, their relation to habitus (Aquinas) and tempers (Wesley), and sin (actual and 
original). Following a constructive exploration of iconic dignity and ecological steward-
ship, the study shifts to grace. Close stereoscopic reading reveals the congruity of grace’s 
nature, divisions, and dynamics for Wesley and Aquinas.
 Throughout, the constructive comparison illustrates the strength of iconic digni-
ty’s theological perspective. Wesley and Aquinas are shown to be similar enough to con-
verse but different enough to contribute: to one another, out of their shared theological 
departures and destinations; and to our practical-theological conversations, including a 
repudiation of total depravity, an embrace of universal grace, joint ecological stewardship, 
radical hospitality, and ongoing Methodist-Catholic ecumenical dialogues.
 Still, many opportunities remain for developing iconic dignity in practice. First, 
more research is needed on the means of grace and the nature and exercise of theological 
virtue for Wesley and Aquinas. Second, future research should focus on additional topics 
like ecclesiology, moral virtue, sociality, and an expansion beyond Wesley and Aquinas. 
Finally, the need remains for further study into practices of iconic dignity, including the 
development of stereoscopic reading for local congregations and communities.
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SOURCES, CONVENTIONS, AND TRANSLATIONS
 Wesley and Aquinas were both highly educated, disciplined individuals, and this is 
immediately evident in the way they structure their writings. This likely doesn’t come as 
much of a surprise to those encountering Aquinas for the first time since he is frequently 
introduced as a paragon of High Scholasticism. For first-time readers of Wesley, though, 
the discovery of such a strict organization may be unexpected—particularly if his self-de-
scribed “practical divinity” is juxtaposed against scholastic or systematic theology. At any 
rate, since Wesley and Aquinas both organize their works so meticulously, references 
thereto can be very precise, even when working with multiple editions or translations. 
Still, certain conventions for citing Wesley and Aquinas have developed among their cor-
responding circles, and these are worth mentioning here.
John Wesley
 The chief source of Wesley’s writings is the Bicentennial Edition of the Works of 
John Wesley. This collection, begun in the mid-1970s by Oxford University Press, and 
transferred a decade later to Abingdon Press, is intended to be the definitive critical 
edition of Wesley’s Works. Currently, 21 of the 35 volumes have been published. Within 
those completed volumes are the majority of Wesley’s most-important texts: his sermons, 
A Plain Account of Christian Perfection, the Appeals to Men of Reason and Religion, The 
Doctrine of Original Sin, the Minutes of the Methodist conferences and other documents 
related to Methodism’s origins and design, the 1780 Hymnal, his Journal, and about half of 
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his letters. For texts awaiting publication in the Bicentennial Edition, it is still necessary to 
employ the much-outdated “Jackson edition” of Wesley’s Works. This 14-volume edition 
of Wesley’s Works, edited by Thomas Jackson, has been reprinted a number of times since 
its publication in the early 19th century. The edition lacks any editorial or critical appa-
ratus and omits several of Wesley’s writings—including the doctrinal Explanatory Notes 
Upon the New Testament (1754). Since this biblical commentary awaits publication in the 
Bicentennial Edition, the current student of Wesley is left to refer to one of the numerous 
reprints or online versions.
 Citations for Wesley’s works follow a simple, conventional method: (1) the title 
of the work, (2) Wesley’s own numbering of part, section, paragraph, etc., and (3) the 
volume and page number as found in Works or other respective source. For Wesley’s ser-
mons, part of the title includes the sermon number (as indexed in Works), which is then 
followed by the sermon title, section or paragraph number, and location within Works. 
Since Wesley’s New Testament Notes proceed verse-by-verse, these citations will be given 
simply as {Notes, [scriptural reference]}. Passages from Wesley’s Journal are cited accord-
ing to the entry date: {Journal, [date]}. Wesley’s personal correspondence is cited normally 
according to recipient and date, but open letters are treated as individual works from a 
particular year. Together, this should ensure that the reader is able to locate any reference 
from Wesley, regardless of the edition.
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Thomas Aquinas
 In Aquinas’s medieval context, the language common to his academic and eccle-
sial audiences was Latin. Within the present context, though, the common language is 
English. Accordingly, all quotations from Aquinas are English translations. Most of these 
are not my own but come from respected translations by scholars of note under the aegis 
of major academic publishers. This is intentional: first, the translations used are common 
and accessible, which expands both readership and critical engagement; second, my own 
translations of Aquinas would rarely deviate significantly from staid translations. (In some 
cases, where nuanced is required, I have provided my own translations and have indicated 
them as such.) I readily concur with countless other scholars that, on the whole, Aquinas 
is clearest in his original Latin. Therefore, I recommend having the Latin immediately 
on hand (ideally in parallel) when reading Aquinas in English.1 The best current editions 
of Aquinas’s Latin text are freely available online,2 and some sites feature English-Latin 
parallels of Aquinas’s major works.3
 While the publication of a definitive Latin collection of Aquinas’s works is still 
underway by the Leonine Commission (having begun in 1880 by decree of Pope Leo XIII), 
1 For a detailed discussion of the method of reading—especially of Aquinas—that I have employed 
throughout this study, see the first section of “Methods and Their Methodology” in the Introduction below.
2 For Aquinas’s full Opera Omnia in Latin, see “Corpus Thomisticum,” Fundación Tomás de Aquino, 
accessed October 27, 2018, http://www.corpusthomisticum.org. This site contains the best available edi-
tions: the Leonine for Aquinas’s major works, and the Parma and Vivès editions for material yet to be pub-
lished in the Leonine.
3 For navigable English-Latin parallels of Aquinas’s main theological works, see “Thomas Aquinas,” 
The Aquinas Institute, accessed October 27, 2018, https://aquinas.cc. For another extensive library of Aqui-
nas’s works in parallel English-Latin (including philosophical works), see “St. Thomas Aquinas’ Works in 
English,” The Dominican House of Studies, accessed October 27, 2018, https://dhspriory.org/thomas.
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there is no equivalent Opera Omnia in English. Instead, English translations of Aquinas’s 
major works stand on their own. In some cases, multiple translations exist for a given 
work. Such is the case with Summa Theologiae, which is often regarded as Aquinas’s most 
important work. A massive 61-volume Latin-English edition was published between 1964 
and 1980, which is now commonly called the “Blackfriars edition.” Although this version 
includes extensive introductions, notes, and commentaries, the actual English transla-
tion can be a bit loose in places, which can obscure Aquinas’s meaning. The commoner, 
more-literal English translation is that by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 
sometimes called the “Benziger edition,” which was originally published in 1911 and is 
freely available online. Alfred Freddoso (emeritus, University of Notre Dame) is currently 
translating the Summa Theologiae and has made his work freely available online as well.4 
The virtue of Freddoso’s translation (about 60% completed) is its literalism without the 
antiquated English or Latin cognates of the Benziger edition.
 For the purposes of citation, Aquinas’s works fall into two broad categories. Works 
such as Compendium Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles follow the classical pattern 
of division according to books and chapters (represented by majuscule Roman numerals 
and Arabic numbers, respectively). Alternatively, works like De Malo, De Potentia, and 
De Veritate employ the structure of the disputed question. Within this scholastic genre, 
the material is arranged hierarchically according to question (q. __), article (a. __), num-
bered objections (obj. __), contrary opinions from tradition (“sed contra,” s.c.), Aquinas’s 
4 This translation is available at Freddoso’s personal page, “New English Translation of St. Thomas 
Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae (Summa Theologica),” Alfred J. Freddoso, last updated January 10, 2018, 
accessed October 27, 2018, http://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/TOC.htm.
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responses (“corpus,” co.), and Aquinas’s replies to the objections (ad __). All of these num-
bers are given as Arabic numerals. Thus, {DV q. 27, a. 7} refers to the seventh article of 
the twenty-seventh question within De Veritate—either to Aquinas’s own response or to 
the article in general. If a specific objection or reply is referenced, that information will 
follow the article number, i.e., {DV q. 27, a. 7, ad 4}, Aquinas’s reply to the fourth objection 
thereof.
 Summa Theologiae is a special case that draws the structure of the disputed ques-
tion into the systematic genre of the Scholastic summa. Aquinas divides Summa Theologiae 
into three parts: Prima Pars (I), Secunda Pars (II), and Tertia Pars (III). The Secunda Pars 
is itself split into two parts: Prima Secundae (I-II) and Secunda Secundae (II-II). Each of 
these parts features numerous questions, all of which follow the structure of the disputed 
question. To minimize the bulkiness of citations from Summa Theologiae, a streamlined 
method will be employed that replaces the intra-citation letters with periods. For example, 
{ST I.19} refers to the nineteenth question of the Prima Pars, while {ST I.19.1} refers to the 
first article of that question; {ST I-II.109.3, co.} refers to Aquinas’s response in the third 
article of question 109 of the Prima Secundae; and {ST III.60.3, ad 2} refers to Aquinas’s 
reply to the second objection of the third article of question 60 of the Tertia Pars.
 Again, these conventions should ensure that the reader is able to locate any refer-
ence from Aquinas, regardless of edition, translation, or language.
1PRELUDE
 It may seem difficult to imagine a time before Black Lives Matter, the #MeToo 
movement, the Trump presidency, the modern refugee crisis, the steady uptick in mass 
shootings, the anguish a single city name can invoke—Ferguson, Charleston, Orlando, 
Charlottesville, Las Vegas, Parkland—but these were not yet historical realities just four 
short years ago.1 Such was the world in 2014 when I began a study of John Wesley, Thomas 
Aquinas, and this thing I’ve called “iconic dignity.” Back then, my objectives were optimis-
tically broad. I had wanted to craft a current theology that could simultaneously be rooted 
in the best of the past and be aimed to the best of the future. I had wanted to give fellow 
Wesleyan scholars a new interpretation of Wesley’s theology that was not constrained 
by Continental Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy, or American Holiness. I had wanted 
to define and defend the worth of the human being without slipping into the snares of 
humanistic pride. I had wanted a stereoscopic, academic study of Wesley and Aquinas 
that cohesively wove together nature, grace, and virtue. But, as I would discover, an icon 
doesn’t disclose its fullness in a single glance, so to speak.
 In the years since 2014, we have witnessed the proliferation of prejudice, partisan-
ship, pride, and pain alongside positive responses of empowerment, awareness, involve-
ment, resiliency, and connection. These social realities have shaped the context in which 
I write—and, I am confident, the contexts in which I am read. (Who hasn’t felt the deep 
1 This list is reflective of my own context in the United States. Sadly, similar events have also played out 
at a global level: shootings in Paris, civil war in Yemen, the Syrian and Rohingyan refugee/migration crises, 
fomenting European populism, threats of nuclear warfare from the Korean peninsula, and so forth.
2impact of racial divide, senseless slaughter, blatant sexual abuse, dehumanizing jingoism, 
or demoralizing politics?) Such circumstances have a way of evoking theological interpre-
tation, and the present situation is no different. That said, I offer here a constructive and 
comparative theology that I believe is capable of addressing the human condition (both 
ideally and presently) in the steadfast hope of love’s faithful labor towards genuine human 
flourishing (cf. 1 Thess. 1:3). Even though my primary theological lens is not explicitly 
liberationist, feminist, ecological, womanist, queer, political, or social-ethical, I hope to 
contribute to these larger conversation through my own work with Wesley and Aquinas.
 If anything, the present social situation has highlighted (if not exacerbated) the 
need for the kind of theological perspective that I am proposing here. However, the stag-
geringly episodic-yet-anticipated phenomena of the past four years have made an organic 
integration of these contextual factors rather elusive. I, for one, am not particularly graced 
with the prophetic insight to glean the gravitas of a given moment, weigh it, and respond 
swiftly and suitably. (Let us be grateful for those who are!) It is therefore a happy accident 
that the project itself has taken on a significance well beyond its original aim in the midst 
of these external circumstances.
 Additionally, the project has flourished on its own terms in two ways. First, it has 
become clear to me that my initial hunches—that viable theological connections could 
exist between Wesley and Aquinas on nature, grace, and virtue—were set far too low. 
Those hunches begat numerous queries and researches, which quickly multiplied the 
materials and subjects for consideration. There were times when an obscure reference 
or a neglected text would turn out to be an unforeseen lynchpin for a whole new way 
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opportunities for new theological frameworks, terminology, and lacunae. This was largely 
felicitous in that it demonstrated the fecundity of the thesis.
 Second, it has also become clear to me that my initial scope for this dissertation 
was set far too high. That is not to say the scope of the study itself was set too high. Instead, 
this is an honest recognition that, given the developments mentioned above, there would 
likely be twice the material originally expected. So, rather than postpone the completion 
of the fully-fledged study as a dissertation, or amputate one (or two) of the three legs sup-
porting the vital framework of iconic dignity, or abbreviate the parts so heavily that only 
a shadow of the original might remain, the decision was made to divide the study into two 
volumes. The decision has, in effect, made it more manageable put iconic dignity into 
circulation as soon as possible.
 The present dissertation (volume 1) covers the entirety of Nature and half of Grace, 
leaving the second half of Grace and the entirety of Virtue to be treated in a subsequent 
volume. That future text would build upon what is presented here without rehashing its 
introductory elements. However, in the same way that this dissertation stands on its own 
while pointing beyond itself, a future volume should be able to stand on its own while 
pointing back to this work.
4INTRODUCTION
 Intuition can be an elusive thing. It frequently begins as a hunch, something 
beyond immediate scientific inquiry (scientia). It pricks the imagination and prompts the 
connection of wonder to exploration. It is unfettered by notions of “what is possible” or 
“the way it’s been done before.” It is freeing, fertile, and flexible. And, if fostered, it often 
unfurls in fresh, unforeseen perspectives. Thus, intuition is indispensable to the formation 
of a theological perspective, especially one intending to fashion and fortify human vitality 
in all its forms. Such was (and is) the case with the present study.
 In its earliest stages, this project sought to investigate deeper themes in John Wes-
ley’s theological ethics, especially its indebtedness to the virtue tradition. Intuition then 
entertained the possibility of positioning Wesley alongside another key theological figure 
in the virtue tradition: St. Thomas Aquinas. Further consideration suggested a viable dia-
logue, but one that could only pass through the lens of grace if it were to be intelligible. 
Still deeper engagement revealed the underpinnings of a vital theological anthropology. 
Together, these intuitions pointed to “something more” existing between Wesley and 
Aquinas—an intersection between human nature, divine grace, and the life and practice 
of virtue.
 These intuitional hunches were indeed fruitful, but they were not yet life-giving 
or life-changing. For that, intuition had to couple with conversation—the promptings of 
others’ intuitions pushing at the possibilities of this developing theological perspective. 
Like a metallurgist purifying ore, these conversations tempered the general perspective 
5with opportunities to re-vise and re-spect—to turn again to Wesley and Aquinas with fresh 
eyes to test prior hypotheses alongside new possibilities for participating in the life and 
love of God. From those converging intuitions, expanded through careful textual research 
and analysis, has emerged the nexus of an orienting motif aimed at genuine human flour-
ishing: the theological perspective that I have come to understand as “iconic dignity.”
1. The Thesis: Theological Perspective and Iconic Dignity
 Theological perspectives have always mattered. They inform what we believe, 
how we believe, and what we do: “the inmost nature of things, the nature of God and man, 
and the immutable relations between them.”1 Therefore, a theological perspective that is 
sufficient to ground faith, inspire hope, and guide practices of transformative love requires 
a substantial understanding of who God is, who we are, and the God-human relationship. 
But not just any theological perspective can yield a practicable vision of human flourish-
ing in loving, transformative fellowship with God and with our fellow-creatures. What’s 
more, the fragmenting currents of xenophobia, commodification, ecological degradation, 
isolation, racial violence, and depersonalizing structural systems only exacerbate matters.
 My thesis is that a comparison of the interrelated themes of nature, grace, and 
virtue in the theologies of John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas establishes the emergent tra-
jectory2 of a vital theological perspective—iconic dignity—that is capable of engendering 
1 John Wesley to the Author of The Craftsman, July 8(?), 1745, in Works 26:149. Cf. Irwin W. Reist, “John 
Wesley’s View of Man: A Study in Free Grace versus Free Will,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 7, no. 1 (1972): 
25-35.
2 The hermeneutical function of an “emergent trajectory” is related to that of an “orienting concern,” as 
employed by Randy L. Maddox, Responsible Grace: John Wesley’s Practical Theology (Nashville: Kingswood 
Books, 1994), 18, especially 18n16. Maddox describes an orienting concern as an implicit theological perspec-
6and sustaining true human flourishing. While a detailed portrait of iconic dignity will be 
presented in Chapter 1, this Introduction offers an initial sketch. Iconic dignity means that 
we are created to radiate divine dignity—that our worth is real yet rooted in the life and 
love of God, not ourselves—that this genuine capacity for God enables true transforma-
tion through participation, not entitlement.3 Iconic dignity names a radiant-yet-reflected 
human worth through divine empowerment for a participatory purpose: to reflect the 
goodness of God, which constitutes our true end.
 The aim of iconic dignity is holiness and happiness4 through a relational partici-
pation in God’s essential love.5 For Aquinas, the underlying dynamic may be described as 
tive that is meta-conceptual in nature and provides a degree of consistency to one’s theological reflection. 
My use of the term “emergent trajectory” adopts the overall character of an orienting concern while shifting 
the focus to a certain aim that results from one’s theology. Whether an orienting concern strictly operates 
from within one’s theology is debatable, especially given its implicit nature. Iconic dignity certainly comes 
out of the study of Wesley and Aquinas as an implicit theme. It is descriptive in relation to Wesley and Aqui-
nas but prescriptive for contemporary theological practice. Cf. Kenneth J. Collins’s hermeneutical approach 
to Wesley’s theology by way of an “axial theme”—a phrase he borrows from Albert Outler. However, in 
both language and implementation, Collins’s “axial theme” operates more “unidirectionally” as a motif from 
which theological particulars radiate. See Collins, The Theology of John Wesley: Holy Love and the Shape of 
Grace (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2007), 3-16
3 Orthodox theologian Vladimir Lossky has addressed this and the paradox of the realization of God’s 
image: “a human person cannot realize the fullness to which he is called, the fullness of becoming the perfect 
image of God, if he appropriates a part of the nature, considering it to be his personal property. For God’s 
image in man attains its perfection only when human nature becomes like God’s nature, when it begins fully 
to participate in uncreated goodness.” Vladimir Lossky, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction, trans. Ian and 
Ihita Kesarcodi-Watson (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1978), 125.
4 The conjunction of holiness and happiness is a Wesleyan hendiadys. Albert C. Outler, who edited Wes-
ley’s sermons for Works (vv. 1-4), tallied at least 54 instances of this conjunction throughout Wesley’s dis-
courses. See also Albert C. Outler, Theology in the Wesleyan Spirit (Nashville: Tidings, 1975), 83-84. Recently, 
Rebekah L. Miles has addressed this conjunctive focus in Wesley’s ethics; for example, see Miles, “Happi-
ness, Holiness, and the Moral Life in John Wesley,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Wesley, ed. Randy 
L. Maddox and Jason E. Vickers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 207-224.
5 In his Notes, Wesley comments on 1 John 4:8 (“God is love”) that St. John is “intimating that this [love] 
is his [God’s] darling, his reigning attribute; the attribute that sheds an amiable glory on all his other per-
fections.” A few pages before this, Wesley notes that the epistle’s author “has this apparent aim, to confirm 
the happy and holy communion of the faithful with God and Christ, by describing the marks of that blessed 
state” (Notes, 1 John, introductory comment). In his own idiom, Aquinas similarly asserts that love charac-
7a “metaphysics of participation” in the Divine Essence.6 For Wesley, it is Christian per-
fection in love through communion with God.7 For both, participation in God is wrought 
by grace, which shapes us according to the pattern of Christ in love.8 We are called to be 
imitators of Christ, the very Icon of God (εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ, Col. 1:15). As expressed in the 
early Christ-hymn (Phil. 2), Jesus Christ is the paradigm of God’s love and the exempli-
fication of true dignity—one that does not “regard equality with God as something to 
be exploited” (Phil. 2:6), but instead reflects the real capacity for living worthy of God 
(ἀξίως τοῦ κυρίου, digne Deo, Col. 1:10). Inasmuch as God has participated in human 
nature through Christ, we are called to participate in the divine nature—again, through 
Christ—and thereby lead lives that are worthy of God.9 In other words, our having been 
terizes the divine will (ST I.20.1), is the proper name of the Holy Spirit (ST I.37.1), and is the Divine Essence 
itself (ST II-II.23.2 ad 1). For Aquinas, love also characterizes humanity’s blessed fellowship (communicatio 
beatitudinis) and participation (conversatio, participatio) in God (ST II-II.23.1-2). However, it is important 
to bear in mind that participation does not mean appropriation: human love is not to be equated with the 
divine essence. Here, the hermeneutic of iconicity helps maintain the proper focus of Aquinas’s teaching.
6 D. Stephen Long compares Wesley to Aquinas by way of this participational-metaphysical theme in John 
Wesley’s Moral Theology: The Quest for God and Goodness (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 2005), especially 
188-195. See also John F. Wippel’s chapter on “Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. 
Norman Kretzmann and Eleanor Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), especially 93-99.
7 See Wesley, Notes, John 4:17: “by this communion with God, is our love made perfect.”
8 “Since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature,” Aquinas writes, “it depends, not on any 
natural virtue, but on the sole grace of the Holy Ghost who infuses charity” (ST II-II.24.3). Yet we must 
not forget Aquinas’s axiom: “grace does not destroy nature but perfects it” (e.g., ST I.1.8 ad 2). Therefore, 
Aquinas finds it “most fitting” (convenientissimum) that Christ should assume human nature to become our 
supreme exemplar (ST III.3.8).
For Wesley, although sin ensnares humans by nature, God’s prevenient grace counteracts our sinful 
inclinations and enables our response to and relationship with God. See Wesley, Sermon 85, “On Working 
Out Our Own Salvation,” III.4-5, in Works 3:207-8. Furthermore, Wesley’s Christological description of 
perfection combines Philippians 2:5 (“having the mind of Christ”) and 1 John 2:5 (“walking as he walked”). 
See Richard P. Heitzenrater, “The Imitatio Christi and the Great Commandment: Virtue and Obligation in 
Wesley’s Ministry with the Poor,” in The Portion of the Poor: Good News to the Poor in the Wesleyan Tradi-
tion, ed. M. Douglas Meeks (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 1995), 58.
9 This idea was most-vividly expressed by St. Athanasius of Alexandria in his De Incarnatione (§54): “He 
was made human so that we might become gods.” Aquinas himself echoes this in a lesson from the Feast of 
8fashioned according to God’s image (Gen. 1:27: κατ᾿ εἰκόνα θεοῦ, LXX; ad imaginem Dei, 
Vulg.) means that we are divinely assembled in order to resemble the Divine.
 As we shall continue to see throughout, the implications of iconic dignity are 
wide-ranging. But, in addition describing the desired end of the study, iconic dignity also 
reflects the means to that end. In other words, iconic dignity bespeaks a theological meth-
odology with clear methods and practices, and it is to these that we now turn.
2. Methods and Their Methodology
 The purpose of this section is to explain the methodology of this dissertation and 
its particular methods of investigation. It is helpful here to heed Emmanuel Lartey’s dis-
tinction between method and methodology: a method is a tool, a precise implementation 
or manifestation of a methodology, which is an underlying theory or rationale of a method 
or methods.10 Method is a species of methodology; the enactment of a particular method 
is then the practice of that method. Still, a methodology operates in service of the aim of 
its larger project. In other words, a study’s aim must direct its means—its methods and 
methodology.
 Now, since iconic dignity aims to present a vital theological perspective, it is con-
cerned with the manner of presenting that perspective—that is, its methodology. On the 
whole, iconic dignity methodologically values conversation and an openness to share 
Corpus Christi: “The only-begotten Son of God, willing to make us participants of his divinity, assumed our 
nature so that he, who was made man, might make men gods [unigenitus siquidem Dei filius, suae divinitatis 
volens nos esse participes, nostram naturam assumpsit ut homines deos faceret factus homo].” See Aquinas, In 
Festo Corporis Christi, noct. 1, lect. 1 (Opusculum 57, 1-4).
10 Emmanuel Y. Lartey, Pastoral Theology in an Intercultural World (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 
2006), 74-78.
9and receive therein. This requires intentional work to see and to understand another, to 
return time and again to reconsider or recognize the truth that surfaces in the experience 
of exchange. In the case of Wesley and Aquinas, iconic dignity methodologically involves 
an appreciation of their unique theological idioms and patterns, social contexts and lim-
itations, and spiritual and intellectual developments. Thus, iconic dignity calls for textual 
vigilance and attention to nuance—because of the prevenient regard with which we are to 
hold another’s life and thought and work.
 These considerations come to inform the prioritized role and native integration of 
theological intuition within the methodology of iconic dignity. To appreciate this, we may 
turn to the language of intuition, which draws on the interplay of sight and thought. The 
Latin verb intueri, from which we derive our English word “intuition,” points to a constel-
lation of meanings: “to consider, behold, look at, gaze upon.” Formally speaking, the verb 
takes an object in the accusative case—meaning that the considerate gaze of intuition 
pertains to things seen—things like an image (imago) or icon (εἰκόν). For us to “see” the 
dignity in the iconicity of another, we must consider the other with a deep respect that is 
receptive and reciprocal. The same goes for a conversation between Wesley and Aquinas: 
it will be rendered unintelligible without a genuine openness to mutual exchange.
 As a methodology, iconic dignity advances four particular methods and their prac-
tices: textual analysis, comparison, construction, and contribution to practice. The divi-
sion is somewhat arbitrary since these methods frequently (if not necessarily) overlap—
especially in practice. It may be helpful to unpack these methods according to certain 
descriptors. Thus, textual analysis is an implicit method; comparison is an explicit method 
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that yields construction as an emergent method; contribution to practice is an intentional 
method that aims to reach beyond the confines of academia into new ways of abundant 
life. Although these descriptors are only suggestions, I have chosen them because of the 
deeper, nuanced meanings the terms convey. In order to see this, let us consider these four 
methods and their practices in greater detail.
A. Textual Analysis
 As a method, textual analysis flows from the methodology of iconic dignity and pri-
oritizes primary sources. Because iconic dignity aspires to understand another as deeply 
as possible, the employment of a textually analytic method entails a close, critical reading 
using the best editions available. By implication, iconic dignity is relationally intertwined 
with methods and practices of good scholarship. Here we find the deeper meaning of 
textual analysis as an implicit method—from the Latin root-word implicare, “to enfold, 
entangle, connect intimately.”11 In this light, textual analysis points to particular practices 
of implicare that extend from the theological intuition of iconic dignity.
 One such practice that integrates this seeing and interweaving may be termed “ste-
reoscopic reading.” This involves holding two (or more) texts side-by-side, constantly flip-
ping back and forth for the sake of critical comparison and comprehension. The clearest 
example of stereoscopic reading is in the basic comparison of texts from Wesley and Aqui-
11 Since textual analysis closely resembles conventional academic inquiry, it may go unnoticed as a 
unique method. In this unnuanced sense, textual analysis may be considered an “implicit method,” i.e., 
because it is easy to overlook or take for granted. However, it is the nuance of the etymological sense pre-
sented here that I have in mind when describing textual analysis as “implicit.” This should become clear 
based on the presentation that follows.
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nas. On occasion there may even be great benefit from a physical juxtaposition of parallel 
passages from Wesley and Aquinas. More often it entails bearing in mind the silhouette 
of the one while reading the other—occasionally because what was first considered to be 
“parallel” turns out to be tangential at best. In short, a stereoscopic reading of Wesley and 
Aquinas is neither haphazard nor irrevocable, but instead encourages continual engage-
ment and more probing comparison.
 Stereoscopic reading also occurs within the textual analysis of each theologian. 
Perhaps most important is the ability to read the “young Wesley” alongside the “elder 
Wesley,” or the “bachelor Aquinas” in light of the “doctor Aquinas.” As Wesley and Aqui-
nas matured intellectually and spiritually over the course of their lives, so did their doc-
trinal and practical positions. Therefore, a reader must always bear in mind when Wesley 
or Aquinas was writing, what was occurring in each man’s life, why a treatise or tract 
was composed, or for whom it was composed. In both ways—attending to development 
over time, and heeding the circumstances surrounding the documents—this requires an 
analytical ability to read con-textually.12 To facilitate this kind of analytical acuity, contex-
tualizing biographies of Aquinas and Wesley are given at the end of this chapter. Further 
opportunities for contextualizing engagement will also surface throughout the remainder 
of the text, and we will address such cases as they arise.
 A special circumstance of stereoscopic reading surfaces when dealing with Aqui-
nas’s texts. All of Aquinas’s major theological works have been translated from their 
12 A corollary implication of this method is the interpretational priority given to Wesley and Aquinas’s 
“later” works. For example, Aquinas’s ST would take precedent over DV, and Wesley’s sermons from the 
1770s and 1780s over those from his earliest days at Oxford.
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native Latin into modern English. On the one hand, this is highly advantageous when 
recommending Aquinas to readers of multiple backgrounds and linguistic abilities. It also 
facilitates the task of providing dependable English translations of Aquinas’s work within 
the present study. On the other hand, it can be dangerous to rely solely upon transla-
tions of Aquinas’s works, since any translation is a form of interpretation. Thus, in an 
effort to respect (lit., “to look at again”) Aquinas’s texts, I have read the English transla-
tion in immediate parallel with the Latin source, giving priority to Aquinas’s Latin—sine 
exceptione. Where multiple English translations of Aquinas’s works exist,13 I have read 
those collectively in concert with Aquinas’s Latin. Quite literally, this means physically 
positioning the texts side-by-side, which allows for unencumbered theological intuition to 
discern textual nuances or (in some cases) discrepancies. I attempt to carry this practice 
forward by calling attention to certain passages in the footnotes and/or the text itself. 
To that effect, I have also re-inserted key Latin words and phrases into translated quota-
tions. Similarly, after providing initial nuanced explanation and analysis, I have left some 
of Aquinas’s most-operative theological terms untranslated throughout my analysis out of 
respect for his precise, nuanced language (e.g., habitus, the kinds of grace, auxilium). In 
practice, there can be no excuse for this kind of attention to detail: anyone with internet 
access may freely access all of Aquinas’s works in Latin and many of his most-important 
texts in highly-navigable English-Latin parallels.14
13 As noted above in “Sources, Conventions, and Abbreviations,” multiple English translations exist for 
such works as ST, SCG, and CT.
14 Again, these sites are mentioned in “Sources, Conventions, and Abbreviations,” above.
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 In order to demonstrate “textual analysis” and the ways in which its practices are 
brought to bear upon one another, let us consider how Wesley and Aquinas approach “pre-
venient grace.” Both theologians discuss something rendered in English as “prevenient 
grace”; and, as it turns out, both theologians have in mind the same basic concept con-
veyed by the Latin word praeveniens. However, context nuances how exactly Wesley and 
Aquinas come to mean something slightly different. Aquinas’s “rudimentary” understand-
ing of prevenient grace derives from his particular context: the academic, theological, and 
pastoral-fraternal circles wherein Augustine was second only to Scripture. Aquinas simply 
passes along Augustine’s straightforward explanation of gratia praeveniens as “grace that 
comes before or precedes.” When Wesley uses the term nearly 500 years later, it seems to 
be the same as Aquinas’s (“grace that comes before”), but the contextual circumstances of 
Wesley’s usage belie such an immediate equivalence. Caught up in the midst of theologi-
cal controversies with Calvinists—including struggles within earlier Methodism to steer 
away from Calvinism—Wesley turns to prevenient grace as a powerful antidote to Cal-
vinistic predestination, limited atonement, and the like. For Wesley, “prevenient grace” 
is God’s universal gift that restores the condition of fallen humanity so that we are able 
to function on a moral plane and respond favorably to God’s universal offer of salvation. 
All this is God’s gracious work and occurs before (praeveniens) we make any move toward 
God. In this light, prevenient grace is one of the pillars of Wesley’s evangel and a doctrinal 
apologia for his practices of “radical evangelism”: publicly preaching in English fields to 
thousands at a time, offering ministry and comfort to condemned prisoners en route to the 
gallows, advocating for the abolition of slavery. The point is that Wesley very clearly takes 
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a pre-existing theological term (one that Aquinas himself uses without much explanation) 
and adapts it according to his particular situation. The result is a very specific doctrine 
with drastic implications for practice! To assume that Wesley and Aquinas have in mind 
identical meanings of “prevenient grace” may be understandable, but the language itself is 
misleading. Turning to Aquinas’s Latin is certainly helpful (especially in order to differen-
tiate praeveniens from subsequens), but still more is needed. In order to “see” the different 
implementations of this doctrine in Wesley and Aquinas, we must gaze deeply into the 
texts of their lives and surroundings.
B. Comparison
 Explicitly, this project is an exercise in comparative theology and the method of 
theological comparison. I hasten to add that “comparative theology” is not “the fledgling 
discipline…in which significant sources from another religious tradition are used as pri-
mary references in Christian theological reflection.”15 Neither is it to be treated (only) as 
a species of religious pluralism, as can often be the case.16 Rather, as leading comparative 
theologian Francis X. Clooney, S.J., explains, comparative theology is distinguished from 
interreligious methods (e.g., comparative religion, theology of religions, interreligious 
dialogue, and interreligious theology) by a broader methodology of comparison.17 “As a 
15 S. Mark Heim, “Religion,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology, ed. Ian A. McFarland, 
David A. S. Fergusson, Karen Kilby, and Iain R. Torrance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
411.
16 See, for example, Gavin D’Costa, “Pluralism, Religious,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Christian 
Theology, 393-395.
17 Francis X. Clooney, Comparative Theology: Deep Learning Across Religious Borders (Malden, MA: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 9-10. See also Clooney, “A Catholic Comparativist’s View of Scriptural Reasoning 
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theological and necessarily spiritual practice (and, in my use of it, a way of reading),” says 
Clooney, “comparison is a reflective and contemplative endeavor by which we see the 
other in light of our own, and our own in light of the other.”18 Accordingly, comparison of 
this sort emphasizes unique encounters that focus on juxtaposed theological particulars.19
 Understanding this nuance helps explain how the comparative method is versa-
tile enough to serve Clooney’s Hindu-Christian interreligious work as well as my own 
Wesley-Aquinas intrareligious focus.20 Methodologically speaking, Clooney’s vision of 
comparative theology is grounded in much the same values as iconic dignity: deep respect 
for others’ traditions that emerges from theological intuition and unfolds in genuine dia-
logical exchange that benefits all participants. Specifically, comparative theology seeks 
theological learning through an exchange of faith traditions that “is sought for the sake of 
fresh theological insights that are indebted to the newly encountered tradition/s as well 
as the home tradition.”21 One must be able to see “the other” as an other: neither above 
in the Anglican Context,” Journal of Anglican Studies 11, no. 2 (2013): 217-232; and Clooney, “Comparative 
Theology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed. John Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain 
Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 653-669. In this chapter on “Comparative Theology,” 
Clooney further eschews “sure and settled definitions” of this “vital yet still developing discipline” (654).
18 Clooney, Comparative Theology, 11.
19 Cf. D’Costa, “Pluralism, Religious,” 394.
20 Despite the resonances detailed below, some may still object that my use of Clooney’s comparative 
method is disingenuous in “cherry-picking” only some of the discipline’s aspects—overlooking, for exam-
ple, Clooney’s inter-religious work. However, Clooney’s work does not proscribe the kind of intra-Christian 
comparison that I present here between Wesley and Aquinas; neither does my work detract from Clooney’s 
own inter-religious focus. My alliance with comparative theology traces back to a common methodological 
vision—and to the fact that it straightforwardly describes what I am doing with Wesley and Aquinas.
21 Clooney, Comparative Theology, 10. Cf. Clooney, “Comparative Theology,” 653-654. Although Cloo-
ney’s language for the groups to be compared varies between “religions” and “traditions,” when he moves to 
define and explain comparative theology his language tends more to “traditions.” This is worth mentioning 
because many consider comparative theology as roughly equivalent to interreligious studies; conversely, 
comparison of Christian traditions tends to be categorized as a facet of ecumenical studies. Clooney’s depic-
16
nor below nor identical to oneself. As we shall see below in the section on “Desired Out-
comes,” comparison that entails a mutual exchange of theological traditions undergirds 
the aims of the present study.
 Furthermore, for Clooney, the practice of comparative theology is “a way of read-
ing” that “ordinarily starts with the intuition of an intriguing resemblance that prompts us 
to place two realities—texts, images, practices, doctrines, persons—near one another, so 
that they may be seen over and again, side by side.”22 Like Clooney, my own work mainly 
occurs through reading—not reading per se, but a way of reading, viz., a practice driven 
by a clear methodology. In my own terminology, this is the practice of stereoscopic read-
ing: one that requires a highly-attentive, loving study that deeply considers textual and 
historical contexts—as well as those of the practitioner.23 One will also notice the overlap 
between Clooney’s model of comparative theology and the general thrust of iconic dignity. 
As discussed above, the seed of iconic dignity began with certain intuitions about Wesley 
and Aquinas; these intuitions sprouted a textual focus and the practice of stereoscopic 
reading. A process of continual inspection, comparison, and reflection then blossomed 
from these intuitions and contextual appreciations.
 As an illuminative aside, Clooney’s research in tracing the lineage of comparative 
theology reveals an unexpected connection to this dissertation. The first English use of 
the phrase “comparative theology” is from the tract Comparative Theology, written by 
tion of comparative theology in no way precludes the sort of inter-traditional, intra-religious comparison of 
the present study.
22 Clooney, Comparative Theology, 11. See 57-60 for more on the practice of comparative reading.
23 Clooney, Comparative Theology, 60.
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the Scottish professor James Garden (1647-1726) in 1700. Although the focus of Garden’s 
tract is decidedly intra-religious, Clooney argues that “Garden’s comparative theology 
is…consonant with the constructive comparative theology I have in mind,” namely, “a 
recognition of intellectual and spiritual possibilities that is not thwarted by the fact of 
differences.”24 Clooney’s engagement with Garden’s comparative theology is significant 
because it demonstrates the versatility of comparative theology to operate within a variety 
of intrareligious and interreligious contexts. This further substantiates my use of Clooney’s 
comparative method within an intrareligious context all while supporting the universal 
thrust of iconic dignity as a theological perspective.
 Additionally, Garden establishes an unexpected link between Clooney and Wesley. 
Not only do we find within Wesley’s sermons support for Garden’s general thesis,25 Wesley 
actually includes an extract of Garden’s tract in the 50-volume A Christian Library (1749-
1755).26 Taken together, this suggests that what Wesley denominates “comparative divin-
ity” and describes using his most-central theological and moral-psychological terms27 is to 
24 Clooney, Comparative Theology, 31. Of course, contemporary comparative theology has expanded 
to include inter-religious comparison, and Clooney notes this. Still, Clooney recognizes the resonances in 
methodology (30-32). These resonances further support my use of theological comparison as a method 
within an intra-religious context.
25 See Wesley, Sermon 92, “On Zeal,” II.5 and III.7, in Works 3:313-314, 318-319. Cf. Sermon 39, “Catholic 
Spirit,” in Works 2:79-95, for another highly-sympathetic account.
26 John Wesley, A Christian Library: Consisting of Extracts from and Abridgments of the Choicest Pieces of 
Practical Divinity Which have been Published in the English Tongue. (Bristol, UK: Farley, 1749-1755), XXII:243-
287. The mammoth work consists of Wesley’s own extracts and abridgements of works in “practical divin-
ity” throughout Christianity in order to provide the Methodists with a breadth and depth of Christian texts 
drawn from the earliest Fathers through Wesley’s own day. For more on Wesley’s editorial practices, see 
Isabel Rivers, “John Wesley as Editor and Publisher,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Wesley, 144-159.
27 See Wesley, Sermon 92, “On Zeal,” II.5, in Works 3:313. By unpacking “comparative divinity” in terms 
of his mature affectional moral psychology, Wesley implicitly tethers who we are as human beings to our 
work toward fostering holiness as embodied in Christian virtues.
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be taken as a self-aware Methodist practice commensurate with the kind of constructive 
and comparative theological dialogue at the heart of iconic dignity.
C. Construction
 As a method, theological construction proceeds from theological comparison 
according to the methodology of iconic dignity’s theological intuition and textual analysis. 
Comparison rightly indicates a degree of construction,28 which is already evident in my 
construal of iconic dignity as an emergent trajectory and transformative theological per-
spective. But seeing alone does not amount to actual transformation—just as an architect’s 
blueprints hardly substitute for the physical structure they represent. Some assembly is 
required, and this is the constructive task of developing the comparative elements into 
something that can stand on its own. Indeed, any theology that aims at faith and practice 
will contain this constructive element.
 But my constructive task is more than just nominal. For the most part, the 
method(s) of constructive theology as a discipline resonate with my own approaches. In 
broad terms, constructive theology begins with a focus on classical theological themes or 
doctrines, developing them collaboratively with multiple existential realities and perspec-
tives.29 Neither systematic nor dogmatic, constructive theology “rejects closed systematic 
frameworks in favor of more open ended reflections” and “links doctrines and concepts 
28 See Clooney, Comparative Theology, 31, 43.
29 For more on constructive theology as a discipline, see Constructive Theology: A Contemporary 
Approach to Classical Themes, ed. Serene Jones and Paul Lakeland (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005); and 
Jason A. Wyman, Jr., Constructing Constructive Theology: An Introductory Sketch (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2017).
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with particular expressions of life” in a process of “discourse that is both constructed and 
engaged in ongoing construction” and always “open to interaction with other forms of 
knowledge.”30 There can be no question that the present study focuses on central and tra-
ditional doctrines (e.g., human nature, sin, grace), but the treatment is neither exhaustive 
nor closed to further development. Likewise, the role of discourse and dialogical exchange 
is integral to the method of theological comparison and, moreover, to iconic dignity’s 
overarching methodology.
 However, my appropriation of construction as a method is qualified. Namely, I do 
not necessarily share in its exact methodological pedigree—which, according to current 
practitioners, includes liberal, critical-modern, post-liberal, post-modern, and liberation-
ist schools of thought.31 As some constructive theologians have acknowledged, this lin-
eage is relevant because critics have charged the discipline with intimations of theological 
relativism (stemming from constructive theology’s open ended method and recognition 
of relativity).32 To complicate matters, the next generation of constructive theologians 
has not necessarily eschewed the charge.33 While I have certainly attempted to steer clear 
30 Joerg Rieger, “Constructive Theology,” in Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions, ed. Anne L. C. 
Runehov and Lluis Oviedo (New York: SpringerReference, 2013), 483-484. Like most accounts of construc-
tive theology, Rieger notes how the discipline traces back to systematic and dogmatic theology while simul-
taneously setting itself off against those other disciplines. Cf. Wyman, Constructing Constructive Theology, 
ix-xxxiv.
31 See Rieger, “Constructive Theology,” 484. Cf. Jones and Lakeland, Constructive Theology, 2-6.
32 For example, see Rieger, “Constructive Theology,” 484-485. As Rieger points out, the acknowledg-
ment of relativity in the existential situations of theological practitioners does not necessarily “end up in 
relativism” (485). See also Jones and Lakeland, Constructive Theology, 9-10.
33 See in particular Wyman, Constructing Constructive Theology, xvi-xvii, xx, xxx. “Constructive the-
ology, though it continues to work with the doctrines of traditional theology, does not assume that those 
doctrines are themselves essential.… They can be expanded or consolidated, prioritized or de-emphasized, 
or in some case…done away with entirely (although that is not the norm)” (xvi-xvii).
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of the pride of modernity—viz., the universalizing assumption that what seems true for 
“me” is universally true for “all”—I do not bear the postmodern skepticism that plagues 
piety. If anything, this dissertation discloses a certain pre-modern perspective evident in 
Wesley and Aquinas. That perspective that finds particular doctrines and practices to be 
both true and essential—notwithstanding latitude for discourse, critical thinking, refine-
ment, and transformation. This does not amount to solifidian indoctrination; rather, it 
signals the unflaggingly sincere quest for holiness, happiness, and beatitude at the heart of 
the theologies of Wesley and Aquinas.
 Qualifications aside, the development, scope, and potential of iconic dignity still 
comport with the distinctive theological method of constructive theology, if not its under-
girding methodology. As Jason A. Wyman, Jr., has described in a recent sketch of the 
discipline, that method is
to develop traditional theological doctrines, but rather than engaging all of them, 
that is systematically, constructive theologies engage limited and specific loci for 
the purpose of illuminating one metaphor, one context, or one important crisis 
from the perspective of contemporary philosophy and critical theory intertwined 
with inherited theological vocabulary.34
In this particular case, iconic dignity emerges from focused critical reflection on doctrines 
within the theologies of Wesley and Aquinas while pointing to the present moment and its 
propensities—fracturing human identity, demeaning the dignity of “others,” and under-
cutting the essential iconicity of our nature.
 As a central guiding metaphor, iconic dignity proposes constructive exploration 
throughout this study, especially in Chapters 5 and 7. These constructions are intended to 
34 Wyman, Constructing Constructive Theology, xxxi.
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reflect iconic dignity’s generative potential over and above the analytical and comparative 
treatment of nature, grace, and virtue. The conversations demonstrate some of the ways 
in which iconic dignity can address topics beyond the immediate scope of this disserta-
tion. Because it stands open to further dialogue, comparison, construction, and intuition, 
iconic dignity draws reflection and practice into new realms and possible meanings for 
what it may still become as a theological perspective. Although these investigative chapters 
do not necessarily yield formal proposals, they do heavily inform the proposed practical 
embodiments of iconic dignity signaled in the constructive synthesis of the Conclusion. 
This brings us to the final method to be discussed: contribution to practice.
D. Contribution to Practice
 By identifying “contribution to practice” as an “intentional method,” I mean that 
this study intentionally comes out of the discipline of practical theology and aims to con-
tribute to theological practice. On the one hand, any study of Wesley must recognize his 
predilection for “practical divinity” over theological speculation.35 “Practical divinity” is 
Wesley’s idiom for the true and truly-practiced objective of Christianity that engages the 
heart and mind alike: “knowledge and vital piety / learning and holiness combined.”36 
35 See Frank Baker, “Practical Divinity—John Wesley’s Doctrinal Agenda for Methodism,” Wesleyan 
Theological Journal 22, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 7-16; and Randy L. Maddox, “John Wesley—Practical Theo-
logian?” Wesleyan Theological Journal 23 (1988): 122-147. It is instructive how Wesley employs the term 
“practical divinity” throughout his diverse theological publications, including the Preface to the Collection of 
Hymns for the Use of the People Called Methodists (in Works 7:73-75) and the subtitle of the abovementioned 
50-volume Christian Library.
36 Charles Wesley, Hymn 461, stanza 5, in A Collection of Hymns for the Use of the People Called Meth-
odists (1780), in Works 7:644. Of the brothers Wesley, Charles was indeed the great poet-hymnist while 
John was the master organizer. They published multiple hymnals under both of their names with Charles 
contributing the verse and John providing prefaces and a degree of editing.
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Whether taking the form of economic reform, micro-lending, education for children and 
adults, healthcare, abolition, animal husbandry, opposition to war, prison reform, voca-
tional training, or employment, Wesley’s tireless work for the improvement of peoples’ 
lives must never be considered separate from his theological practice of holy love.37 On the 
other hand, iconic dignity intentionally seeks to foster practices that carry its transforma-
tive potential into existential reality. The question “What difference does this make?” does 
not linger on the periphery of this dissertation; rather, it marks the horizon toward which 
the study aims. To that effect, three categories of practice emerge from iconic dignity as a 
transformative theological perspective. While these will be borne out in the Conclusion, 
we may take note of them now.
 First, iconic dignity contributes to research practices. Part of this involves possible 
subjects for future study, some of which emerge from trajectories of the dissertation,38 
others of which go into greater detail of what I have addressed here only in part.39 More 
significantly, iconic dignity informs the method(s) for theological study and intellectual 
discovery. This begins with the role given to intuition as a catalyst for theological explo-
ration. It is a shame when research agendas or requirements stifle the wonder at the heart 
of theological pursuits. Iconic dignity methodologically safeguards intuitional wonder 
by claiming an explicit role for it throughout the practices of theological investigation. 
37 For more on Wesley’s theologically-grounded social work, see Manfred Marquardt, John Wesley’s 
Social Ethics: Praxis and Principles, trans. John E. Steely and W. Stephen Gunter (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 1992).
38 For example, the nature, status, and practice of the moral virtues in Wesley and Aquinas remains a 
subject to be researched. So, too, is the notion of sociality—especially in terms of social sin.
39 For example, while I address environmental stewardship in Chapter 5, my discussion only represents 
the tip of the iceberg. One could easily develop the topic into a full-length monograph.
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Within this study, the practice of stereoscopic reading receives the greatest attention as 
integral to the implementation of iconic dignity in the context of dialogical comparison. 
This aims at fostering a critical respect for the persons, texts, or ideas being investigated. 
Critical respect does not entail blind acceptance, but it does imply a willingness to “look 
twice” (re-spect) out of consideration for the iconic dignity of those involved. None of this 
is particularly novel; as a whole, though, it bespeaks tremendous generative capacity that 
extends throughout the theological disciplines and encourages conversant connections 
with other fields of study. In the final analysis, it is my hope that this dissertation is received 
as a representative instance of iconic dignity in terms of research practices.
 Second, iconic dignity can contribute to ecumenical practices. At a formal level, 
iconic dignity evokes practices of comparative dialogue and stereoscopic reading as ele-
ments of the very substance of ecumenical work. Within the context of ecumenical dia-
logue, close, careful, comparative, and constructive analysis of another’s doctrinal texts or 
central theological figures may give rise to new intuitions and insights for practical-theo-
logical convergence between traditions. Such is the case of the present study with respect 
to the ecclesial traditions of the theologians being considered: Methodism (Wesley) and 
Catholicism (Aquinas). But iconic dignity need not be sequestered to one theological con-
versation (Wesley and Aquinas) or even to one bilateral dialogue (Methodists and Catho-
lics). Part of the work of iconic dignity is to carry forward this kind of comparative work 
into other denominations and traditions.
 Ecumenical (bilateral) dialogues are formal, but there are also informal practices 
of ecumenism that iconic dignity proposes. Importantly, these informal practices are not 
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performed by “professionals” or “experts” in theology, ecumenical dialogue, activism, or 
the like (although such talent ought never be excluded!). Rather, iconic dignity calls forth 
a kind of “lay ecumenism” embodied in the typical conversations and actions of practi-
tioners’ lives. Collaboration should begin at the concrete, local level, with the practice 
of reading the world in a stereoscopic manner. Collaborative consideration then leads to 
collaborative work in areas such as the following: work to safeguard human rights, espe-
cially those of women, children, minority populations (e.g., racial, ethnic, religious), and 
LGBTQ persons; work to steward Creation and protect the natural environment; work 
to promote human health in its many dimensions (physical, psychological, relational); 
work to ensure quality, affordable education; work to facilitate dialogue across religious, 
racial, ethnic, and/or national borders; and work to advocate for—and especially to undo 
patterns of ecclesial discrimination against—LGBTQ persons. The watchword here is 
“collaboration”: collaboration between faith communities of different traditions to create 
programs emerging from iconic dignity; collaboration between such communities to join 
together in pre-existing programs sympathetic to iconic dignity; and collaboration with 
outside organizations or programs (sacred or secular, Christian or not) that promote a 
perspective consistent with iconic dignity.
 In this way, iconic dignity evokes informal ecumenical practices similar to those 
in a third and final category: contributions to quotidian ecclesial practices. I say “eccle-
sial” not because these practices are for the church as such, but because they emerge in 
and from ecclesial communities. These are the most basic locale for emergent practices 
of iconic dignity. They are also the most important: within these contexts, practices and 
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methods of iconic dignity may be cultivated, exercised, and strengthened. The clearest 
avenue for doing so is Christian education within ecclesial communities, congregations, 
or small-groups.40 Without assuming extensive theological background or training, this 
kind of educational formation would address participants’ hunches, questions, or interests 
through practices of iconic dignity—intuition, re-spect, dialogue, comparative exchange, 
textual and contextual analysis, and stereoscopic reading. Pedagogically, this might take 
a familiar practice and expand it by way of stereoscopic reading. For example, one could 
take the familiar practice of group Bible study and expand it through comparing parallel 
passages, classical and/or contemporary theological commentary, or sacred texts from 
other traditions. Once the methods have been established, formational groups could prac-
tice stereoscopic reading with social, political, historical, cultural, or intellectual topics or 
events by applying the hermeneutic of iconic dignity to concrete life experiences. Ideally, 
this leads into the quotidian “lay ecumenism” mentioned above.
3. Desired Outcomes
 Certain motivations and convictions have influenced the development of this 
project, framed as practical-theological contributions. My foremost desire is to be able 
to present a body of theological reflection that challenges modern fragmentation with a 
transformational worldview of iconic dignity. Second, as a Wesleyan theologian, I aim to 
contribute a fresh hermeneutical perspective for Wesleyan theological studies by placing 
40 Although I have not developed a curriculum for teaching or implementing iconic dignity, this would 
be a logical method for what I am describing here. That development would need to be collaborative because 
I personally lack the experience and the skills needed for the job. However, this collaborative necessity 
accords with the relational and dialogical perspective of iconic dignity.
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Wesley in fruitful conversation with Aquinas on classical and compatible themes. Third, 
I hope to provide a theological resource to further ecumenical dialogue between Meth-
odists and Catholics as they continue to seek full communion with one another. Though 
I detail these three desired outcomes below, they will not come to full fruition until the 
Conclusion.41
A. Iconic Dignity as a Transformational Theological Perspective
 Because of the central importance of the desire to present iconic dignity as a trans-
formational theological perspective, two facets of the study are intended to serve this 
outcome. The first facet comes to fruition in the overall structure, which unfolds in three 
parts: Wesley and Aquinas on (1) nature, (2) grace, and (3) virtue. These parts each have a 
chapter that develops constructs of iconic dignity and the ways in which these constructs 
address contemporary theological and social concerns and practices. These chapters 
demonstrate the constructive capacity of iconic dignity in Wesley and Aquinas, pointing 
to the future possibilities for study.42
41 In an attempt to illustrate the iconicity proposed in this dissertation, I have partly sought to structure 
the project “iconically.” Like a religious icon, this study presents a broad picture through multiple details, 
but these details do not properly represent the icon’s full significance. In order to “understand” an icon, 
one must encounter that-to-which-the-icon-points. Likewise, this project offers details (nature, grace, and 
virtue) to present a broad picture (Wesley and Aquinas fruitfully compared) which is then transcended in 
order to signify a truth (iconic dignity). Thus, the Conclusion imitates a fuller iconic “comprehension”—
epiphanic, transcendent truth wrought through the process of the long gaze. The overall structure suggests 
a movement that is more inductive than deductive. Consequently, while some of my proposals for theologi-
cal practice are embedded in the body of the dissertation, the fullness and interconnection of iconic dignity 
and its proposed practices emerge in the Conclusion.
42 Note, this dissertation does not encompass the entirety of the broader comparative study of Wesley 
and Aquinas. As such, parts of that broader study are not included in this dissertation. See the Prelude 
(above) for an explanation of the structure and its divisions.
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 The second facet is how the study concludes by distilling the implicit themes of 
iconic dignity into explicit characteristics. The theological perspective afforded by the 
assemblage of these characteristics yields a desirable disciplinary trajectory for theology 
in general and practical theology in particular. More specifically, iconic dignity proposes 
an understanding of theology’s nature and activity that resonates with the observations 
of Edward Farley and Randy Maddox, among others. The thrust of their argument is that 
theology—here understood as theologia—is itself a thoroughly-practical discipline when 
understood in broader, more-holistic terms.43 By extension, one of the fragmentations that 
iconic dignity seeks to mend is the multifarious fracturing to the discipline of theology itself. 
As such, the emergent characteristics and practical embodiments of iconic dignity offer a 
unified foundation for Christian practice and constructive practical-theological reflection.
 By extension, these two facets point to the capacity of iconic dignity as a trans-
formational theological perspective beyond a study of Wesley and Aquinas. Although 
informed by the constructive comparison of Wesley and Aquinas, iconic dignity is, in a 
certain sense, “translatable” to other theologians, theological traditions, or theological 
practices. Of course, the parameters of such future work would be unique to those partic-
ular studies.44 Still, since iconic dignity aims at a theological perspective that is both good 
43 See Edward Farley, Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education (Eugene, OR: 
Wipf & Stock, 2001). See also Randy L. Maddox, “The Recovery of Theology as a Practical Discipline,” 
Theological Studies 51 (1990): 650-672. In his article, Maddox articulates seven “desired characteristics of a 
truly practical theology” (665-669), which are similar to my own proposals that emerge from my treatment 
of iconic dignity.
44 For example, I have chosen nature, grace, and virtue because they are core theological concepts 
that underscore the total theological perspectives of John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas. And I have chosen 
Wesley and Aquinas because of prior intellectual pursuits and theological traditions. For more on this meth-
odology, see the next section of this Introduction. For more on the task of comparing Wesley and Aquinas, 
see the final section of this Introduction.
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and true,45 it must pertain to matters beyond the scope of the present study. This is the 
requisite “adequacy and explanatory power” of iconic dignity,46 which will be assessed in 
the Conclusion.
B. A Fresh Hermeneutic for Wesleyan Theological Studies
 The second desired outcome of this project comes from my personal background 
in Wesleyan theology. By placing Wesley and Aquinas in fruitful conversation on the 
themes of nature, grace, and virtue, I am proposing a fresh hermeneutical lens for Wes-
leyan theological studies. It will be evident in the course of this dissertation that I am not 
seeking to displace prior approaches to Wesley’s theology. Rather, my goal is to offer a 
reading of Wesley that has often been overlooked.
 In the course of my research, I have identified at least four different models for 
interpreting Wesley’s theology and practice over the past century.47 The first model, 
45 See Aquinas, DV, q. 1, a. 1, on the strong connection between being, goodness, and truth.
46 See Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1988), 403.
47 This statement requires three qualifications. First, the typology which I am providing is a generaliza-
tion at best. My categories are intended to reflect the overall tendencies of the authors discussed.
Second, I have established this time frame (the 1930s through the present) because it is only around 
the 1930s when scholarship shifts from “internal accounts” of Wesley and his thought to more-critical and 
focused treatments. By and large, the majority of materials before the 20th century are quasi-hagiographical 
“lives” of John Wesley. Albert Outler describes this shift—to “Phase II” Wesley studies—as placing “less 
emphasis on the Wesley-Methodist symbiosis and more emphasis on one or more angles of interest in Wesley 
as a theologian in his own right.” See Outler, “A New Future for Wesley Studies: An Agenda for ‘Phase III,’ in 
The Future of the Methodist Theological Traditions, ed. M. Douglas Meeks (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1985), 
39. This is also the era in which “standard editions” (precursors to the contemporary “critical edition”) of 
Wesley’s works begin to emerge: The Journal of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M., ed. Nehemiah Curnock, 8 vols. 
(London: Charles H. Kelly, 1909-1916); Wesley’s Standard Sermons, ed. Edward H. Sugden, 2 vols. (London: 
The Epworth Press, 1921); and Letters (Telford), 1931.
Third, this typology overlooks a fifth category: Roman Catholic scholars interested in John Wesley and 
his theology. A short list of such scholars would have to include Maximin Piette, John Murray Todd, Michael 
Hurley, Donal J. Dorr, Jean Orcibal, Mark S. Massa, Ralph De Colle, and Daniel J. Luby. On the one hand, 
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which I am calling the Eastern-Patristic model, traces back to Albert C. Outler’s editorial 
commentaries on Wesley,48 as well as various essays and monographs.49 More recently, 
this perspective has been advocated by the likes of Randy Maddox.50 Broadly speaking, 
the Eastern-Patristic approach portrays Wesley’s theological emphases and influences as 
stemming from exposure to and reflection upon Eastern Fathers. Consequently, this first 
model underscores the dynamic elements of Wesley’s soteriology, especially in terms of 
grace. Salvation, including theological perfection, is seen as a therapeutic process that heav-
ily involves humanity working in tandem with God. Prevenient grace effectively offsets 
the classical Protestant doctrine of total depravity,51 which enables a stronger emphasis of 
grace as co-operant.52
these scholars do not necessarily view Wesley through a “Catholic lens”—although many of them do. In other 
words, there is a (slight) difference between “A Catholic Study of Wesley” and “A Catholic’s Study of Wesley.” 
On the other hand, this oversight provides a rich opportunity to engage more deeply with Roman Catholics 
who have chosen to interact with Wesley’s theology. This is all the more important given the relative lack of 
these Catholic interpreters’ voices within Wesleyan theological circles. Deeper engagement with Catholic 
perspectives of Wesley’s theology could very well occur in a subsequent volume of the present study.
48 See Albert C. Outler’s editorial commentary in John Wesley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 
especially 3-33. See also Outler’s editorial “Introduction” in Works 1:1-100, as well as his editorial comments 
throughout Works 1-4.
49 See, for example, Albert C. Outler, Evangelism in the Wesleyan Spirit (Nashville: Tidings, 1971); and 
Outler, Theology in the Wesleyan Spirit. See also Outler’s various essays, especially Outler, “Towards a Reap-
praisal of John Wesley as a Theologian,” Perkins School of Theology Journal 14, no. 2 (Winter 1961): 5-14; and 
Outler, “John Wesley: Folk-Theologian,” Theology Today 34, no. 2 ( July 1977): 150-160.
50 See, for example, Responsible Grace; see also Maddox, “Reading Wesley as a Theologian,” Wesleyan 
Theological Journal 30, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 7-54.
51 For Outler, God’s therapeutic prevenient grace functions as an antidote to total depravity, “where 
‘total’ means that all of the humanum is ‘depraved,’ rather than that none of it is anything but depraved,” and 
“as an alternative to election” (Theology in the Wesleyan Spirit, 37). Cf. Maddox’s more-reserved interpreta-
tion: “[Wesley] wed his affirmation of total depravity with his conviction of the universal initial restoring 
effects of Prevenient Grace” (Responsible Grace, 93). In accordance with his orienting concern, Maddox 
emphasizes how prevenient grace effects personal responsibility.
52 One could say that prevenient grace (in which God operates without our cooperation) always “aims 
at” subsequent grace, human responsibility, and divine-human cooperation.
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 A second model for interpreting Wesley is what I have termed the Lutheran-Mora-
vian model.53 This “German” reading of Wesley is clearly evident in the work of Harald 
Lindström,54 which is later echoed (though not replicated) in works by John Deschner55 
and Colin Williams.56 More recently, Kenneth J. Collins has advanced this approach, 
expanding it more in a “Continental Protestant” (i.e., less specifically German) direction.57 
In brief, the Lutheran-Moravian model tends to place more emphasis on justification 
(whether first or final) and on the instantaneity of change in theological “status” (i.e., justi-
fication, sanctification, perfection, etc.). Thus, while acknowledging traces of co-operant 
grace (“Catholic emphasis”) in Wesley’s theology, Ken Collins gives the majority of his 
attention to “free grace” (“Protestant emphasis”), which is predicated upon the classical 
sola formulations of Lutheran Protestantism.58 The portrait is one of humanity’s total 
depravity before God, which necessitates God’s sovereign action of restorative grace prior 
to, and constitutive of, our response-ability.59
53 In a qualified sense, this classification could be applied to Richard P. Heitzenrater, Wesley and the 
People Called Methodists, 2nd ed. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2013). However, I understand Heitzenrater’s 
work on Lutheran-Moravian themes to be more historical than hermeneutical.
54 See Harald Lindström, Wesley and Sanctification: A Study in the Doctrine of Salvation (London: 
Epworth Press, 1950). Kenneth J. Collins has interpreted Lindström more in a Reformed/Calvinist light 
in The Theology of John Wesley, 348n157. This seems to be a stretch considering that Lindström engages far 
more with Lutheranism and Moravianism than with Calvinism (see especially Lindström, 1-18).
55 See, for example, John Deschner, Wesley’s Christology: An Interpretation (Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University Press, 1985).
56 See Colin W. Williams, John Wesley’s Theology Today: A Study of the Wesleyan Tradition in the Light of 
Current Theological Dialogue (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960), 51.
57 See especially Collins, The Theology of John Wesley.
58 See Collins, The Theology of John Wesley, 160-165 (and charts).
59 Collins, The Theology of John Wesley, 72-73. Collins all but explicitly names Wesley as a paradigm of 
Western Protestantism, which is to be contrasted (this time explicitly) with the views of the Eastern Fathers.
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 A third interpretive model—the Calvinist-Reformed model—is similar to the 
Lutheran-Moravian in terms of grace and soteriology. Also like the previous model, Wes-
ley’s own personal history and writings attest to the influence of this Protestant tradition.60 
The distinguishing factor of this third model is the near-exclusive emphasis on divine ini-
tiative and enactment in all salvific matters. The result is a soteriological monergism that 
safeguards Wesley from any semblance of humanism or Pelagianism by deliberately (re)
aligning Wesley’s thought and practice with that of the Reformers, especially Calvin. In 
The Rediscovery of John Wesley, George Croft Cell (the main proponent of this model) 
argues that “the Wesleyan ethic of life…and the exclusive orientation of its Christian ethic 
in the idea of divine grace” is “essentially and thoroughly Calvinistic.”61 Portraying the 
Methodist movement as a “Wesleyan Reformation” from the outset,62 Cell self-knowingly 
positions himself against typical interpretations of Wesley and instead ventures to argue 
that, in Wesley and early Methodism, we witness a strong reaction against Arminian 
Anglicanism and certain High Church practices, as well as a return to the orthodoxy of 
the Reformers.63 Accordingly, Cell sees in Wesley an open, conscious concurrence with 
60 Wesley’s affiliation with the Moravians in the 1730s is historical fact. Their theological fingerprints 
are unmistakable in Wesley’s Aldersgate experience. Arguably, Wesley’s relationship to Calvinism parallels 
his relationship to George Whitefield. This explains the infamous line in the 1745 Minutes of the Methodist 
conference about “com[ing] to the very edge of Calvinism” (in Works 10:153).
61 George Croft Cell, The Rediscovery of John Wesley (New York: Holt & Co., 1935), vii.
62 Cell, especially 1-10.
63 Cell, 17.
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Calvin vis-à-vis salvation and faith.64 It is thus unsurprising that Cell extends this reading 
into a thoroughly-Calvinist economics with clear echoes of Weber and Troeltsch.65
 A fourth and final interpretive model for Wesley’s theology is quite simple to 
denominate but much more difficult to detail—the Anglican model. All studies of John 
Wesley and his thought must certainly engage his staunch Anglican identity—and, to 
be sure, all of the studies listed above have addressed this identification. However, Frank 
Baker’s John Wesley and the Church of England66 remains the most thorough treatment 
of Wesley’s complex relationship with the Church of England and how Wesley operated 
with distinctively Anglican categories and language. The difficulty with this model lies 
more with the variety of theological strands within Anglicanism than it does with Wesley’s 
Anglican status.67 Accordingly, this model highlights the broad trends in the Anglicanism 
of Wesley’s day: a Protestantism unbeholden to the Continental Reformers, yet compre-
hensive enough to accommodate its voices; a learned and inquisitive return to the texts 
of the Primitive Church, especially the Patristics; a burgeoning of cellular-structured reli-
gious societies to provide a vital piety to a national church wearied from the past century 
of religious-political revolution; and a tradition that expressed its theology liturgically 
64 Cell, 242-272.
65 Cell, especially 384-401.
66 Frank Baker, John Wesley and the Church of England (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970).
67 For background information on the Church of England circa Wesley’s day, see Heitzenrater, Wesley 
and the People Called Methodists, 1-36. See also the “prelude” and “interludes” in Henry D. Rack, Reasonable 
Enthusiast: John Wesley and the Rise of Methodism, 3rd ed. (London: Epworth Press, 2002), 1-42, 158-180, 
and 314-329. The essays in The Cambridge Companion to John Wesley by Jeremy Gregory (“The Long Eigh-
teenth Century,” 13-39), Kenneth J. Collins (“Wesley’s Life and Ministry,” 43-59), and David N. Hempton 
(“Wesley in Context,” 60-77) are also helpful resources. Finally, for more helpful context, see J. C. D. Clark, 
“The Eighteenth-Century Context,” in The Oxford Handbook of Methodist Studies, ed. William J. Abraham, 
and James E. Kirby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3-29.
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through sermons, prayers, and hymns.68 In short, this model helps to situate Wesley as an 
Anglican participating in the movements and interests of his time. By extension, studies 
that trace Wesley’s Anglican soteriology69 or Wesley’s Anglican Arminianism70 help to 
contextualize Wesley’s theological perspective while advancing Wesley studies by engag-
ing his own theological sources and tradition.
 To be sure, Wesley’s theology displays all of the influences and traditions repre-
sented in the four models I describe. Wesley himself acknowledges as much. The ques-
tion is not one of influence, but rather one of emphasis—an obvious point, but especially 
necessary as we turn to consider Wesley and Aquinas. For, as far as we know, Wesley 
never spent (much) time in the work of the Common Doctor71—nor have many of those 
represented by my fourfold typology. If Aquinas is mentioned therein (a rare occurrence), 
it customarily serves to juxtapose Wesley’s “folk theology” or “practical divinity”72 with 
Aquinas’s “Western scholasticism.”
68 See Ryan Nicholas Danker, Wesley and the Anglicans: Political Division in Early Evangelicalism (Down-
ers Grove, IN: InterVarsity Press, 2016).
69 See William H. Shontz, “Anglican Influence on John Wesley’s Soteriology,” Wesleyan Theological 
Journal 32, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 33-52.
70 See Jason Vickers, “Wesley’s Theological Emphases,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Wesley, 
190-193. Vickers’s observation essentially places him in direct opposition to Cell’s thesis, noted above under 
the third model.
71 Wesley offers but two passing references to Aquinas, which do not evidence that Wesley actually read 
St. Thomas. The first is in his “Address to the Clergy,” in Works ( Jackson), 10:492, where Wesley exhorts his 
preachers to be acquainted with sound philosophy, logic, and, in this case, metaphysics, as exemplified by 
Aquinas (and Scotus). The second is from the prefatory “To the Reader” in the first issue of The Arminian 
Magazine (1777), in Works ( Jackson), 14:281. The reference here is to the reverence that Catholics have for 
Aquinas, whom Wesley takes to be more Augustinian than Augustine!
72 Outler is attributed with the infamous ascription of John Wesley as “folk theologian.” See Outler, 
John Wesley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), iii. See also Outler, “John Wesley: Folk-Theologian.” 
Since then, numerous Wesleyan commentators have adopted Wesley’s own language of “practical divinity” 
to describe the character of his theology, sometimes modernizing the language to “practical theology.” Thus 
34
 This generalization has seen a reversal over the past decade, particularly in the 
work of three Wesleyan scholars who have sought to engage aspects of Aquinas’s theology. 
D. Stephen Long has worked toward recasting Wesley’s theology as a Thomistically-styled 
moral theology (especially transmitted through Malebranche).73 Since then, two insight-
ful dissertations (now both published) have sought a Wesleyan-Thomistic exchange with 
an eye toward Methodist-Catholic dialogue. To this end, Edgardo Colón-Emeric has pro-
posed a dialogue focusing on Christian perfection,74 and Kenneth M. Loyer has concen-
trated on pneumatology.75
 These three studies have largely assumed an underlying Wesleyan-Thomistic 
framework of the constitution of human nature and the operations of divine grace, but 
an explicit treatment thereof remains unwritten. Additionally, since the contours of 
nature and grace establish the parameters of a virtuous and holy life, any work in theolog-
ical ethics—whether critical, constructive, comparative, or ecumenical—must seriously 
engage Wesley’s (and, in my estimation, Aquinas’s) theological perspectives on human 
Maddox, Responsible Grace; Collins, The Theology of John Wesley; Thomas A. Langford, Practical Divinity, 
2 vols. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1998-1999); and Kenneth Wilson, Methodist Theology (London: T&T 
Clark, 2011), 39-57.
I should note that the perspective I am ultimately advocating may seem strongly Western/Catholic 
since it engages a doctor of the Roman Catholic Church. However, given the influence of Eastern/Greek 
theologians in Thomas’s thought (especially that of St. John of Damascus and the Patristics), a singular 
classification of Aquinas as “western” is insufficient—perhaps just as a singular classification of Wesley as 
“evangelical” is insufficient.
73 See Long, John Wesley’s Moral Theology, especially 171-207.
74 Edgardo Colón-Emeric, Wesley, Aquinas, and Christian Perfection: An Ecumenical Dialogue (Waco, 
TX: Baylor University Press, 2009).
75 Kenneth M. Loyer, God’s Love through the Spirit: The Holy Spirit in Thomas Aquinas and John Wesley 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press of America, 2014).
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nature, grace, and virtue.76 Therefore, I propose that contemporary Wesleyan theology 
must give more attention to Wesley’s integrated treatment of nature, grace, and virtue, 
and that this thematic trio needs to undergird the comparison of Wesley and Aquinas. In 
doing so, Wesleyan scholars will find themselves in dialogue with Aquinas’s theology as 
well as with fresh perspectives on Christian action in the world.
C. A Resource for Methodist-Catholic Dialogue
 Finally, it would be rather shortsighted if a study comparing Wesley and Aqui-
nas—representative figures of Methodism and Roman Catholicism—neglected the 50 
years of ongoing bilateral dialogue between Catholics and Methodists and how this study 
might contribute to that ecumenical work.77 Therefore, a tertiary desired outcome of this 
dissertation is that it would be able to serve as a possible resource for Methodist-Catho-
lic dialogue. In 2010, the Joint International Commission for Dialogue between the two 
76 This imperative starting-point may be demonstrated inversely in Kevin Twain Lowery, Salvaging 
Wesley’s Agenda: A New Paradigm for Wesleyan Virtue Ethics (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2008). 
Self-knowingly avoiding engagement with Aquinas (xiv-xv), Lowery discharges Wesley’s doctrines of 
(human) nature and (divine) grace, thereby excising the “theological” from Wesley’s understanding of the 
virtues and their practices.
77 All of the dialogues have been conducted by The Joint International Commission for Dialogue 
between The World Methodist Council and The Roman Catholic Church. Beginning with the third series of 
dialogues (1981), the reports were given titles representative of the topic(s) addressed. The first two reports 
(1971 and 1976) were simply titled according to the location of their respective quinquennial meeting (Denver 
and Dublin). Still, the practice of referring to a report by its meeting location has endured somewhat; thus, 
Towards a Statement on the Church is also called “the Nairobi Report,” or, colloquially, just “Nairobi.” In 
discussing these dialogues (especially in the Conclusion), I will refer to the city name as though it were the 
“author’s” surname: for example, “Nairobi discusses ecclesiology….”
All ten dialogues to date are available at the World Methodist Council website. “Ecumenical Dialogues,” 
Roman Catholic Dialogue Reports, World Methodist Council, accessed October 1, 2018, http://worldmeth-
odistcouncil.org/resources/ecumenical-dialogues/.
Finally, although my primary focus here is the ongoing series of dialogues between the World Meth-
odist Council (WMC) and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) that began shortly after Vatican Council II, 
it should be noted that the United Methodist Church (the largest of the 80 denominations comprising the 
WMC) has also been in direct dialogues with the RCC for the same amount of time.
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communions synthesized the work done up to that point. The synthesis opens with a 
recognition of the ongoing dialogue’s goals and challenges:
From the beginning of the dialogue, without any glossing over of difficulties, 
members of the Joint Commission have increasingly discovered the richness of the 
certain, though sadly as yet imperfect, communion that Methodists and Catholics 
already share. The ultimate goal of our dialogue is full ecclesial communion—“full 
communion in faith, mission and sacramental life.” As we move in that direction, 
we acknowledge the vital elements in the partial communion we already enjoy, 
while also recognizing the remaining differences on which further work needs to 
be done.78
A way forward emerged in 2006, when the commission suggested future engagement 
based on mutually recognizing each tradition’s “saints.”79 My dissertation organically 
adopts this suggestion by providing a rich taproot for continued ecumenical exchange: an 
extended theological comparison of “saint” John Wesley and St. Thomas Aquinas.80
 To be more particular, two aspects of this dissertation may be of special interest 
to the continued ecumenical work between Methodists and Catholics. The first is the 
way that iconic dignity itself, as a comparative and constructive theological perspective, 
may help to advance the dialogue. In addition to offering a methodology for continued 
78 Synthesis: Together in Holiness—40 Years of Methodist and Roman Catholic Dialogue (Lake Junaluska, 
NC: The World Methodist Council, 2010), §3. The phrase in quotation marks comes from the 1986 Nairobi 
Report, Towards a Statement on the Church, §20. Since 1986, “full communion in faith, mission and sacra-
mental life” has been the explicit goal of the dialogues; it has been enunciated in every document thereafter.
79 The Grace Given You in Christ: Catholics & Methodists Reflect Further on the Church (Seoul, 2006), 
§§127, 137, 157, 161. As noted Methodist ecumenist Geoffrey Wainwright elaborates, the recognition of 
another tradition’s saints (i.e., as exemplars of faith and models of holiness) bears ecumenical implications. 
“To recognize the saints of another community is in some way also to recognize their home community, 
and vice versa.… The prayers and witness of the saints…must surely be allowed to influence our growing 
mutual recognition and our progress to greater ecclesial unity on earth.” Wainwright, Methodists in Dialog 
(Nashville: Kingswood Books, 1995), 248-249.
80 I would add that it was only after outlining a comparison of Wesley and Aquinas on nature, grace, and 
virtue that I was introduced to the ecumenical dialogues between Methodists and Catholics. As such, it was 
quite serendipitous to find an ecumenical basis for my study in the 2006 Seoul Report!
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theological reflection in ecumenical dialogue, iconic dignity presents a method of deep, 
comparative textual analysis between central figures from each tradition.81 More impor-
tantly, the practice of stereoscopic reading may help to address a lack of “reception” of the 
dialogues at a local level.82 As discussed above, stereoscopic reading can be implemented 
as a pedagogical tool for use within congregations or other regional gatherings. This can 
foster opportunities for Methodists and Catholics to engage in one another’s doctrinal 
traditions and to collaborate more deeply in the work of the church.
 The second possible area of interest is the way in which my threefold hermeneutic 
(nature, grace, and virtue) may be able to broaden the dialogue by approaching faith more 
as a virtue than as assent to a list of doctrines.83 This again points back to the stated goal 
of the dialogues (“full communion in faith, mission and sacramental life”), recognizing 
that Methodists and Catholics “are not agreed on the unity in faith required for admis-
sion to [Holy] Communion.”84 A hermeneutical shift toward the virtue bears constructive 
potential for arriving at an understanding of “faith” that may simultaneously be held “in 
81 This is not to say that the methodology exhibited to date in Methodist-Catholic dialogues is insuffi-
cient or wanting. Rather, I am merely suggesting an additional method (and practice) that fully accords with 
the overarching methodology of the dialogues to date.
82 See, for example, the “Preface” of Synthesis: Together in Holiness, in which the dialogue co-chairs 
express the situation in which the dialogue reports “had not been received very deeply or widely in the 
two ecclesial communities sponsoring them.” This issue continues to hamper the “full communion” desired 
between the two bodies.
83 In what follows, we shall, indeed, find significant doctrinal consensus between Wesley and Aquinas. 
What’s more, where we find doctrinal divergence between Wesley and Aquinas, the comparative dialogue 
invites both theologians/traditions to consider their own position(s) in light of the other’s, thereby encour-
aging mutual exchange and collaborative construction. That is to say, (1) Methodists and Catholics have 
more in common than many realize, and (2) where there in divergence, the practice of “reading stereoscop-
ically” tacitly opens the door to new, more-convergent positions.
84 Synthesis: Together in Holiness, §106. Cf. The Denver Report (1971), §84; and The Word of Life: A State-
ment on Revelation and Faith (Rio de Janeiro, 1996), §119.
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common” (i.e., consensus fidei) while providing adequate latitude for the diversity of Meth-
odist and Catholic traditions to exist in practical communion with one another. By turn-
ing to a comparison of Wesley and Aquinas on nature, grace, and virtue, Methodists and 
Catholics may find a formidable resource for approaching faith (as a theological virtue) 
in terms of a balanced stress on being and doing.85 The dual focus on being and doing has 
already helped to frame Methodist-Catholic ecclesiological reflection on the nature and 
activity of the church from the outset.86 Therefore, this dissertation both encourages and 
enables further ecumenical reflection as informed by a comparison of Wesley and Aqui-
nas. However, the contribution of this study to ongoing Methodist-Catholic dialogue is 
still only a tertiary desired outcome and would clearly require additional collaborative 
work to implement ecumenically.
4. John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas: Contexts and Conversations
 Before we proceed with a comparative analysis of Wesley and Aquinas, we must 
first address two related questions: Who were John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas? and Why 
and how are they dialogue partners? The first question focuses on the issue of contextual-
ization, which requires a basic understanding of the relevant details of the lives of Wesley 
and Aquinas. The second question then focuses on the suitability of the ensuing com-
85 As we shall see in the following chapters, Wesley and Aquinas share a common (though not identical) 
theological anthropology, moral psychology, and understanding of the nature and dynamics of grace. These 
combine to inform a common understanding of virtue that can then serve as a basis for Methodist-Catholic 
reflection on faith in terms of a common tradition of the theological virtues.
86 See the section on “Common Witness and Salvation Today,” in The Dublin Report (1976), §§6-25. Here, 
the Commission underlines the ecclesiological import of ecumenical dialogue by tethering the dialogical 
task before them with the church’s unified witness in and to the world. See especially §§8, 11, 16-17, and 24.
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parison. The purpose of what follows is to gain a deeper sense of Wesley and Aquinas as 
real, historical figures located in (and affected by) concrete social, political, and ecclesias-
tical situations—and then to see how these circumstances contribute to a comparison of 
Wesley and Aquinas.
A. Wesley and Aquinas in Context
 Wesley and Aquinas were very much the products of their historical, educational, 
ecclesial, socio-political, and even geographical contexts. However, arriving at the details 
of those lives can be somewhat challenging for a number of reasons. On the one hand, 
those who wrote about Wesley and Aquinas (up through the 20th century) were typically 
either “insiders,” who tended to write florid hagiography, or “outsiders,” who sought to 
condemn or discredit their subjects. In either case, the veracity of those accounts is often 
questionable. On the other hand, Wesley and Aquinas are polar opposites with respect 
to how they portray themselves in their work. Whereas Aquinas (almost) never mentions 
himself or the facts of his life, Wesley is in no uncertain terms a main character in his work: 
directly, as in his Journals; indirectly, as in his Letters; implicitly, as in the Minutes of the 
Methodist conferences. As a result, the task of providing critical, accurate lives of Wesley 
and Aquinas is nothing shy of a Herculean attempt to sift through the volumes of what is 
present while attempting to reconstruct or deduce what is absent. Thankfully, a number 
of excellent contemporary accounts exist, to which the curious student is directed.87 The 
87 Below is a selected list of this literature; for a more-complete list, see Bibliography. Also, it has become 
quite typical in recent scholarship to present a brief biographical sketch to preface an extensive treatment of 
the thought and theology of both John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas—especially in modern handbooks and 
companions. I have noted a few of these below:
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task of the present section is to provide contextualization—not biography—for the pur-
pose of tracing and comparing the theological perspectives of Wesley and Aquinas. For 
the sake of chronology, I begin with Aquinas.
i. Thomas Aquinas
 The details of Thomas Aquinas’s life, especially his early life and upbringing, are 
hazy at best. It is not known for certain when he was born—1224 or 1225—but we do 
know that he was the youngest son of the aristocratic d’Aquino family at Roccasecca in 
Naples, Italy. With a cousin as the Holy Roman Emperor, and an uncle as a Benedictine 
abbot, Aquinas himself represents a tension of the era—Christendom strung between the 
two internationalisms (as Chesterton has observed88) of the Catholic Church and the Holy 
Roman Empire. It was a time of Crusades and Cathars, Inquisition and inquiry—and 
schoolmen and mendicants, of which Aquinas was both.
WESLEY: Heitzenrater, Wesley and the People Called Methodists. Heitzenrater, “The Founding Broth-
ers,” in The Oxford Handbook of Methodist Studies, 30-50. Henry D. Rack, Reasonable Enthusiast: John 
Wesley and the Rise of Methodism, 3rd ed. (London: Epworth Press, 2002). Kenneth J. Collins, John Wesley: 
A Theological Journey (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2003). Cf. Collins, “Wesley’s Life and Ministry,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to John Wesley, 43-59. Ronald H. Stone, John Wesley’s Life and Ethics (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 2001). William J. Abraham, Wesley for Armchair Theologians (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox, 2005). See also Albert C. Outler’s editorial “Introduction,” in Works 1:1-100.
AQUINAS: Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Volume 1: The Person and His Work (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996). Cf. Torrell, “Life and Works,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15-32. 
James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1983). Aidan Nichols, Discovering Aquinas: An Introduction to His Life, Work, 
and Influence (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2002). Martin Grabmann, Thomas Aquinas: His 
Personality and Thought, trans. Virgil Michel (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963). See also the opening 
chapters in Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 1-20; and 
Davies, Aquinas: An Introduction (London: Continuum, 2002), 1-16. Cf. Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologiae: A Guide & Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 3-17. Fergus Kerr, Thomas 
Aquinas: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1-30. Thomas F. O’Meara, 
Thomas Aquinas: Theologian (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), xi-40.
88 See G. K. Chesterton, Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 29-44.
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 Aquinas began his educational career at the age of five at a Benedictine monastery 
in Monte Cassino (headed by his uncle); but by 1239, tensions between the pope and the 
emperor (Frederick II, his cousin) forced Aquinas to continue his studies at the Univer-
sity of Naples. At Naples, Aquinas was exposed to two novel (and controversial) systems 
that invariably shaped the course of his life: the recently-rediscovered writings of Aris-
totle (perhaps the only positive consequence of the Crusades), and the recently-ratified 
mendicant Dominican Order (established in 1216 as the Order of Preachers). Somewhere 
between 1242 and 1243, Aquinas joined the Dominicans and was sent to Paris for further 
study with the Dominican Albert Magnus—but not before being detained for two years 
by his evidently displeased family.
 Aquinas’s time under Albert’s tutelage was a snapshot of the next 30 years of 
teaching, traveling, and writing. Having studied with Albert in Cologne for a few years 
(during which he also began teaching), Aquinas returned to Paris to become a Master of 
Theology and a university professor. Many of his writings were the immediate fruit of his 
teaching activities, which included overseeing disputations, lecturing on Scripture, and 
commenting on theology (especially Peter Lombard’s Sentences) and philosophy (espe-
cially Aristotle’s works). It was in Paris that he began his first summa—Summa Contra 
Gentiles—likely as a handbook-treatise for his fellow Dominicans to aid and instruct them 
in their missionary encounters with non-Christians.
 Though not his most famous work, Summa Contra Gentiles was characteristic of 
two elements that defined the remainder of Aquinas’s writings and travels: instruction for 
Dominicans, and encounters with non-Catholics. Around 1260, Aquinas traveled to Italy 
42
to work under the pope in the field of Greek and Patristic theology. While there, he also 
developed Dominican studium in Rome and began working on his most famous work, 
Summa Theologiae (Prima Pars). He then returned to Paris (1268-1272), where he contin-
ued to work on Summa Theologiae (Secunda Pars), held university disputes on topics such 
as the virtues and perfection, wrote numerous tracts in defense of the mendicant orders 
(whose presence in the universities had increasingly been scrutinized), and argued for the 
use of (Aristotelian) philosophy in theology that avoided radical interpretations (i.e., Siger 
of Brabant). In 1272, he returned to Italy to establish a Dominican studium at the priory 
in his native Naples. He would spend the next two years in Naples, commenting on Aris-
totle and liturgical theology alike, and continuing to work on Summa Theologiae (Tertia 
Pars). Soon after an intense experience at the end of 1273 that abruptly halted his work,89 
Thomas was summoned to attend the Second Council of Lyons as an esteemed theologian 
with unparalleled expertise in non-Western Christianity and non-Christian philosophy.90 
On his way to the Council, he fell ill (a case again shrouded in mystery) and died March 7, 
1274. Within five years of his death, he would be condemned; within 50 years, canonized.
 While this account of Thomas Aquinas is woefully brief, it would actually be incom-
plete without pausing to consider the significance and stature of his Summa Theologiae. 
As a genre, summae had become quite common in Aquinas’s day. This was especially true 
among the Dominicans, who produced numerous handbooks (in the summa style) suited 
89 Whether this abrupt stop was caused by an emotional breakdown, mental exhaustion, physical 
fatigue, or a mystical encounter with Christ (he had been celebrating Mass, after all), we may never fully 
know. We are left with Thomas’s infamous words to his longtime friend, Reginald, that he could not return 
to his work (including finishing the Summa) because everything he had written “seemed like straw” to him.
90 With respect to the latter category, some of Thomas’s greatest philosophical influences were from 
Jewish and Muslim interpreters of Aristotle.
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for preaching and hearing confessions.91 While not the exclusive genre of medieval scho-
lasticism,92 the summa (as genre) sufficiently represented the scholastic, philosophical, 
and speculative turn in theology.93 And yet, as Leonard Boyle has famously argued, Aqui-
nas found the Dominican curriculum and its manuals insufficient because they focused too 
narrowly on one or another aspect of pastoral care without connecting the practices with 
a proper doctrinal foundation. As Boyle deduces, “By prefacing the Secunda or ‘moral’ 
part with a Prima pars on God, Trinity, and Creation, and then rounding it off with a 
Tertia pars on the Son of God, Incarnation, and the sacraments, Thomas put practical 
theology, the study of Christian man, his virtues and vices, in a full theological context.”94 
Plainly, Aquinas noticed a doctrinal gap in the instruction of his fellow Preachers and 
sought to fill it.
 The sources with which he filled that gap were both orthodox and uncommon. 
As expected, Aquinas wove together Scripture with the Fathers of his Catholic tradi-
tion—Augustine, Chrysostom, Dionysius, and countless others. He also incorporated 
heavy doses of philosophy in his quest for theological scientia, but his use of Aristotle 
(over against Plato) was unprecedented. This was partially due to the recent rediscovery 
of Aristotle and partially due to the unorthodox (even scandalous, as Aquinas’s disputes 
91 See Leonard E. Boyle, “The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas,” in The Gilson Lectures 
on Thomas Aquinas, ed. James P. Reilly (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008), 19-45.
92 See Jean-Pierre Torrell, Aquinas’s Summa: Background, Structure, and Reception, trans. Benedict M. 
Guevin (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 63-71.
93 See Davies, Aquinas: An Introduction, 4. Arguably, this stylistic turn paralleled the translocation of 
theology from cloistered monasteries to expanding universities.
94 Boyle, “The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas,” 33. Italics added to facilitate reading.
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with the Paris faculty reveal) appropriation of “the Philosopher”—Thomas’s common 
appellation for Aristotle.
 Although Aristotle’s influence is evident in nearly all of Aquinas’s works, an inter-
pretation of Aquinas that exclusively treats him as a philosopher grossly mischaracterizes 
the frame, scope, and idiom of his work—especially in Summa Theologiae. Scholars fre-
quently express Thomas’s trajectory in Summa Theologiae as a theological scheme of exitus 
and reditus—that all things come from God, and that all things return to God. Thus, the 
Prima Pars and Tertia Pars provide the “full theological context” (to use Boyle’s phrase) 
of the Secunda Pars. While the merit of exitus-reditus as an interpretive scheme to Summa 
Theologiae may be debated, there can be no denying Aquinas’s doctrinal progression: 
from the One God to the Holy Trinity, Creation, humanity, human actions, grace, beatific 
communion with God, Christ as the Exemplar of communion, and Christ’s communal 
sacraments. Whatever scheme we use to understand Aquinas, we must not miss the heart 
of his theology: we are made by God for God, in whom we find our greatest good and 
ultimate beatitude.
ii. John Wesley
 Ascertaining the contextual details of John Wesley’s life is considerably easier 
than for Aquinas, mostly because Wesley lived nearly 500 years nearer to our present day. 
Wesley was born in the summer of 1703, the fifteenth child of Susanna and Samuel, who 
was an Anglican priest in Epworth, North Lincolnshire, England. Wesley’s parents hailed 
from Puritan/Dissenting families in which they, like John and his siblings, were well-ed-
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ucated, strong-minded, and highly-disciplined. Susanna was indisputably responsible for 
fostering these qualities in her children, which would later earn her the unofficial title of 
“the mother of Methodism.”
 After attending the Charterhouse school (London), John continued his studies 
at Oxford University, where he received both his bachelor’s (Christ Church, 1724) and 
master’s (Lincoln College, 1727) degrees, was ordained a deacon (1725), and was elected a 
fellow of Lincoln (1726-1751). In addition to Wesley’s educational responsibilities tutoring 
Greek and logic, he was ordained a priest in 1728 and (very) temporarily became a curate 
to his father at Epworth. But parish ministry was not to be. Oxford beckoned in the form 
of a pious group he had recently begun with his brother Charles (then a student at Oxford) 
and some mutual friends. The group members adopted a highly-disciplined form of 
Christian asceticism that stressed both works of piety (e.g., intense study, prayer, fasting, 
journaling, and accountability) and works of mercy (e.g., prison ministry, medical aid and 
remedies, education for children and adults, almsgiving, and advocacy for the destitute). 
Their employment of strict “methods” in the quest for practical divinity inspired derisive 
appellations: “The Holy Club,” “Bible-Moths,” and “Supererogation-Men,” to name a few. 
It would be two years before a new moniker was given—“Methodists.” Wesley embraced 
the epithet and the name stuck.
 Inspired by the writings of Greek Patristics, Catholic mystics, Anglican divines, 
and Nonjurors alike, the early Methodist ethos was very much aligned with the “holy 
living” tradition.95 Although this tradition—which emphasized pious, ascetic practices in 
95 This tradition may be seen in the likes of Jeremy Taylor (Rules and Exercises of Holy Living and Holy 
Dying) and William Law (Christian Perfection and Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life).
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the human quest for sanctity—unquestionably resonated with Wesley’s upbringing under 
Susanna’s tutelage, he was plagued by a feeling of never being able to attain this holy 
goal. Thus, in 1735, Wesley embarked for Georgia as a missionary with the Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel (SPG) with the hope that, in ministering to others, he might 
be able to save his own soul. The mission proved a royal failure on both counts (including 
romance), and Wesley absconded back to England under the cloak of night. However, in 
his travels, Wesley grew close to a group of Moravians whose unshakeable faith during 
an Atlantic storm indicted Wesley’s self-critical conscience. When Wesley returned to 
England in 1738, he partnered with the Moravian community; under their tutelage he 
would come to have a profound religious experience of faith at an evening gathering on 
Aldersgate Street in London.96 Wesley resolved then to preach a Moravian message of 
sola fide, but by 1740 he parted ways with the Moravians due to antinomian leanings in 
their Lutheranism. The following year, Wesley would part ways with George Whitefield 
(a founding member of the Oxford Methodists) over Whitefield’s Calvinist stance on 
election—but not before Whitefield had convinced Wesley to join him in preaching out-
of-doors to the captive Kingswood colliers who were flocking to the evangelical revival 
that was sweeping England. The move put Wesley at odds with the established Anglican 
ecclesiology (an odd move for a High Churchman like Wesley) and effectively precluded 
future parish ministry.
96 Wesley recounts the events of May 24, 1738—now commonly referred to as “the Aldersgate experi-
ence,” or simply “Aldersgate”—in his Journal (in Works, 18:241-251). The account, which Wesley published 
in his own lifetime (a common practice in his day), was undoubtedly a later-written reflection and expansion 
of what would have been his personal diary entry for the day. The 10-page statement is the source of Wesley’s 
infamous line, “I felt my heart strangely warmed.”
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 Instead, he declared the world as his parish,97 and a “parish” so large required 
organization, discipline, connection, and constant oversight. Enter the Methodist Con-
nection—a cellular polity modeled after the religious societies of early-eighteenth-cen-
tury England and the fraternal bands of Moravianism (and, more broadly, of continental 
Lutheranism) that was bound together by a common discipline and doctrine, both main-
tained by Wesley’s annual conferences with the itinerant Methodist preachers. Those 
conferences, which first met in 1744, would come to circumscribe Methodist doctrine to 
Wesley’s published Sermons and Explanatory Notes on the New Testament.98 The Minutes 
of those conferences would come to establish Methodism’s discipline.99
 These media were quite common for conveying Anglican theology.100 But while 
Wesley’s practices may have stood at odds with many English Christians of his day (e.g., 
field-preaching, the Holy Club), Wesley was undoubtedly Anglican in his theology. This 
has just as much to do with Wesley’s theological emphases as it does with the many strands 
of Christian tradition the Church of England had woven together in its establishment.101 
As Methodist historian and theologian Richard Heitzenrater observes,
97 See John Wesley to Rev. John Clayton(?), March 28, 1739(?), in Works 25:616.
98 These standards, established by the “Model Deed” of 1763, were to establish a certain doctrinal limit 
on who would be allowed to preach in the Methodist preaching houses.
99 The “Large Minutes” were Wesley’s distillation “of the questions and answers by which he, in suc-
cessive conferences with his preachers, had hammered out the doctrines, practices, expectations, and 
procedures by which the movement would live.” Russell E. Richey, Dennis M. Campbell, and William B. 
Lawrence, Marks of Methodism: Theology in Ecclesial Practice (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2005), 73. They 
are the immediate predecessor of the contemporary Book of Discipline of United Methodism.
100 So, too, was hymnody—territory more-than-ably covered by John’s younger brother Charles, who 
composed an estimated 9,000 hymns in his lifetime!
101 See Jason E. Vickers, “Wesley’s Theological Emphases,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Wesley, 
190-206. Vickers convincingly situates Wesley in the English Arminian theological tradition (190-193).
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The task of the religious settlement under Elizabeth [1559] was to establish a 
balanced approach that would protect the national church, formed (if not fully 
“reformed”) under Henry, from the traditional “catholic” claims of Rome on the 
one side and from the more radical “reform” tendencies of the Puritans on the 
other, a stance traditionally expressed as the via media (“middle way”) between 
Rome and Geneva.102
Whether or not the Elizabethan Settlement could have prevented the ensuing centuries 
of religious tumult, fanaticism, and eventual decline is of course debatable. What seems 
clear is that Anglicanism self-consciously attempted to carry forward—and balance—
the diversity of theological perspectives and practices that marked the Roman Catholic 
Church since Aquinas’s era (at the very least).103
 Wesley’s context bequeathed to him not only a panoply of theological resources—a 
radical confluence of theological traditions, a wealth of Patristic readings, an ecumenical 
blend of sanctity and fideism, a cache of classical civilizations’ wisdom (and folly), an intel-
lectual prowess tuned toward doctrinal disentanglement104—but also the precise need to 
employ them all with and for a people for whom the via media had grown mediocre. Wes-
ley’s enterprise in practical divinity must then be read in light of his theological conviction 
that the via salutis (Wesley’s commonly-interpreted theological scheme) necessarily holds 
102 Heitzenrater, Wesley and the People Called Methodists, 8. Heitzenrater further explains this via media 
according to a threefold typology of theological sources—scripture, tradition, and reason—while delineat-
ing their Anglican use from Roman Catholic and Continental Protestant ones (10-11).
103 Heitzenrater sees a certain degree of cause and effect here between Anglicanism’s attempted bal-
ance of perspectives/practices and the cooling religious (and moral) sentiments witnessed by Wesley’s day 
(Wesley and the People Called Methodists, 1-36, especially 12-27). This plausible (though not unassailable) 
argument is based on the paradox of a cohesive plurality: the latitude (to include a plurality of perspectives) 
ends up diluting the identity of the group. But see also J. C. D. Clark, “The Eighteenth-Century Context,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Methodist Studies, 3-29.
104 See Outler’s editorial “Introduction” to Wesley’s Works for a masterful account of Wesley’s numerous 
sources and influences (in Works 1:66-96).
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together faith and works, words and deeds, theology and ethics, justification and sanctifi-
cation through love. In other words, the Methodist work in education, medicine, mission, 
slavery, and poverty was tantamount to Wesley’s theological design105 “to hold together 
the two concerns that were central to his own spiritual biography: first, a deep conviction 
that Christian faith demanded an active program of personal discipline and social service 
through which spiritual progress was realized; and second, an equally profound belief that 
such faith was the utterly free and gracious gift of God.”106
 The inflections of Wesley’s conjunctive theological expression are indeed both 
various and singular. It is the reason why he engages the likes of Hutcheson or Hume 
or the Deists: their moral systems are devoid of God and the things of God—practical 
atheism at its finest. It is also the reason why he distances himself from the Moravians and 
the Calvinists and the enthusiasts: their religious systems are devoid of morality and the 
work of faith in love—antinomianism at its finest. Outler has expressed Wesley’s way as 
an anomalous “third alternative”:
a Protestant doctrine of original sin minus most of the other elements in classical 
Protestant soteriology, plus a catholic doctrine of perfection without its full pan-
oply of priesthood and priestcraft. Thus, he stood exposed to charges of inconsis-
tency from both sides. Even after justification by faith alone had become his central 
message, he retained the holy living tradition of his upbringing and he taught his 
people not only to go on toward perfection but to “expect to be made perfect in 
love in this life”! This caught him in a crossfire—a catholic who had become an 
evangelical and yet never ceased to be catholic: i.e., an evangelical-catholic!107
105 Interestingly, in his 1746 “Preface” to his published sermons, Wesley expresses his design as a desire 
to write and speak ad populum (§2, in Works 1:103). Wesley’s use of the Latin drips with irony.
106 D. Lyle Dabney, “John Wesley,” in Biographical Dictionary of Christian Theologians, ed. Patrick W. 
Carey and Jospeh T. Lienhard (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 531.
107 Outler, Theology in the Wesleyan Spirit, 33-34. Note that Outler does not capitalize “catholic.”
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Of course, Wesley would have understood this position not as a via media or a “third alter-
native,” but rather as the very heart, soul, and evangel of “Primitive Christianity.”108
B. Wesley and Aquinas in Conversation
 These are the contexts of Wesley and Aquinas—similar enough to converse, dif-
ferent enough to contribute within that conversation. Both theologians faced potent frag-
mentations at the political, religious, and social levels. As we saw above, Aquinas was 
particularly caught between two worlds—Church and Empire, with ties to each—yet 
he was squarely situated in a world shrinking due to expansion. Given Aquinas’s era of a 
crumbling empire, burgeoning nation-states, and the formation of new mendicant orders 
within the Church, we needn’t be surprised that the Common Doctor located a need—
proper theological training for his fellow Preachers.109 Due to the needs of Aquinas’s day, 
the theology he offered was at once creational, providential, Christological, moral, sacra-
mental, penitential, and, above all, doctrinally practical.
 For Wesley, the Anglicanism of his day certainly shaped his myriad theological 
output. English Christianity had maintained the unity of theologia with more integrity 
than had its continental-European counterparts by holding together an understanding of 
theology as a rational discipline and as a disciplined habitus.110 Still, in “the long eigh-
108 See Charles Wesley’s poem “Primitive Christianity,” which John appended to the second edition of 
An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion (1743), in Works 11:90-94. See also Outler’s note on Wesley, 
Sermon 4, “Scriptural Christianity,” in Works 1:172-173n125, which further explains the normative role that 
“primitive Christianity”—that of the pre-Constantinian Church—played for Wesley.
109 Again, Boyle carries this forward in his “The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas.”
110 See Farley’s Theologia for the particulars of this argument. Cf. MacIntyre’s Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality?
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teenth century,” fragmentation loomed large in the form of slavery, poverty, educational 
disparity, industrialization, colonization and revolution—to say nothing of the British 
political (and religious) turmoil of the 16th and 17th centuries.111 But Wesley also faced the 
challenges of Enlightenment thinking (especially Deism) and its offspring, Modernity. As 
these movements threatened to untether both inquiry and ethics from their theological 
moorings, Wesley acutely understood the need to critique the atheistically-leaning frag-
mentations surrounding him. We may well conclude that Wesley’s contextually-guided 
theology—at once evangelical and catholic, soteriological and ethical—is altogether a 
doctrinally practical theology.
 My intention is that the foregoing material can provide enough contextual and 
conceptual linkage between Aquinas and Wesley to substantiate the fruitful theological 
comparison that follows. It is true that historical realities can complicate matters. As far 
as we can tell, Wesley never read Aquinas—and Aquinas (1224/5-1274) clearly never read 
Wesley (1703-1791)! And, while it has been maintained that Wesley and Aquinas stood in 
similar traditions of theological inquiry,112 the present work seeks a conversation that best 
unfolds according to how Aquinas and Wesley understand humanity in relation to God. 
That understanding reveals a common theological aim (participation in the holiness and 
happiness of God) rooted in a common theological foundation (having been created by the 
111 For the social fragmentation of Wesley’s day, see Charles Yrigoyen, Jr., John Wesley: Holiness of Heart 
& Life (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 9-22.
112 Cf. Long, John Wesley’s Moral Theology, which is part history of the modern-Protestant traditions of 
inquiry that have effectively separated “God” and “the Good” (i.e., theology and ethics), and part re-reading 
of Wesley in light of Aquinas and a pre-modernist tradition. Long attempts to substantiate the connection 
between Wesley and Aquinas as textually as is possible—through Malebranche—but I am not trying to 
establish such a literary-historical linkage.
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Creator, the source of Love, being, motion) and realized in common theological means 
(the gift and exercise of Christological character through the theological virtues). Theol-
ogy properly conduces to the knowledge and love of God, who is the very foundation and 
focus of our iconic dignity.
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CHAPTER 1: 
ICONIC DIGNITY IN GREATER DETAIL
 Having established the general framework of iconic dignity, its emergence from 
the theology Wesley and Aquinas, and the contextualizing details of these two theolo-
gians’ careers, it is now appropriate to examine iconic dignity itself in greater detail. A 
nuanced account of this theological perspective will give us a greater appreciation for the 
comparative work that follows. To do this, we will look into both terms, iconic/icon and 
dignity, in a manner consistent with that of Wesley and Aquinas. In other words, part of 
“seeing Wesley and Aquinas” is “seeing like Wesley and Aquinas”— to enter their worlds 
and, at the same time, to let them enter ours. Therefore, we will unpack iconicity and dig-
nity according to scripture, Christian tradition, historical developments, and interaction 
with contemporary thought. The range of perspectives regarding iconicity and dignity 
makes the present task of clarification and delineation all the more important. After exam-
ining both terms, we shall return to their mutual interplay and interdependence in order 
to provide a working definition of iconic dignity.
1. Icon and Iconicity
 Over the past few generations, the concept of iconicity has been receiving increased 
attention. Not only have icons permeated our technology and, along with it, our patterns 
of thinking, speaking, and acting, theologians and philosophers been turning to the icon 
as an interpretive device for their respective fields. This isn’t to say that icons and iconicity 
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are novel to the present age; to the contrary, the notion of a representative image reaches 
far back into human history as well as Christian theology. Therefore, in order to disam-
biguate and delimit, it is important to explain the approach to iconicity undertaken in this 
dissertation. That task will occur in three phrases according to three theological sources 
of iconicity: scripture, tradition, and modern/alternative perspectives.1 To conclude this 
section on iconicity, I will then provide a brief illustrated summary.
A. Scripture: Image and Icon
 My understanding of icon finds its primary rooting in the language of scripture: 
the Greek εἰκών, the Hebrew tselem, the Latin imago.2 Indeed, the underlying notion to 
which these terms mutually point—iconicity—influences Wesley’s and Aquinas’s theo-
logical anthropology more so than any other theological concept. For them, as for me, the 
locus classicus is Genesis 1:26-27, which describes humanity as having been made in, to, 
or according to the image (tselem, εἰκών, imago) of God.3 Two points are to be made here. 
First, iconicity bespeaks a quality of likeness—but not an equality. The prepositions (“in,” 
1 Again, the idea here is to approach the concept (iconicity) in a manner that comports with that of 
Wesley and Aquinas. Theological reflection in that mode privileges scripture, Christian tradition, the insights 
of other fields of inquiry (both contemporary and historical), and so forth. As we shall see in subsequent 
chapters, this method of “doing theology” aligns with central features of Wesley’s and Aquinas’s theological 
anthropology, including epistemology. It further bespeaks the posture that iconic dignity proposes—one 
that holds sources in dialogue and remains receptive to exchange.
2 These terms—εἰκών, tselem, and imago—are here understood to represent a common underlying 
notion of iconicity. This is not meant to flatten the diversity of contexts and cultures that nuance the terms 
and their respective languages. Indeed, Hebrew features a few terms that have come to be translated as 
“image” or “icon”; still, tselem stands out because of its centrality in the Genesis 1 narrative. I include Latin 
not as a language in which scripture was composed but instead as an important language in which scripture 
was commonly transmitted for nearly a millennium.
3 See also Genesis 5:1 and 9:6, which employ the same language in the same sense.
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“to,” “according to”) imply motion and the sense that the icon has not yet “arrived” at its 
prototype-origin. Related to this is the second point: God is the one who fashions human-
ity according to the divine image. This may seem obvious, but it is a point very clearly lost 
on humanity after Creation. Thus, the many other references to iconicity in the Hebrew 
Bible interpret εἰκών/tselem/imago in the opposite manner, with humans fashioning for 
themselves false gods or other creatures to worship.4 These idolatrous incidents of iconic-
ity inversely illustrate a defining characteristic of the icon: the icon must stand in relation 
to its source, lest the divine art become creaturely forgery.
 Turning to the New Testament, iconicity/εἰκών is largely a (deutero) Pauline con-
cept that develops along three related lines. First, εἰκών is used to depict humans having 
been created in/to God’s image (e.g., 1 Cor. 11:7; Col. 3:10). This usage is very much a 
continuation of the theological anthropology of the Hebrew Bible, and the occasional 
pairing of εἰκών with δόξα (glory) reinforces the positive iconicity held in relation to God 
4 See Numbers 33:52; 1 Samuel 6:5, 11; 2 Kings 11:18; Ezekiel 7:20; 16:17; 23:14; Amos 5:26; Daniel 
2-3; and 2 Chronicles 23:17. The two references from Psalms (39:6 and 73:20) nuance the term as a kind of 
phantom or shadow—again, a disingenuous image.
It is worth noting that the Apocrypha, too, contributes to the biblical notion of iconicity. Both Wisdom 
(2:23) and Sirach (17:3) name our creation according to God’s incorruptible, eternal, and strong εἰκών. 
(Note: the source of Apocrypha is the Septuagint, not the Hebrew Bible, and thus the use of Greek as 
opposed to Hebrew.) The Book of Wisdom further adds that Wisdom personified (Sophia) is an εἰκών of 
God’s goodness (7:26). The additional uses of εἰκών in Wisdom (13-15) pertain to false images (i.e., idols). 
Aquinas very clearly receives and employs the Apocrypha as Holy Writ, as we might expect of a pre-Refor-
mation Catholic theologian. Conversely, Wesley’s Anglican Protestantism might lead us to believe that he 
dismisses the Apocrypha entirely, but this is not the case. Albert Outler notes “how casually Wesley resorts 
to an apocryphal text; the line between canonical and apocryphal Scripture is by no means absolute. Actu-
ally, the Wisdom of Solomon is his favorite apocryphal writing, and he quotes 9:15 at least eight other times 
in his sermons over sixty years” (in Works 2:130n18). Since the references to iconicity from the Apocrypha 
comport with the positive and negative meanings from the Hebrew Bible (with the possible exception being 
Wis. 7:26), a case could be made either to include or to disregard these references. That choice remains open 
to the reader.
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while warning against the negative iconicity of idolatry.5 Second, εἰκών is used in a special 
sense to speak of Christ as God’s perfect, glorious image (e.g., 2 Cor. 4:4; Col. 1:15).6 The 
Christological subject of this εἰκών emphasizes the incarnation as the prototypical, per-
fect, and proper image of God (cf. Col. 1:15). Romans 8:29 also underscores Christ as God’s 
perfect image while adding a third usage of εἰκών: the call for our conformity with Christ’s 
image as the perfect image of God. The vocation of Christ-conformity is also the promise 
of Christ-conformity (1 Cor. 15:48-49). As we are being transformed (μεταμορφούμεθα) in 
the Lord’s glorious image (εἰκών), we come to reflect (κατοπτριζόμενοι) the glory of the 
Lord (2 Cor. 3:18).
 On the whole, Scriptural iconicity has three basic referents: (1) theological anthro-
pology, in which humans are created in God’s image; (2) Christology, in which the incar-
nate Christ is the perfect and proper image of God; and (3) admonition—of idolatry, in 
which iconicity is distorted by losing sight of God.7 That is to say, iconicity can be under-
stood to mark our human origin, objective, and obstacles.
5 Such is the case in 1 Corinthians 11:7, where εἰκών and δόξα are paired in a positive parallelism (not 
unlike the “image and likeness” of Gen. 1:26). Unfortunately, the context of this verse tends toward a sexist 
anthropological hierarchy. Romans 1:23 features another pairing of εἰκών and δόξα, but not in a parallel 
sense; rather, Paul’s point is that humans have exchanged God’s δόξα for human and animal εἰκώνοι. In 
other words, Paul is describing our forfeiture of God’s glorious image, which is not “ours” although we are 
made in such a way that it “befits” us, as we adopt our own creaturely images, which are “ours” but do not 
properly befit our theological anthropology.
6 2 Corinthians 4:4 also connects εἰκών and δόξα, but notice that the glory is Christ’s own, unlike the 
pairings of εἰκών and δόξα from the first usage above (1 Cor. 11:17; Rom. 1:23). In the original Greek, the 
second half of 2 Corinthians 4:4 reads as follows: τὸν φωτισμὸν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τῆς δόξης τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὅς 
ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ.
7 There are still other references to εἰκών in the New Testament, and these basically fall into two narra-
tives: the synoptic account of Jesus and the coin bearing the emperor’s εἰκών (Matt. 22:20; Mark 12:16; and 
Luke 20:24); and the apocalyptic reference to the εἰκών of the beast in Revelation (13:14; 14:9, 11; 15:2; 16:2; 
19:20; 20:4). Lastly, while Hebrews 10:1 mentions εἰκών, its meaning is unlike any of the other examples 
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B. Christian Tradition: Eastern Orthodoxy
 Where I step beyond scriptural language and hermeneutics, my understanding of 
iconicity leans most heavily upon classical Eastern Orthodoxy. This move is actually a 
double recognition of the theological style of Wesley and Aquinas. First, it reflects their 
engagement with the Christian tradition as they think theologically; second, it reflects 
their particular engagement with the Eastern (Orthodox) Christian tradition. Over the 
past 50 years or so, Wesleyans and Thomists have insightfully uncovered many Eastern 
influences upon (and sources within) the theologies of Wesley and Aquinas.8 Hence, the 
Eastern turn for a fuller picture of iconicity is not arbitrary; it purposefully reflects the 
methods and concerns of this dissertation while remaining attentive to the manner of 
practicing theology in a Wesleyan and Thomistic spirit.9
 Although it is impossible for one theologian to speak for an entire tradition, it is 
generally regarded that the foremost authority on an Eastern Orthodox theology of icons 
is St. John of Damascus (c. 675-750). John’s Three Treatises on the Divine Images heav-
ily contributed to the defense of icons at the Second Council of Nicaea (787) and to the 
mentioned. The connotation is positive but uniquely metaphysical (i.e., participation in the εἰκών of the 
reality of the good things to come).
8 For example, Randy Maddox (and Albert Outler before him) has insightfully argued for a more-East-
ern-leaning interpretation of John Wesley’s practical theology. See the Index of Maddox’s Responsible Grace 
(415) for Wesley’s Eastern Christian emphases. This topic is further explained in my discussion of critical 
approaches to Wesley in the Introduction. For Aquinas, see Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d’Aquino, 147-176. See 
also the entry “Thomas Aquinas” in The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd ed., ed. F. L. Cross 
and E. A. Livingstone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1614-1617. Beyond this, many modern schol-
ars are quick to note Aquinas’s indebtedness to certain Eastern Fathers such as John of Damascus, (pseudo) 
Dionysius, and John Chrysostom. Cf. Davies, Aquinas: An Introduction, 15-16.
9 For example, recent Orthodox theologies have been concerned with issues of personal, social, and 
theological fragmentation. Their particular contribution is to approach fragmentation through the lens of 
iconicity (here expanded to include the notion of “image and likeness”). See, for example, Vladimir Lossky, 
Orthodox Theology, 119-137, especially 125-127.
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so-called “Triumph of Orthodoxy” (843).10 In the Three Treatises, John defines an icon 
(εἰκών) as follows:
An image [εἰκών] is therefore a likeness [ὁμοίωμα] and pattern [παράδειγμα] and 
impression [ἐκτύπωμά] of something, showing in itself what is depicted [τὸ εἰκο-
νιζόμενον]; however, the image is certainly not like the archetype [πρωτοτύπῳ], 
that is, what is depicted, in every respect—for the image is one thing and what it 
depicts is another—and certainly a difference is seen between them, since they are 
not identical.11
Here, John presents a paradox: first, there is an ontological difference between an icon and 
its archetype—in this case, between Creation and its Creator; second, there is an ontolog-
ical similitude between an icon and its archetype—in this case, the relational impression 
of the Creator upon human creatures. The paradox raises two particular issues, which 
John addresses in turn.
 First, John confronts the difficulty posed to a theology of icons by Romans 1:25 
(“they worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator”). Icons have always 
dealt with value and worth—and, by extension, dignity and worship.12 Historically, the 
figures depicted in icons were deserving of honor, tribute, veneration, or allegiance; 
hence, the εἰκών of the emperor was (and still is) stamped into an empire’s coins.13 Consid-
10 For more on the development of this Orthodox “theology of images/icons,” see Ambrosios Giakalis, 
Images of the Divine: The Theology of Icons at the Seventh Ecumenical Council, rev. ed. (Leiden, Netherlands: 
Brill, 2005).
11 St. John of Damascus, Three Treatises on the Divine Images, Treatise III, §16, trans. Andrew Louth 
(Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003), 95. The full sentence in Greek reads as follows: 
Εἰκὼν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὁμοίωμα καὶ παράδειγμα καὶ ἐκτύπωμά τινος ἐν ἑαυτῷ δεικνύον τὸ εἰκονιζόμενον, 
πάντως δὲ οὐ κατὰ πάντα ἔοικεν ἡ εἰκὼν τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ τουτέστι τῷ εἰκονιζομένῳ—ἄλλο γάρ ἐστιν ἡ εἰκὼν 
καὶ ἄλλο τὸ εἰκονιζόμενον—καὶ πάντως ὁρᾶται ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφορά, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλο ἐκεῖνο.
12 As treated below, “dignity” is a Latin cognate, from dignus/dignitas, “worth, worthy.” “Worship” is 
from the Old English weorthscipe, “to acknowledge something’s worth.”
13 In Matthew 22:17-22 (on paying taxes to Caesar), Jesus himself points to this practice. After requesting 
and receiving a coin, Jesus asks, τίνος ἡ εἰκὼν αὕτη καὶ ἡ ἐπιγραφή, “Whose icon and epigraph is this?”
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ering the work required to produce an icon (frequently many times over), an εἰκών would 
have signified at least some “native” value, some indication of the worth of the object or 
of the one depicted. The question regards the source of that worth: whether it belongs to 
the icon itself or whether it is a participated worth. John’s understanding is conveyed in 
his explanation of the objects of his veneration: “I venerate what I see, not as God, but as 
an honorable image of those worthy of honor [τιμίων εἰκόνισμα τίμιον].”14 Drawing from 
St. Basil’s teaching that “the honor [τιμὴ] offered to the image passes to the archetype,”15 
John further surmises that “the glory [δόξα] of the image [εἰκών] becomes that of the one 
depicted in the image.”16 How does this “transfer” occur? “Divine grace is given to material 
things through the name borne by what is depicted,” writes John. “So material things, on 
their own, are not worthy of veneration, but if the one depicted is full of grace, then they 
become participants in grace [μέτοχοι χάριτος], on the analogy of faith.”17
 But what if the εἰκών is already “full of grace”? This question points to the second 
issue: the relationship between a theology of icons and Christology. These two subjects 
are very intimately connected within John’s Treatises, for Christ is the exemplary εἰκὼν 
τοῦ θεοῦ (Col. 1:15). Accordingly, “what the image [εἰκὼν] is by imitation [μιμητικῶς] here 
below, there [ἐκεῖ] the Son is by nature [φυσικῶς],” for “with the divine and incomposite 
nature the union is in the communion of the divinity [ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τῆς θεότητός ἐστιν 
14 John of Damascus, On the Divine Images, Treatise I, §36 (42).
15 John of Damascus, On the Divine Images, Treatise I, §35 (42).
16 John of Damascus, On the Divine Images, Treatise I, §36 (42-43).
17 John of Damascus, On the Divine Images, Treatise I, §36 (43). The original Greek runs as follows: Χάρις 
δίδοται θεία ταῖς ὕλαις διὰ τῆς τῶν εἰκονιζομένων προσηγορίας.… οὕτως αἱ ὕλαι αὐταὶ μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὰς ἀπρο-
σκύνητοι, ἂν δὲ χάριτος εἴη πλήρης ὁ εἰκονιζόμενος, μέτοχοι χάριτος γίνονται κατ’ ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως.
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ἡ ἕνωσις].”18 Although this latter teaching—hypostatic union—is typically associated 
with Christology, it also contributes to a theology of icons.19 On this doctrine hangs an 
icon’s participation in the reality of its archetype, from which it “receives” (and to which 
it “transmits”) its goodness and worth. Early in his third treatise, John combines these 
aspects to unite Christ’s iconicity with our iconic participation in God by way of the Incar-
nation—that we may become participants in the divine nature (2 Pet. 1:4) through its 
mystery. Connecting this doctrine to the practice of venerating an icon, especially one of 
the invisible God, John proclaims, “I do not venerate the creation instead of the creator, 
but I venerate the Creator, created for my sake, who came down to his creation without 
being lowered or weakened, that he might glorify my nature and bring about communion 
with the divine nature.”20
 Throughout the Treatises, John’s language challenges one-dimensional readings 
of iconicity, which has deep implications for the present study. In particular, when we 
read (in English) about “depicting” and its related words, John’s Greek verb is the rich-
ly-nuanced εἰκονίζω. Together with meanings like “to depict,” “to iconize,” or “to make 
an icon,” εἰκονίζω may also be interpreted as “to imitate,” “to express the nature of,” or “to 
18 John of Damascus, On the Divine Images, Treatise I, §35 (42). Context would seem to indicate that the 
“there” (ἐκεῖ) to which John refers is the heavenly/divine realm—less a place than a state of being.
19 Cf. Theodor Damian, “Icons,” in The Encyclopedia of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Vol. I, ed. John 
Anthony McGuckin (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 334-335.
20 John of Damascus, On the Divine Images, Treatise III, §6 (86). Note John’s allusion to Romans 1:25. 
John also continues in the same paragraph that the Incarnation signals God’s real, true participation in our 
human nature—flesh and blood and all. John’s Greek for the quoted sentence is as follows: οὐ προσκυνῶ τὴν 
κτίσιν παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, ἀλλὰ προσκυνῶ τὸν κτίστην κτισθέντα τὸ κατ’ ἐμὲ καὶ εἰς κτίσιν ἀταπεινώτως καὶ 
ἀκαθαιρέτως κατεληλυθότα, ἵνα τὴν ἐμὴν δοξάσῃ φύσιν καὶ θείας κοινωνὸν ἀπεργάσηται φύσεως.
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typify.”21 So, when John writes “I…depict the invisible God [εἰκονίζω θεὸν τὸν ἀόρατον],”22 
his language suggests a plurality of meanings. On one level, he conveys that, in the process 
of making an icon, he “iconifies” the invisible God—i.e., he crafts an image of Christ. 
On another level, John appears to be claiming that he himself “expresses the nature of ” 
the invisible God—i.e., he imitates the divine nature.23 This second interpretation is not 
without internal support from John’s Treatises. Among seven kinds of icon veneration, 
John includes that by which “we venerate one another as having a portion of God and 
having come to be in the image of God, humbling ourselves before one another and ful-
filling the law of love.”24 Rooting his reasoning in scripture and the Fathers,25 John weaves 
together a positive-yet-humble valuation of humanity with our origin in God’s image and 
its expression as love. In other words, John underscores the dynamic interplay between 
human dignity and our iconicity of the divine nature.
21 See the entry for “εἰκονίζ-ω,” in G.W.H. Lampe, ed., A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1961), 409-410.
22 John of Damascus, On the Divine Images, Treatise III, §6 (86).
23 The same double interpretation holds true for what John adds later in the same paragraph (§6, 86): 
“I do not depict the invisible divinity, but I depict God made visible in the flesh [Οὐ τὴν ἀόρατον εἰκονίζω 
θεότητα, ἀλλ’ εἰκονίζω θεοῦ τὴν ὁραθεῖσαν σάρκα].” Perhaps a better (yet more challenging) translation of 
the last phrase is, “but I represent the visible flesh of God.”
24 John of Damascus, On the Divine Images, Treatise III, §37 (109). Again, John’s original Greek is as 
follows: Πέμπτος τρόπος, καθ’ ὃν προσκυνοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις ὡς μοῖραν θεοῦ ἔχουσι καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγε-
νημένοις ἀλλήλοις τε ταπεινούμενοι καὶ νόμον πληροῦντες ἀγάπης.
25 Louth’s notes (109nn139-141) indicate John of Damascus’s references to Genesis 1:26, Romans 13:8, 
and St. Gregory Nazianzen’s Homily 14.7.
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C. Modern/Alternative Perspectives
 As mentioned, iconicity has been approached from a variety of disciplinary per-
spectives, each with its own concerns and foci. For example, within modern Eastern 
Orthodox communities, interpretation of iconicity has carried forward the practical-theo-
logical concerns regarding icons established by St. John of Damascus (as above). Within 
this context, a theology of icons is informed by a liturgical perspective and developed 
for the sake of practical piety and proper veneration.26 However, iconicity has also come 
to be interpreted by post/modern schools of thought as a philosophical, metaphysical, 
and/or phenomenological trope. Here I have in mind the thought of Jean-Luc Marion, 
whose postmodern-postmetaphysical phenomenology of the idol and the icon stands out 
as a contemporary “alternative” to classical approaches to iconicity.27 As such, my atten-
tion in this brief section looks to Marion’s postmodern depiction of the icon as a potential 
resource for clarifying and nuancing my own notion of iconicity.
 Marion organizes his account of the icon according to its antithesis, the idol, and 
their phenomenological incongruity. The difference between the icon and the idol is less 
a matter of being than it is a manner of being—or, better, a manner of seeing.28 “Whereas 
the idol results from the gaze that aims at it,” Marion writes, “the icon summons sight in 
26 Thus, for example, the work of Orthodox theologians Vladimir Lossky, John Zizioulas, and Leonid 
Ouspensky (among others), as well as materials from St. Vladimir’s Seminary and its Press.
27 See Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, 2nd ed., trans. Thomas A Carlson (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2012), 7-24. For an expert explication of Marion’s dense phenomenological thought, see 
Thomas A. Carlson, “Postmetaphysical theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, 
ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 58-76.
28 See Marion, God Without Being, 7-9.
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letting the invisible…be saturated little by little with the invisible.”29 Idols therefore freeze 
the gaze of an observer by captivating his or her gaze with a fixatedly dazzling reflection 
of the gaze itself. Conversely, an icon frees an observer’s gaze by dynamically referring it 
to the icon’s underlying reality.30 “This referral constitutes the most essential dignity of 
the work.”31 Marion helpfully underscores how the root of an icon’s dignity is located in its 
essential dynamism, its “signaling toward” the dignity of the one depicted or, to connect 
back with John of Damascus, its participation in the dignity to which the one depicted 
points. In so doing, Marion contributes to the present portrayal of iconic dignity as both 
a theological perspective and a methodological approach: iconicity concerns not just that 
we “see,” but also (and more importantly) how we “see.”32
 However, Marion’s contribution is not without certain difficulties. While 
(seemingly) attempting to demystify iconicity with phenomenology, Marion manages 
to over-complicate the concept to such a degree that it leaves one wondering if he has 
fallen captive to his own prolixity as an “invisible mirror.”33 Curiously, Marion’s inten-
29 Marion, God Without Being, 17.
30 See Marion, God Without Being, 11-22.
31 Marion, God Without Being, 9. 
32 Furthermore, Marion’s reflections lead us to consider how “iconic dignity” might be differentiated 
from its inverse and/or permutations. For example, what might “idolatrous dignity” signify? Or “iconic 
indignity”? Or even “idolatrous indignity”? I would suggest that “idolatrous dignity” might signify over-
ly-humanistic approaches to dignity that unmoor it from its theological anchor. “Iconic indignity” might 
signify a doctrine like total depravity, which dis-gracefully severs dignity from iconicity. It would then seem 
that “idolatrous indignity” signifies the kind of fragmentation, bigotry, and oppression on display today: we 
employ self-styled idols to denigrate others. Although such ruminations fall beyond my explicit scope, the 
questions nonetheless challenge us to take stock of the phenomenological fluidity at play in this (or any) 
hermeneutic.
33 For Marion’s use of the “invisible mirror” concept, see God Without Being, 11-14.
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tion-based postmodern phenomenology of iconicity becomes a phenomenology of the 
idol that occludes constitutive aspects of an icon/idol through subjectivist (if not relativist) 
interpretation. Having not broached the subject of what an icon sets out to depict, Mar-
ion’s account is found to be wanting. Granted, Marion seems to indicate that the idol is 
self-referential while the icon is other-referential (the point is never resolved); still, with-
out grounding an icon in the divine reality that it represents—that is, the true basis of its 
iconic infinity34—it is not actually clear how an icon may be distinguished from an idol. 
These difficulties do not necessarily countermand Marion’s contributions, but they do 
raise the question of whether Marion’s insights may be encapsulated more clearly within 
John of Damascus’s own teachings.
D. Summary
 By way of summary, we may observe that iconic dignity proceeds along a threefold 
exegesis of εἰκών as representation, reflection, and refraction. Like a painting, an icon 
re-presents something—iconic dignity represents the Christological pattern of human 
flourishing. Like a mirror, an icon reflects something—iconic dignity reflects our response 
to God’s grace and participation in God’s love. Like a prism, an icon refracts something—
iconic dignity refracts our human potential as a divinely-enabled ability to participate 
with God to “color” our world with genuine acts of virtue infused with God’s transforming 
grace. In these three ways, iconicity helps to describe the way in which human nature first 
34 See Marion, God Without Being, 20-24, where he focuses on the infinite gaze evoked by the icon.
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portrays, then radiates, and ultimately diffuses the splendor and goodness of the divine 
nature.35 These three notions are best expressed visually, as in the following diagram.
Representation
| |
Painting
| |
Portray
Reflection
| |
Mirror
| |
Radiate
Refraction
| |
Prism
| |
Diffuse
Diagram 1. Three Senses of Eikōn
2. Dignity
 When we turn to the notion of dignity, we face challenges similar to those encoun-
tered in the treatment of iconicity—perhaps even to a greater degree. Some of this is again 
attributable to the multiplicity of disciplines laying claim to the concept, each with its own 
interpretation and application. For example, dignity features prominently in discussions 
of human rights, jurisprudence, public policy, politics, medicine, ethics, and religion.36 
35 See Romans 5:5, on the love of God being “shed abroad” in our hearts.
36 A prime example of the assortment of approaches to dignity is the anthology by the President’s Coun-
cil on Bioethics, Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics 
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But, without discrediting the dignities of these arenas, the substance of what I am pro-
pounding is altogether theological, stemming directly from the inestimable dignity of the 
Holy Trinity. Since this connects inextricably with our iconicity of the divine, I have not 
necessarily qualified dignity as “human,” although that is the principal context in which I 
am using the term. What I mean by this qualification will be borne out in the following, 
which again seeks to engage scriptural, historical, and contemporary sources.
A. Scripture: Dignity
 Unlike “icon,” which derives from the Greek word εἰκών, the term “dignity,” which 
derives from the Latin dignitas, clearly does not appear in Hebrew or Greek scripture. But 
this is not to say that the concept of dignity is absent from scripture—far from it. In fact, 
as we shall see, the same essential dynamic of the Latin dignitas (and related terms) also 
appears in its Greek equivalent, which very much is present in scripture. Therefore, let us 
first examine what dignitas means in Latin (on its own terms), so that we may understand 
the concept underlying dignitas/dignity and, ultimately, how it features in the Greek New 
Testament.37
(Washington, D.C., 2008). The collection is actually quite diverse and defies disciplinary pigeon-holing, 
even though it emerges from the topic of bioethics.
37 My decision to limit scriptural consideration of dignity to the (Greek) New Testament is twofold. 
First, the concept of dignity doesn’t quite function the same way in Hebrew as it does in Greek or Latin. 
Most of the Hebrew terms that might be translated as “dignity” deal more with strength, monetary value, 
or virtuousness, which represent a slightly different concept that I am advancing here. In fact, Hebrew’s 
prefixed prepositions actually convey a closer equivalent to “dignity.” Second, the pertinent texts regarding 
dignity are drawn much more heavily from the (Greek) New Testament. This could be a reflection of the first 
point, inasmuch as languages reveal something about the cultures and societies that produce them. If so, one 
wonders whether the presence of “dignity” language in the Greek New Testament is more a linguistic-ideo-
logical reflection of Greek, Roman, and Western cultures—which, incidentally, were heavily classist. To be 
clear, I am not employing “dignity” in a manner that perpetuates class-based distinctions of human worth. 
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 First, the Latin root dign- conveys a sense of worth. This is to be considered more 
in terms of qualitative “value” than quantitative “price.” Furthermore, dign- suggests that 
the value is suitable or properly-proportioned to its “possessor.” Thus, dignitas (n.) is a 
befittingly excellent worth, something deserving of its (given) value; related to this is 
dignus (adj.), which describes something that is appropriately worthy.38 It will be observed 
that these meanings also indicate a degree of relationality: X is worthy of Y; A is suitable to 
B. The auxiliary prepositions are no accident, for dignity is something held “with respect 
to” and “in relationship to” another.
 Within the New Testament, the closest approximation to dignitas/dignus is the 
Greek ἀξία/ἄξιος (and other related cognates). The underlying notion of ἀξία/ἄξιος is, 
like dignitas/dignus, an appropriate worth or a worthiness of something. Linguistically, 
this is perhaps even more clear in Greek than in Latin: ἀξία/ἄξιος frequently takes the 
genitive case, which expresses a fundamental relationship between the subject and the 
object of worth.39 This dynamic is also an essential facet of the icon—it is always an icon 
of something. Therefore, it is a worthiness-of-something-else that locates a thing’s dignity, 
just as it is an other-reference that typifies a thing’s iconicity.
My point in raising this is to bring to our attention the cultural-linguistic concepts we may take for granted 
today and some of the baggage that may unwittingly attend our patterns of thought and speech.
38 In this respect, dignitas also bespeaks an element of justice: that one thing is suitable to another 
implies a sense of equity in determining a rightness of fit or worth.
39 See, for example, the lexical entries for “ἀξία,” “ἄξιος,” “ἀξίωμα,” and the many other related Greek 
terms that take the ἀξι- or ἀξιο- prefix (similar to the English suffix “-worthy”) in Lampe, A Patristic Greek 
Lexicon, 166-168. It is also worth mentioning that this family of Greek words is typically translated in the 
Latin Vulgate as dignus, dignitatis, and other related dign- terms.
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 That being the case, it is instructive to consider the objects of which we are (or 
should be) worthy as discussed in the New Testament.40 In the gospels we hear the voice 
of John the Baptist calling us to “bear fruits worthy of repentance [ἄξιον τῆς μετανοίας]” 
(Matt. 3:8; Luke 3:8; cf. Acts 26:20). Twice in Luke characters proclaim themselves unwor-
thy of something: in Luke 15:21, the younger (“prodigal”) son considers himself unworthy 
of filiation (οὐκέτι εἰμὶ ἄξιος); and in Luke 7:4-10, the centurion does not consider his good 
deeds to be worthy of Christ healing his slave ([οὐδὲ] ἄξιός ἐστιν ᾧ παρέξῃ τοῦτο).41 In the 
epistles, ἄξιος often carries an ethical imperative to lead a life worthy of several related 
objects: “the calling” (Eph. 4:1), “the gospel of Christ” (Phil. 1:27; cf. Matt. 10:11), “the 
Lord” (Col. 1:10), “God” (1 Thess. 2:12; 3 John 6), and “the kingdom” (2 Thess. 1:5; cf. 1 
Thess. 2:12). Finally, John’s eschatological vision of heavenly worship depicts the 24 elders 
singing “You are worthy (ἄξιος εἶ), our Lord and God, to receive glory and honor and 
power (τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὴν τιμὴν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν), for you created all things, and by your will 
they existed and were created” (Rev. 4:11) to the One seated upon the heavenly throne.
 What, then, are we to make of scriptural dignity? These passages signal that dig-
nity is not so much a given as it is given—bestowed and graciously gifted. Where there is 
40 We could also consider the uses of ἄξιος in the Greek Septuagint, but those instances tend focus more 
on the material worth of things (i.e., fair prices). Although this meaning is certainly contained by the Greek 
ἄξιος, it does not serve the immediate scope of this dissertation. A notable exception to this is Wisdom 3:5: 
“Having been disciplined a little, they will receive great good, because God tested them and found them 
worthy of [ἄξιος ] himself.” This instance stands out because of its similarity to the language in the New 
Testament.
41 It should be added that, in both these pericopes, the “unworthy” figure encounters the lavish gift of 
grace, restoration, and healing. Also, Luke 7 features a bit of wordplay. The crowd calls the centurion ἄξιός 
(v. 4) because of his good deeds, but the centurion says (v. 6) he is not ἱκανός (“sufficient, worthy, able”), and 
therefore (v. 7) did not ἠξίωσα (“presume, deem, request, count [himself ] worthy of ”) Christ and Christ’s 
healing.
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dignity, there is a calling to participate in a flourishing reality that is beyond-but-appro-
priate-to our nature as humans. Repentance, kinship, healing, vocation, gospel, glory, the 
reign of God—these worthy objects direct us toward relationship with the One whom we 
worship from within our nature. Scripture reveals that the dignity of human nature is a 
dignity properly predicated of God (both essentially and actually), and that it is by grace 
that God engrafts us into God’s life—not that we have somehow earned the right to be 
children of God, but that we may come to “see what love the Father has given us, that we 
should be called children of God; and that is what we are” (1 John 3:1).
B. Historical Developments and Modern Difficulties
 Given the foregoing description of scriptural dignity, it is necessary to address the 
challenges facing my approach to dignity. Symptomatic of those difficulties has been the 
historical development of “human dignity” as synonymous with—or, at the very least, a 
preamble to—the concept of “human rights.” Such is the case in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948), the very first article of which seeks a conjunction of “dignity” with 
“rights.”42 Without detracting from the immense contribution of this document for safe-
guarding standards of human welfare, it still represents a modernizing trend of conflating 
“human dignity and the possession of certain core rights.”43 But if such a conceptual eli-
sion really is a symptom, what is its disease and etiology?
42 The Declaration was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948, 
as Resolution 217 A (III). The text of the Declaration, which has been translated into over 500 languages, 
is freely available from the website of the United Nations. See “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 
United Nations, accessed December 10, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
43 See Michael Robinson, “Divine Image, Human Dignity, and Human Potentiality,” Perspectives in Reli-
gious Studies 41, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 65.
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 This question brings us to the primary difficulty regarding a modern notion of 
dignity: the development of a uniquely human dignity freed from theological moorings 
and instead independently anchored in characteristic human traits.44 Kurt Bayertz has 
described this shift, which occurred roughly around the Renaissance, as follows:
Whereas the theology of the Middle Ages had essentially deduced human dignity 
from the human being’s special relationship to God, this idea of the human being 
as imago dei is increasingly covered up (not necessarily replaced) over the centu-
ries to follow by classifications decreeing the human being an independent being 
within the terrestrial world. Dignity is thus no longer comprehended as reflection, 
falling upon the human being from the transcendental world, but as the epitome 
of everything the human being represents within this world.45
With the unmooring of dignity from divinity, Bayertz continues, modern philosophy came 
to premise human dignity on three elements that were perceived to constitute humanity: 
intellectual reasoning, constant (almost inevitable) self-improvement, and self-norming 
autonomy.46 As Bayertz concludes, the result is how
the human being defines its own essence as subjectivity. Neither God, nor Fate, 
nor Nature tell the human being what to think or what to do. The human being is 
its own master. To put it pointedly, the human being is no longer just an image of 
God, but has become a kind of God itself, capable of thinking and deciding ratio-
nally, of shaping its environment and itself, and, ultimately, of creating its own 
values and norms.47
44 Robinson’s thesis hinges on the potential (as opposed to actual) possession of “certain person-making 
characteristics” (Robinson, “Divine Image,” 65). This makes future potential (i.e., actualization) the grounds 
of current dignity and, by extension, “core rights.” However, Robinson never explains or enumerates these 
rights.
45 Kurt Bayertz, “Human Dignity: Philosophical Origin and Scientific Erosion of an Idea,” trans. Sarah 
L. Kirkby, in Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity, ed. Kurt Bayertz (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 1996), 74.
46 Bayertz, “Human Dignity,” 75-77.
47 Bayertz, “Human Dignity,” 77.
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Like many others who discuss the theme of human dignity, Bayertz recognizes the coales-
cence of this modernizing shift in the thought of Immanuel Kant, particularly with respect 
to the third constitutive element. “Autonomy,” writes Kant, “is…the ground of the dignity 
of human nature and of every rational nature.”48
 More recently, Michael Rosen has further punctuated the modernist shift by com-
paring Kant’s understanding of dignity to that of Aquinas. For Aquinas, dignity is predi-
cated on a thing’s goodness (1) relative to God and (2) located within God’s good creation. 
Aquinas’s notion of dignity therefore meshes with his understanding of God’s goodness 
permeating every degree of being within all of Creation. Kant, on the other hand, con-
fines the concept of dignity to human beings alone, so that it is “natural for people now 
to assume that all dignity in the full sense of the word has to be human dignity,” thereby 
making “an exception of human beings from the rest of creation.”49 By disconnecting dig-
nity from the God of Creation (that is, the One to whom dignity is properly predicated), 
Kant also disposes human iconicity of the divine—in terms of our having been created 
in God’s image and the interdependence of that identity within God’s Creation. In this 
manner, concludes Rosen, Kant “opened the way for a secular understanding of the dig-
nity of human beings.”50
 The shift away from dignity’s theological foundation also signals a shift toward 
dignity’s humanist meaning. Incidentally, it is the loss of Aquinas’s theologically-grounded 
48 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:436, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 43.
49 Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History & Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 24.
50 Rosen, 25.
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idea of dignity that explains Wesley’s overwhelmingly negative remarks on human digni-
ty.51 For example, Wesley’s disparages of
the writings of many of the ancients [that] abound with gay descriptions of the 
dignity of man; whom some of them paint as having all virtue and happiness in 
his composition, or at least entirely in his power, without being beholden to any 
other being; yea, as self-sufficient, able to live on his own stock, and little inferior 
to God himself.… Accounts of this kind have particularly abounded in the present 
century; and perhaps in no part of the world more than in our own country.52
Here, Wesley provides us with a glimpse of how others had been employing “human 
dignity” to abandon the theological grounds of anthropology, morality, virtue, and hap-
piness. Bear in mind that Wesley (1703-1791) and Kant (1724-1804) are contemporaries 
of one another, and that Kant’s position had been prefigured throughout the 17th and 
18th centuries.53 Thus, Wesley’s dissatisfaction with then-contemporary (1759) accounts 
of human dignity is less a renunciation of dignity per se than it is an indictment of the shift 
in foundation and meaning of dignity described above. Amid what he takes to be increas-
ingly-atheistic accounts of human flourishing, Wesley swings the opposite direction to 
underscore our relation to and dependence on God’s sufficiency.54 In so doing, Wesley 
consistently tempers dignity with a robust iconicity.
51 There are, however, notable exceptions to this generality—a prime example being his commentary 
on the prologue of John’s gospel. There, Wesley connects the incarnation with Christ’s work in raising us “to 
this dignity and happiness” (Notes, John 1:14).
52 Wesley, Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” §§1-2, in Works 2:172. Note, this sermon is a distillation of Part I 
of his lengthy tract The Doctrine of Original Sin (1757). Wesley published the sermon on its own in 1759 and 
included it in his 1760 addition to his Sermons on Several Occasions. Cf. Sermon 63, “The General Spread of 
the Gospel,” §2, in Works 2:486; Sermon 128, “The Deceitfulness of the Human Heart,” §2, in Works 4:151; 
and Sermon 129, “Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels,” §2, in Works 4:162.
53 See the quotations from Bayertz (above) on the historical development and evolution of “dignity” that 
began to emerge in 15th century Europe.
54 This may also explain why Wesley flirts with the Reformed doctrine of total depravity (under the 
auspices of a doctrine of original sin). Original sin and depravity will be treated at length in Chapter 4.
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C. Contemporary Recovery and Ressourcement
 Given the preceding portrait, it is difficult to overstate the magnitude of the modern 
shift—especially by Kant—to the substrate and substance of dignity. But as Michael 
Rosen observes, although it has become common to assume that by dignity we mean 
human dignity, “before Kant this was not so—and nor was it so in the Catholic tradition 
after Kant.”55 Since we have already validated Rosen’s first claim, regarding reflection on 
dignity predating Kant (as in scripture), the task of the present subsection is to investigate 
the second claim by highlighting some examples from the Catholic tradition that continue 
and/or recover the desired theological tradition of dignity.
 The dignity of the human person, viewed in light of having been created in God’s 
image and for God’s goodness, has been a hallmark of official Catholic social teaching for 
the greater part of a century. Granted, the initial work toward a Catholic recovery of dig-
nity can be seen in a number of encyclicals by Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903).56 (Leo XIII, it 
will be noted, also famously promoted the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas as an antidote 
to external modernist, secularist, and “atheist” philosophy and internal resistance to the 
integration of faith and reason.57) However, contemporary minds will likely find Leo’s 
perspective on dignity woefully dated and dripping with hierarchy (and sexism).58 Still, 
55 Rosen, Dignity, 24.
56 See, for example, his encyclicals Quod Apostolici Muneris (1878) and Rerum Novarum (1891).
57 See Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris (August 4, 1879) and allocution Pergratus Nobis (March 7, 
1880—given on the 606th anniversary of Aquinas’s death), both of which recommend the study of Aquinas’s 
philosophy.
58 Such is the position of Michael Rosen in Dignity, 48-53, 91-93.
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his pontificate seems to have opened the door to a recovery of a theological grounding of 
dignity at the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).
 Within the documents of the Second Vatican Council (especially those promul-
gated at its close), dignity is unquestionably a central theological theme. For example, Dig-
nitatis Humanae, the Council’s Declaration on Religious Freedom, opens with a recogni-
tion of the state of the question—that “a sense of the dignity of the human person has been 
impressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man.”59 
But, in the very next paragraph, the Council clarifies that this dignity is not a humanist 
abstraction or lip-service to an innate set of rights (under which religious freedom could 
then be enumerated). Rather, the Council proclaims that “the very dignity of the human 
person…is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.”60 As suggested 
later in the Declaration, the dignity of the human person stems from God’s regard for us as 
a species created by God and in God’s image.61
 In truth, Dignitatis Humanae paves the way for the watershed proclamation in 
Gaudium et Spes, the Council’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. 
It is within this document (arguably the last of the Council) that we hear a resonant recov-
ery of the theological dignity of scripture:
59 Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae (Declaration on Religious Freedom), §1 (December 7, 1965). As with 
the other documents from the Council, the gender-specific language of “man” and “men” is understood to 
encompass the whole human species.
60 Dignitatis Humanae, §2. Elsewhere in the same paragraph, it is maintained that personal dignity 
is connected to being “endowed with reason and free will,” and that this is the foundation of “personal 
responsibility.”
61 Dignitatis Humanae, §11.
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The root reason for human dignity lies in man’s call to communion with God. From 
the very circumstance of his origin [i.e., “that man was created ‘to the image of 
God’ and is capable of knowing and loving his Creator,” §12], man is already invited 
to converse with God. For man would not exist were he not created by God’s love 
and constantly preserved by it; and he cannot live fully according to truth unless 
he freely acknowledges that love and devotes himself to his Creator.62
As the pastoral constitution continues, a recognition of the divine source of our dignity 
in no way derogates from that dignity. Since our “dignity is rooted and perfected in God,” 
we have been “called as a son to commune with God and share in His happiness.”63 At the 
same time, Gaudium et Spes reorients dignity away from a one-dimensional focus on our 
intellectual faculties (imitative as they are of God), or as something that could be granted 
by a socio-political body. More precisely, the Council looks to the life, death, and resur-
rection of Christ Jesus to reveal the heart of our dignity: “Since in [Christ] the assumed 
human nature has not been annulled, by this very thing, it has also been raised up to a 
sublime dignity in us.”64
 Since the Second Vatican Council, many Catholic theologians have continued 
to carry forward this theological interpretation of dignity, especially through ressource-
ment to scripture and the tradition of the Church. One particularly noteworthy retrieval 
is found in the work of the late Catholic theologian William E. May, who has unpacked 
62 Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World), §19 (Decem-
ber 7, 1965).
63 Gaudium et Spes, §21.
64 Gaudium et Spes, §22. This is my translation from the Latin text, which reads, “Cum in Eo natura 
humana assumpta, non perempta sit, eo ipso etiam in nobis ad sublimem dignitatem evecta est.” The English 
translation provided by the Vatican obscures some of the original meaning: “Since human nature as He 
assumed it was not annulled, by that very fact it has been raised up to a divine dignity in our respect too.”
76
dignity according to a threefold typology of nature, grace, and glory in Aquinas.65 First, 
there is the dignity of nature, which, as an indelible gift of God, is proper to us as persons 
and corresponds with the “fitting-ness” aspect of dignity. As May explains, the dignity 
of nature names our very capacity for God (capax Dei) and for communion with God (as 
described in Gaudium et Spes). The first kind of dignity makes us capable of participation 
in the second kind of dignity—the dignity of grace. “This is the dignity we are to give 
to ourselves (with the help of God’s never-failing grace) by freely choosing to shape our 
choices and actions in accord with the truth.”66 As such, it is “an achievement made pos-
sible…only by God’s unfailing grace.”67 May’s language here can be a bit misleading, and 
it is important to note that he is not saying that grace is somehow a human achievement. 
Instead, the actualization of this second of dignity is only realized in cooperation with 
God’s restoring, empowering grace building upon the capacities of the dignity of nature.68 
This leads to the third type of dignity, that of glory or sanctity. “This is the dignity we have 
as ‘children of God’” who have been “given the vocation to become holy” and “co-workers 
with Christ, his collaborators in redeeming the world.”69 May observes that this third type 
65 William E. May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, 2nd ed. (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor 
Publishing, 2003), 41-44. May is here interpreting Aquinas’s theological anthropology in ST I.93.4, where 
Aquinas addresses the image of God existing in humans according to nature, grace, and glory. Thus, in terms 
of dignity, there is within humans both a gift and a capacity.
66 May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, 42.
67 May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, 41.
68 The nature and dynamic of grace within Aquinas’s theology will be treated at length below in Chapter 
6. There we shall see how, for Aquinas, God’s grace operating in the human soul is the formal principle of 
our justification; God’s cooperative grace then works with and in the human soul as the formal principle of 
meritorious acts. In this sense, the dignity of grace may be called a “human achievement”—but one never 
separated from God.
69 See May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, 44.
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of dignity is closely bound to the second—and rightfully so. Whereas nature and grace 
differ in kind (thus grace opens us to what is super-natural), grace and glory differ only 
in degree. Accordingly, our ultimate dignity is to be found in actually knowing and loving 
God by means of ongoing communion and conformity with the Divine.
 Similar to May’s typology is that of Ron Highfield, who, although not Catholic, 
expresses clear resonances with a Catholic recovery of dignity as theological. Highfield 
brilliantly articulates a relational interpretation of human dignity that moves beyond 
static renderings of standard imago Dei-based accounts.70 Instead of turning to modern/
Enlightenment accounts of human dignity (e.g., Descartes, Rousseau, Kant), Highfield 
mines the wisdom of the Church Fathers and medieval theologians to unearth a threefold 
iconic dignity similar to May’s interpretation of Aquinas. For Highfield, human dignity 
may be expressed in terms of an “excellence of nature” (an inherent worth attributable to 
the qualities with which we have been created), a “moral excellence” (an acquired worth 
attributable to God’s gracious gifts), and as a “belovedness” (a superior worth founded upon 
God’s favor and love for humans).71 As Highfield explains, “Being loved by God bestows a 
dignity on us that far surpasses the excellence of our nature or of our moral performance” 
because it relates us to the dignitatis Dei, which “is both inherent and relational.”72 As 
70 See Ron Highfield, “Beyond the ‘Image of God’ Conundrum: A Relational View of Human Dignity,” 
Christian Studies 24 (2010): 21-32. An expanded version of this article is featured in Highfield, God, Free-
dom and Human Dignity: Embracing a God-Centered Identity in a Me-Centered Culture (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2013), 191-206.
71 Highfield, “Beyond the ‘Image of God’ Conundrum,” 24.
72 Highfield, “Beyond the ‘Image of God’ Conundrum,” 27, 29.
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with May, Highfield relates our superlative dignity to the multi-directional love of God as 
revealed in scripture, Christian tradition, and human experience.
D. Summary
 In summary, we might return to a macroscopic view of dignity by asking what 
these resources either have in common or reveal about the understanding of dignity being 
proposed. According to a theological interpretation of dignity, human dignity is not to 
be understood as a standalone concept, as though it were absolute or unqualified. If we 
are to speak of dignity in an absolute sense, it must be reserved exclusively for the God-
head (cf. Rev. 4:11). When we refer to the dignity of human nature, it is always relative to 
our movement toward and participation in divine dignity. To put it differently, whether 
we speak of dignity descriptively—as having been made “very good” in God’s own image 
(Gen. 1:27, 31), “a little lower than God, and crowned…with glory and honor” (Ps. 8:5)—
or prescriptively—as the call to lead lives worthy of God (e.g., Phil. 1:27; 1 Thess. 2:12; 2 
Thess. 1:5; Col. 1:10; 3 John 6)—the message is clear: the dignity of humanity is located in 
our participation in God and is always to be held in creative tension with our iconicity.
3. The Perichoresis of “Icon” and “Dignity”
 It is no accident that dignity returns to iconicity: there exists a reciprocal relation-
ship between the two concepts. Furthermore, the account of dignity presented here pur-
posefully suggests a telos similar to that of an Eastern Orthodox theology of icons: theosis, 
participation in the superlative goodness and dignity of God, as exemplified in Christ, our 
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iconic exemplar and archetype. In point of fact, John of Damascus’s practical-theological 
defense of icons also presents a “Christoform” theological anthropology of participational 
dignity. John appeals to the authority of St. Gregory of Nyssa to claim that,
just as the custom is that those who fashion images of rulers, as well as expressing 
their features, express the imperial dignity by garments of purple, and it is custom-
arily called both image and emperor, so too human nature, since it is fashioned to 
rule everything else, is set up as a kind of living image, participating in its arche-
type in both dignity and name [οἷόν τις ἔμψθχος εἰκὼν ἀνεστάθη, κοινωνοῦσα τῷ 
ἀρχετύπῳ καὶ τῆς ἀξίας καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος].73
The archetype is Christ, the very Image of God (Col. 1:15), whose incarnation confirms 
the dignity of humanity conferred by God at Creation. On that account, we are said to be 
images of the Image of God,74 bearing both an iconic ontology and dignity.75
 We are icons of the Divine, dignified to participate in and reflect God’s radiant life 
and love in an ever-growing perichoresis of iconicity and dignity, humanity and divinity. 
Wesley beautifully encapsulates this sentiment in his description of what he calls “spiri-
tual respiration”:
God is continually breathing, as it were, upon his soul, and his soul is breathing 
unto God. Grace is descending into his heart, and prayer and praise ascending to 
heaven. And by this intercourse between God and man, this fellowship with the 
Father and the Son, as by a kind of spiritual respiration, the life of God in the soul 
is sustained: and the child of God grows up, till he comes to “the full measure of 
the stature of Christ.”76
73 John of Damascus, On the Divine Images, Treatise I, §49 (47).
74 For more on the Orthodox Christian perspective of a Christological anthropology, see Nicolae Răzvan 
Stan, “Human Person as a Being Created in the Image of God and as the Image of the Son: The Orthodox 
Christian Perspective,” International Journal of Orthodox Theology 2, no. 3 (2011): 120-143. 
75 See Panayiotis Nellas, Deification in Christ: Orthodox Perspectives on the Nature of the Human Person, 
trans. Norman Russell (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1987), 33-34.
76 Wesley, Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” II.4, in Works 2:193. Typical of the time, Wesley’s language is 
gendered. By “his,” Wesley means “the Christian’s.”
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The pattern of human flourishing in communion with God rightfully upholds our dignity 
as predicated upon the lavish gifts of God’s grace. This includes the imprint of God’s image 
on our nature, which imitates the perichoretic procession of God’s love within the Trinity. 
But the dignity that God graciously invests in humanity is not an end in itself; as icons, we 
are to return God’s gifts to God in the form of service and worship. Doing otherwise would 
betray the icon for an idol.
 Our dignity is proportionate (ἀξία/ἄξιος) to our reflectivity of God. Sadly, it is easy 
to misinterpret this axiom to assume (wrongly) that only those who are Christians have 
dignity, or (wrongly) that those who are “better Christians” have “more dignity” than 
others. As we shall see, such misinterpretations miss the mark of how the imago Dei is 
present in every person inasmuch as God has constituted human nature with the capacity 
to participate in God by knowing and loving and experiencing God.77
 “Dignity” is indeed wrapped up with “aptitude” and “capacity,” but it is not limited 
to this sense alone.78 By pairing “iconic” with “dignity,” we keep in mind the imitative 
aspect of dignity—a dignity first predicated of God, then imitatively of us—that unites us 
to the most inexhaustibly profound depth and degree of dignity possible: the knowledge 
and love of God. The “closer” we come to God, the more we participate in God, and the 
77 This topic—the capax Dei stemming from the imago Dei—comes to light especially in Chapter 2, 
Section 2, on “Humanity in the Imago Dei.” In particular, we will see at that point how Aquinas’s mature 
analysis of a threefold imago Dei in humans (ST I.93.4) underscores the idea of “appropriateness” and “fit-
tingness” contained in the language of dignitas and ἀξία/ἄξιος. That is to say, the interplay of iconicity and 
dignity will feature prominently in that assessment of Aquinas’s essential theological anthropology.
78 Compare the meanings of “aptus” and “dignus” in Roy J. Deferrari, M. Inviolata Barry, and Ignatius 
McGuiness, A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 
1948), 78 and 310. Aptitudo may be interpreted as “suited, suitable, proper, fit, adapted, apposite,” and dignus 
as “worthy, suitable, fitting, proper.”
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more “worthy” we become of God. In other words, the perichoresis of “icon” and “dig-
nity” means that we signify what dignifies and dignify what signifies.
 Taken together, then, iconic dignity may be defined as a participational goodness 
characterized by a tri-directional interplay of nature, grace, and virtue: (1) of human nature 
formed according to God’s image—but never equal thereto; (2) of God’s grace empower-
ing human response and growth in holy love—but never merited by human nature alone; 
and (3) of virtues and habits worthy of “the mind of Christ”—but never isolated from their 
theological root. Or, as St. Leo the Great taught over 1500 years ago :
If we reflect upon the beginning of our creation with faith and wisdom, dearly 
beloved, we shall come to the realization that human beings have been formed 
according to the image of God precisely with a view that they might imitate their 
Designer. Our race has this dignity of nature, so long as the figure of divine good-
ness continues to be reflected in us as in a kind of mirror. Indeed, the Savior’s grace 
refashions us to this image on a daily basis.… It is by loving that God refashions us 
to his image. That he might find in us the image of his goodness, he gives us the 
very means by which we can perform the works that we do—by lighting the lamps 
of our minds and inflaming us with the fire of his love, so that we might love not 
only him but also whatever he loves.… There will be no other way for us to possess 
any grandeur of divine majesty within us except by imitating his will.79
Dignity is the heart of God; iconicity is how we get there. Let us now turn to discover both 
within the theologies of John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas.
79 St. Leo the Great, Sermon 12 (17 December 450), in St. Leo the Great: Sermons, trans. Jane Patri-
cia Freeland and Agnes Josephine Conway (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1996), 49-50.
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PART I. NATURE
Considerandum est de homine, qui ex spirituali et corporali substantia com-
ponitur.… Naturam autem hominis considerare pertinent ad theologum ex 
parte anime.
—St. Thomas Aquinas1
CHAPTER 2: 
THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN WESLEY AND AQUINAS
 The purpose of this chapter is to gain a sense of what it means to be human within 
the theologies of John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas. Due consideration of this topic nec-
essarily begins with the framework of all things originating in and conducing to God—a 
core belief that qualifies anthropology as theological. Further, both Aquinas and Wesley 
maintain that humans are formed in God’s very image (imago Dei), and it is this essential 
likeness (limited though it may be) that establishes both the core capacities of human 
nature and its iconic dignity. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, our very ability to 
act—whether for good (through God’s grace and the virtues) or for bad (through our sin 
and its consequences)—relies upon this basic portrait of human nature.
1. Wesley and Aquinas on God and Nature
 For some, “God” may seem like an odd place to begin an analysis of humans in 
Wesley and Aquinas. For others, the opening focus on human nature, which itself seems 
1 ST, I.75, prologue.
83
to begin with the doctrine of God, may seem too systematic, rigid, artificial. In both cases, 
those dissenting voices are likely to be of a Wesleyan persuasion, for there is little question 
that Aquinas begins both his summae with the doctrine of God, from which he freely treats 
the Trinity, the created world, humans, and so on. It has already been noted that Wesley’s 
preferred theological media (sermon, commentaries, letters, liturgy) contrasted with the 
systematic style of Aquinas’s summae, yet the substantive starting point for both is God. 
How could it be otherwise? Since we are investigating theological anthropology, and since 
the capacities of human nature are expressive of God’s image, the logical point of depar-
ture for discussing humans is God.
 Both Wesley and Aquinas are what we may consider “classical Christian theists,” 
and this strongly influences what they have to say about human beings. Specifically, both 
theologians take God to be the beginning and the end of all Creation, humans included. 
Here is a common portrait of a God who creates, redeems, sustains, and perfects. In what 
follows, we will investigate what Wesley and Aquinas have to say with respect to two 
“poles” of created (and thus human) existence in relation to God: first, God as the begin-
ning of all things—that is, God the Creator; second, God as the end of all things—that is, 
God the Perfector.
A. God as Creator-Cause
 It is commonly said that Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae displays a structural orga-
nization of exitus and reditus—a “going-out” of all things from God, and a “return” of all 
things to God. However, the phrase exitus et reditus never actually appears in the Summa; 
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its notoriety stems from M.-D. Chenu’s observations in his Toward Understanding St. 
Thomas.2 In Chenu’s explanation, Aquinas reveals certain Platonic influences in this “ema-
nation and return” scheme.3 And though Chenu’s thesis upholds the general emergence/
return trajectory of the Summa,4 Aquinas’s discussion of “emanation” in ST I.45 marks 
a significant deviation from traditional Platonism. This is because, in question 45, Aqui-
nas intends to discuss the particular mode of “emanation of all being from the universal 
cause”—which is to say, creation.5 Now, by “universal cause,” Aquinas means the “first 
principle of all,” “the efficient, the exemplar, and the final cause of all things,” the source 
of all matter—God.6 But how Aquinas understands God has direct ramifications on what 
it means to create, what God creates, how God creates, and why God creates. And it is pre-
cisely along such causal lines that we begin to discover fundamental doctrinal agreement 
between Wesley and Aquinas. Let us now consider three particulars in turn.
 First, when Aquinas shifts from discussing the immanent Trinity to consider what 
the Trinity does (ad extra), he begins the discussion with causality, maximally-understood. 
As “essentially self-subsisting Being”—the only self-subsisting being, whose essence and 
2 M.-D. Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, trans. A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1964).
3 Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, 304-314.
4 For example, see the very first question of ST (I.1.7 co.), which addresses the subject matter of sacra 
doctrina. For Aquinas, sacra doctrina studies either Godself or those things that are ordered to God as their 
beginning and end (principium et finem)—viz., creatures.
5 Aquinas, ST I.45.1.
6 ST I.44.4 ad 4.
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existence are the same—God is the efficient cause of all that is.7 Michael Dauphinais and 
Matthew Levering note that Aquinas’s notion of efficient causality is largely equivalent 
to a modern understanding of creation: “Something is an efficient cause if it is the force 
that leads something else to occur.”8 And for Aquinas, God not only causes other things 
to occur, God causes all things to be. As elsewhere, Aquinas appeals to a participational 
ontology9 to emphasize what it means to be created: “every being in any way existing is 
from God,” such that “all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by 
participation.”10 In brief, if something is, it is because of God—or, more precisely, because 
of its relationship to God, the ground of all being.
 Wesley’s own teaching on the matter fully aligns with Aquinas’s, even though 
Wesley expresses the doctrine in his own idiom. Thus, “the true God” who is to be wor-
shipped is “the only Cause, the sole Creator of all things,” who is “absolutely necessary for 
the beginning of [the] existence [of all things].”11 Like Aquinas,12 Wesley underscores the 
Christological role in creation, but with an explicit eye toward upholding Christ’s divinity 
7 ST I.44.1. Here, Aquinas references his earlier material (ST I.3.4) on the equation of God’s essence and 
existence, from which he argues that God is the first efficient cause of all.
8 Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering, Knowing the Love of Christ: An Introduction to the Theol-
ogy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 30.
9 John F. Wippel has written some excellent chapters on Aquinas’s metaphysics that particularly address 
a “metaphysics of participation.” See Wippel, “Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, 
85-127. See also Wippel, “Being,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, 77-84. For a brief historical-bib-
liographic account of Aquinas’s doctrine of a metaphysics of participation, see Wippel, “Being,” 84n23. For 
the relevance and relationship of Aquinas’s metaphysics of participation to Wesley’s own doctrinal heritage 
and intellectual milieu, see Long, John Wesley’s Moral Theology, especially 188-195.
10 ST I.44.1.
11 Wesley, Sermon 77, “Spiritual Worship,” I.2-3, in Works 3:91.
12 Cf. ST I.46.3.
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in light of the Deist impulse to reduce the Second Person of the Trinity to a mere man.13 
Wesley counters that heterodoxy by maintaining that Christ’s divinity and righteousness 
are consubstantial with the Divine Nature, “as he is ὁ ὤν,”14 “the being of beings, Jehovah, 
the self-existent, the supreme, the God who is over all, blessed for ever!”15 Wesley’s dox-
ological flourish is altogether appropriate considering his subject matter: because God, 
Creation exists; without God, there is no thing.16
 Second, as God is the efficient cause of all being, God is also the causal Creator of all 
matter.17 En route to a mutual affirmation of the goodness of the material creation, Wesley 
and Aquinas both wax speculative in their attempts to describe an elemental or primary 
form of matter.18 Lest this distract us from their underlying point, we must recognize that 
13 This is but one of many examples of Wesley’s contextualized theological output. As with nearly every-
thing he composes, there is an immediate situation that (for him) demands addressing.
14 Wesley, Sermon 20, “The Lord Our Righteousness,” I.1, in Works 1:452.
15 Wesley, Sermon 21, “Upon the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, Discourse I,” §9, in Works 1:474.
16 Wesley emphasizes the radicalness of our dependence—our subsistence—upon God in numerous 
places, but what he has to say in Sermon 77, “Spiritual Worship,” I.3 and 5, is largely representative of the 
whole. God is the cause of our and every being, and continually so. One dramatic outworking of this doc-
trine is evident in Wesley’s economics: if we cannot properly “possess” even our own being (esse in Aquinas’s 
Latin), how can we possibly lay claim to any of the material goods in Creation? See, for example, Wesley, 
Notes, Luke 16:9, 12.
17 The Thomist commentator Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange notes that, while Creation has an efficient, 
an exemplary, and a final cause, it does not have a material cause. See Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality: A Synthe-
sis of Thomistic Thought, trans. Patrick Cummins (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1950), 105.
18 Aquinas advances the term “primary matter” (materia prima) as that primordial “stuff ” that specifies 
and determines the form of a thing (ST I.44.2). Fundamentally, it is not independent of God, but is counted 
among the things “created by the universal cause of things.” For his part, Wesley puts forward the four 
elements (earth, water, air, and fire) as “the four constituent parts of the universe: the true, original, simple 
elements,” each distinct and yet thoroughly mixed in all physical things. See Wesley, Sermon 56, “God’s 
Approbation of His Works,” I.1, in Works 2:388; cf. Sermon 77, “Spiritual Worship,” I.5, in Works 3:92. Both 
theologians’ explanations are likely to sound jarringly primitive to modern ears influenced by advances in 
scientific discovery. For more on Wesley’s interaction with the sciences of his day, see Randy L. Maddox, 
“Wesley’s Engagement with the Natural Sciences,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Wesley, 160-175.
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both theologians are staunch advocates of the orthodox doctrine of creatio ex nihilo—and 
that this doctrine is in service of what they have to say about the very goodness of Cre-
ation.19 As Wesley exhorts,
evil did not exist at all in the original nature of things. It was no more the necessary 
result of matter than it was the necessary result of spirit. All things then, with-
out exception, were very good. And how should they be otherwise? There was no 
defect at all in the power of God, any more than in his goodness or wisdom. His 
goodness inclined him to make all things good: and this was executed by his power 
and wisdom.20
For his part, Aquinas maintains the goodness of all Creation—including, specifically, cor-
poreal creatures—precisely because anything that exists “is” because of God and must 
therefore participate in God’s being and goodness.21
 Third, part of the goodness of Creation is to be found in God’s wise and exemplary 
causation, which is connected with the procession of the Son as wisdom in Creation.22 
Now, when Aquinas briefly discusses God as the exemplar cause of all things, it is true 
that he is trading on a highly Platonic conception of “types” and “ideas”; but, given his 
responses to the objections, it is quite clear that he is trying to express the notion that in 
19 For Wesley’s adherence to ex nihilo, see, for example, Sermon 57, “On the Fall of Man,” II.6, in Works 
2:409; cf. Wesley’s commentary on Gen. 1:1, in John Wesley, Explanatory Notes on the Old Testament, 3 
vols. (Bristol, UK: Pine, 1765). Wesley’s Old Testament Notes do not carry the same kind of quasi-canonical 
status that his New Testament Notes do. Wesley also very clearly acknowledges that these Old Testament 
Notes are almost exclusively woven together from four other biblical commentaries. As for Aquinas, see ST 
I.45.1.
20 Wesley, Sermon 56, “God’s Approbation of His Works,” II.2, in Works 2:399. Emphasis added.
21 See ST I.65 on the topic of material, bodily creatures being from God. Further, Aquinas argues 
throughout ST that like things cause like things. So, since the Trinitarian processions cause Creation, Cre-
ation occurs through the wisdom of the Son and through the love of the Spirit (ST I.45.6).
22 See ST I.46.3 for the correlation of efficiency, potency, and God as Father, and exemplarity, wisdom, 
and God as Son.
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God resides the paradigm of all Creation.23 This explains the Christological connection 
he makes two questions later. His commentary on John 13:15 (“For I have given to you an 
example [ὑπόδειγμα]”) only further confirms this line of interpretation:
Note that the Son of God is a fitting and sufficient example [in exemplum virtutum] 
for us. For he is the art of the Father [ars Patri], and just as he was the model or 
pattern for every thing created [exemplar creationis], so he was the model for our 
justification [exemplar iustificationis]: “Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an 
example that you should follow in his steps” (1 Pet. 2:21).24
To connect these elements, Aquinas here affirms the Trinitarian nature of creating, the 
wise and intelligible (“logical,” on the reading of Christ as logos) conception of creating, 
and the Christ-shaped pattern of human flourishing.25
 Without employing the language of metaphysics, Wesley still very much expresses 
a doctrine of God as the exemplar cause in Creation. In a late sermon, Wesley writes that
the wisdom, as well as the power of God, is abundantly manifested in his creation, 
in the formation and arrangement of all his works…and in adapting them all to the 
several ends for which they were designed…all conspiring together in one con-
nected system, to the glory of God in the happiness of his intelligent creatures.26
As we have already seen, Wesley reads Creation as inherently good because it is the work 
of God; here, Wesley unites this goodness under the headings of God’s power and wisdom, 
23 ST I.44.3. Other interpreters of Aquinas have alternatively described this exemplar causality in terms 
of a “blueprint,” no doubt because Aquinas illustrates his own meaning with an anecdote of an artificer 
desiring to build something and first having the example in mind. Thus, see Dauphinais and Levering, 
Knowing the Love of Christ, 31; see also Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, 111.
24 Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of John, 13-21, trans. Fabian Larcher and James A. Weisheipl, ed. 
Daniel Keating and Matthew Levering (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 21. 
The quote is taken from the third lecture on John 13.
25 See, for example, ST I.45.6 and 7. Of course, ST III.1-59 approaches Christology with an explicit 
understanding that Jesus Christ is Lord, Savior, and Way (cf. prologue).
26 Wesley, Sermon 68, “The Wisdom of God’s Counsels,” §2, in Works 2:552. The proem of this sermon, 
published in 1784, echoes what he had written two years earlier in the proem to Sermon 56, “God’s Appro-
bation of His Works,” §§1-2, in Works 2:387-388.
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which is “clearly deduced from the things that are seen, from the goodly order of the uni-
verse.”27 The ordering of Creation according to a connected, compact system, is analogous 
to Aquinas’s exemplar causality—but so, too, is what Wesley has to say concerning the 
Word’s involvement in creating. Specifically, the Word is the means by which God creates 
and is “the foundation of life to every living thing, as well as of being to all that is” and 
“the fountain of wisdom, holiness, and happiness.”28 As such, the Word-made-flesh is our 
exemplar par excellence, both in terms of how he reveals the mind and will of God, and in 
how he patterns for us the way of holiness and happiness.29
B. God as Perfection-End
 To speak of cause as Wesley and Aquinas do is to speak of being and animation—
which is to say, motion.30 But movement is not arbitrary, nor is God’s Creation (especially 
in light of exemplar causality). The beginning of all things is intimately, inextricably con-
27 Sermon 26, “Upon the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, Discourse VI,” III.7, in Works 1:580-581. The 
twin themes of power and wisdom in creating find a parallel in Aquinas (ST I.45.6 ad 3; ST I.46.3), who 
further connects power to God the Father and wisdom to God the Son.
28 Wesley, Notes, John 1:4.
29 Cf. Notes, John 9:5; John 10:4; Phil. 2:12; and 1 John 2:8. Further, what is predicated of “the true God” 
is likewise fully predicated of Jesus Christ. Cf. Sermon 77, “Spiritual Worship,” I.10-II.1, in Works 3:94-95.
30 Both Wesley and Aquinas attribute any and all forms of motion singularly to God’s agency. Aquinas 
famously argues this as the first of his Five Ways of demonstrating God’s existence (ST I.2.3). Borrowing 
from Aristotle’s understanding of motion, Aquinas posits that we may observe—without the aid of revela-
tion—clear evidence for God’s existence if we understand God to be a Primary, Unmoved Mover who is the 
cause of all subsequent motion.
Wesley’s argument for God as the author of all motion is frequently tied to God as the maker of all 
matter. Physical matter is entirely inert in Wesley’s natural philosophy, and he even goes to the extent to 
argue, on principle, against Newton’s theory of gravitation because it would seem to posit a natural motion 
to/in matter without God’s prior motion. See Sermon 77, “Spiritual Worship,” I.5-6, in Works 3:92-93; and 
Sermon 56, “God’s Approbation of His Works,” I.1, in Works 2:388.
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nected to the end of all things. The truth of the Christian witness for Wesley and Aquinas 
is that the Alpha and Omega are One.
The Lord God is both the Alpha or beginning, and the Omega, or end of all things. 
God is the beginning, as he is the Author and Creator of all things, and as he pro-
poses, declares, and promises so great things. He is the end, as he brings all the 
things which are here revealed to a complete and glorious conclusion. Again, the 
beginning and end of a thing, is in Scripture styled the whole thing. Therefore God 
is the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, that is, one who is all 
things, and always the same.31
God is our End, in whom we find our perfection, rest, and ultimate happiness. Aquinas 
expresses this connection of Creation to its End as a final causality based on “the first 
principle of all things.”32 Due to the goodness of divine perfection, God also wills to com-
municate this divine goodness to all creatures as their proper perfection.33 In this way, “all 
things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be 
intellectual or sensible, or natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and 
desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God.”34
 That notion of participation in God’s likeness as Creation’s End carries with it a 
major qualification: “inasmuch as we are creatures and God is our Creator.” The distinc-
tion is critical because we, unlike God, are finite. We do not have the capacity to possess 
the perfect attributes of God.35 We are neither the source, the sustenance, nor the summit 
31 Wesley, Notes, Revelation 1:8.
32 Aquinas, ST I.44.4 ad 4.
33 ST I.44.4 co. Notice here the nuanced understanding of dignity as a proper fit or appropriateness of 
one thing to/for another.
34 ST I.44.4 ad 3.
35 Both Wesley and Aquinas uphold the “classical” attributes of God, such as God’s infinity, eternal-
ity, incorporeality, presence, knowledge, power, sanctity, goodness, etc. For an example from Wesley, see 
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of all things—God is, and in God is found the perfection of all things.36 But in creatures 
of a rational nature—humans37—perfection-as-end, which is located in God, is radically 
distinct. Since humans have been created according to God’s own image, we have the 
capacity to know and to love, to reason and to will. While the specifics of these capacities 
will be addressed more comprehensively in Chapter 3, we must at the very least raise them 
here insofar as they pertain to the nature of humanity’s glorious end.
 Owing considerably to a pivotal reading of 2 Peter 1:4 (“that you may become par-
ticipants in the divine nature”), Wesley and Aquinas comprehend our End as communion 
and fellowship with God, whose very nature is Love.38 Commenting on 1 John 4:8, Wesley 
writes, “God is often styled holy, righteous, wise: but not holiness, righteousness, or 
wisdom in the abstract: as he is said to be love, intimating that this is his darling, his reign-
ing attribute; the attribute that sheds an amiable glory on all his other perfections.”39 “The 
Divine Essence Itself is charity,” Aquinas similarly remarks, “even as It is wisdom and 
Sermon 120, “The Unity of the Divine Being,” §§1-8, in Works 4:61-63. For Aquinas, see his treatise on the 
One God, ST I.2-26, especially regarding God’s perfect perfection (ST I.4.1).
36 See Wesley, Sermon 120, “The Unity of the Divine Being,” §4, in Works 4:62. See Aquinas, ST I.4.2.
37 It must be noted that, for Aquinas as well as for Wesley, human beings do not exhaust the category 
of “rational creatures.” Angels fall squarely within this classification, the difference (among others) being 
that angels are incorporeal while we are not. A very possible topic for further, separate study would be a 
comparison of the angelologies of Aquinas and Wesley. For the sake of constraining the scope of the present 
study, I have foregone a consideration of angels. For more on angelology, see Wesley, Sermons 71 and 72, 
“Of Good Angels” and “Of Evil Angels” (respectively), in Works 3:3-29; see also Aquinas’s treatise on angels 
in ST I.50-64.
38 For an excellent treatment on the role of 2 Peter 1:4 in the moral theologies of Wesley and Aquinas, 
see Long, John Wesley’s Moral Theology, 195-202. Also, it should be noted that while Aquinas takes “Love” to 
be the proper name of the Holy Spirit (as he does “Word” for the Son), this attribute is likewise predicated of 
the entire Trinity. Kenneth M. Loyer superbly explicates this in God’s Love through the Spirit, 63-100.
39 Wesley, Notes, 1 John 4:8.
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goodness.”40 Wesley’s and Aquinas’s works are similarly saturated with this foundational 
formula, making further itemized citation both impractical and unnecessary. Our present 
concern addresses human participation in this divine essence and goodness, which is the 
perfection and end of the species.
 Both Wesley and Aquinas reserve their most robust theological language for 
characterizing the nature of humanity’s goal and perfection as it is grounded in God. In 
Wesley’s writings, this is styled as “holiness and happiness”—a singular concept that 
receives further nuance in its correlation to Christian perfection, righteousness, perfect 
love, sanctity, and true religion.41 “As the more holy we are upon earth,” writes Wesley, 
“the more happy we must be (seeing there is an inseparable connection between holiness 
and happiness).”42 Elsewhere, Wesley proclaims that God “made all things to be happy. 
He made man to be happy in himself,” even urging parents to teach this to their children, 
saying, “‘He made you; and he made you to be happy in him; and nothing else can make 
you happy.’”43
40 ST II-II.23.2 ad 1. When Aquinas mentions “wisdom” and “goodness,” he is speaking with the Trinity 
in mind: the Son, whose proper name is “Word,” pertains to wisdom (and thus to intellect); the Spirit, 
whose proper name is “Love,” pertains to goodness (and thus to will’s desire). But, as mentioned above, love 
is properly predicated of all the Persons of the Trinity, for it is “the Divine Essence Itself.”
41 The particular conjunction of “holiness and happiness” is an expression appearing in Wesley’s ser-
mons at least 54 times, according to Albert C. Outler, the editor of the sermons for the modern critical 
edition of Wesley’s Works. See Outler, Theology in the Wesleyan Spirit, 83-84.
42 Sermon 59, “God’s Love to Fallen Man,” I.10, in Works 2:431. Cf. Sermon 5, “Justification by Faith,” 
I.4, in Works 1:185 and n.18; Sermon 7, “The Way to the Kingdom,” I.12, in Works 1:224; Sermons 26, 30, 
and 33, “Sermon on the Mount VI” (III.8), “Sermon on the Mount, X” (§20), and “Sermon on the Mount, 
XIII” (II.3), in Works 1:582, 660, and 693 (respectively); and Sermon 70, “The Case of Reason Impartially 
Considered,” II.10, in Works 2:600.
43 Sermon 120, “The Unity of the Divine Being,” §§9-10, in Works 4:63-64.
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 For even the casual student of Aquinas, Wesley’s portrait of “holiness and happi-
ness” is bound to resonate with Aquinas’s notion of beatitudo—that blessed happiness 
that is “the last end of human life [ultimus finis humanae vitae].”44 For rational creatures, 
this supreme goal finds its culmination in knowing and loving God.45
Now the proper object of love is the good, as stated above [I-II.27.1], so that wher-
ever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But the Divine 
good [bonum divinum], inasmuch as it is the object of happiness [beatitudinis obiec-
tum], has a special aspect of good [specialem rationem boni], wherefore the love of 
charity [amor caritatis], which is the love of that good [amor huius boni], is a special 
kind of love.46
Like Wesley,47 Aquinas heartily maintains that, even though a perfect love—absolute 
happiness, holiness, and beatitude—is not attainable in the sphere of present human 
existence (i.e., pre-glorification, on earth), an imperfect (inchoata)48 form of love may be 
attained in this life by means of participation.49 Pure, perfect, and ultimate beatitudo is an 
uninterrupted communion with God consisting in nothing else than the Beatific Vision, 
the vision of the Divine Essence.50
 So starkly similar are Wesley’s and Aquinas’s conceptions of the end of all things 
(especially of humans) that it is highly beneficial to interpret and expand the one in light 
44 ST I-II.1 proem.
45 ST I-II.1.8.
46 ST II-II.23.4. I offer more of Aquinas’s original Latin here due to the instrumentality and specificity of 
his language, and the nuance he is attempting to achieve therewith.
47 See Wesley, Sermon 120, “The Unity of the Divine Being,” §11, in Works 4:64-65.
48 See Aquinas, ST I-II.2.3 co.
49 ST I-II.5.3.
50 ST I-II.3.8.
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of the other. What does beatitudo mean? Certainly nothing less than holiness and happi-
ness. And what does holiness and happiness entail? A foretaste of the beatific vision and 
fellowship with God, no doubt. Indeed, the fruit of such a mutual and critical reading of 
this human end has been demonstrated recently in an ecumenical study of Wesley and 
Aquinas on Christian perfection.51
 Although more could be said in service of the strong correspondence of Aqui-
nas’s beatitudo to Wesley’s “holiness and happiness”—including the clear Aristotelian 
eudaimonianism informing both52—the above account is sufficient for the present pur-
pose of sketching the general trajectory of humans in relation to God as both Origin and 
Terminus. But what is the consequence of this doctrinal formation? As Aquinas states in 
the prologue to the prodigious Secunda Pars of Summa Theologiae:
Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God’s 
image, in so far as the image implies “an intelligent being endowed with free-will 
and self-movement”: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e., God, and of 
those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; 
it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e., man, inasmuch as he too is the principle 
of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.53
Having first treated the cause of our being, nature, and constitution, we may now turn, 
with Aquinas, to the unique effect and significance of God’s imago within humanity.
51 See Colón-Emeric, Wesley, Aquinas & Christian Perfection.
52 This topic is indeed one pregnant with possibilities. Establishing Aquinas’s indebtedness to the Sta-
girite is as straightforward as turning to the third article of the first question of the Summa Theologiae, and 
then proceeding through all 3500+ references to “the Philosopher.” Tracing the exposure to and influence of 
Aristotle upon Wesley is a bit more challenging. It is true that Wesley is best read as a eudaemonist, as Outler 
observes in Theology in the Wesleyan Spirit, 81-88. Further, it is true that Aristotle is one of the foremost 
classical eudaemonists. And it is likely that Wesley was suitably exposed to Aristotle (including his Ethics) 
during his many years at Oxford.
53 ST I-II, proem.
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2. Humanity in the Imago Dei
 Most theological anthropologies hinge on the concept of imago Dei—the image of 
God impressed upon the human species, which distinguishes humanity from the rest of 
Creation and capacitates us for fellowship with God. This is no less the case in the theolo-
gies of Wesley and Aquinas, for whom God’s image within humanity is a type of Alpha and 
Omega—though its consummation (i.e., the restoration of the image) is even more glo-
rious than its origin (i.e., Creation). But restoration implies that something has been lost, 
and that topic—sin, original and personal—will be reserved for Chapter 4. Also implied 
in the present discussion are characteristic human faculties and attributes that are rooted 
in God’s image. We acknowledge those below but will properly discuss them in Chapter 3. 
For now, the objective is to paint a broad picture of imago Dei in Wesley and Aquinas.
A. Wesley on the Image of God
 “The image of God” is one of the more ubiquitous motifs in Wesley’s sermons and 
New Testament Notes, with approximately 150 combined references. Still, because of the 
prominence of imago Dei discourse in contemporary theology, it is easy for modern eyes 
simply to overlook Wesley’s numerous references. However, if we approach “the image of 
God” as a leitmotif of Wesley’s theology (based on its frequency in Wesley’s works), imago 
Dei provides key insights for establishing his theological anthropology. What then does 
Wesley mean by the phrase “the image of God”?
 Wesley chiefly explains the imago Dei by stringing together various parallel con-
cepts, phrases, or passages of scripture. Thus, “righteousness…is the image of God, the 
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mind which was in Christ Jesus. It is every holy and heavenly temper in one; springing 
from as well as terminating in the love of God as our Father and Redeemer, and the love 
of all men for his sake.”54 To this typical account, Wesley elsewhere adds that the image 
of God is an imprint of God’s holiness and love,55 God’s favor,56 and a renewal or resto-
ration of “the life of God in the soul.”57 Two observations emerge from this representative 
sample. First, the image of God is characteristically prefaced by restoration. Restoration 
implies a lack of something that had once been possessed, and in this case, Wesley seems 
to imply a restoration of a lost original justice or original righteousness.58 At this point, 
Wesley echoes what Aquinas has to say about the perfection and innocence of humans in 
the state of original justice (iustitia originalis).59 However, Wesley raises this state to focus 
on a future renovation of the image.60
 Second, the “substance” of the image of God that is restored is, for Wesley, moral. 
As seen above, the full imago Dei is a pattern of life shaped by love—God’s essential attri-
54 Wesley, Sermon 22, “Sermon on the Mount, Discourse II,” II.2, in Works 1:495.
55 Sermon 5, “Justification by Faith,” I.1, in Works 1:184. Cf. Sermon 12, “The Witness of Our Own 
Spirit,” §16, in Works 1:310.
56 Sermon 6, “The Righteousness of Faith,” I.12, in Works 1:209. Note how this will come to parallel one 
of the ways in which Wesley understands grace. See Chapter 6, below.
57 Sermon 21, “Sermon on the Mount, Discourse I,” I.11, in Works 1:481. See also Sermon 12, “The Wit-
ness of Our Own Spirit,” §16, in Works 1:310; Sermon 29, “Sermon on the Mount, Discourse IX,” in Works 
1:644; and Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” III.5, in Works 2:185.
58 See Sermon 5, “Justification by Faith,” I.1-4, in Works 1:481-482. This description is fairly emblematic 
of Wesley’s account of humanity in its original, perfect, and paradisiacal state—especially that humans were 
“holy and happy” (I.4). 
59 See Aquinas, ST I.100.1; and ST I-II.81.2.
60 While some of Wesley’s references imply a present orientation of the restoration of the image—i.e., as 
the righteousness of justification and the favor of God—his focus on the inherent growth (in grace) subse-
quent to justification maintains a perennial future orientation.
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bute and the fullness of Christ’s mind.61 Wesley especially addresses “the image of God” 
within his thirteen sermons on the Sermon on the Mount, that “locus classicus of evangel-
ical ethics.”62 Thus, Wesley’s threefold explication of Christ’s Sermon—viz., the character 
of a Christian, the actions of a Christian, and the hindrances in reaching the Christian’s 
end63—should be read as an extended meditation on moral theology through the lens of a 
restoration of the image of God in all true holiness.64
 In addition to the above “restoration/morality” interpretation, Wesley details what 
we might call a “capacity/nature” interpretation of the imago Dei. In a perfected sense, the 
image according to “capacity/nature” is a type or degree of the “restoration/morality” 
image—namely, the pattern of original perfection that is to be restored. Wesley’s early 
sermon on the imago Dei substantiates this kind of maximalist reading of God’s image 
according to the “capacity/nature” mode:
an unerring understanding, an uncorrupt will, and perfect freedom—gave the last 
stroke to the image of God in man, by crowning all these with happiness. Then 
indeed to live was to enjoy, when every faculty was in its perfection, amidst abun-
dance of objects which infinite wisdom had purposely suited to it, when man’s 
understanding was satisfied with truth, as his will was with good; when he was at 
full liberty to enjoy either the Creator or the creation; to indulge in rivers of pleasure, 
ever new, ever pure from any mixture of pain.65
61 For Wesley, love is an actively moral concept. In recognizing this, we must also appreciate how the 
moral restoration of the image of God is not a reinstatement of the capacity for moral action, but instead the 
rehabilitation of the person in genuinely moral activity.
62 Outler, “An Introductory Comment [to Wesley’s Sermons 21-33],” in Works 1:466. Within these ser-
mons, Wesley mentions “image of God” twelve times directly, with an additional six indirect or implicit 
references.
63 See Wesley, Sermon 30, “Sermon on the Mount, Discourse X,” §§1-3, in Works 1:650-651.
64 This is precisely how Long (for one) reads Wesley in John Wesley’s Moral Theology.
65 Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” I.4, in Works 4:295. Emphasis added. This sermon, preached 
November 15, 1730, is Wesley’s first public “university sermon,” given at St. Mary’s, Oxford.
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While the specific faculties will be analyzed in the following chapter, it is important to 
note here that Wesley is claiming that the maximization of our faculties is tantamount to 
the full image of God expressed within human nature. To operate in this ideal fashion is to 
radiate divine happiness in a manner similar to God. Furthermore, this roots our “natural 
faculties” in God’s own nature; by way of creation, God has shaped us to participate in 
God’s glorious, happy image.
 In a less-idealistic (yet oft-quoted) passage from a later sermon, Wesley summarizes 
the prior sketch of the basic human faculties as the natural image of God.66 The qualifier 
“natural” is meant to distinguish the concept from two additional manifestations of God’s 
image, which Wesley terms the political image and the moral image.67 The moral image of 
God within humans is commensurate with the “restoration/morality” interpretation of 
the imago Dei described earlier: it is a transcript of God’s perfect moral attributes, “pro-
rated” according to our creatureliness, and broadly understood as righteousness, holiness, 
and love (these being related). The moral image also relates to the natural image as the 
proper orientation of the latter’s faculties; rightly employed, these faculties conduce to the 
knowledge and love of God.68
66 Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” I.1, in Works 2:188. In this sermon, Wesley identifies three basic facul-
ties that constitute the “natural image of God”: understanding, will (and its affections), and liberty (of the 
will). Again, these faculties are the subject of the following chapter; the recognition that they make up the 
natural image of God is here sufficient.
67 Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” I.1, in Works 2:188.
68 Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” I.2, in Works 2:189.
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 Wesley hastily treats the political image (a concept borrowed from Isaac Watts and 
appearing only twice in Wesley’s Works69) as humanity’s governance over Creation as the 
Lord’s representative stewards. Outside of this sermon, the political image remains unde-
veloped in Wesley’s theology. However, a number of Wesley-an interpretations of “the 
political image” have surfaced over the years.70 While these contemporary explanations 
are indeed laudable, I suggest that the hermeneutical contribution of iconic dignity can 
help us to expand Wesley’s “political image” in two related directions: we are relational 
creatures entrusted with a creational task.71 “All the blessings of God in paradise flowed 
through man to the inferior creatures,” for “man was the great channel of communication 
between the Creator and the whole brute creation.”72 By consequence, the Fall not only 
fractures human relationships with God and with one another, it also disrupts the trans-
mission of goodness throughout Creation.73
69 As Outler indicates (Works 2:188), Wesley is borrowing from Isaac Watts’s 1740 Ruin and Recovery of 
Mankind, which Wesley extracts at length in The Doctrine of Original Sin (1757), Part IV, in Works 12:352-401
70 For a socio-political understanding of what Wesley’s political image could entail, see Theodore R. 
Weber, Politics in the Order of Salvation: Transforming Wesleyan Political Ethics (Nashville: Kingswood 
Books, 2001). Cf. Jason Vickers, Wesley: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2009), especially 
60-82. For a cosmo-/eco-theological interpretation, see Theodore Runyon, The New Creation: John Wes-
ley’s Theology Today (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1998), 7-25. Cf. Michael Lodahl, God of Nature and of 
Grace: Reading the World in a Wesleyan Way (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 2003); and Lodahl, “Wesley 
and Nature,” in Wesleyan Theology and Social Science: The Dance of Practical Divinity and Discovery, ed. M. 
Kathryn Armistead, Brad D. Strawn, and Ronald W. Wright (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publish-
ing, 2010), 21-32.
71 A facet of this interpretation may be seen below in Chapter 5, which approaches the subject of “nature” 
beyond humanity to include Creation. That interpretation necessarily implies relationality.
72 Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” II.1, in Works 2:442.
73 See Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” II.2, in Works 2:443. Although the topic of sin will be 
addressed below in Chapter 4, this postlapsarian consequence illustrates both interpretive corollaries to 
Wesley’s “political image.”
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 In summary, the imago Dei names for Wesley certain human capacities of intel-
lect, will, and liberty (natural image), as well as relationality and responsibility (political 
image). When ordered rightly toward God and fellow-creatures, these images conduce to 
the realization of God’s loving image within humans (moral image). But if the natural and 
political images are in the order of capacities—and thus proper to our species—then they 
are indelible and depict a particular human iconic dignity. To a certain degree, Wesley 
appears to affirm this conclusion in a late sermon on God’s providence. Wesley deduces 
that God “cannot destroy out of the soul of man that image of himself wherein [man] 
was made” because God “cannot counteract himself, or oppose his own work.”74 Para-
doxically, God does not remove God’s image from us—that would abuse our God-rooted 
liberty, thereby indicting God; however, with this God-given capacity of liberty, it seems 
that we can efface God’s image ourselves—but we cannot erase it. The conclusion derives 
from logic: if we were able to obliterate God’s natural image from our nature, we would be 
caught in the non sequitur of using our God-imaged liberty to nullify that liberty.75 As long 
as we are humans (creatures distinct from the Creator in whose image we are formed) and 
as long as God is God (righteous, holy, just, merciful, true, pure love76), we humans have 
a capacity for moral likeness to God by means of participating in the divine nature. Alone, 
our capacities are “good” because they are rooted in the goodness of the divine essence. 
74 Sermon 67, “On Divine Providence,” §15, in Works 2:540-541. Wesley composes this sermon in 1786, 
at the age of 83.
75 Although Wesley does not make an explicit claim along these lines, his experience in formal logic at 
Oxford is more than sufficient for recognizing the logical fallacy in this paradox.
76 See Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” I.1, in Works 2:188. Cf. Notes, 1 John 4:8.
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But for superlative goodness to abound, we must use these capacities according to the 
moral image of God, which is not indelibly inscribed upon the human fabric.77
B. Aquinas on the Image of God
 Admittedly, Aquinas’s approach to the imago Dei differs from Wesley’s. Whereas 
Wesley focuses on the restoration of God’s image, Aquinas stresses a continuation of the 
image of God in humanity as essential to our very nature. In other words, the difference 
is one of orientation—toward Eden or eschaton. The nuance is relevant because it under-
scores how compatibility may exist in the midst of differences.
 The idea of an “image” comes much earlier in the Summa than we might expect. 
Long before investigating the nature of humanity, Aquinas wants to know if there is some 
“trace of the Trinity” (vestigium Trinitatis) present in all creatures. To summarize Aqui-
nas’s inquiry, he extends the earlier argument of God as Creator/Cause to insist that all 
creatures have a vestigial mark of the Trinity: the evidence of God’s work in their crea-
turely existence, form, and ordering.78 Humans are a special case, though. We have God’s 
image—not only a vestige, but a special likeness to God in form, character, and manner. In 
particular, we image God’s intellect and will, viz., God’s Word (Son) and Love (Spirit).79
77 For more, see Chapter 4 below, which continues the conversation with sin and its consequences.
78 Aquinas, ST I.45.7. In the previous question (44), Aquinas addresses God’s creative causality.
79 ST I.45.7. It should further be noted that Aquinas speaks here of “rational creatures,” not just humans. 
As noted earlier, angels are also rational creatures; but unlike humans, angels are immaterial. See also Jaro-
slav Pelikan, “Imago Dei: An Explication of Summa theologiae, Part 1, Question 93,” in Calgary Aquinas 
Studies, ed. Anthony Parel (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), 37.
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 Although Aquinas does not employ “image of God” language nearly as frequently 
as “beatitude,” “perfection,” or “virtue,” we find him implementing a doctrine of imago Dei 
at key transitions in Summa Theologiae.80 After discussing the One God, the Trinity, and 
Creation, Aquinas positions an explication of imago Dei as the capstone to his treatise on 
humans.81 We next encounter imago Dei in the opening paragraph of the massive Secunda 
Pars, which is traditionally understood to inaugurate Aquinas’s hermeneutic of “return” 
within an exitus-reditus scheme.82 Having predicated his anthropology upon a solid theo-
logical foundation in the Prima Pars, Aquinas proceeds to detail the implications of God’s 
image upon human nature, actions, and character in the Secunda Pars.83 Finally, the Chris-
tological Tertia Pars opens with further references to the imago Dei, connecting the image 
of God in humanity to a capacity to know and to love God.84 Aquinas is so convinced of 
the impression of God’s image upon human nature and of the soul’s inclination to God that 
he qualifiedly describes our supernatural end as “in accordance with [our rational] nature, 
80 See D. Juvenal Merriell, “Trinitarian Anthropology,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik Van 
Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 124. Cf. 
Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 2: Spiritual Master, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 82.
81 A brief treatise on divine government follows this importance treatise on humans and brings the 
Prima Pars to a close.
82 ST I-II, prologue. Aquinas is citing John of Damascus.
83 By no means does Aquinas’s treatise on grace fall outside of this general observation, for God’s grace 
is what actualizes or activates the natural human capacities for knowing and loving God, elevating those 
natural proclivities to supernatural dispositions and virtues. The trajectory is one of continuing perfection, 
culminating with the Ipsum Imago Dei, Christ, in the Tertia Pars.
84 See ST III.4.1 ad 2: “The likeness of image is found in human nature, forasmuch as it is capable of God, 
viz. by attaining to Him through its own operation of knowledge and love.”
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inasmuch as it is capable of [the beatific vision and knowledge] by nature, having been 
made to the image of God.”85
 But to what does the image of God refer, and for whom does it apply? In effect, 
Aquinas answers both questions in an article concerning whether God’s image is found in 
every human being. His penetrating reply is provided here in full:
Since it is because of his intellectual nature that man is said to be made to the 
image of God, it follows that he is made to God’s image to the highest degree to 
the extent that his intellectual nature is able to imitate God to the highest degree. 
But it is with respect to God’s knowing and loving Himself that an intellectual 
nature especially imitates God. Hence, there are three possible ways to think of the 
image of God in man: In the first way, a man has a natural capacity [aptitudinem 
naturalem] to understand and to love God, and this capacity resides in the very 
nature of the mind (consistit in ipsa natura mentis), which is common to all men. In 
the second way, a man actually or habitually understands and loves God, but still 
imperfectly; and this is the image associated with the conformity of grace (imago 
per conformitatem gratiae). In the third way, a man has actual and perfect under-
standing of and love for God, and the image so taken is associated with the likeness 
of glory (imago secundum similitudinem gloriae). This is why a Gloss on Psalm 4:7 
(“The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”) distinguishes three 
images: (a) the image of creation, (b) the image of re-creation, and (c) the image 
of likeness. The first image is found in all men, the second image is found only in 
the justified (tantum in iustis), and the third image is found only in the blessed in 
heaven (solum in beatis).86
Aquinas covers a lot of theological ground in this response; for now, let us focus on two 
key points.
 First, we are likely to notice the intellectual thrust of the imago Dei for Aquinas. All 
existing things possess a trace of the divine; that trace “increases” among those invested 
with life, then sensation, then appetite, and then cognition. It belongs to humans alone, 
85 ST III.9.2 ad 3. The Benziger edition translates Aquinas’s prout scilicet ad imaginem Dei facta est as 
“having been made to the likeness of God,” which seems both lexicographically and theologically improper 
given Aquinas’s distinction between “image” and “likeness.”
86 ST I.93.4 (Freddoso). The Latin parentheticals are Freddoso’s own; the bracketed Latin is my addition.
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though, to have an intellectual soul—and, by extension, to have been created according 
to God’s own image.87 It may be tempting to read Aquinas as an inveterate rationalist. 
However, as Jaroslav Pelikan cautions, such a reading would be a mistake if “the place of 
love in his doctrine of the image is overlooked or understated.”88 A careful explication of 
ST I.93 “discloses [Aquinas’s] stress on love of God rather than knowledge about God as 
the goal and fulfillment of the image of God.”89 Love, the defining characteristic of God’s 
nature and the participational essence of our perfection, pertains to the will. But since the 
will is a rational appetite, contained within the rational soul, we will misinterpret Aquinas 
if we suppose that the image of God is restricted to “intellectual functions.” God’s image 
involves knowing and loving, intellect and will, to which the Trinitarian processions of 
Word (the Son) and Love (the Spirit) testify most profoundly.
 Second, Aquinas further interprets the image of God vis-à-vis a triplex scheme 
of nature, grace, and glory. Importantly, the natural instance of the image—the human 
capacity for God by knowledge and love—pertains to all people without exception. Aqui-
nas’s examples illustrate just how radical a doctrine the imago Dei can be (especially within 
his medieval context). God’s ubiquitous image pertains equally to men and women, for 
“there is no distinction between the sexes” with respect to intellection.90 It likewise applies 
87 More precisely, humans are the only material creatures with an intellectual soul; angels, which are 
immaterial, also have an intellectual soul. In fact, of all those beings with a rational soul, humans are the 
most inferior “in the intellectual order” (ST I-II.50.6)!
88 Pelikan, “Imago Dei,” 38.
89 Pelikan, “Imago Dei,” 38.
90 ST I.93.6 ad 2. Cf. ST I.93.4 ad 1
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equally to sinners and saints.91 But the most profound enunciation of this position is Aqui-
nas’s conclusion that “the image of God remains continuously (permanere semper) in the 
mind, regardless of whether ‘this image of God is so thinned out [sit obsoleta]’—clouded 
over, as it were—‘as to amount to almost nothing,’ as in those who do not have the use of 
reason.”92 If we are to take Aquinas seriously regarding the imago Dei, we will find God’s 
image equally and indelibly inscribed on those who have not had the time to develop 
or use reason (e.g., the pre-born and newly-born, and all children), those who have lost 
their use of reason (e.g., the elderly, those with Alzheimer’s and other forms of dementia, 
those with brain-damaging injuries), and those whose cognitive abilities are genetically 
or developmentally hampered (e.g., those with birth defects, mental handicaps, or other 
disabilities).
 To summarize, Aquinas is unequivocally clear: the image of God in our nature 
always exists in every person as the capacity to know and love God. Since a capacity awaits 
activation, the first instance of imago Dei is “incomplete” without an orientation ad imita-
tionem.93 This explains Aquinas’s second and third interpretations of the image: the image 
according to grace and the image according to glory. We are naturally capacious of know-
ing and loving God because God has created us ad imaginem Dei—but it is through grace 
that we may come to know and love God actually (albeit imperfectly). The knowledge and 
love of God in actu builds upon what has already begun to exist, in germine, through the 
91 See ST I.93.8 ad 3. Cf. ST I.93.4 obj. 3 and ad 3.
92 ST I.93.8 ad 3 (Freddoso). This translation spectacularly captures the nuance of the phrase sit obsoleta. 
Aquinas is quoting from Augustine’s De Trinitate XIV.6.
93 See ST I.93.1 for Aquinas’s discussion of the etymological connection between “image” and “imita-
tion,” as well as his analysis of the preposition ad.
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natural representation of God’s image in our nature. Perfect knowledge and love of God 
occurs gloriously through the beatific vision. Still, humanity is naturally inclined to the 
beatific vision because the germinative imago Dei entails the capacity to know and to love 
God.
3. Body and Soul, Matter and Knowledge
 Up to this point, we have mainly been discussing the theological anthropologies 
of John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas with respect to the human soul.94 But the soul is not 
the singular approach that Wesley and Aquinas take to theological anthropology; in fact, 
the soul, together with its operations, is dependent on the material body. Although we 
will indeed return again to the soul in the next chapter (to consider the various capacities 
of human beings in greater detail), the present section aims to unpack how Wesley and 
Aquinas regard humans as composed of body and soul—giving particular attention to the 
implications for epistemology.
 God is altogether simple, simplex, says Aquinas.95 We, however, are not. As com-
plex creatures, we humans are composed of body and soul and the myriad relations of the 
quantities with one another and with other bodies and other souls.96 Thus, for all that has 
94 In the prologue to his so-called “Treatise on Man” (ST I.75-102), Aquinas interestingly limits his treat-
ment of humans to the soul as opposed to the body—or, rather, to the soul and the body inasmuch as the 
body is related to the soul. To be sure, Aquinas is self-knowingly doing “theology,” not “physics.” However, 
he still leaves ample room for bodies in this extensive section of the Summa.
95 See ST I.3. The question’s eight articles develop what Aquinas means by the term—notably, that God 
is neither bodily nor material, and that God’s essence is God’s existence.
96 See ST I.75-76. Note that these myriad interrelations also preclude us from being duplex, that is, 
metaphysically dualistic.
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been said about Aquinas’s teaching on human nature, we must consider it in light of the 
fact that “it is of a man’s nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impos-
sible.”97 In other words, just as the image of God, which is impressed upon the human 
mind/soul,98 is constitutive of human nature, so is matter.
 Wesley’s position here whole-heartedly resonates with Aquinas’s. For example, 
commenting on 1 Thessalonians 5:23 (“may the whole of you, the spirit, and the soul, and 
the body, be preserved”), Wesley notes that “the soul and the body…make up the whole 
nature of man”; again, they are “the natural, constituent parts of man.”99 What’s more, 
Wesley consistently maintains this view for nearly 60 years. In 1788 (34 years after his New 
Testament Notes) he affirms the compositional character of humanity, its various faculties, 
and its divine source of movement (animation) in the soul (animus).100 Likewise, in 1730, 
Wesley observes that
man even at his creation was a compound of matter and spirit; and that it was 
ordained by the original law that during this vital union neither part of the com-
pound should act at all but together with its companion; that the dependence of 
each upon the other should be inviolably maintained; that even the operations of 
the soul should so far depend upon the body as to be exerted in a more or less 
perfect manner.101
97 ST I.44.3 ad 2.
98 For the impression of the image of God, see ST I.93.6 ad 1. For the equation of the human soul (animam 
humanum) with the intellect or mind (intellectus vel mens), see ST I.75.2.
99 Wesley, Notes, 1 Thessalonians 5:23. Wesley devotes an unusual amount of space to this verse to expli-
cate the three “parts” of humans mentioned in scripture: body, soul, and spirit. Noting that “spirit” is proper 
only to Christians—whereas body and soul are naturally essential to humans—it seems that Wesley may 
here be eliding spirit and Spirit. Cf. Maddox, Responsible Grace, 70-71, for further discussion.
100 See Sermon 116, “What Is Man? Psalm 8:4,” §§1-9, in Works 4:19-23. As mentioned above, Wesley 
regards matter as naturally inanimate; motion comes from God. Here again is an affirmation of the integral 
correlation of body and soul, matter and animus.
101 Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” II.1, in Works 4:296. Emphases added.
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The integrated, “vital union” that Wesley mentions helps to stave off certain intimations 
of dualism that have been known to infiltrate Christian thought.102 Aquinas, too, deliber-
ately positions himself against those who would denigrate the materiality of Creation in 
general, and of the body in particular—especially the Manicheans.103
 In addition to concerns that heretical beliefs about the devaluation of the physi-
cal body could jeopardize the doctrine of the Incarnation (and thus salvation), Wesley’s 
and Aquinas’s holistic integration of body and soul serves an additional anthropological 
element: epistemology. Bearing in mind that Wesley and Aquinas both argue that under-
standing is an operation of the soul (to be detailed in Chapter 3), it is highly instructive 
that they also maintain that the object of understanding enters the intellect via the bodily 
senses. More specifically, Wesley and Aquinas jointly endorse the peripatetic (Aristote-
lian) axiom: nihil est in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu, “nothing exists in the intellect 
that is not first in the senses.”104 As such, Wesley proceeds from the proposition “[God] 
has given to each a body as it pleased him” to the immediate implication “that he gives 
them various degrees of understanding and of knowledge, diversified by numberless cir-
102 For example, Gnosticism, Manicheanism, certain forms of Platonism—even Cartesian disembodied 
rationalism—can tend towards a distillation of the mind away from the body/material world. Wesley would 
have nothing of the sort of “philosophical contempt of what the wise Creator has given” (Notes, 2 Corinthi-
ans 5:4).
103 References to the Manicheans and their heretical notions of the profanity of matter and bodies are 
peppered throughout the ST (e.g., I.8.3; II-II.10.6; II-II.25.5) and the SCG (e.g., II.44, §14; III.154, §23; IV.29).
104 Aquinas offers the axiom verbatim in DV, q. 2, art. 3, arg. 19. He also alludes to it in ST I.84.7, where 
he enlists Aristotle’s De Anima in the sed contra. Wesley’s citations are more abundant; for example, An 
Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, §32, in Works 11:56; Sermon 117, “On the Discoveries of Faith,” 
§1, in Works 4:29; and Sermon 119, “Walking by Sight and Walking by Faith,” §7, in Works 4:51.
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cumstances.”105 Similarly, Aquinas insists intellectual operations originate in the senses; 
however, one cannot sense without a body.106
 Why should we care about epistemological commitments, though? For one, the 
shared Aristotelian heritage is telling, especially as it extends beyond empiricism and 
epistemology into psychology, morality, and habituated virtues.107 Additionally, it reveals 
a common theological commitment that roots Christian living in bodily existence. The 
faculties of human nature are to be employed and cultivated toward the service and glory 
of God. Most telling, though, is the way in which knowledge, as rooted in the senses, 
works real and perceptible transformation. For example, consonant with his epistemolog-
ical commitments, Wesley develops a notion of “spiritual senses” to describe the spiritual 
intercourse and fellowship that unfolds “sensorily” within believers.108 Although Aquinas 
does not fully subscribe to such an immediate form of God-knowledge,109 his characteriza-
105 Wesley, “Thoughts Upon God’s Sovereignty,” §2, in Works 13:549.
106 See ST I.78.4 ad 4, and ST I.76.1, respectively.
107 It is also very true that epistemological questions have occupied the minds of Wesleyans and Thom-
ists alike, with no indication that interest will wane any time soon. Among Wesleyans, William J. Abraham is 
likely the most vocal regarding questions of epistemology. See Abraham, Aldersgate and Athens: John Wesley 
and the Foundations of Christian Belief (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010). See also the discussion 
in John Culp, “A Wesleyan Contribution to Contemporary Epistemological Discussions,” in Thy Nature & 
Thy Name Is Love: Wesleyan and Process Theologies in Dialogue, ed. Bryan P. Stone and Thomas Jay Oord 
(Nashville: Kingswood Books, 2001), 239-262. Maddox also addresses Wesleyan epistemology in an early 
excursus in Responsible Grace, 27-28. Thomists’ interests in epistemology have been even more widespread, 
with the likes of Anthony Kenny and Robert Pasnau leading the bylines. See, for example, Anthony Kenny, 
Aquinas on Mind (London: Routledge, 1993); and Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A 
Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae Ia 75-89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Further-
more, epistemology is given two (of ten) chapters in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, and an entire 
section in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas.
108 See Wesley, Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” II.4, in Works 2:192-193.
109 For a discussion comparing Aquinas with Wesley on the perceptibility of the assurance of received 
grace, see Loyer, God’s Love through the Spirit, 251-256
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tion of the beatific vision (and of the process of knowing in general) bespeaks the transfor-
mative effect that “the sensible” has upon “the sensor.” “Knowing is a new way of being on 
the knower’s part,” writes one of Aquinas’s modern commentators; it essentially entails 
an epistemology of participation.110 In a way just as radical as Wesley’s spiritual senses, 
Aquinas finds his own way to underline the sensory channels of knowledge, not the least 
of which is the vision of God that unfolds in the love of God among the blessed.
4. Summary and Transition to Characteristic Human Faculties
 This chapter has aimed at providing an initial sketch of what it means to be 
human for Wesley and Aquinas in light of iconic dignity’s emergent trajectory. For them, 
an account of any nature (not just human nature) must begin with a conception of God 
as Creator-Cause and Perfection-End. On this account, to be is good, inasmuch as being 
entails participation in God, who is the Good of all that is. Within God’s good Creation, 
human beings inhabit a unique interstitial identity as the embodied recipients of God’s 
own image—material, mortal bodies with immaterial, immortal souls. The imago Dei 
is, for Wesley and Aquinas, the very language of theological anthropology, and it char-
acterizes our faculties as well as the use of those faculties. Therefore, in continuing to 
investigate theological anthropology in Wesley and Aquinas, we will turn to a detailed 
discussion of the faculties and capacities constitutive of human nature. That analysis of 
our faculties will frame a working moral psychology for Wesley and Aquinas, which will 
then be developed in terms of human acts and sin. Chapter 3, on the characteristic human 
110 Kerr, Thomas Aquinas, 59-60.
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faculties and moral psychology, will address the former, while Chapter 4, on human acts 
and sin, will treat the latter.
 Preliminary as it is, this initial sketch of theological anthropology within Wesley 
and Aquinas may already suggest key insights for iconic dignity and its practices. For one, 
inasmuch as human nature is an embodied nature, holiness (our greatest good) must be 
an embodied holiness.111 By extension, dualisms that equate physicality with inferiority are 
to be eschewed.112 The goodness of Creation also points to the wisdom of Creation and, 
as a result, to our need as humans to heed Creation’s voice all around us. Part of iconic 
dignity’s perspective is its humbling theological anthropology: we are one species among 
many, all of whom point to God as our being and blessing, yet we also figure prominently 
in prudentially tending to what God has created. Chapter 5 will develop this perspective 
and its implications by considering ecological stewardship as informed by iconic dignity. 
In the final analysis, a theological anthropology of iconic dignity points to practices that 
affirm the God of nature and the employment of our own nature therein. This concern 
with doing in addition to being, not to mention the quality of doing in addition to the quid-
dity of doing, means that we will need to give direct attention to the particular faculties 
111 This statement calls to mind (and is confirmed by) the centrality of the Incarnation for Christian the-
ology. It further suggests the possibility of expanding the comparison of Wesley and Aquinas to additional 
topics, such as Christology. That particular topical recommendation (among others) will be made in the 
Conclusion.
112 Two historical equations of materiality and inferiority come to mind, both of which have appeared 
within the church over the centuries. First, Christianity has historically been “dis-eased” with bodies, espe-
cially women’s bodies. This has led to a mischaracterization of bodies and women as somehow inferior 
to minds and/or spirits and men. Related to this is the second equation—the degradation of the material 
Creation out of a supposed human superiority. This topic is the particular focus of Chapter 5, where iconic 
dignity will be brought to bear on the subject of ecological stewardship within Wesleyan and Thomistic 
theological traditions.
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that characterize our human nature—knowing that such an analysis will allow for deeper 
reflection on iconic dignity’s practical embodiments. We therefore turn now to consider 
the faculties of human nature in greater detail.
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CHAPTER 3: 
CHARACTERISTIC HUMAN FACULTIES AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
 Having made the case in the previous chapter that human faculties are rooted in 
God’s intellect and will, we turn now to consider our faculties in greater detail. The objec-
tive of addressing these characteristic human faculties is to nuance an integrated account 
of human nature with an eye toward moral action. Critically, humans have intellectual 
and volitional capabilities because we have been made according to the pattern of God, but 
these capacities are both bane and blessing. Flourishing is a matter of consistently acting 
out of our capacities for good. Inversely, fragmentation is a matter of the same dynamics 
working against good. The difference resides in moral psychology, which is to say, the 
ways in which the characteristic faculties of human nature operate together as we act.1
 The primary faculties to be investigated in this chapter are the intellect and the 
will. While Wesley and Aquinas are of a similar mind as to what constitutes human intel-
1 I employ the language of “moral psychology” here for a number of reasons—some due to the general-
ly-accepted nature and subject of the field of inquiry, some due to the ways in which contemporary Wesleyan 
theologians have employed it with respect to the thought of John Wesley. Regarding the former, Nicholas 
Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu note the interest of moral psychology in contemporary virtue ethics, particularly as it 
comes to bear on the phenomena of what we do and how we do it. Specifically, “these phenomena include 
cognitive states such as deliberation and choice; emotional states such as love, mercy, satisfaction, guilt, 
remorse, and shame; and desires, character, and personality.” See Bunnin and Yu, The Blackwell Dictionary 
of Western Philosophy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 448.
Regarding the latter, Randy Maddox has advanced a moral-psychological reading of Wesley for over 
20 years, including his Responsible Grace, and numerous articles and essays (see Bibliography). Andrew 
C. Thompson, one of Maddox’s doctoral students, has also taken up the mantle of moral psychology in 
recent essays. Cf. Thompson, “Outler’s Quadrilateral, Moral Psychology, and Theological Reflection in the 
Wesleyan Tradition,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 46, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 49-72; and Thompson, “From 
Societies to Society: The Shift from Holiness to Justice in the Wesleyan Tradition,” Methodist Review 3 
(2011): 141-172.
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lection,2 shades of nuance appear as they tackle human volition and its related affective 
components. For example, Wesley considers the affections under the broader heading of 
the will, yet he approaches “liberty” (i.e., freedom of the will) as something worth enu-
merating separately. Alternatively, Aquinas subsumes free-will (liberum arbitrium) under 
the broader category of the will, whereas he treats the “affective” aspects of our nature 
(i.e., passions and habits) as a subject of special and separate (though not independent) 
consideration in the Secunda Pars. Such linguistic differences can complicate an organized 
analysis. However, Wesley and Aquinas are attempting to say very similar things with 
respect to fundamental human faculties and the ways in which those faculties come to 
bear upon moral psychology.
1. Intellect, Synderesis, and Conscience
 Unsurprisingly, what Wesley and Aquinas have to say about the intellect and 
the abilities of humans to reason is largely a product of their particular circumstances. 
Far more intriguing is how, almost in spite of those contextual differences, Wesley and 
Aquinas unpack the intellectual faculty so similarly. In the previous chapter, resonances 
in causality, metaphysics, and imago Dei gave way to a common epistemological commit-
ment—the relationship of the senses and sensory data to the intellect—which was rooted 
in Aristotelian thought (especially the peripatetic axiom). This commitment serves as the 
2 As is true elsewhere, Wesley and Aquinas do not always speak in the same “language,” though they 
frequently intend the same overall concepts. So, while Aquinas uses intellectus and its cognates to describe 
this human capacity, Wesley is more apt to speak of “reason,” “knowing,” and “understanding.”
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primary lens through which Wesley and Aquinas approach the human intellect and its 
specific capacity for reasoning.
 Without rehashing the biographical sketches of Wesley and Aquinas given in the 
Introduction, we need to pause here to take stock again of their social and intellectual 
contexts, for each theologian has in mind a middle way in describing human reason. For 
Aquinas, the recent rediscovery of Aristotle in the West had provided a balanced under-
standing of the operations and orientations of the mind—especially one that could avoid 
the pitfalls of Plato and Averroës, both of whom seemed to Aquinas to redact materiality 
from the process of knowing.3 However, by turning (not uncontestedly!) to an Aristote-
lian epistemology and anthropology, Aquinas has to navigate another middle course: to 
conceive of human reasoning as a kind of balance between the mere sense perception of 
animals and the angelic/divine knowledge of a thing’s essence by pure, simple, and imme-
diate intellection.4 As we shall see, what Aquinas comes to say with respect to this second 
via media entirely comports with his thesis regarding the composite aspect of human 
nature: we are ensouled bodies, enfleshed souls—undeniably part of Creation, yet with a 
continual eye to the Creator.
 Wesley’s equally self-aware balancing act is of a decidedly different nature. Many 
contemporary scholars have observed and contextualized the mediating course that 
3 See ST I.88, for example. Cf. Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, 145. Against Plato, Aqui-
nas maintains that we come to know by means of sense perception—i.e., there is a material component to 
knowing. Against Averroës, Aquinas maintains that agent intellect (to be discussed below) is not a single 
immaterial principle, but is tied up with human knowing. 
4 See ST I.85.5.
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Wesley seeks concerning the right role of reason.5 To one side are the “enthusiasts,” who 
“despise and vilify reason,” giving it no role in religion; to the other are those who (in 
typical Enlightenment or deist fashion) “extol it to the skies.”6 Against reason’s despisers, 
Wesley points to the many ways we can and must employ reason: from our daily tasks to 
education, governance, and (most importantly) religion—where it assists us in reading 
and understanding Scripture, doctrine, and practice.7 However, against reason’s extollers, 
Wesley flatly rejects the possibility that human reason can generate faith, hope, or love—
and, consequently, happiness.8
 At the heart of what Wesley and Aquinas say about the intellect could well be sum-
marized in the observation that the intellect is a tool in the process of moving from sensory 
objects to knowledge, truth, and action.9 There are, of course, a number of steps along 
5 See Rex D. Matthews, “‘Religion and Reason Joined’: A Study in the Theology of John Wesley” 
(Th.D. diss., Harvard University, 1986), especially 121-125. Since then, Rebekah L. Miles has written on “The 
Instrumental Role of Reason,” in Wesley and the Quadrilateral: Renewing the Conversation, ed. W. Stephen 
Gunter (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), 77-106. A few years later, Gunter echoes Miles (a bit too closely) 
in Gunter, “Personal and Spiritual Knowledge: Kindred Spirits in Polanyian and Wesleyan Epistemology,” 
Wesleyan Theological Journal 35, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 130-148. See also Laurence W. Wood, “Wesley’s Epis-
temology,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 10 (Spring 1975): 48-59; and Yoshio Noro, “Wesley’s Theological 
Epistemology,” The Iliff Review 28 (Winter 1971): 59-76.
6 Wesley, Sermon 70, “The Case of Reason Impartially Considered,” §§2-3, in Works 2:587-588.
7 See Sermon 70, “The Case of Reason Impartially Considered,” I.3-6, in Works 2:590-592.
8 See Sermon 70, “The Case of Reason Impartially Considered,” II.1-10, in Works 2:593-600. It is 
important to bear in mind the way in which Wesley progresses through this list, with each step building 
upon the previous. Thus, hope builds on faith, upon which love may then build, giving way to real virtue 
and, ultimately, happiness.
9 We have already discussed the empirical epistemology in Wesley and Aquinas; cf. Wesley, An Earnest 
Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, §32, in Works 11:56-57; cf. Aquinas, ST I.85.1. Accordingly, the senses 
are the natural media for supplying the intellect with data to be processed. From there, our reasoning ability 
can direct us toward truth and action. For Aquinas, the difference in objects names the difference between 
the speculative and the practical intellect (ST I.79.11); for Wesley, reason assists us in matter of faith and 
practice.
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the way to understanding something.10 Consider the description of “reason” in Wesley’s 
sermon “The Case of Reason Impartially Considered”:
In another acceptation of the word, reason is much the same with understanding. 
It means a faculty of the human soul; that faculty which exerts itself in three ways: 
by simple apprehension, by judgment, and by discourse. Simple apprehension is 
barely conceiving a thing in the mind, the first and most simple act of understand-
ing. Judgment is the determining that the things before conceived either agree with 
or differ from each other. Discourse (strictly speaking) is the motion of progress of 
the mind from one judgment to another. The faculty of the soul which includes 
these three operations I here mean by the term reason.11
Now consider Aquinas’s account of the mode and order of understanding:
the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of appre-
hension; but it first apprehends something about its object [apprehendit aliquid de 
ipsa], such as its quiddity, and this is its first and proper object; and then it under-
stands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it 
necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or division [habet 
unum apprehensum alii componere vel dividere]; and from one composition and 
division it proceeds to another, which is the process of reasoning [ratiocinari].12
Though Wesley and Aquinas again use slightly different language to describe the three 
basic processes of the human intellect—apprehension, judgment/combining-and-sepa-
rating, and discourse/reasoning—an explanation of their terms reveals an utterly similar 
account of reasoning. Let us treat each aspect in turn.
10 Without constraining the notion of understanding too much, we might say that “to understand” some-
thing is to be able to do something with that concept. It could be a subsequent act of thinking or it could be 
an outward act. The common thread is that “to understand” entails some kind of doing.
11 Sermon 70, “The Case of Reason Impartially Considered,” I.2, in Works 2:590. The first two “accepta-
tions” of reason are “argument, justification, motive” and “eternal/essential reason” (I.1).
12 ST I.85.5 co. In this response, Aquinas is also emphasizing the gradual (and imperfect) character 
of human understanding, which is actually tied back to the sensitive/material basis for immaterial/formal 
understanding. As Brian Davies comments, “Aquinas thinks that understanding what something is involves 
having the form of something without actually being what the thing whose nature one understands is” 
(Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, 129). But because we are material creatures interacting in a material 
world, this “formalizing intellection” has an arduous element to it—like swimming upstream.
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 Both Wesley and Aquinas begin with the basic apprehension of a thing. Since sen-
sation is not equivalent to understanding,13 we must first receive the sensory information 
into the mind. The fact that simple apprehension is not the sensation of a thing is demon-
strated by the ways in which we can seem to reject or “tune out” various sensory input 
from our thought processes. It is not that our senses are no longer receiving the informa-
tion; rather, the mind just doesn’t process the information (sometimes intentionally, some-
times not). Apprehension is therefore the necessary initial intelligible unit of thought. To 
put it differently, sensation parallels seeing what we are seeing, but apprehension parallels 
seeing that we are seeing—in a most rudimentary way. The basic point is that some pro-
cess must come between the physical sensation and the cognitive thought.
 Having received the basic apprehension of a thing, the second step is to turn it over 
in the mind—what Wesley calls judgment, and what Aquinas describes as a process of 
combining and separating. For both, the basic function of this conceptive process is “deter-
mining that the things before conceived either agree with or differ from each other.”14 
By comparing, contrasting, weighing, composing, and dividing, we aim to “get at” the 
essence of what we have apprehended by the senses. Judgment (or comparison) of this 
kind is likely to occur many times over, especially if we consider that “the things before 
conceived” can be taken two ways. First, it can be the simple apprehension of a thing—
13 See, for example, Aquinas in ST I.84.6. However, in ad 3 of that article, Aquinas admits in passing 
that “sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge.” Lest this be construed as a 
flagrant inconsistency or vestigial Platonism, we must realize that Aquinas is leaving open the possibility 
that God can cause intellectual knowledge to occur by means of infusion, whether through the virtue of 
faith or (much rarer) through a directly-infused wisdom. Wesleyans will notice the parallels between the 
implications of Aquinas’s response and Wesley’s notion of the spiritual senses.
14 Wesley, Sermon 70, “The Case of Reason Impartially Considered,” I.2, in Works 2:590. Cf. Sermon 
116, “What Is Man? Psalm 8:4,” §5, in Works 4:21.
119
the first step in cognition. But it can also refer to things conceived in one’s past, as in 
memory. Wesley seems to have this in mind when he mentions “imagination and memory” 
as endowments of the intellective faculty.15
 Aquinas has much to say about memory, although it frequently occurs through 
the lens of Augustine’s discussion of memory, understanding, and will as aspects of the 
soul.16 Aquinas does not necessarily follow Augustine here. Instead, he turns to a discus-
sion of “active” and “passive” intellect.17 In effect, the passive intellect (intellectus possibilis) 
is “memory”—meaning that “memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for it 
belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive.”18 Accordingly, one 
way to view the passive intellect is as a “storehouse” of prior abstractions attained through 
prior apprehensions—a kind of mid-point between apprehension and comparison.19 But, 
in another way, the passive intellect can contribute heavily to the process of comparison 
by bringing past memories to bear on present experiences. The active intellect actually 
performs the abstraction and “ideation” from sense-experience.
 The degree to which Aquinas’s notion of “active intellect” verges upon what he calls 
“reasoning” (ratiocinari) need not be belabored here. However, it is helpful to compare 
Wesley’s “imagination and memory” to Aquinas’s “active and passive intellect,” and then 
15 Wesley, Sermon 116, “What Is Man? Psalm 8:4,” §5, in Works 4:21.
16 Cf. ST I.77, 78, 79, 93, where Aquinas presents Augustine’s thesis from De Trinitate X, 11.
17 Cf. ST I.79, especially aa. 3-7.
18 ST I.79.7.
19 For an account of the active and passive intellect in Aquinas, see Anthony Kenny, Aquinas (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1980), 68-69.
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to draw a further parallel to the second and third phases of understanding. In other words, 
the way in which memory influences judgment in Wesley is parallel to the way in which 
passive intellect influences comparison in Aquinas. Likewise, the way in which imagination 
influences discourse in Wesley is parallel to the way in which active intellect influences rea-
soning in Aquinas. A simple diagram is helpful to organize these intellectual processes.
Memory
|
Passive Intellect
Judgment
|
Comparison
Imagination
|
Active Intellect
Discourse
|
Reasoning
Wesley:
Aquinas:
Diagram 2. A Comparison of Wesley and Aquinas on Intellectual Processes
The key insight here is how Wesley and Aquinas fundamentally agree on the process of 
receiving and apprehending sensory data, pondering it through comparison and judg-
ment, recalling past experiences, and reiterating this many times over.
 In fact, the procession from one comparative judgment to another is the very 
characterization of the third aspect of understanding: discourse (Wesley) or reasoning 
(Aquinas).20 Based on their descriptions of this final phase, it may be difficult to distin-
guish where Wesley and Aquinas draw the line between judgment/comparison and 
discourse/reasoning. It may be helpful to think of this final phase in terms of analytical 
or critical reasoning, or the kind of active thinking that orients us toward further acts.21 
More to the point, by discourse Wesley essentially means discursive reasoning, which is to 
20 Wesley and Aquinas use nearly-synonymous terms to detail this final phase: discourse progresses from 
one judgment to another, and reasoning proceeds from one composition and division to another. See Wesley, 
Sermon 70, “The Case of Reason Impartially Considered,” I.2, in Works 2:590; and Aquinas, ST I.85.5
21 Gunter reads Wesley this way in “Personal and Spiritual Knowledge,” 136.
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be differentiated from intuitive reasoning—or, to put it differently, Aristotelian intellect as 
distinguished from Platonic intellect.22 In this way, what Wesley and Aquinas say about the 
human intellect fully coheres with the observations of the previous chapter with respect 
to epistemology: there are no “innate ideas”; nothing comes to the intellect without pass-
ing through the senses.
 A difficulty surfaces if we dig a bit deeper, uncovering an apparent natural human 
capacity for knowing basic principles of moral action. Aquinas calls this natural habit-
ual knowledge of the first principles of action synderesis.23 This habit operates in a way 
that parallels what many of us think of as “conscience”: instigare ad bonum et murmare de 
malo, it incites us to what is good and murmurs about the bad.24 In other words, synder-
esis habitually pertains to the “universal principles of the natural law,” and so it naturally 
manifests in all human actions as the foundational principles thereof.25 The difficulty is 
that Aquinas unpacks the concept such that it certainly seems to be the kind of “innate 
idea” (Platonic or otherwise) that his empirical-Aristotelian epistemology avoids! And, 
should we be tempted to discard the idea of synderesis, Aquinas throws down the gauntlet 
of synderesis being both infallible and universal—all without connecting it to grace or an 
infused habit.26 What are we to make of this apparent inconsistency?
22 Discursive reasoning runs throughout Aristotle’s works, but it may be seen in De Anima, III.
23 Aquinas, DV, q. 16, a. 1, resp. Cf. ST I.79.12.
24 ST I.79.12 co. However, Aquinas treats synderesis as distinct from conscientia. The former is an infalli-
ble, indelible, inextinguishable natural habit; the latter is an act that works with the knowledge of synderesis 
(hence, “con-scientia”), yet can err and fade. See ST I.79.12-13 for the distinction; cf. DV, qq. 16-17.
25 DV, q. 16, a. 1, resp.
26 DV, q. 16, aa. 2 and 3.
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 The answer that Aquinas proposes in De Veritate pushes us to consider the extent 
of the goodness of nature. Synderesis is an inextinguishable “habitual light,” akin to the 
agent intellect within humans. “This light,” he continues, “belongs to the nature of the 
soul, since by reason of this the soul is intellectual.”27 Again, it may be tempting to read 
Aquinas here as a humanist par excellence—the kind of intellectual opponent that Wesley 
seeks to refute.28 However, Aquinas’s next line points us to the nature of the habit and illu-
minates the vitality of iconic dignity as an emergent trajectory: “In Psalms (4:7) it is said 
of this: ‘The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us,’ so that it shows good 
things to us.”29 Synderesis, then, is integral to human nature, an aspect of the intellectual 
soul of humanity, and a means by which humans image the Divine. Hence, Aquinas prem-
ises both the knowledge of and the inclination to good as stemming from nature, since 
the imago Dei is part of our nature. “As long as the nature remains, the inclination to good 
cannot be taken even from the damned.”30
 Furthermore, Aquinas grounds the necessity of synderesis in the process of discur-
sive reasoning itself. In order for the compositional and divisional function of discursive 
reasoning to proceed, there must be some sort of initial data (literally, “things given”) 
27 DV, q. 16, art. 3, resp.
28 See, for example, Wesley’s Sermon 69, “The Imperfection of Human Knowledge,” in Works 2:568-
586. The argument is a recurring one within Wesley, especially evident whenever he discusses original 
sin—which itself is a doctrine that he emphasizes when attempting to refute what he perceives as a rampant 
“atheistic” (i.e., without premise on God) intellectualism.
29 DV, q. 16, art. 3, resp.
30 DV, q. 16, art. 3 ad 5. Emphasis added.
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from which to begin.31 Vernon Bourke has discussed the complications of synderesis within 
Aquinas’s thought, especially as it has been interpreted over the centuries as a kind of 
“synderesis rule (SR).”32 Yet, basing his analysis on the necessary role of sense experi-
ence within Aquinas’s doctrine of human knowledge, Bourke denies that synderesis can 
be “the source of our knowledge of what is good or evil.” Instead, “it is a formal principle 
with no specific material content,” an “intellectual skill whereby a person ‘sees’ that what 
is really good ought to be done and what is known to be evil ought not. Only after one 
has experienced something of the world and human life can the knowledge of the SR 
be developed.”33 Although Bourke’s interpretation may be debated among Thomists, his 
account fits with the general tenor of what Aquinas seems to be conveying in Summa 
Theologiae and De Veritate, as well as with Aquinas’s overarching epistemological thesis. 
We need not fear that synderesis is inconsistent with Aquinas’s theology or that it strays 
into atheistic humanism given (1) Aquinas’s rather clear linking of synderesis to our inte-
gral human nature,34 (2) Bourke’s thesis that synderesis for Aquinas represents neither an 
innate knowledge nor any independently-actionable content,35 and (3) the present emer-
31 See ST I.79.12 co. It is worth noting that Aquinas specifically mentions discursive reasoning (ratioci-
natio) as a movement—just like Wesley.
32 Vernon J. Bourke, “The Synderesis Rule and Right Reason,” The Monist 66, no. 1 ( January 1983): 
71-82. Bourke defines this “rule” as “good should be done and evil avoided” (71).
33 Bourke, “The Synderesis Rule,” 71, 75.
34 See in particular DV, q. 16, art. 3, resp. Thus, synderesis is part of what it means to have an intellectual 
soul and so to be made in God’s image.
35 See Bourke, “The Synderesis Rule and Right Reason,” 75.
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gent trajectory of iconic dignity. It is a habit connected with our intellectual faculty, which 
itself is patterned after God.
 The closest that we come to a notion of synderesis in Wesley’s theology is “nat-
ural conscience.”36 Actually, in those places where Wesley addresses the topic of “natu-
ral conscience,” he is clear that the term is not his own but instead belongs to the moral 
philosophers of his era—like Francis Hutcheson, whose account of virtue, premised on 
an internal and innate “moral sense,” Wesley takes to be “atheism all over.”37 Wesley’s 
accusation is indeed a serious one, which helps us to understand his typical approach to 
“natural conscience.” On the whole, he rejects it on its own terms: what others call “nat-
ural conscience…is not natural; it is more properly termed ‘preventing grace.’”38 Still, 
Wesley does concede that, in one way, it may be considered “natural” because all people 
have it—but he is quick to add that all people have it as a supernatural gift from God, i.e., 
grace.39 In “re-theologizing” conscience, Wesley further details some of its contributions 
to theological anthropology: “Everyone has sooner or later good desires.… Everyone has 
36 This phrase appears in five of Wesley’s sermons, most of which come from “the mature” or “elderly 
Wesley.” In chronological order, they are as follows: Sermon 27, “Upon Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, 
Discourse VII,” II.11, in Works 1:603 (1748); Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” I.2, in Works 
2:156 (1765); Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.4, in Works 3:207 (1785); Sermon 105, 
“On Conscience,” I.5, in Works 3:482 (1788); and Sermon 129, “Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels,” I.1, 
in Works 4:163 (1790).
37 Sermon 105, “On Conscience,” I.8-9, in Works 3:483-484. Hutcheson was certainly one of Wesley’s 
bêtes noires, particularly because of the underlying “practical atheism” Wesley saw in Hutcheson’s ethics. As 
we shall see in Part III, Wesley’s moral teaching is moral theology through and through. He recoiled at those 
attempts to remove God from the ethical equation. For more on this topic, see Long, John Wesley’s Moral 
Theology.
38 Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.4, in Works 3:207. Cf. Sermon 105, “On Con-
science,” I.5, in Works 3:482.
39 See Sermon 105, “On Conscience,” I.5, in Works 3:482.
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some measure of that light, some faint glimmering ray, which sooner or later, more or less, 
enlightens every man that cometh into the world.”40 Here, as elsewhere,41 Wesley wants 
to safeguard human enlightenment and benevolence from those of his day who would 
seek to naturalize these inclinations and abilities that draw us to the good and warn us of 
bad—like Aquinas’s synderesis.
 In order to pit Wesley so sharply against Aquinas on synderesis/natural conscience, 
though, we would have to disregard a significant sermon that Wesley pens only nine 
months before his death. In “Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels,” Wesley comes to 
alter his earlier stance on “natural conscience,” and he speaks positively about “the dig-
nity of man.”42 What would have inclined Wesley to change his tone? Wesley offers a clue 
toward the beginning of his sermon, where he answers his self-posed question on what the 
“heavenly treasure” actually is:
Part of this [heavenly treasure] they [Christians] have in common with other men, 
in the remains of the image of God. May we not include herein, first, an immate-
rial principle, a spiritual nature, endued with understanding, and affections, and 
a degree of liberty, of a self-moving, yea, and self-governing power (otherwise we 
were mere machines, stocks and stones)? And secondly, all that is vulgarly called 
‘natural conscience,’ implying some discernment of the difference between moral 
good and evil, with an approbation of one and disapprobation of the other, by 
an inward monitor excusing or accusing? Certainly, whether this is natural or 
superadded by the grace of God, it is found, at least in some small degree, in every 
child of man. Something of this is found in every human heart, passing sentence 
40 Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.4, in Works 3:207.
41 See Sermon 105, “On Conscience,” I.5, in Works 3:482; cf. Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salva-
tion,” I.2, in Works 2:157.
42 Sermon 129, “Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels,” §1 and I.1, in Works 4:162-163. Wesley very 
rarely uses the expression “the dignity of man” in a positive sense, making this reference exceptional. Wes-
ley’s disdain for the phrase/idea has much to do with the ways in which those around Wesley were using 
it. It had become a soundbite for the deism, humanism, renaissance, and enlightenment of Wesley’s day, 
especially as articulated by Pope and Burgh.
126
concerning good and evil not only in all Christians, but in all Mahometans, all 
pagans, yea the vilest of savages.43
Although this does not necessarily represent a reversal of Wesley’s interpretation of natural 
conscience over the course of his life, it does stand (within his sermons) as his most-ma-
ture statement on the matter. In this sense, the lack of Wesley’s characteristic reframing 
of natural conscience as prevenient grace, alongside an added ambiguity regarding the 
origin of this conscience, is anomalous.44 However, it is not inconsistent, especially if we 
approach it by way of iconic dignity.
 As already noted, when Wesley discusses natural conscience in his other sermons, 
he aims to unfasten “conscience” from “nature” by linking it to prevenient grace. In doing 
so, Wesley theologically safeguards the function and the content of conscience from the 
moral-philosophical trends of his day, which posited an inherent moral sense or ability 
apart from its theological foundation. However, in “Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Ves-
sels,” Wesley’s argument hinges not on prevenient grace but on “the remains of the image 
of God…in every child of man.”45 In effect, Wesley correlates a natural conscience to the 
natural image of God within humans, enumerating it along with reason, affective will, 
liberty, self-movement, and self-governance. Wesley theologically underpins conscience 
by appealing to the image of God that remains within us. The dignity that results from 
(and is instantiated by) conscience working within humanity is present because we are 
43 Sermon 129, “Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels,” I.1, in Works 4:163.
44 For more on Wesley’s general interpretations of conscience, see Leon Hynson, “John Wesley’s Con-
cept of Liberty of Conscience,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring 1972): 36-46.
45 Wesley, Sermon 129, “Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels,” I.1, in Works 4:163.
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images of God, not in spite of God—and this is Wesley’s chief argument, whether aided by 
prevenient grace or the enduring natural image of God.46
 The ambiguity in this sermon actually affords us an opportunity to test the inter-
pretive power of iconic dignity as an emergent trajectory. In the other sermons where 
Wesley discusses natural conscience, it is clear that his focus is to hem in the goodness 
of humans by means of prevenient grace—for example, as illustrated through the fac-
ulties constitutive of human nature and any “natural” inclination to good. As such, this 
perspective depicts a graciously-provided human dignity. But without setting this aside, 
“Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels” adds another dimension by locating the human 
faculties and natural conscience in the enduring image of God. What results is an organic, 
emergent manifestation of iconic dignity within Wesley that presses us to ask a greater 
question: Without naturalizing or trivializing (prevenient) grace,47 how is (human) nature 
shot-through with grace—that is, how is Creation God’s good gift in the first place? The 
question does not necessarily remove the difference between nature and grace (nor should 
it), but it does challenge us to consider the ways in which grace permeates nature—in this 
case, through natural conscience.
46 In his “Introductory Comment” to Sermon 129, Albert Outler notes the difference of the sermon’s 
argument from Sermon 128. “It begins,” writes Outler, “by defining ‘the heavenly treasure’ which is God’s 
unmerited gift to man, not as natural religion or as prevenient grace (I.1-2), but rather as full salvation, 
itself farther defined as ‘a renewal in the whole image of God’ (I.3)” (in Works 4:161). While my point here 
is slightly different than Outler’s, the general trajectory is consistent—as long as we understand “natural 
religion” to be different from “natural image.”
47 In Salvaging Wesley’s Agenda, Lowery proposes a naturalization of grace in order to account for his 
cognitivist (and Kantian) reading of Wesley’s ethics. While he rightly calls for an abandonment of total 
depravity for Wesleyan ethics (which I will likewise do in the next chapter), he wrongly fills in the gap with 
a cognitivized account of conscience (which becomes a kind of indirect witness of assurance manifest in a 
naturalized, empirical self-knowledge) and a heavily-Kantian redefinition of sin. Thus, Lowery’s reinterpre-
tation indicates the dangers inherent to naturalizing grace.
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 I expect that a fair number of Wesleyans might balk at my suggestion of reading 
“natural conscience” in light of iconic dignity and its implications for the relationship of 
nature and grace. For example, Kenneth Collins’s Continental-Reformed interpretation of 
Wesley’s theology simply precludes my suggestion. Collins effectively flattens any of Wes-
ley’s nuance with respect to conscience in order to underscore the sovereignty of God and 
grace, which Collins juxtaposes with the utter depravity of humanity.48 In order to arrive 
at an account of human nature that is even remotely capable of moral response, Collins 
ultimately argues for the irresistibility of Wesleyan prevenient grace.49 In the present state 
of human nature, we are impotent to accept or reject God’s initial grace; therefore, this 
grace must be irresistible.
 Symptomatically, Collins’s version of conscience suffers, making Collins’s addi-
tional fifth benefit of prevenient grace—the restraint of wickedness—both unnecessary 
and incomplete.50 More specifically, for Collins, conscience emerges as a negative capacity 
48 Collins, The Theology of John Wesley, 77-82. It should be noted that Collins is following the lead of 
Charles Allen Rogers, “The Concept of Prevenient Grace in the Theology of John Wesley” (Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Duke University, 1967). Rogers unpacks four benefits of prevenient grace: a basic God-knowledge, a 
re-inscription of the moral law, conscience, and free will (196). Collins adds a fifth—“the restraint of wick-
edness” (78)—which divulges his Reformed leanings vis-à-vis Calvin’s teaching on “common grace.” For a 
juxtaposition between Calvin’s “common grace” and Wesley’s “prevenient grace,” with particular attention 
to the former’s emphasis on “keep[ing] sin in check,” see Lodahl, God of Nature and of Grace, 194-195. Cf. 
G. Michael Leffel, “Prevenient Grace and the Re-Enchantment of Nature: Toward a Wesleyan Theology of 
Psychotherapy and Spiritual Formation,” Journal of Psychology and Christianity 23, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 
135-136. 
49 See Collins, The Theology of John Wesley, 82. For Collins, postlapsarian humanity is impotent to accept 
(or reject) God’s initial grace without God’s gracious assistance, which, by such logic, must be irresistible. 
This position seems to overlook the possibility that an “initial encounter” with God’s prevenient grace may 
itself transform the moral capacity of the individual experiencing God’s grace. In other words, a nuanced 
and integrated approach to Wesley’s doctrines of humanity and grace can better uphold God’s gracious 
operation without characterizing this operation as irresistible. Note, in the present case of prevenient grace, 
God’s gracious operation enables our gracious cooperation with God.
50 Collins, The Theology of John Wesley, 77-78, 79-81.
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that is effected by irresistible grace and ultimately becomes equated with the restraint of 
evil. This interpretation lacks the acuity of Wesley’s own account of natural conscience, 
which discerns both good and evil, giving both approval and disapproval, illuminating a 
basic positive path for action as well as monitoring deviations therefrom.51 The danger of 
Collins’s position is evident in the inherent passivity and quietism it implicitly advocates, 
and in the way it tacitly places any and all goodness beyond the pale of human nature.52
 Against this stands the hermeneutic of iconic dignity, informed as it is by the 
thought of Aquinas. Let us recall that, for Aquinas, synderesis is primarily concerned with 
the positive: it first instigates us to what is good; it then provides us with the basic “data” 
with which to begin (and continue) discursive reasoning. Though present, the “negative” 
aspect of synderesis is lessened—from an instigation (instigare) to a murmur (murmare).53 
Hence, viewed through the lens of iconic dignity, a correlation of Wesley’s “natural con-
science” with Aquinas’s synderesis is far more profitable than a strictly-prohibitive and 
depraved version of the faculty within Wesley’s theology.
 Beyond this, a conjoined reading of natural conscience and synderesis assists us to 
bridge yet another difficulty: the relationship between the intellect and the will. Bearing 
in mind that its content is a sort of basic (intellectual) knowledge of principles for good 
51 See Wesley, Sermon 129, “Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels,” I.1, in Works 4:163. Cf. Sermon 105, 
“On Conscience,” I.3, 5, 7, and 11, in Works 3:481, 482, 483, and 485. In the latter, Wesley particularly ascribes 
many positive attributes and activities to conscience, including witnessing, judging, and executing, as well 
as a supervening delight or satisfaction upon the discerning of or action according to what is good/right.
52 It should be noted that Randy Maddox’s account is far more amenable to the present thesis than is Col-
lins’s—partially because Maddox struggles to hold together the spectrum of Wesley’s developing thought, 
and partially because Maddox is rooted in an Eastern-leaning hermeneutic. See Maddox, Responsible Grace, 
92-93.
53 See Aquinas, ST I.79.12 co.
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(volitional) action, conscience/synderesis points to the cognitive and affective dimensions 
of human nature working in tandem. But to appreciate this linkage, we now must unpack 
the second characteristic faculty of human nature for Wesley and Aquinas: the will and 
everything contained therein.
2. Will, Appetite, and Affection
 Alone, intellectual rationality is insufficient to account for human activity and a 
full theological anthropology for Wesley and Aquinas. Since the faculties of the human 
soul bear a direct relationship to the nature of the Triune God, in whom exists intellect 
and will,54 Wesley and Aquinas posit that the second critical capacity of human nature is 
the will. But what does this faculty signify within their theologies? This question will bear 
tremendous weight moving forward, so it is important to grasp what the will is, what it 
does, and how it does it—especially in relation to reason. We begin with Aquinas, whose 
account of the will helps to establish the general terms and their contours for this analyti-
cal comparison of volition.55
54 See the discussion of the imago Dei, above. In particular, Aquinas connects the persons of the Son and 
the Spirit to the processions of the Word and Love, which further correspond to the intellect and the will, 
respectively. See Aquinas, ST I.27-29, 34, 36-37.
55 While it is true that my decision to begin this section with Aquinas reveals a certain predilection for 
reading Wesley’s account of the will in Thomistic terms, it is my hope that the ordering of materials will 
demonstrate some of the ways in which Wesley’s own thought regarding the will is far more “classical” than 
“modernist.” This will have ramifications for his account of a third distinctive human faculty—liberty—
which is highly susceptible to modern misinterpretation. Since Responsible Grace (1994), much of Randy 
Maddox’s work has helped to establish the foundation for the present reading, as will be demonstrated 
below when we turn to Wesley.
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 The will, for Aquinas, is most fundamentally a matter of desire (appetitus), and 
desire is most fundamentally a matter of goodness (bonum).56 Now, in order for the will 
to desire something as good, it must first comprehend it—or, rather, the intellect appre-
hends the object (as described previously) and presents it to the will for desiring.57 I say it 
this way—that the intellect presents the apprehended object to the will, which desires the 
object as a “good”—because the key terms presuppose one another, and this presupposi-
tion distinguishes the nature of appetite in human beings.
 As we have already noted, Aquinas maintains that all things desire what is good 
but not equally. Inanimate things desire “naturally,” meaning that they have been created 
with a natural predisposition to flourish. Sensory creatures have the ability to process 
sense information,58 to which their passions respond. The response (a movement of the 
sense appetite) is with respect to the creature’s perception of the goodness of or within the 
object. So, while a tree seems to grow and flourish “naturally,” it cannot detect the good-
ness or badness of a lumberjack who has come to fell it; alternatively, a sheep can detect 
(sensorily) the threat posed by a wolf lurking nearby, “estimate” the danger, and respond 
by fleeing. While the tree’s “appetite” depicts what Aquinas calls “natural appetite,” the 
sheep’s “appetite” portrays “sensual appetite,” including its two kinds of passions: concu-
56 See ST I.80.1; and ST I.5.1. Cf. DV, q. 21, a. 1. In each of these cases, Aquinas makes direct reference to 
Aristotle’s ethical teaching (Nicomachean Ethics I), that “goodness is what all desire.” For a brief overview of 
the human will’s inclination to goodness, especially differentiated from God’s will, see Brian Davies, Thomas 
Aquinas on God and Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 82-83.
57 ST I.80.1. In his reply to the second objection, Aquinas makes it clear that the senses and the intellect 
apprehend the object as existing, whereas the appetite desires the object as good. Given Aquinas’s metaphys-
ical connection of being and goodness, the present link is to be expected.
58 Aquinas calls this capacity the “estimative power” (ST I.78.4), and it functions in a non-intellective 
manner as a way for animals to “process” information gathered from their five senses.
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piscible passions, which pursue what is good and avoid what is not; and irascible passions, 
which resist what attacks the good.59
 “Passion” may be described for Aquinas as “a physiological and psychological 
response to the apprehension of a sensible good or a sensible evil, that is, an object that is 
known through the senses, and judged to be either good or evil.”60 Passion pertains to the 
sense appetite, which responds in kind to perceived good at a sensory level. While it is true 
that humans possess passions, they are not unique to our species; other animals readily 
perceive and respond to the physical world around them. Our distinguishing appetitive 
mark is the will—an intellectual appetite working in tandem with our intellective faculty. 
Thus, the rational appetite (will) is “fed,” as it were, by the discursive and abstracting 
capacities of the intellect, to which it responds with desire and, consequently, move-
ment.61 Like other appetites, the will is a “moved mover.”62 But because it is an intellectual 
appetite, the will has the capacity for (being moved by and moving toward) something 
greater than a sensory desire for a sensible good. In fact, the human will has a capacity for 
God (capax Dei) that is actualized through love. Here is another reminded that we are cre-
ated according to God’s image: we possess intellectual and volitional capacities, through 
59 See ST I.81.2-3 for Aquinas’s categorical distinction of the passions as “concupiscible” and “irascible.” 
Later, in the Prima Secundae (qq. 22-48), he devotes considerable attention to specifying these passions, 
of which there are eleven. Presently, a recognition of this material is sufficient; our objective focuses more 
specifically on the aspect of appetite pertaining uniquely to human beings.
60 Nicholas Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2011), 20.
61 See ST I.82, especially aa. 3 and 4.
62 This term, owing as it does to Aristotelian physics (and metaphysics), is perhaps best described as 
“responsive”: appetite receives something and then acts out of that reception.
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which we may realize our supreme beatific end.63 As the Thomist commentator Réginald 
Garrigou-Lagrange observes, the will is distinct
from the sensible appetite, both irascible and concupiscible. For the will, directed 
by the intellect, is specified by the universal good, which is known only by the 
intellect, whereas the sensitive appetite, which is immediately directed by the cog-
nitive sensitive faculties, is specified not by the universal good but by the sensible, 
delectable, and useful good. Therefore the sensitive appetite, as such, cannot will 
the rational or moral good which is the object of virtue.64
In other words, if the sensible appetite and its passions aim at sensibly good objects,65 then 
the will and its affections aim at intelligibly good objects—because the will is an intellec-
tual appetite.
 Might we then suppose that the affections properly distinguish us humans from 
other animals? In a qualified sense, Aquinas would seem to support such a notion, given 
what he says regarding the will as a rational appetite. But he offers further clarification to 
this qualification—both directly and indirectly—in the way he uses the concept and the 
language of the affections vis-à-vis the passions.66
63 ST I.82.2. In this article, Aquinas is concerned with the necessity of the will’s desiring. Because of 
its intellectual nature, the will is capable of (i.e., “undetermined to”) desiring many kinds of goods as pre-
sented to it by the intellect. This satisfies the necessarily good-desiring nature of the will as an appetite 
while upholding the distinction present through the discursive intellect. More importantly, though, Aquinas 
posits that the will is necessarily drawn to the absolute good, beatitude with God, of which it is uniquely 
capable among God’s Creation.
64 Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, The Trinity and God the Creator: A Commentary on St. Thomas’ The-
hological Summa, Ia, q. 27-119, trans. Frederic C. Eckhoff (St. Louis: Herder Book Co, 1952), 590. Note the 
importance here of the way in which virtues and virtuous actions flow out of the present kind of theological 
anthropology.
65 Cf. ST I.80.2.
66 To discuss this aspect of Aquinas’s understanding of volition is to deal with affectivity as it is 
more-commonly understood today: as an emotional-responsive network. However, Aquinas’s understand-
ing of the will’s affectivity extends beyond a common construal that flattens the human faculties to just 
“thinking” and “feeling.” “Feeling” hardly seems adequate for the kind of metaphysical desire that grounds 
Aquinas’s teaching on the will and its activities. Furthermore, an isolated concept of “feeling” flies in the face 
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 In a superb study of Aquinas’s affective moral psychology, Nicholas Lombardo 
aids Aquinas’s readers in discerning a crucial connection between affections and passions: 
the passions are the affections of the sense appetite. “For Aquinas,” Lombardo writes, 
“the category of affection denotes a class of psychological phenomena that includes both 
movements of the sense appetite and movements of the intellectual appetite, that is, the 
will. Unlike passion, affection does not necessarily imply either corporeality or passivi-
ty.”67 Lombardo is quick to note that affection (affectus) is largely an undefined category 
in Aquinas’s thought, meaning a delicate reconstruction is required to analyze affectus in 
Aquinas.68 Lombardo’s reconstruction involves reframing the “passivity” of the passions 
in terms of receptivity and motion, especially over against suffering.69 This reframing of 
the passions is all the more applicable to the affections, which are a broader appetitive 
category into which the passions may fit.70
 Where Aquinas employs of the language of affection (affectus, affectio), his princi-
pal usage connotes a relational disposition undergirding the will as the human’s rational 
of Aquinas’s volitional tenet: that the will is a rational appetite. As we will continue to see in the remainder 
of this chapter and throughout the next, Aquinas’s classification of the will as a rational appetite is highly 
descriptive of the symbiotic relationship between these two human faculties. For an accessible account of 
these faculties, see Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke, Aquinas’s 
Ethics: Metaphysical Foundations, Moral Theory, and Theological Context (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2009), 46-66.
67 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 75.
68 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 75-77. For Lombardo, that reconstruction is drawn from Aquinas’s 
clear discussions of appetite (generally) and intellectual appetite (particularly).
69 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 34-37. Of course, the verbal root of “passion” is the Latin patior, which 
is typically translated as “to suffer, endure.” This potentially problematizes such a reframing. Nonetheless, 
Lombardo’s argument is convincing because of how he guides the discussion by grounding the passions in a 
teleological orientation and movement toward the good. Cf. Lombardo, 43.
70 Affections are not necessarily limited to the corporeal scope that Aquinas sets on the passions.
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appetite for the ultimate good, proportionate to human nature—beatitudo.71 “That good 
is most complete which the man with well-disposed affections desires for his last end” 
(illud bonum oportet esse completissimum, quod tanquam ultimum finem appetit habens 
affectum bene dispositum).72 Since God is the only absolute good, the human will (as ratio-
nal appetite) naturally inclines to beatitude as its summum bonum.73 As with all creaturely 
good, beatitude is good by way of participation in God—specifically, by knowing and 
loving God by means of the intellect and the will.74 However, this participation is just 
metaphysical language for the responsivity of the appetite to good. In the case of humans, 
our appetite is rationally inflected to goodness in the person of God, meaning our affective 
response to Divine Good is thoroughly relational.75
 One may object that this assessment of Aquinas’s teaching on appetite and will has 
erred categorically in somehow substituting “affections” for “passions,” and then inserting 
71 See “affectio” in Deferrari, Barry, and McGuinness, A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas, 37-38. Cf. “affec-
tio” in Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, eds., A Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879), 64. 
Cf. Aquinas, ST I-II.1.8.
72 ST I-II.1.7.
73 ST I.82.2. In this article, Aquinas is interested in the necessity of the will’s desiring, which will inform 
his next question regarding the freedom of human choice (inasmuch as that ability is informed by our intel-
lect and will). Though that general topic will be addressed in the next section below, it is worth mentioning 
here that, in this article, Aquinas maximizes his initial stance that all things desire good in kind. Humans 
are unique in that we are not limited to desire one particular good or another; rather, due to our intellectual 
capacities, we can perceive goodness on a more-abstract and universal level. This actually requires us to 
use our intellects and our wills in employing ourselves well in attaining our greatest good. However, that 
greatest good—beatitude—is the natural object of our desiring.
74 See, for example, ST I.6.4; I.44.4 ad 3; I.106.4; I-II 2.7; I-II.2.8; I-II.3.1 ad 1; and I-II.9.6.
75 As DeYoung, McCluskey, and Van Dyke compellingly argue in Aquinas’s Ethics (46-49), Aquinas’s 
account of human nature can only be understood inasmuch as humans stand in relation to God. Further, 
our relation to God is personal, for God is personal (Trinity) and the traces of the Trinity are woven into our 
nature by way of the image. More particularly, our resemblance to God is most apparent in our possession 
of intellect and will.
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that substitution into the content of the will. The objection is warranted given the con-
temporary tendency discuss Aquinas’s account of human appetites as “passions” and/or 
“emotions.”76 However, if we are to take Aquinas at his word—literally—then the charac-
teristic content of the will as a rational appetite is to be located in the affections, not (just) 
the passions.
 This claim begins with Aquinas’s own distinction between the passions of the soul 
and the other human affections (passiones animae ab aliis affectionibus humanis). Respond-
ing to the question of whether moral virtue can exist “with passion,” Aquinas observes:
For since the Stoics did not draw a distinction between the intellective appetite, 
i.e., the will, and the sentient appetite, which is divided into the irascible and the 
concupiscible, they did not distinguish, in the way the Peripatetics did, the pas-
sions of the soul from other human affections by claiming that the passions of the 
soul are movements of the sentient appetite, whereas the other affections, which 
are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite, which is called the 
will. Instead, they claimed only that ‘the passions’ are any affections that oppose 
reason.77
76 Alone, translations of Aquinas’s language of affectus as “affections” and “emotions” are insufficient in 
accounting for the predominant contemporary focus on the passions and/or emotions as the substance of 
this appetite within Aquinas’s thought. As noted above, Lombardo does recognize the role of the affections 
within Aquinas’s moral psychology, but his thesis is that the category remains largely undefined within 
Aquinas’s work (The Logic of Desire, especially 75-82). More typical is the scholarship of Peter King, whose 
relatively recent chapters on human psychology and affectivity in major publications by Oxford University 
Press have exclusively focused on the passions. See Peter King, “Aquinas on the Passions,” in Thomas Aqui-
nas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Brian Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
353-384; and King, “Emotions,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, 209-226. Brian Davies’s own recent 
account is more moderate and nuanced, blending specifically affective and responsive language with that of 
the passions. See Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, 170-187.
Over the past 30 years, Gregory S. Clapper has devoted considerable scholarship to the topic of John 
Wesley and religious affections. In his most-recent publication, Clapper presents a solid overview of the 
philosophical and linguistic chasm existing between modern conceptions of “emotion” and Wesley’s use of 
“affection.” For this penetrating analysis (which applies equally in considering Aquinas and affection), see 
Clapper, The Renewal of the Heart Is the Mission of the Church: Wesley’s Heart Religion in the Twenty-First 
Century (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010), 33-51. Clapper’s chief resource in that chapter is Thomas 
Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003).
77 ST I-II.59.2 (Freddoso). Freddoso’s translation smooths out some of the awkward syntax of Aquinas’s 
incredibly long sentence: “Quia enim Stoici non distinguebant inter appetitum intellectivum, qui est vol-
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The distinction is an important one that hinges on Aquinas’s use of the preposition ab, 
“from”: the passions are to be distinguished from the other human affections inasmuch 
as they pertain solely to the sentient appetite, whereas the remaining affections (having 
had the passions “subtracted” out) pertain solely to the intellectual appetite. Elsewhere, 
Aquinas gives this “passion-less” affective category a name: “simple affection.”78 The sim-
plicity of which Aquinas speaks here ought to call to mind what he has to say much earlier 
in the Prima Pars regarding God’s simplicity,79 and this is no accident: “simple affection” 
is attributable to God and the angels; passion is not.80
 To be clear, Aquinas in no way argues that humans somehow lack the passions, 
nor does he argue that a good person will somehow eradicate the passions. Conversely, 
neither is he arguing that humans are exclusively bound by the passions of the sensory 
appetite (unlike other animals). Rather, he situates humans in the space between animals 
and God, materiality and immateriality, passions and “simple affections.” “We constitute 
the bridge between material and immaterial beings because we possess both the actuality 
inherent to intellective beings and the potentiality characteristic of material creatures.”81 
untas, et inter appetitum sensitivum, qui per irascibilem et concupiscibilem dividitur; non distinguebant in 
hoc passiones animae ab aliis affectionibus humanis, quod passiones animae sint motus appetitus sensitivi, 
aliae vero affectiones, quae non sunt passiones animae, sunt motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur volun-
tas, sicut Peripatetici distinxerunt, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod passiones esse dicebant quascumque 
affections rationi repugnantes.”
78 ST I.85.2 ad 1.
79 See ST I.3
80 ST I.85.2 ad 1. Indeed, given Aquinas’s teaching on the immateriality of God and the angels, they quite 
simply cannot have passions. But through the distinction of passion from affection, Aquinas leaves open a 
metaphysically consistent account for the existence of love—as an affection—in God. Cf. ST I.20.1 ad 1. See 
also Lombardo’s discussion of affection in God and angels, in The Logic of Desire, 82-83.
81 DeYoung, McCluskey, and Van Dyke, Aquinas’s Ethics, 27.
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We bear distinctive marks of God within our nature because we are created in the image 
of God according to our possession and exercise of intellect and will (the hallmarks of 
our rational soul). At the same time, we are also material creatures, animals with physical 
senses, appetites, and needs. Therefore, within our appetitive faculty (the will) we have 
affections: volitional motivators and responses to the Good and its goods, neither exclu-
sively physical-passive nor exclusively immaterial-active.
 If this is analysis is correct, we should expect to find instances where Aquinas either 
makes explicit reference to the affective content of the will or makes a basic substitution 
of “affections” for “will.” This is precisely what Aquinas does throughout the Secunda 
Pars: “affection” operates as a stand-in for “will” as our uniquely-human appetite.82 In 
addition to supporting the claim of the affective content of the will, these instances also 
reflect Aquinas’s characteristic integration of intellect and will. This integrated account 
will prove indispensable to Aquinas’s theory of human action, wherein intellect and will 
operate in tandem to produce human actions. While that topic will be explored in the 
82 Some notable instances from the Secunda Pars include the following:
• I-II.5.3—as ignorance is an insufficiency to the intellect, inordinate affection is an insufficiency to 
the appetite (here taken as “will”);
• I-II.68.1—though presenting various opinions on the relationship between the gifts and the vir-
tues, Aquinas’s linguistic pairing of the appetitive power with the affections is his own; this is then positioned 
with the intellect;
• I-II.68.4 ad 5—wisdom’s twofold gift pertains to intellect (via “understanding”) and affections (via 
“fear”); again, Aquinas presents the two human faculties together;
• I-II.79.3—Aquinas again presents the pair of human faculties as he addresses the effects of grace on 
the intellect and the affections (i.e., knowing and loving God);
• I-II.101.2—interior worship is the soul being united to God by the intellect and the affections;
• II-II.13.1—blasphemy (as contrary to faith) pertains to the intellect and the affections;
• II-II.95.6—dreams are caused by the things which occupy a person’s thoughts and affections;
• II-II.180.1—the contemplative life pertains to the intellect and the affections; the sed contra links 
the affections and the appetitive power; the corpus then connects this with the will.
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following chapter, it is important for us first to understand the relationship between the 
intellect and the will.
 We have already encountered an implicit account of this integration in the process 
of determining the affective content of the will; elsewhere, Aquinas makes the relationship 
of intellect and will explicit. From his early commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences 
to his own unfinished Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas consistently argues that the 
object of the will is apprehended good—good known as good, and known by way of the 
intellect.83 While other species’ apprehensive and appetitive abilities can work together 
toward what is “good,” Aquinas holds that our intellectual nature gives us the capacity 
for comprehending good as good (and as supreme good, for that matter).84 On its own, 
though, the intellect is insufficient to generate movement toward what it knows to be 
good. Motion requires desire, and this desire-working-with-reason is the will.85 In this 
way, epistemology and volition portray a common dynamic: the intellect can only process 
information as it is received by the senses, and the will can only desire something known 
to be good by the intellect.86
83 Michael Sherwin has compiled a brief sampling from Aquinas’s works to demonstrate the consistency 
of Aquinas’s perspective. See Sherwin, By Knowledge & By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theol-
ogy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 21-22n12.
84 As detailed in the previous section, this ability of the intellect is rooted in its nature and its acts, which 
are disposed toward ordering, comparing, judging, abstracting, and the like, thereby enabling it to com-
prehend universals as universals. With respect to volition, it is because the intellect is able to comprehend 
goodness as good that the will is able to direct action toward that good.
85 For a nice overview of this, see DeYoung, McCluskey, and Van Dyke, Aquinas’s Ethics, 62.
86 For unambiguous references to the necessity of the intellect in presenting the apprehended good 
to the will, see ST I.82.4 co. ad 2, and ad 3; cf. DV, q. 22, aa. 4 and 13. See also Sherwin, By Knowledge & 
By Love, 18-62. Cf. Richard Cross, “Thomas Aquinas,” in The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western 
Christianity, ed. Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 175-
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 Significantly, the relationship between intellect and will is not unidirectional for 
Aquinas. As Brian Davies explains,
Aquinas clearly thinks that when we act voluntarily, there is a kind of interweaving 
of intellect and will. Generally speaking, he holds that we are drawn to what we 
take to be good as we think about things, but he also thinks that how we think 
about things can be affected by our willing or desiring.… What we know can some-
times depend on what we are willing to pay attention to.87
Davies draws his observations from what Aquinas has to say in ST I.82.4 (on whether 
and how the will moves the intellect). In all things, motion derives from the desires and 
intentions of the appetites. This holds true for humans as well: the will moves all of the 
powers of the soul to act, including the intellect.88 But, as we have already seen, the intel-
lect “feeds” the rational appetite. While the practical outworking of the perichoresis of will 
and intellect will be treated in the following chapter, we do well to note that, “in every 
voluntary action, intellect and will cooperate.… Inasmuch as the two powers interact in 
every choice, so Aquinas thinks, and neither power can act independently of the other, 
they are deeply interdependent for their respective operations.”89 Or, as Aquinas himself 
insightfully concludes,
the reason why these powers include one another by their acts is that the intellect 
understands that the will wills, and the will wills that the intellect understand. 
And by a similar line of reasoning, the good is contained under the true insofar as 
176. Cross’s essay is particularly helpful in underscoring the responsive nature of the will and its affections to 
goods and goals presented to it by reason. 
87 Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, 140.
88 ST I.82.4 co.
89 Peter S. Eardley and Carl N. Still, Aquinas: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum Books, 
2010), 45.
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the good is a certain true thing that is understood, and the true is contained under 
the good insofar as the true is a certain desired good.90
Bearing in mind the emergent trajectory of iconic dignity, we may understand that the 
reason for this inter-penetration of intellect and will is that their source, substance, and 
summit is found in God alone.
 As we turn now to consider the will in Wesley’s theological anthropology, we find 
a similar dynamic between the faculties of the soul and a similar (albeit more implicit) 
rationale for their interplay. In a sermon addressing stewardship, Wesley’s first point is 
to underscore that God has entrusted us with a soul, “together with all the powers and 
faculties thereof ”—namely, “understanding” and “will, and a train of affections either 
included in it or closely dependent upon it.”91 As Wesley continues, it is only when our 
faculties are operating in concert with one another and with God’s empowering grace that 
we may encounter true, ultimate happiness.92 The similarity here to Aquinas need not 
come as any surprise given their mutual formation in Scripture and classical (Aristotelian) 
thought concerning the soul.93
90 ST I.82.4 ad 1 (Freddoso).
91 Wesley, Sermon 51, “The Good Steward,” I.2, in Works 2:284.
92 Sermon 51, “The Good Steward,” I.3. Cf. Sermon 62, “The End of Christ’s Coming,” I.5, in Works 
2:475, where Wesley specifically claims that “these three”—understanding, will, and liberty—“are insepa-
rably united in every intelligent nature.” Wesley’s third faculty, liberty, will be treated in the following sec-
tion. Also cf. Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” I.4, in Works 4:295, on the supervening happiness resulting 
from the perfection of these faculties properly working together.
93 For an account of Wesley’s Aristotelian leanings, especially over against Locke, see Mark T. Mealey, 
“John Wesley,” in The Spiritual Senses, 245-248.
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 But what of the will per se? As mentioned in Wesley’s aforementioned sermon on 
stewardship, the salient feature of the will is its appositional equation with the affections.94 
Thus, if Aquinas’s axiom is that the will is a rational appetite for good, Wesley’s is that 
the affections “are only the will exerting itself [in] various ways.”95 This is not to say that 
Wesley’s view of the will (as affections) is inconsistent with Aquinas’s (as rational appe-
tite). Already we have seen how Aquinas’s own perspective reveals an underlying affective 
dimension, and it would be no stretch to say that, for Aquinas, the will is both a rational 
94 Randy Maddox offers a brief catalogue of this apposition over the course of Wesley’s lifetime in 
Responsible Grace, 69n27. We should further note that in those places where Wesley explicates the image of 
God (whether briefly or at length), he does so according to this division of faculties wherein “affections” and 
“will” are used interchangeably. Cf. Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” I.2, in Works 4:294-295; Sermon 45, 
“The New Birth,” I.1, in Works 2:188; Sermon 51, “The Good Steward,” I.2, in Works 2:284; Thoughts Upon 
Necessity, III.8-9, in Works 13:539-540; Sermon 62, “The End of Christ’s Coming,” I.4, in Works 2:474-475; 
Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” I.1, in Works 2:439; Sermon 57, “On the Fall of Man,” II.6, in Works 
2:409-410; Sermon 116, “What Is Man? Psalm 8:4,” §7, in Works 4:22; and Sermon 129, “Heavenly Treasure 
in Earthen Vessels,” I.1, in Works 4:163.
95 Sermon 62, “The End of Christ’s Coming,” I.4, in Works 2:274. Much of Wesley’s basic understand-
ing of the nature of the affections—including their volitional characterization and their indispensability to 
Christianity—may be traced to Jonathan Edwards’s Treatise on Religious Affections, which Wesley abridged 
and included in his multivolume Christian Library (vol. 50). Gregory Clapper has spent much time analyzing 
Wesley’s abridgement of Edwards, which, according to Clapper, reduced the original text by five-sixths. 
Still, Wesley retained the bulk of Edwards’s basic principles on the correlation of the will and the affections, 
the cognitive aspects to the exercise of the affections, and the dispositionally motivational aspect of the 
affections. See Clapper, John Wesley on Religious Affections: His Views on Experience and Emotion and Their 
Role in the Christian Life and Theology (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1989), 136-148.
Of course, scholars are not entirely of one mind when it comes to characterizing the will for Wesley. 
Many, like Wesleyan psychologists Brad D. Strawn and Warren S. Brown, grasp the general equation of the 
will with the affections and tempers—this latter term being a habituated affection or enduring disposition. 
However, Strawn and Brown hedge their definition of Wesley’s will by distancing it from modern under-
standings of will as conscious, rational, and/or self-determinative. As we shall see, this hedging may in fact 
prune too much from Wesley’s concept! See Strawn and Brown, “Wesleyan Holiness through the Eyes of 
Cognitive Science and Psychotherapy,” Journal of Psychology and Christianity 23, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 
121-129.
A different reading is offered in Kenneth Collins, “John Wesley’s Topography of the Heart: Disposi-
tions, Tempers, and Affections,” Methodist History 36, no. 3 (April 1998): 162-175. While recognizing the 
affections as the exertions of the will, Collins makes the contradictory claim that “Wesley maintains that to 
make the will and the affections the same thing is inaccurate,” giving reference to Thoughts Upon Necessity 
III.9. However, Collins seems to have overlooked Wesley’s all-important concessive “unless” (Works 13:540). 
Wesley’s point is that it would be inaccurate to divide “affections” and “will” unless that division entailed 
“affections” as “will” and “will” as “liberty”—which basically amounts to a circumlocutory restatement of 
Wesley’s own threefold division of understanding, will, and liberty!
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appetite and an affective reality. What’s more, Wesley indicates in a number of places that, 
in addition to reading the will as affective (and vice-versa), it may also be read as appetitive. 
In fact, we might consider the relationship between affection and appetite to be a second 
Wesleyan volitional apposition.96
 To be sure, many of Wesley’s references to “appetites” in his sermons carry a neg-
ative tone. But, in a crucial turn, many instances also reveal the rationale for avoiding 
wayward appetites: “none of these can satisfy the appetite of an immortal soul. Nay, all of 
them together cannot give rest, which is the lowest ingredient of happiness, to a never-dy-
ing spirit which God created for the enjoyment of himself.”97 As a creation and gift of God 
(and for God), appetite itself is not bad. After all, Aquinas and Wesley both underscore the 
divine foundation of human affectivity and appetite. Spiritual appetite names the underly-
ing desire for goodness at the heart of the human will.98 When the affective appetite of the 
will operates in right relationship with the intellect, and when these faculties are aimed 
toward their ultimate End and Goodness, human holiness and happiness flourishes. It is 
this kind of properly-proportioned and properly-aimed affective desire that Wesley has in 
mind when describing our original volitional and appetitive state as “rational.”99
96 Examples of this include the following: Sermon 17, “The Circumcision of the Heart,” I.10, in Works 
1:407; Sermon 84, “The Important Question,” I.4, in Works 3:184. Additionally, Wesley enjoins certain other 
volitional facets to this apposition, as seen in the following: Sermon 15, “The Great Assize,” II.7, in Works 
1:363; Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” I.2, in Works 2:174-175.
97 Wesley, Sermon 125, “On a Single Eye,” II.4, in Works 4:125. Cf. Sermon 14, “The Repentance of 
Believers,” I.6, in Works 1:338-339.
98 See Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” I.4, in Works 4:295, where Wesley specifies the classical objects 
of understanding and the will: truth and goodness (respectively).
99 See Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” I.2, in Works 4:294. See also Sermon 60, “The General Deliv-
erance,” I.2, in Works 2:439: “[Adam’s] will had no wrong bias of any sort, but all his passions and affections 
were regular, being steadily and uniformly guided by the dictates of his unerring understanding; embracing 
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 These observations point to a third facet of volitional affectivity within Wesley’s 
theological anthropology: transitivity.100 Affections “take objects,” both in a linguistic and 
an appetitive sense. The will’s affective desire is for something—even if it is the reflex-
ive object of the will’s own well-being. Of course, not all objects are equal. This is why 
Wesley’s treatment of “appetites” is not an open endorsement of human desires. Proper 
desiring employs the discernment of reason and the will operating together. When these 
faculties are well-proportioned and well-aimed, their object is God, in whom our intellects 
and wills participate through the acts of knowing and loving. All other desires are to be 
proportioned according to our ultimate desire for God.101
 Early on in his extended treatment of the Sermon on the Mount, Wesley explains 
this God-ward inclination as a native disposition for righteousness:
Our Lord has hitherto been more immediately employed in removing the hin-
drances of true religion.… And when once these hindrances are removed—these 
evil diseases of the soul which were continually raising false cravings therein, and 
filling it with sickly appetites—the native appetite of a heaven-born spirit returns; 
it hungers and thirsts after righteousness.… Righteousness (as was observed 
before) is the image of God, the mind which was in Christ Jesus. It is every holy 
and heavenly temper in one; springing from as well as terminating in the love of 
God as our Father and Redeemer, and the love of all men for his sake.… Hunger and 
nothing but good, and every good in proportion to its degree of intrinsic goodness” (emphasis added). Given 
Wesley’s multiple readings of “reason” (arguments, motives, relations, and the amalgamate faculty of under-
standing-apprehending-judging-discoursing; cf. Sermon 70, “The Case of Reason Impartially Considered,” 
I.1-2, in Works 2:589-590), we may reasonably infer the present reading of “rational” as “properly-rationed” 
based on the relational and comparative-judging qualities of rationality. This also underscores Wesley’s 
(ideal) dynamic between reason and will.
100 Clapper develops this notion throughout John Wesley on Religious Affections, but addresses it specif-
ically in 76-78.
101 Whenever Wesley references our loving the Creator above the creature (cf. Rom. 1:25), it is this 
kind of ultimate desiring for God that he has in mind. When this relational desire is the foremost aim of the 
will (which is the result of being well-rationed, as we have seen), the hendyadis of holiness and happiness 
supervenes. This is the ultimate joy and rest for the human soul—when all its operations are held in proper 
balance because it is God-wardly aimed.
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thirst are the strongest of all our bodily appetites. In like manner this hunger in the 
soul, this thirst after the image of God, is the strongest of all our spiritual appetites 
when it is once awakened in the heart; yea, it swallows up all the rest in that one 
great desire to be renewed after the likeness of him that created us.102
The nuances of this passage are vital to a full-bodied understanding of the will in Wesley’s 
theological anthropology. He opens with what amounts to Aquinas’s distinction between 
the irascible and concupiscible passions (those that “remove the hindrances” and those 
that “hunger and thirst for” good, respectively). Note that the faculty of appetite, of desire, 
of affective volition is not the “evil disease of the soul”; rather, the object of the faculty 
specifies its worth. With the impediments removed, the will is able to hunger and thirst 
for righteousness—a rectitude of God’s image dwelling within humans, calling to mind 
the pattern of Christ Jesus. Thus, the reference to Philippians 2:5 names a noetic flourish-
ing and an affectional disposition from which flow our words, thoughts, and deeds.103
 The transitivity of volitional affection couples with the fluency of words, thoughts, 
and deeds from our affectional dispositions to point to a fourth aspect of Wesley’s teach-
ing on the will: motion. This is unsurprising given the meaning of “transitive” (trans 
+ ire, “to go across”). Much like Aquinas, Wesley maintains that motion is achieved by 
102 Sermon 22, “Upon our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, II,” II.1-3, in Works 1:495-496.
103 The image of “flowing,” paired with the triad of “thoughts, words, and deeds,” is a hallmark of Wes-
ley’s affectional moral psychology and the dynamic of the perfection of love within the Christian. Since 
discussing Wesley’s “holistic psychology” in Responsible Grace (69-70), Randy Maddox has richly developed 
what he calls “Wesley’s [habituated] affectional moral psychology.” See Maddox, “A Change of Affections: 
The Development, Dynamics, and Dethronement of John Wesley’s ‘Heart Religion’,” in “Heart Religion” in 
the Methodist Tradition and Related Movements, ed. Richard Steele (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 
3-31; cf. Maddox, “Reconnecting the Means to the End: A Wesleyan Prescription for the Holiness Move-
ment,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 33, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 29-66. The habituative dynamic which Maddox 
identifies will be addressed later in the current chapter; the activation of this dynamic will be analyzed in the 
next chapter. For now, it is important to bear in mind the Wesleyan notion of our various activities flowing 
from our intellectual and volitional faculties, as articulated by Maddox.
146
an act of the will.104 Although Wesley does not draw a clear line between metaphysical 
and physical motion (considered volitionally), he is quite clear that the motion he has in 
mind is self-motion (as opposed to mere locomotion).105 The “inward principle of motion” 
is received immediately from the Spirit as a component of the image of the animating 
God.106 Furthermore, Wesley “locates” this principle of motion in the “inward emotions 
which are commonly called ‘passions’ or ‘affections.’ They are styled, by a general appel-
lation, ‘the will,’ and are…the only spring of action in that inward principle I call ‘the 
soul.’”107 The unique dignity of motion (and emotion108) afforded to humans is but another 
104 E.g., Sermon 116, “What Is Man? Psalm 8:4,” I.9, in Works 4:23.
105 It is true that Wesley’s examples are instances of physical motions (e.g., moving a limb of the body), 
leaving “intra-soul” motion in question. Though the contexts of these examples readily suggest that the will 
is the activator of all motion, physical or immaterial, a speculative possibility for this apparent lacuna is that 
Wesley’s concept of “liberty” (to be discussed later in this chapter) functions as the agent of metaphysical 
motion. Such speculation would be substantiated by the quasi-apposition (note his genitives and conjunc-
tions!) Wesley strikes between “liberty,” “self-moving,” and “self-governing.” See Sermon 129, “Heavenly 
Treasure in Earthen Vessels,” I.1, in Works 4:163).
106 Sermon 116, “What Is Man? Psalm 8:4,” I.8, in Works 4:22-23. Cf. Sermon 129, “Heavenly Treasure 
in Earthen Vessels,” I.1, in Works 4:163, where Wesley specifically correlates this motion with the imago Dei; 
and Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” I.1, in Works 2:438-439. In “The General Deliverance,” Wesley 
actually draws a metaphysical distinction between the pure passivity of matter and (what may logically be 
inferred as) the pure activity of immaterial spirit. The distinction is nearly identical to Aquinas’s metaphysi-
cal category of “prime matter,” which is the logical inverse of God’s pure actuality (see ST I.44.2). As matter 
without form, prime matter represents absolute potentiality—meaning it cannot actually (in actu) exist on 
its own.
107 Sermon 116, “What Is Man? Psalm 8:4,” I.7, in Works 4:22. Wesley should not necessarily be read 
here as advancing the synonymy of “passions” and “affections.” Clapper notes the ambiguity of Wesley’s lan-
guage (John Wesley on Religious Affections, 53-55), but ultimately ends up distinguishing Wesley’s “affections” 
from “passions” by the former’s tendency toward human control (Clapper, 69). Collins seems somewhat 
perplexed by Clapper’s conclusion (“John Wesley’s Topography of the Heart,” 171 and 171n44). As was the 
case proposed above with Aquinas, the category of “affection” seems more expansive than “passion” within 
Wesley’s thought—and it is this more-expansive category of affection that is more characteristic of the will. 
For Aquinas, the human will is a rational appetite, and the implication is that the affections (over against the 
passions) are “rationally formable,” so to speak. If the same is true for Wesley—as I am maintaining—we 
must side more with Clapper’s conclusion that Collins’s confusion!
108 Volitional affectivity for Wesley certainly includes what we would consider an “emotional” core. As 
Wesley frequently stresses in his sermons, “true religion” is “the religion of the heart.” See Sermon 7, “The 
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example for Wesley of the divine image of the God in whom we live, and move, and have 
our being.109
 Perhaps another way to put this is to say that the affections of the will are “moved 
movements.” This fundamental dynamic is certainly what Randy Maddox has in mind 
when he emphasizes the responsive nature of the affections within Wesley’s (mature) moral 
psychology.110 While Maddox rightly connects this dynamic to the empiricist undercur-
rent of Wesley’s day,111 his emphasis drives at Wesley’s greater purpose for highlighting 
affective response: human responsibility. Due to the responsivity of our affections, we 
are responsible for our will and the actions it produces. Specifically, affective responsivity 
is tantamount to our volitional responsibility to inculcate particular affections that con-
stitute the character of a Christian as one who follows after the mind of Christ. Because 
our affections take objects and do so responsively, we are responsible for focusing and 
developing our inclinations on the best object—God.112 In other words, though our affec-
tions are transitive, they need not be transitory. We are responsible for nurturing them 
Way to the Kingdom,” I.1-7, in Works 1:218-221. Cf. Sermon 9, “The Spirit of Bondage and the Spirit of 
Adoption,” I.6, in Works 1:253-254 (note the correlation here between holiness, heart-religion, and the mind 
of Christ); and Sermon 33, “Upon our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, Discourse XIII,” III.12, in Works 1:698 
(note Wesley’s culminating force and focus!).
109 See Wesley, Notes, Acts 17:38. Note, the “necessity” to which Wesley refers is not a deterministic 
necessity, but rather one of classical logic and causality.
110 Maddox, “A Change of Affections,” 13-15; cf. “Reconnecting the Means to the End,” 39-40.
111 Maddox, “A Change of Affections,” 13-15. Again, the line between physics and metaphysics is some-
what blurred. We can call to mind a metaphysical analogy to the Newtonian physics of the latter 17th cen-
tury: as an object at rest/motion tends to stay at rest/motion unless acted upon by an outside force, so a 
metaphysical capacity (i.e., the will) is not “active” until it is “affected” by an outside motion. Maddox rightly 
draws our attention to Wesley’s core (and Scriptural!) belief that all matter, motion, and emotion is first 
animated by God.
112 See, for example, Sermon 17, “The Circumcision of the Heart,” I.1, in Works 1:402-403.
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into enduring dispositions—what Aquinas holds to be habitus and what Wesley terms 
tempers.113
 Cumulatively, Maddox classifies Wesley’s mature moral psychology as one of 
“habituated holistic affections” or tempers that is most similar to the model of holisti-
cally-habituated virtues as propounded by Aquinas.114 Characterizing Wesley in this way 
rightly recognizes Wesley’s rejection of determinist and passional streams of moral psy-
chology while honoring the development in his thought from an intellectually-driven 
model to one embracing an integrated and habituated balance of intellect and will.115 
As Maddox observes, “Wesley viewed the motivations behind human action as ideally 
integrating the rational and emotional dimensions of human life into holistic inclinations 
toward action.”116 This holistic focus on the cooperation of the intellect and the will echoes 
of our analysis of Aquinas. And, as that analysis concluded, the volitional faculty for Aqui-
nas may best be characterized by its various affections that respond to the data received by 
113 There has been ample quality scholarship in recent decades that discusses Wesley’s contextualized 
notion of “tempers” as “enduring dispositions” or “character.” Included in that scholarship is the work of 
Maddox, Responsible Grace, 69; Maddox, “A Change of Affections,” 15; Maddox, “Reconnecting the Means to 
the End,” 41-42; Clapper, John Wesley on Religious Affections, 46-55; and Collins, “John Wesley’s Topography 
of the Heart,” 165-170. These scholars agree that, for Wesley, “tempers” are enduring affectional dispositions. 
Most important for the present study is how Aquinas, too, correlates “habit” and “disposition” (ST I-II.49.1). 
The ramifications of this parallelism between Wesley and Aquinas will be born out in the concluding section 
of this chapter.
114 Maddox, “A Change of Affections,” 16. Note that Maddox himself makes this connection to Aquinas! 
Cf. Maddox, “Reconnecting the Means to the End,” 41. Maddox’s appendices to “Reconnecting the Means to 
the End” (65-66) present a solid overview and taxonomy of various models of moral psychology differenti-
ated according to agency (determinist vs. self-determinist), primacy (rational, passional, or integrated), and 
reflexivity (spontaneous, habituated, or decisionistic). My analysis here is based upon Maddox’s taxonomy.
115 Maddox presents this general overview, the development of Wesley’s own moral psychology, and the 
eventual 19th century North American displacement of Wesley’s mature model by a decisionistic one in “A 
Change of Affections” as well as “Reconnecting the Means with the End.”
116 Maddox, “A Change of Affections,” 15.
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the intellect under the aspect of “good.”117 As such, the nuanced similarity of Wesley and 
Aquinas on the will exemplifies the profitability of such a “diverse unity” of perspectives 
for the comparative theological dialogue of iconic dignity.
3. Liberty, Liberum Arbitrium, and “Free Will”
 The decision to address “liberty, liberum arbitrium, and ‘free will’” as a separate 
“faculty” has been difficult. This is partly because contemporary thought frequently 
lumps it with “will,” partly because Aquinas does not consider it a separate faculty, and 
partly because Wesley does consider it a separate faculty. But, more primarily, it because 
Aquinas and Wesley agree that it is the sine qua non of genuine human moral action. The 
belief that we lack this ability “is not only contrary to faith but also subverts all the princi-
ples of moral philosophy,” writes a mature Aquinas. “If nothing is within our power, and 
we are necessarily moved to will things, deliberation, exhortation, precept, punishment, 
and praise and blame, of which moral philosophy consists, are destroyed.”118 And Wesley 
agrees: without it, “both the will and the understanding would have been utterly useless”; 
wherever it is absent, “there can be no moral good or evil, no virtue or vice.” In short, 
“there is no virtue but where an intelligent being knows, loves, and chooses what is good; 
nor is there any vice but where such a being knows, loves, and chooses what is evil.”119 
117 Aquinas, DV, q. 24, a. 14, resp., is a sufficient summary of this responsive quality of the human will: 
“[The human will] is thus in some sense in potency unless it is moved by an activating principle, which is 
either something presented to it from the outside, such as an apprehended good, or something which works 
within it interiorly, as God Himself.”
118 DM, q. 6, a. 1, resp. Cf. DV, q. 24, a. 1, resp.; and ST I.83.1.
119 Wesley, Sermon 62, “The End of Christ’s Coming,” I.4, 6, in Works 2:475. Cf. Thoughts Upon Neces-
sity, III.8-9, in Works 13:539-540; and Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” I.1, in Works 2:439.
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That said, we can clearly observe why it would be of vital importance for Wesley and 
Aquinas—but what exactly is “it”?
 The concepts informing Wesley’s use of “liberty” and Aquinas’s use of “liberum 
arbitrium” do not quite map onto a contemporary colloquial understanding of “free 
will”—viz., that we are fully free to act interpedently however we wish without internal 
or external restriction.120 For starters, language gets in the way. Aquinas never uses the 
language of “free will” (i.e., libera voluntas or libertas voluntatis).121 Where Wesley men-
tions “free will” (and he does), the references are typically drawn from his various open 
letters in which he evidently attempts to keep his own terminology consistent with that 
of the one to whom he is replying or addressing.122 The greater question is, of course, 
whether “liberty” and “liberum arbitrium” are even convertible terms. As we shall see, 
Wesley and Aquinas present highly-nuanced accounts of this critical human capacity for 
free moral action. In coming to see this, we will continue to read Wesley and Aquinas ste-
reoscopically and contextually, with the hope of revealing some of the motivating factors 
behind their respective positions.
120 A helpful theological treatment of volitional freedom may be found in Ian A. McFarland, “Free Will,” 
in Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology, 191-192.
121 See Brian Davies’s editorial “Introduction” to On Evil (De Malo), 35-36. Like many other scholars 
of Aquinas have noted, it seems best to leave liberum arbitrium untranslated in order to avoid linguistic 
confusion and anachronistic implications.
122 Most of the examples are, understandably, drawn from Wesley’s various controversies with those of 
a Calvinist persuasion (e.g., Predestination Calmly Considered, Thoughts Upon Necessity, A Thought on Neces-
sity, and Remarks on Hill’s “Review”). The few references from Part III of his treatise on Original Sin may fit 
into this category, too. Lastly, there are a very few instances where Wesley is simply quoting someone else 
directly. A formidable exception to this is Wesley’s own phrase “freedom of will” in Sermon 45, “The New 
Birth,” I.1, in Works 2:188. To my knowledge, this is the only time that Wesley speaks this way of his own 
accord.
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 To begin, Aquinas locates liberum arbitrium in the will as an appetitive power of 
choice that proceeds from judgment.123 Liberum arbitrium is, decidedly, not a separate 
faculty of the human soul. In fact, it is of the same power (potentia) as the will.124 But, as 
Eleonore Stump has rightly argued,
the dynamic interactions of intellect and will yield freedom as an emergent prop-
erty or a systems-level feature.… Liberum arbitrium isn’t a property of the will 
alone. It can be understood as a property of the will only insofar as the will itself 
is understood to be the rational appetite and to have a close tie to the intellect.125
The intellect turns things over discursively and has the capacity for weighing options. The 
will seeks things out desirously and has the capacity for enacting motion. In a way, liberum 
arbitrium is suspended between the two stanchions of human nature: without intellect or 
will, liberum arbitrium would certainly sink; without liberum arbitrium, though, intellect 
and will would be purposeless posts. Within human nature, the intellect and the will work 
in concert to produce real, free, uncoerced human choices and acts.126
123 Aquinas’s clearest and most concise explanation of this is ST I.83.3-4. His argument there is consis-
tent with what he has to say in DM, q. 6, which he composed as a result of a controversy in Paris (1270) on 
the question of necessity surrounding divine action and human liberty. In By Knowledge & By Love (24-53), 
Sherwin addresses the development of Aquinas’s thought on liberum arbitrium and choice in practical rea-
soning from DV (qq. 22 and 24), presumed to be written 1256-1259, to DM (q. 6), presumed to be written 
around the 1270 controversy. Sherwin argues that Aquinas is consistent while he develops a heightened 
integration of the intellect and the will in practical reasoning (49-53). Sherwin’s case is a masterful analysis 
of how choice works within Aquinas’s moral psychology; the present concern, however, is more basic: that 
Aquinas locates liberum arbitrium in the will while maintaining its clear procession from the judgment of 
cognitive reasoning.
124 Aquinas, ST I.83.4.
125 Eleonore Stump, “Aquinas’s Account of Freedom: Intellect and Will,” The Monist 80, no. 4 (1997): 
576, 587. Versions of this essay have appeared elsewhere in various forms, including Stump, Aquinas 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 277-306.
126 See ST I.83.2 ad 3. In the previous article (ST I.83.1), Aquinas makes this kind of argument for liberum 
arbitrium from the very nature of humans: “Forasmuch as man is rational it is necessary that man have a 
free-will [liberi arbitrii].” Note, “rational” here applies to the “intellectual nature” that defines humans; it 
includes the intellect and the will, which is a rational appetite.
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 Conversely, Wesley is adamant that liberty is a third, separate faculty that can act 
upon the intellect and will alike:
[Liberty] is very frequently confounded with the will, but is of a very different 
nature. Neither is it a property of the will, but a distinct property of the soul, capa-
ble of being exerted with regard to all the faculties of the soul, as well as all the 
motions of the body. It is a power of self-determination which, although it does not 
extend to all our thoughts and imaginations, yet extends to our words and actions 
in general, and not with many exceptions.127
Elsewhere, Wesley specifies that, by self-determination, he has in mind choice—an ability 
to choose the good and (ideally) to refuse the bad.128 In light of the observations of the 
previous section, it is illuminating that Wesley depicts liberty as “a power of directing 
[one’s] own affections and actions, a capacity of determining [oneself ], of choosing good 
or evil.”129 Drawing from the insights of Maddox’s topology,130 we may see that Wesley 
self-consciously distances himself from voluntarist and naturalist moral psychologies, 
especially of the deterministic variety. The role of liberty in his anthropology further 
functions in tandem with his affectional moral psychology to prevent deterministic 
accounts of indomitable passions from ruling the will and the person (i.e., Hume’s moral 
psychology).131 Additionally, Wesley’s views on liberty place him outside of the “spon-
127 Wesley, Sermon 116, “What Is Man? Psalm 8:4,” §11, in Works 4:23-24.
128 See Sermon 63, “The General Spread of the Gospel,” §9, in Works 2:489, for the express correlation of 
liberty, self-determination, and choice. Cf. Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” I.3, in Works 4:295; Sermon 34, 
“The Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law,” I.1, in Works 2:6; Sermon 62, “The End of Christ’s 
Coming,” I.4, 5, 8, in Works 2:475-476; Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” I.1, in Works 2:439; and 
Sermon 57, “On the Fall of Man,” §1, II.6, in Works 2:401, 409. But also cf. Sermon 129, “Heavenly Treasure 
in Earthen Vessels,” I.1, in Works 4:163, where Wesley seems to relate liberty, self-motion, and self-gover-
nance grammatically.
129 Sermon 57, “On the Fall of Man,” I.1, in Works 2:401.
130 See Maddox, “Reconnecting the Means to the End,” especially 65-66 (appendices).
131 Cf. Maddox, “Wesleyan Theology & Moral Psychology,” in Wesleyan Theology and Social Science, 10.
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taneous action” strands of self-determinist thought but without subjecting his position 
to “decisionistic” tendencies. Thus, given Wesley’s affectional moral psychology and his 
historical-social context (in which the terms and dynamics of that psychology could mean 
many different things), “liberty” is his safeguard against various forms of necessity in 
human action.
 To be sure, “necessity” lies at the heart of what Wesley and Aquinas have to say 
about “acting freely.”132 Is the will moved necessarily—by fate or by fiat? This is the under-
lying question that drives Wesley and Aquinas to their impassioned positions that we 
encountered at the outset of this section. A will “necessarily moved to choose things” is an 
affront to Scripture, the Christian tradition, the wisdom of moral philosophy, judgment 
(divine or otherwise), and so forth.133 Necessity renders humans patients, not agents.134 
And if we are not agents, humanity forfeits its iconicity and its dignity: its iconicity, as it 
ceases to reflect even the faintest rays of the acting, actual, and activating God; its dignity, 
as it discredits its moral worth in the relinquishment of the capacity for genuine moral 
decisions.135
132 Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange highlights this precise focus while commenting on Aquinas (ST I-II.10). 
Garrigou-Lagrange, Beatitude: A Commentary on St. Thomas’ Theological Summa, Ia IIae, qq. 1-54, trans. 
Patrick Cummins (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co, 1956). He points out that, “Throughout this question the 
phrase ‘non ex necessitate’ means ‘freely.’ St. Thomas writes: ‘determinat non ex necessitate’ [‘determined not 
by necessity’]. He does not write…: ‘non ad unum determinat’ [‘determined not to something’]” (201). In DM, 
q. 6, Aquinas exchanges “determined” for “moved,” but the essential meaning remains. The “determined by” 
/ “determined to” distinction that Garrigou-Lagrange mentions is important and will be addressed below.
133 See Aquinas, DM, q. 6, resp.
134 See Wesley, Sermon 62, “The End of Christ’s Coming,” I.4, in Works 2:475. By “patient” Wesley 
means “altogether passive,” “lacking agency.” It is instructive that it is impossible to talk about this kind of 
necessity without using the grammatical passive voice—i.e., the will is moved necessarily.
135 A recurring phrase in Wesley’s treatment of liberty is that, without it, we would have the same 
capacity for morality, virtue, and goodness as a machine, a stock, a tree, or a stone. Sermon 67, “On Divine 
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 Inasmuch as Wesley’s “liberty” and Aquinas’s “liberum arbitrium” are about moral 
free agency without necessity, they concern choice. Aquinas argues that “the proper act 
of liberum arbitrium is choice,” electio, “to take one thing while refusing another.”136 In 
nearly the synonymous terms, Wesley likewise identifies choice as the proper activity of 
liberty: “a capacity of choosing the one and refusing the other.”137 However, in that same 
sentence, Wesley also ties liberty’s capacity for choice to reason, in order “to discern truth 
from falsehood, good from evil.”138 The distinction is important, and Aquinas makes it 
just as plainly: cognition and appetite converge in the act of choice.139 To reiterate, the 
intellect apprehends an object and “presents” it to the affective will, which may freely 
desire it or not; having apprehended, desired, and chosen, the will may then move the 
person to act.
 Interestingly, Wesley and Aquinas find it necessary to go beyond the foregoing con-
siderations by investigating an additional and highly-nuanced “twofold power of man.”140 
Providence,” §15, in Works 2:541, is perhaps his most robust and impassioned case, which he premises on 
God’s unnecessitated activity of creating us ad imaginem Dei; were God to take away that liberty (through 
the necessity of action), God would effectively contradict God’s character, attributes, and self. Cf. Thoughts 
upon Necessity, III.9, in Works 13:540; and Sermon 129, “Heavenly Treasures in Earthen Vessels,” I.1, in 
Works 4:163.
136 ST I.83.3. Cf. ST I-II.13; and DM, q. 6.
137 Sermon 34, “The Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law,” I.1, in Works 2:6. Cf. Sermon 
57, “On the Fall of Man,” §1, in Works 2:401; Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” I.1, in Works 2:439; 
Sermon 62, “The End of Christ’s Coming,” I.4, 7-8, in Works 2:475-476; Sermon 63, “The General Spread 
of the Gospel,” §9, in Works 2:489; Sermon 67, “On Divine Providence,” §15, in Works 2:541; Thoughts upon 
Necessity, III.8-9, in Works 13:539-540; and Thoughts upon God’s Sovereignty, §3, in Works 13:549.
138 Sermon 34, “The Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law,” I.1, in Works 2:6.
139 Aquinas, ST I.83.3, 4. Cf. ST I-II.13.1; and DM, q. 6.
140 Aquinas, ST I-II.13.6.
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While Aquinas does not give these powers names, Wesley does: the “liberty of contradic-
tion” and the “liberty of contrariety.”141 By the former term, Wesley means the “power to 
do or not to do” something; by the latter, “a power to act one way or the contrary,” i.e., for 
good or for evil.142 Aquinas’s version runs as follows: “For man can will and not will, act 
and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do this or that.”143 In simpler language, the 
former concept (contradiction) is “an ability to do X or not to do X”—an up/down vote, 
so to speak. The latter concept (contrariety) is then “an ability to do X or Y”—a choice 
between options. Since the task of comparing objects is the responsibility of the intellect, 
only those beings with an intellectual nature have choice (properly speaking).
 At this point a possible difficulty surfaces—viz., what moral philosophers typi-
cally call a “liberty of indifference.”144 In the simplest terms, indifference is an entirely 
141 Wesley, Sermon 116, “What Is Man? Psalm 8:4,”§11, in Works 4:24; cf. Thoughts upon Necessity, III.9, 
in Works 13:540.
142 Sermon 116, “What Is Man? Psalm 8:4,”§11, in Works 4:24.
143 ST I-II.13.6. It needs must be mentioned that, for Aquinas, choice pertains to means and to proximate 
ends (which have the character of means to the ultimate end), not to the ultimate end, which is beatitude. 
Should the will encounter the ultimate end, it is moved necessarily to desire it—there is no contrary or 
alternative for it to deliberate. But the fact that we do not get to choose our ultimate end is not an affront 
to our liberum arbitrium. As creatures made according to God’s image, we have been created with a (neces-
sary) desire for beatitude (for Wesley, holiness and happiness), although we may not recognize it as such. 
Additionally, let us recall that, for Aquinas (as for Wesley), God is the cause of all being, truth, goodness, 
motion, and the like. “And just as by moving natural causes [God] does not prevent their acts being natural, 
so by moving voluntary causes [God] does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather [God] is 
the cause of this very thing in them; for [God] operates in each thing according to its own nature” (ST I.83.1 
ad 3). Cf. ST I.83.3-4; I-II.13.3-6; and DM, q. 6 ad 6-9. The corpus of DM, q. 6, also upholds the belief that 
God’s action causes the intellect and the will to move in the first place. This avoids the possible ad infinitum 
objection lurking beneath the co-operant dynamic of the intellect and the will (i.e., “Which moves first?”). 
Again, God’s activation of our capacities is not a threat to those capacities; rather, it is the very source of 
them.
144 An excellent historical, philosophical, and theological account of this may be found in Servais Pinck-
aers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Mary Thomas Noble (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Univ-
eristy of America Press, 1995), 327-353.
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dispassionate, disinclined, unaffected, neutral type of volitional liberty that precedes the 
intellect’s act. The basic idea is that the will and its choices can only be free if absolutely 
nothing—not even another faculty of the soul—has an impact on the will’s decision.145 
The difficulty is that the liberty of contradiction and of contrariety can cumulatively (and 
somewhat erroneously) be taken as a liberty of indifference. Such is the case of Stephen 
Long’s interpretation of Wesley’s liberty.146 Long concludes that Wesley’s liberty is one of 
indifference, whereas Aquinas’s defense of the will as a rational appetite precludes such 
indifference. Peculiarly, Long does not base his conclusion on the only reference to a lib-
erty of indifference found in Wesley’s Sermons.147 Instead, Long seems to locate a liberty 
of indifference in Wesley’s 1788 sermon, “What Is Man? Psalm 8:4,” which was cited above 
in support of a liberty of contradiction and of contrariety. But, as we have already seen, 
that passage is nearly verbatim to Aquinas’s own description of the powers undergirding 
choice—meaning Long’s juxtaposition of Wesley’s liberty (as “indifference”) and Aqui-
nas’s will (as liberum arbitrium) is unfounded, or, at the very least, falls short according to 
his very own rubric.
145 The classic illustration of the liberty of indifference is commonly referred to as “Buridan’s Ass,” 
named after a paradoxical thought-experiment intended to satirize the moral determinism of the 14th cen-
tury French philosopher Jean Buridan. In the situation, a donkey that is equally hungry and thirsty is placed 
equidistant from a bale of hay and a bucket of water. According to its nature, the donkey should advance 
toward the nearest object of its desire; but, without the ability to reason, it dies of starvation and dehydration 
because it can’t decide which object to approach. Satirically, then, the dead donkey comes to symbolize the 
achievements of a liberty of indifference.
146 See Long, John Wesley’s Moral Theology, 39-50. Recall that Long explicitly engages with the thought 
of Thomas Aquinas in this book, making the conclusion here all the more perplexing.
147 Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” I.3, in Works 4:295. In this, the first of Wesley’s “university ser-
mons” (preached at Oxford, 1730), Wesley describes Adam’s implanted, perfect freedom as “an entire indif-
ference, either to keep or change his first estate: it was left to himself what he would do; his own choice was 
to determine him in all things. The balance did not incline to one side or the other unless by his own deed. 
His Creator would not, and no creature besides himself could, weigh down either scale.”
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 It is true that Aquinas flatly rejects a liberty of indifference in the Summa Theolo-
giae—but the rationale he offers is of vital importance, especially for Wesleyans. “If two 
things be proposed as equal under one aspect,” writes Aquinas, “nothing hinders us from 
considering in one of them some particular point of superiority, so that the will is bent 
[flectatur voluntas] towards that one rather than towards the other.”148 In other words, 
Aquinas’s moral psychology precludes a reduction of liberum arbitrium into a liberty of 
indifference. The will’s affections do not remain unaffected; inclination eventually occurs, 
for this is part of the nature of the will—just as it is for it to receive its data from the 
intellect or to move the powers of the soul. Already we have noted the high degree of 
compatibility between Wesley and Aquinas on the nature and activities of the intellect 
and the will—especially their remarkably similar mature affective moral psychologies. 
Thus, the manner in which Aquinas applies his moral psychology to the question of the 
liberty of indifference may be seen to apply equally to Wesley’s case. Furthermore, Wes-
ley’s sole reference to a “liberty of indifference” comes from his early career—prior to 
developments in his moral psychology that would aid him to arrive at a mature, affectional 
moral psychology.149 Whether or not there exists a causal relationship between Wesley’s 
mature moral psychology and his abandonment of “indifference,” the parallel is striking 
and ought not be discounted.150
148 ST I-II.13.6 ad 3. The objection to which Aquinas responds is, in essence, the paradox of Buridan’s 
Ass—but antedating Buridan by a century!
149 As noted above, Maddox’s studies have contributed heavily to the present analysis of Wesley’s moral 
psychology in general and his mature, affectional moral psychology in particular. See Maddox, “A Change of 
Affections,” and Maddox, “Reconnecting the Means to the End.”
150 One may even detect a slight difference between Wesley’s 1752 tract Predestination Calmly Considered 
(in Works 13:258-320) and his 1785 sermon “On Working Out Our Own Salvation” (in Works 3:199-209). In 
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 What we see in Aquinas’s “liberum arbitrium” and Wesley’s “liberty” is a common 
twofold concern regarding humans, choice, and necessity: human acts are both genitive 
and genuine. First, because of “liberum arbitrium” and “liberty,” human actions are genitive 
of human beings. They are “of us,” “ours.” In consequence of this “actional genitivity” is 
an ascription of moral worth to who we are and what we do. Second, because of “liberum 
arbitrium” and “liberty,” human actions are genuine to human beings. They are “real” and 
“really ours”—but in a way that always “presupposes the help of God.”151 Even though 
their language and their respective arrangements of the human faculties differ on a the-
oretical level, Wesley and Aquinas converge on the practical level—especially in light of 
iconic dignity. Our capacity for choosing, for exercising our God-given and God-reflective 
faculties, names not only our dependence and rootedness in God, but also the genuine 
worth and possibility that emerge therefrom.
the former, Wesley engages in a discussion of “natural free will,” which he does not want to defend because 
he holds that it is “supernaturally restored to every man, together with that supernatural light, which 
‘enlightens every man that cometh into the world’” (§46, in Works 13:287). Over 30 years later, Wesley 
discusses “natural conscience” (i.e., the “supernatural light” mentioned earlier) and extends it to all people 
vis-à-vis prevenient grace. “Everyone has sooner or later good desires,” writes Wesley in 1785 (III.4, in Works 
3:207). The mixture here is interesting: what had been set up with intellectual terms (“enlightens”) becomes 
volitional, affective, and choice-related. The firm line between “nature” and “grace” that Wesley wants to 
establish in 1752 becomes more blurred by 1785—as does the distinction between cognitive and affective 
“enlightenment” (with consequent ramifications for liberty)! This is a prime example of the way in which 
Wesley matures theologically, especially between his mid- and late-life: his positions are consistent, but they 
grow.
151 Aquinas, ST I.83.1 ad 4. In response to an objection that we are not masters of our actions, Aquinas 
answers that the choice remains within us, but that this always points to God’s auxilium. We can already see 
how this aligns with Wesley’s own notions of prevenient grace, although a fuller treatment will be found in 
Chapter 6.
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4. Summary Conclusion: A Holistic Anthropological Iconicity
 If it were possible to summarize all these findings regarding the theological anthro-
pologies of Wesley and Aquinas into just one word, a strong candidate might be “holistic.” 
In the previous chapter we addressed many topics in groups or pairs that have sometimes 
run the risk of sliding into forms of competitive dualism: beginning and end, God and 
nature, body and soul, material and intellectual. But, as we saw, Wesley and Aquinas con-
sistently hold these pairs together through a rich reading of the doctrine of God, Creation, 
and humanity created according to the imago Dei. In other words, Wesley and Aquinas 
appeal to God’s essential integrity and unity to stave off dualistic oppositions. Further-
more, the present chapter has extended that delicate, integrated balance to the character-
istic faculties of human nature. For Wesley and Aquinas, the faculties of human nature are 
an extension of the integrity of the imago Dei within their theological anthropologies. The 
result is a portrait of our iconicity that is dignified with an intellectual capacity for compre-
hending truth, an affectively-volitional capacity for seeking good, and a liberal capacity 
for choosing freely. As we shall see in the next chapter, genuinely human actions (whether 
holy or not) always exhibit this integrated portrait of our natural faculties.
 Others have indeed recognized this holism. For example, Randy Maddox has 
advanced Wesley’s anthropological holism in the rejection of psycho-physical, ethical, 
and metaphysical dualisms that undercut genuine human agency and responsibility.152 
Similarly, by starting with the recognized psycho-physical unity in Aquinas’s anthropol-
ogy, Richard Cross has argued that Aquinas’s robust anthropological tendency is “strongly 
152 Maddox, Responsible Grace, 70-72. Maddox concludes that Wesley’s “basic anthropological convic-
tions sought to emulate the holism of biblical teachings” (72).
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holistic or integrative: the same emotions inform our responses to the divine as inform our 
responses to the created realm, and the same cognitive powers are responsible for both 
sorts of cognition.”153 In both cases, the point is that the theological anthropologies of 
Wesley and Aquinas resist an overly-simplified flattening or dichotomization of our char-
acteristic human faculties—or even the prioritization of one faculty over against another. 
Our fundamental capacities are drawn from the divine template, which exemplifies the 
unity and integration our nature is meant to reflect.
 At the same time, we know all too well of the fracturing effects of sin on such a 
statuesque depiction of human nature. Here lies a paradox, though: as sin splinters our 
anthropological holism, it relies upon the exact faculties of our nature to do so. Without 
this holistic theological anthropology, human action—including sin—would not be possi-
ble. By a “willful act of disobedience,” writes Wesley, we defied God and declared that we 
“would be governed by [our] own will, and not the will of him that created [us], and that 
[we] would not seek [our] happiness in God, but in the world, in the works of [our] hands.” 
As Wesley insightfully deduces, we are “therefore created able to stand, and yet liable to 
fall.”154 That is to say, our holistic anthropological iconicity always leaves open the real 
possibility of the indignity of human sin. As we turn now to consider human acts and sin, 
the difficulty will be maintaining this critical tension without snapping the line and falling 
into depravity.
153 Cross, “Thomas Aquinas,” in The Spiritual Senses, 177.
154 Wesley, Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” I.2, in Works 2:189. I have taken the liberties of removing 
Wesley’s gendered language and, in so doing, calling attention to the universal effects of the fall upon the 
entire human species. As we shall see in the next chapter, this alteration is entirely consistent with Wesley’s 
core theological beliefs.
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CHAPTER 4: 
ACTS AND HABITS, SIN AND DEPRAVITY
 The order in which we are investigating human nature for Wesley and Aquinas 
is not arbitrary. Already we have witnessed a kind of “conceptual unfolding” by tracing 
theological anthropology back to God’s nature, our roots in that nature, and our general 
constitution therefrom. In the previous chapter, we continued to build upon that founda-
tion by exploring the characteristic faculties of human nature—the intellect, the will, and 
a freedom expressed in/through both. The present chapter continues with that trajec-
tory of “unfolding” and “building upon” as we seek an account of human nature in action. 
Therefore, the objective is to move beyond a description of the faculties of human nature 
and into the use (and consequences) of those faculties.
 In what follows, we will first explore how humans act within the thought of Wesley 
and Aquinas. My goal is not to present a comprehensive theory of action but instead to 
tie the moral psychology of the previous chapter with the reciprocal relationship between 
human acts and human personality. In other words, our first topic will be the formation 
and role of habits for Wesley and Aquinas. Second, we will turn to the topic of “bad human 
acts”—sin. Again, my goal is not a systematic theodicy or hamartiology; rather, I intend to 
discuss sin through the lens of moral psychology, acts, and habits in the thought of Wesley 
and Aquinas. This limitation is necessary because the issue of sin (whether original sin 
or personal-actual sin) must comport with the prior accounts of Wesley and Aquinas’s 
theological anthropology. Building on this trajectory, the third and final section endeavors 
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to draw a critical conclusion by way of a question: “Depravity or Deprivation?” As we 
shall see, the question strikes at the heart of human nature for Wesley and Aquinas, and, 
in so doing, illustrates the constructive capacity of iconic dignity for comparative dialogue 
between Wesley and Aquinas.
1. Human Acts and Habitus/Tempers
 At the end of the previous chapter, we sought to answer the question, “What are 
the principles of human acts?” There, we began to see how a combination of the facul-
ties that characterize human nature come together to constitute what makes an action 
uniquely human. Let us briefly reprise those insights before proceeding.
 When considering Aquinas, we may be tempted to say that the human intellect is 
most definitive of human acts. But, against such a limited reading is the reality that, for 
him, the will itself is a rational appetite. As Michael Sherwin observes, this
accounts for how the human person is both guided by reason and free in his or her 
actions. Intellect and will together form the dual principle of human action. At 
every stage of practical reasoning, the intellect is bringing the informing light of 
human intelligence to bear upon the particulars of human action, while the will is 
directing the intellect in the consideration of those particulars.1
The reciprocal dynamic inherent to these faculties may be expected, since Aquinas clearly 
locates our affective and appetitive abilities within “rational soul” of human nature.2 The 
inclusion is not to be seen as a kind of modulation of affectivity to “the key of intellectu-
1 Sherwin, By Knowledge & By Love, 18-19.
2 DeYoung, McCluskey, and Van Dyke make this point especially well in Aquinas’s Ethics, 60-66.
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ality”; rather, it serves as a constant reminder that the human faculties are exceptionally 
integrated within Aquinas’s theological anthropology.
 The same kind of conclusion may be drawn from Wesley, albeit from the opposite 
direction. We may be tempted to interpret Wesley’s focus on “the heart” and the affections 
as the exclusive faculty functioning in human acts. However, against such a myopic read-
ing stands the prominent role Wesley gives to reason, yoking it with “true religion,”3 the 
essential nature of spiritual beings,4 and the proper operations of the will and of liberty.5 
Indeed, “the mind” collectively contains both reason and the affections.6 However, with-
out the propulsion of affectivity, reason is impotent in motivating us to act; conversely, 
our desires and affections remain woefully uninformed (and unaffected) without the con-
tributions of reason. “Ultimately,” notes Randy Maddox, “we are able to act only when 
there is a holistic inclination, which was initially awakened responsively.”7 As with Aqui-
nas, so too with Wesley: accountable moral agency occurs at the unique intersection of 
all the faculties of human nature in a human act.8 Of course, this is simply another way of 
expressing the centrality of moral psychology in human nature and its acts.
3 See Wesley, An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, §31, in Works 11:56.
4 See Sermon 62, “The End of Christ’s Coming,” I.3, 5, in Works 2:474, 475; cf. Thoughts upon Necessity, 
III.8, in Works 13:539.
5 See Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” I.2, in Works 2:439.
6 See Wesley, Notes, Colossians 1:21 and 1 Peter 1:13.
7 Randy L. Maddox, “‘Visit the Poor’: John Wesley, the Poor, and the Sanctification of Believers,” in The 
Poor and the People Called Methodists, 1729-1999, ed. Richard P. Heitzenrater (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 
2002), 74.
8 See Wesley, Thoughts upon Necessity, III.8, in Works 13:539. See Aquinas, ST I.83.1; cf. ST I.83.3.
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 In the previous chapter, we encountered two key categories of volitional appetite 
in discussing moral psychology for Wesley and Aquinas. The first, passions, are certain 
“receptively motivating” appetites rooted in desire, especially at the sensory level. As sen-
sory creatures, we experience passions, just like other animals. But other animals do not 
experience affections. As previously argued, “affections” is a broader category than “pas-
sions” for Wesley and Aquinas. “Affections” can accommodate the physicality of “passions” 
as well as the immateriality of the rational human soul.9 In other words, “affections” is the 
more-inclusive category for discussing the rationally- and sensitively-appetitive capacity 
of human desiring. And, given the unique body-and-soul unity proper to the human spe-
cies, “affections” really is the most appropriate term for this responsive human capacity.
 “Responsivity” is certainly the most important dynamic within the affective-appe-
titive aspect of Wesley’s and Aquinas’s moral psychology. We humans are equally “moved,” 
“moving,” and “movers.” However, passions and affections are fairly transient; they tend 
more toward the “reactive” end of the spectrum than the “responsive” end. The difficulty 
is that fleeting reactivity could jeopardize genuine freedom in acting (i.e., “Are these 
responses mere reflexes, beyond my control?”). And if agential liberty could be suspended, 
so, too, could personal accountability and the evaluation of actions (i.e., “If it’s beyond my 
control, can I really be held responsible?”).
 Given the importance of freedom for human acts, it is telling that Wesley and 
Aquinas both believe that our affections, inclinations, and tendencies can become more 
established and enduring over time. This is essentially what Wesley and Aquinas have in 
9 As we also discussed in the previous chapter, “affections” are not limited to human beings; the angels 
and God, both immaterial beings, have affections.
165
mind when they discuss “dispositions” vis-à-vis moral psychology: patterns of affectivity 
and response that orient us to act one way or another.10 The added facility of a disposition 
is readily apparent, especially in our quotidian acts.11
 For example, when I am driving home from work, I don’t have to calculate my 
route every time. Since I have come to know the various routes, and since I keenly dis-
like traffic and U-turns, I have already figured out the “best” way to get home. I am not 
obligated to take this route, but I have become disposed to doing so because of the way my 
knowledge, desires, preferences, and choices have come together over time. We might 
conclude that this disposition is “characteristic of me”—but we would hesitate to say that 
it characterizes me. Why?
 For one, the disposition alone doesn’t address how I have driven or what kind of 
person I am. Neither does the disposition address the goodness or badness, the rightness 
or wrongness, of what I’m doing. Consider the following: while driving along my “dispo-
sitional route” home, a zippy little sports car cuts me off and nearly causes me to swerve 
into oncoming traffic. My next action will say a lot about what kind of person I am. Will I 
react by honking and waving lewd hand gestures, or will I respond more graciously? On its 
10 Many of the terms in this “affective lexicon” may seem roughly synonymous without reference to their 
nuanced Latin cognates. We have already noted the underlying meanings of passion and affection above; 
both pertain to receiving an action and its influence. Now we add to this list inclination, tendency, and dispo-
sition. Inclination comes from the Latin verb for “to bend toward,” while tendency is rooted in the Latin verb 
“to stretch”—something a bit more active. Disposition, from the Latin verb “to arrange, place, or order,” 
adds a degree of calculation to intentionality.
11 In De Virtutibus, q. 1, a. 1, Aquinas specifically enumerates what I am calling “facility” (in promptu) 
as one of the three reasons why we need such dispositions. The other two reasons include “consistency” 
(uniformitas) and “pleasurableness” (delectabiliter). For a modern English translation of this work, see Aqui-
nas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues [De Virtutibus], ed. E. M. Atkins and Thomas Williams, trans. E. M. 
Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). The editors of this translation avoid using English 
cognates of technical Latin terms; thus, they translate habitus as “disposition” (as in the article under consid-
eration), and dispositio as “tendency” (278-282).
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own, a disposition to drive home along a particular route is inadequate for informing what 
I will (or should) do next. The same could be said if, driving along my “dispositional route,” 
I should come across someone with a flat tire or smoke pouring out from under the hood. 
Will I apathetically turn my gaze and drive away, or will I pull over to lend assistance? 
Again, the disposition for driving home along a particular route is inadequate to address 
this new situation or any of the countless others I may encounter in my commute.
 The idea I’m driving at is what Aquinas calls “habitus” and Wesley “temper.”12 To 
be sure, neither Wesley nor Aquinas marks a radical categorical distinction between “dis-
position” and “habitus/temper.” However, since both theologians discuss “dispositions” 
in addition to “habitus/tempers”—and since their language of “habitus/tempers” greatly 
outnumbers that “dispositions”13—the distinction is worth honoring.14 Therefore, if we 
collate all of the various moral-psychological categories from Wesley and Aquinas, the 
comparison would be represented visually as follows:
12 As noted above, there are varying opinions on how to translate Aquinas’s technical terminology from 
Latin to English. Specifically, there has been a growing tendency to translate habitus (as opposed to leaving 
it untranslated) as “disposition” (as opposed to its cognate, “habit”). The reasoning is that the cognate, 
“habit,” has changed in meaning too much to use as a translation of Aquinas’s habitus. However, in order to 
avoid a translational ripple-effect for what are clearly different terms for Aquinas, I will either leave habitus 
untranslated or use its cognate, “habit”—trusting that readers will bear in mind the meaning. Finally, it will 
be noted that habitus can be either singular or plural in Latin.
13 For example, Kenneth J. Collins deduces that “temper(s)” was clearly Wesley’s preferred term, which 
Wesley used nearly six times more often in his writings than “disposition(s).” See Collins, “John Wesley’s 
Topography of the Heart,” 166. As for Aquinas, nearly two-thirds of the enormous Secunda Pars of the 
Summa Theologiae effectively stands as a study in habitus—beginning with a treatise on habits (ST I-II.49-
54), continuing with treatises on good (ST I-II.55-70) and bad habits (ST I-II.71-89), viz., virtues and vices, 
and rounding off with treatises on the theological (ST II-II.1-46) and cardinal moral virtues (ST II-II.47-170).
14 For lack of better terminology, I am using the phrase “habitus/tempers” to capture the concept 
common to Aquinas and Wesley without abandoning their particular language. When referring to this con-
cept within Wesley’s writings, I will use his language of “tempers.” When referring to Aquinas’s use of the 
concept, I will use his language of “habitus” or “habits.”
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Aquinas:
Wesley:
Passions
|
Passions
Affections
|
Affections
Dispositions
|
Dispositions
Habits
|
Tempers
Virtuous/Vicious
|
Holy/Unholy
Diagram 3. A Comparison of Moral Psychology in Wesley and Aquinas
Having established and organized these basic categories, we may now focus on the ques-
tion at hand: What distinguishes “habitus/tempers” from “dispositions” for Wesley and 
Aquinas?
 In the first place, habitus/tempers reflect a certain durability not necessarily pres-
ent in dispositions. Part of this is reflected in the language that Aquinas and Wesley employ. 
When Aquinas speaks of habitus, he is essentially translating into Latin Aristotle’s Greek 
ἕξις. Both terms are based in their respective languages’ verbs for “having.”15 Again follow-
ing Aristotle, Aquinas emphasizes how habitus is a kind of disposition that is difficult to 
change (difficile mobile) or lose (amittere) because a habitus is a perfectly-existing way of 
“having” (habere). Habitus is distinguished from a disposition’s imperfectly-existing (and 
thus easily-lost) affective trait.16 “From this it is clear that the word ‘habit’ implies a certain 
lastingness [diuturnitatem quandum], while the word ‘disposition’ does not.”17 Part of this 
distinction has to do with how habitus directly pertains to the nature of the possessor, its 
15 The Greek word ἕξις is based on ἔχω, meaning “to have.” In Latin, habitus is taken from the verb 
habere, also meaning “to have.” Aquinas’s familiarity with the etymology is on display in ST I-II.49.1.
16 Aquinas introduces this in ST I-II.49.1, s.c., but he actually interacts with the concept in ST I-II.49.2 
ad 3.
17 ST I-II.49.2 ad 3. Cf. ST I-II.50.1, especially ad 3.
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possessor’s operations, and the quality of those operations.18 Taken together, a disposition 
may be “characteristic of ” a person, but only a habitus properly “characterizes” a person. 
Without the distinction, it becomes difficult to comprehend what Aquinas means by iden-
tifying “power and habit” as the intrinsic “principles of human acts.” The “powers” are 
precisely those faculties and capacities named in the previous chapter as characteristic of 
human nature as a whole. “Habits” are certain stable and enduring dispositions that are 
characteristic of this or that person in particular; from these “habits” flow acts proportion-
ate to its possessor’s habitus.19
 Unlike Aquinas’s habitus and Aristotle’s ἕξις, Wesley’s term, “tempers,” does not 
share in the etymology of “having.” Rather, Wesley’s language reflects his 18th century 
context: he takes “temper” to be an enduring, habitual character disposition befitting a 
human being.20 This connotation of “temper” is informed by another, drawn from met-
allurgy. Tempering an alloy is a process of thermally strengthening a metal to achieve an 
ideal balance of hardness and malleability—thereby enhancing its durability and func-
tionality.21 Thus, we might say that tempering helps to “characterize” a metal.
18 ST I-II.49.4.
19 ST I-II.49, proem. The “outflowing” language is taken from the root meaning of principia (“princi-
ples,” as in “the principles of human acts”) as “source.”
20 Randy Maddox notes this historical usage of “tempers” in Responsible Grace, 69, as well as in his essay 
“A Change of Affections,” 15.
21 Considering the Latin verb temperare, “to mingle, mix,” metallurgical tempering may even be argued 
to begin in the alloying process itself. Certain mixtures of elements will produce alloys of varying brittleness, 
ductility, malleability, elasticity, and the like. Excellence in metalworking requires a view to the application 
of the metal and the recognition that the most enduring metal may not be the hardest. For example, gold, 
while very soft, will not corrode from oxidation.
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 Wesley’s nuanced use of “tempers”—enduring, characterizing affectional traits, 
especially distinguished from ephemeral affectional phenomena—is on display in his 
commentary on 1 Thessalonians 2:17:
In this verse we have a remarkable instance, not so much of the transient affections 
of holy grief, desire, or joy, as of that abiding tenderness, that loving temper, which 
is so apparent in all St. Paul’s writings toward those he styles his children in the 
faith. This is the more carefully to be observed, because the passions occasionally 
exercising themselves, and flowing like a torrent, in the apostle, are observable to 
every reader; whereas it requires a nicer attention to discern those calm standing 
tempers, that fixed posture of his soul, from whence the others only flow out, and 
which more peculiarly distinguish his character.22
Here, Wesley confirms our earlier observation about the “transient” nature of the affections 
and the passions. He also describes “temper” with the language of endurance, character, 
and originating principle (principium). As Kenneth Loyer comments, “tempers are more 
than simply passive feelings, and more than even motivating dispositions.… According 
to Wesley, tempers are habituated affections that orient these affections properly toward 
good choices and actions.”23 Gregory Clapper, too, rightly approaches this kind of distinc-
tion when he differentiates “feeling an emotion” from “having an emotion.”24 The latter 
is his focus, which he defines as “standing dispositions which characterize a person over 
time.”25 However, Clapper’s analysis slips at the point where the definition attaches to its 
term: Clapper has subtly shifted Wesley’s language (e.g., passions, affections, tempers) to 
22 Wesley, Notes, 1 Thessalonians 2:17.
23 Loyer, God’s Love through the Spirit, 183-184. By “motivating dispositions,” Loyer means Wesley’s 
notion of “affections.”
24 Clapper, John Wesley on Religious Affections, 162. It is telling that Clapper resorts to what is essentially 
“habitus language” to describe the nuance and emphasis of Wesley’s affective thought.
25 Clapper, John Wesley on Religious Affections, 163.
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that of “emotions.” Since Clapper more or less subsumes “temper” into “affection,”26 it is 
unsurprising that he (functionally) misconnects Wesley’s temper to a modern reading of 
“emotion.” Clapper’s subtle elision ultimately runs the risk of severing the Wesley’s vital 
connection between tempers and action. For Wesley, the tempers are the fountainhead 
of human acts.27 As Maddox very rightly observes, for Wesley, this is tantamount to the 
“assumption that our moral actions flow from our tempers.”28
 Secondly, for Wesley and Aquinas, habitus/tempers are intimately linked to moral-
ity. In the present context, “morality” is best expressed as pertaining to the manner of 
acting. Thus, how we do something (“quality”) matters as much as (if not more than) what 
we do (“quiddity”). When Aquinas turns to the subject of habitus in Summa Theologiae, 
he devotes his first article not to the durability of habitus (over against dispositions), but 
rather to the affirmation that habitus pertains to quality.29 The relationship of quality to 
manner and morality comes to light in Aquinas’s use of Aristotle to define habitus as “a 
26 Clapper, John Wesley on Religious Affections, 51-53. Note that affection also subsumes temper’s disposi-
tional nature for Clapper.
27 For example, see Wesley, Notes, 2 Corinthians 9:6; Sermon 26, “Sermon on the Mount, Discourse 6,” 
§1, in Works 1:572-573 (reiterated in Sermon 30, “Sermon on the Mount, Discourse 10,” §2, in Works 1:651); 
Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” I.2, in Works 2:174-175; and Sermon 120, “The Unity of the Divine Being,” §25, in 
Works 4:71. These are “positive” examples; but Wesley’s point also swings to the contrary—to the negative 
out-workings of this moral psychology. Thus, see Sermon 37, “The Nature of Enthusiasm,” §32, in Works 
2:58; and Sermon 75, “On Schism,” II.13-14, in Works 3:65. In all fairness, Clapper does mention Wesley’s 
“flow out” language (cf. Notes, 1 Thessalonians 2:17), but he again misinterprets this by conflating “tempers” 
and “affections.” Still, it is worth noting his correlation of “temper,” “character,” and “affectional make-up.” 
See Clapper, John Wesley on Religious Affections, 63.
28 Maddox, Responsible Grace, 182. Throughout Responsible Grace, Maddox draws attention to this 
dynamic of Wesley’s affectional moral psychology. It receives greatest attention in Maddox’s section on Wes-
ley’s holistic psychology (69-70).
29 Aquinas, ST I-II.49.1. It should be noted that Aquinas does mention the durability of a habitus while 
quoting Aristotle’s Categories in the sed contra to this article, i.e., immediately prior to his response; how-
ever, it is not until the following article that Aquinas specifically engages the topic of durability—most of 
which is in his reply to the third objection. 
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disposition according to which that which is disposed is either well or ill disposed, either 
in itself or with reference to something else.”30 “Well or ill” (bene vel male) gives habitus 
a moral inflection in two very related ways: first, since goodness (bonum) is the object of 
the will, doing something well (bene) heavily involves the rational appetite;31 second, since 
“moral” categorically pertains to appetite,32 a well-disposed rational appetite is productive 
of morally-good actions.33 Earlier we discerned that “a well-disposed rational appetite” 
means one that is well-ordered by reason. By virtue of the reciprocity of reason and the 
will, we may now also see how “a well-disposed rational appetite” is also one that orders 
reason well.
 This intersection of habitus/temper, morality, and manner is equally evident in 
Wesley’s own theological anthropology, but his focus differs slightly. Like Aquinas, Wesley 
firmly maintains that true holiness and happiness (“beatitude”) flow from a well-ordered 
psychology—especially when our affections are tempered (not trampled) by reason.34 
Wesley’s unique contribution is the way he unpacks the logical sequence of action vis-à-vis 
30 Aquinas cites Aristotle’s Metaphysics (V.20; 1022b10) in ST I-II.49.1. Cf. Aquinas, ST I-II.54.3: “habits 
are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad.”
31 See Aquinas, ST I-II.50.5; cf. I-II.50.1 obj. 1.
32 In Nicomachean Ethics, I.13 (1103a5), Aristotle classifies the virtues according to the faculties they per-
fect. To those that perfect the rational faculties, he gives the name “intellectual virtues” (ἀρετὴ διανοητική); 
to those that perfect the appetitive faculties, he gives the name “moral virtues” (ἀρετὴ ἠθική). To translate 
ἠθική, Latin translators used the word moralis, which has worked its way into English.
33 Again citing Nicomachean Ethics (II.1; 1103b20), Aquinas supports the proportionality of a habitus and 
its actions (ST I-II.50.1).
34 For the affections receiving their proper ordering from reason, resulting in happiness, see Wesley, 
Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” I.2, 4, in Works 4:294-295. For the understanding rightly guiding the pas-
sions and the affections, resulting in the happy state and use of the faculties, see Sermon 60, “The General 
Deliverance,” I.2, in Works 2:439. For holiness as bound with happiness, and together rooted in the tempers, 
see Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” III.3, in Works 2:195.
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an “inward-outward” motif.35 In a formal sermon preached before the 1763 meeting of 
the Society for Reformation of Manners, Wesley sets out to show “with what spirit and in 
what manner [social reform] ought to be pursued” by members of the Society. His analysis 
depicts the inward-outward dynamic with respect to human acts:
The spirit with which everything is to be done regards the temper, as well as the 
motive. And this is no other than that which has been described above [i.e., the 
intention, the eye of the mind, is always to be fixed on the glory of God and good 
of man].… As to the outward manner of acting, a general rule is, let it be expressive 
of these inward tempers.36
The spirit with which to act is likewise the temper from which to act and the motive by 
which to act—all of which comprises what is “inward.” The manner of acting is then the 
outward, perceptible act itself as an expression of its temper from which it flows. Or, as 
Wesley succinctly comments on Colossians 3:7, “Living—denotes the inward principle; 
walking—the outward acts.”37
 This inward-outward motif is front and center in Wesley’s exegesis of “the locus 
classicus of evangelical ethics, ‘The Sermon on the Mount’ (i.e., Matthew 5-7).”38 Through-
out his thirteen discourses thereon, Wesley repeatedly calls interpretive attention to the 
manner in which Jesus’ teaching proceeds from an inward to an outward focus—from 
35 The language is certainly not unique to Wesley. For example, the Anglican Book of Common Prayer 
defines a sacrament in terms of “outward sign” and “inward grace.” Cf. Wesley, Sermon 16, “The Means of 
Grace,” II.1, in Works 1:381.
36 Wesley, Sermon 52, “The Reformation of Manners,” IV.1-3, in Works 2:316-317.
37 Wesley, Notes, Colossians 3:7.
38 Albert C. Outler, “An Introductory Comment [to Sermons 21-33],” in Works 1:466.
173
holiness of heart to holiness of life.39 This constitutes the moral quality inherent to habi-
tus/tempers, as seen in Wesley’s synopsis:
[In Matt. 5] our Lord has described inward religion in its various branches. He 
has laid before us those dispositions of soul which constitute real Christianity: the 
inward tempers contained in that holiness ‘without which no man shall see the 
Lord’—the affections which, when flowing from their proper fountain, from a 
living faith in God through Christ Jesus, are intrinsically and essentially good, and 
acceptable to God. He proceeds to show [in Matt. 6] how all our actions likewise, 
even those that are indifferent in their own nature, may be made holy and good 
and acceptable to God, by a pure and holy intention. Whatever is done without 
this…is of no value before God. Whereas whatever outward works are thus conse-
crated to God, they are…of great price.40
The inwardly disposing principle of action gives to the outward work its moral inflection, 
which, we will note, is grounded in the affective disposition of the soul. As with Aquinas, 
morality pertains more to “quality” than to “quiddity.” But Wesley isn’t trying to pit inten-
tionality against consequentiality. Rather, he is arguing that it is the manner of a righteous 
person to act righteously. The sequence is of maximum importance. “Outward holiness” 
flows from the tempers of “inward holiness”—“holiness of life arising from holiness of 
heart.”41 We might go so far as to say that, for Wesley, we act holy because we are holy.42
39 This conjunction—holiness of heart and holiness of life—is another of Wesley’s recurring phrases 
regarding the focus and aim of the Methodists. Wesley concisely summarizes its meaning in Sermon 76, “On 
Perfection,” I.8, in Works 3:75. See also Outler’s editorial footnote to this paragraph (75n29).
40 Wesley, Sermon 26, “Upon our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, Discourse VI,” §1, in Works 1:572-573. 
Emphasis added. This summary is nearly identical to Sermon 30, “Upon our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, 
Discourse X,” §2, in Works 1:651.
41 Wesley, Sermon 76, “On Perfection,” I.8, in Works 3:75.
42 Echoes of this sentiment ring throughout Wesley’s closing section of Sermon 74, “Of the Church,” 
III.28, in Works 3:55. There, Wesley rhetorically asks why the church is termed “holy” (as in the traditional 
mark of the church). His reply cuts to the quick: “the shortest and the plainest reason that can be given, and 
the only true one, is: the church is called ‘holy’ because it is holy; because every member thereof is holy.” 
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 But what of the other direction, of habitus/tempers somehow resulting from 
actions? The question brings us to a third characteristic of habitus/tempers: active habitu-
ation. In brief, this is the notion that what we do shapes who we are. Aquinas clearly artic-
ulates this position throughout his “Treatise on Habits” (ST I-II.49-54), which he frames 
according to Aristotle’s philosophical teaching that habitus arise out of like (“appropriate” 
or “proportionate”) actions.43 As such, we humans need habitus to dispose us properly to 
act in matters wherein we are not singularly determined by nature—matters effectively 
involving the rational soul, which is capable of discursive and comparative thought. Our 
greatest good as rational creatures capax Dei is beatitude, which all people desire.44 But 
no human act qua human is proportional to beatitude; for us, it is super-natural, beyond 
our nature. Does this mean Aquinas’s “act-based habituation” (i.e., formation, growth, and 
deterioration of habits by means of our acts) is limited to natural habitus proportioned to 
our natural end and attainable by natural means?
 If Aquinas were strictly a philosopher, the answer to this question would have to 
be “yes”: on its own, human nature is incapable of acting beyond its nature. However, 
Aquinas’s task is theological, and this treatise on habits must be considered as a theolog-
ically deliberate piece of his Summa Theologiae. Thus, if we are to become habituated to 
our greatest good and in accordance with our greatest good, we will require a principle 
external to and beyond our nature in order to form habitus proportionate to our super-
43 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.1 (1103b20). Brian Davies notes that, within the “Treatise on 
Habits” (ST I-II.49-54), Aquinas references Scripture only thrice, whereas references to Aristotle (and his 
commentators) abound. See Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, 393n2.
44 See Aquinas, ST I-II.1-5, especially I-II.5.7. See also ST I-II.109.5.
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natural end—which principle is God’s grace.45 It is true that Aquinas “Treatise on Grace” 
(ST I-II.109-114) comes much later in the Prima Secundae (qq. 109-114), but this does not 
prevent Aquinas from establishing grace as a kind of habitus right in the middle of the 
“Treatise on Habits.”46 Grace is the supernatural habitus that orients us toward our super-
natural end. It is not acquired through human activity but rather through God’s action of 
infusing it in the human soul as a gift.47 Because God’s infusion of gracious habitus does 
not contradict our nature as humans, infused habitus can be strengthened or increased 
by way of suitable actions, which means we can grow (or deteriorate) in grace.48 In other 
words, the process of active habituation is pertinent whether the habitus are “natural” or 
“gracious”; the difference is how we come to “have” these different kind of habitus.49
 Turning to Wesley, we are faced with a methodological difficulty: we simply do 
not have the kind of source materials from Wesley on the subject of active habituation 
that we do from Aquinas—“kind” being the operative word here. Instead of a philosophi-
45 Aquinas, ST I-II.51.4.
46 See ST I-II.50.2, where Aquinas writes “aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam”—“namely, grace.” Later, 
in his “Treatise on Grace” (ST I-II.109-114), Aquinas refers to “habitual grace” (versus “actual grace”), which 
has two parts (ST I-II.111.2): operating grace (a God-conferred holy disposition of the soul) and co-operating 
grace (our acting through this holy disposition). The distinction parallels the two-fold relation of a habitus 
that Aquinas discusses in ST I-II.49—that which pertains to the subject’s nature (thus, operating grace) and 
that which pertains to the subject’s operations or end (thus, co-operating grace). For a further discussion on 
Aquinas’s typology of grace, see Chapter 6 below.
47 See ST I-II.51.4. God’s infusion of gracious habitus does not contradict human nature (ad 2)
48 See ST I-II.51.4 ad 2 and ad 3, respectively. This account is but a foretaste of the detailed discussion of 
grace that will occur in Chapter 6. Part of that analysis includes the dynamics of grace and the possibility of 
growing in grace. For that reason, I have not gone into greater detail here about growing in grace.
49 However, without grace we are able neither to perform the “gracious” actions that would be produc-
tive of “gracious” habitus, nor to prepare ourselves for grace (ST I-II.109.6). Rather, “gracious” habitus are 
infused by God (ST I-II.51.4), but not in a way that contradicts human nature (ad 2). Accordingly, infused 
habitus can be strengthened or increased by way of suitable actions (ad 3).
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cally-driven treatise on active habituation, Wesley leaves us with a patchwork of personal 
journals, correspondence, histories, and practices, all of which point to his position(s) on 
the matter. In other words, it is necessary at this point to embrace the interpretive latitude 
regarding “texts” afforded by a comparative methodology.50 Therefore, my suggestion is 
that, in order to discern what amounts to a high degree of similarity between Wesley and 
Aquinas regarding active habituation, we must consider Wesley himself and the historical 
development of his theological views.51
 Recalling the biographical sketch from the Introduction, we may infer that the 
first portion of Wesley’s life (up to 1738) was largely characterized by direct active habit-
uation. Whether we consider Wesley’s early formation in strict moral rectitude under his 
mother’s tutelage,52 the Aristotelian bent of Wesley’s 18th century Oxford education,53 or 
Wesley’s fervent asceticism with the “Holy Club” at Oxford,54 it is clear that Wesley had 
been attempting to acquire holy tempers (i.e., righteousness) through the disciplined per-
formance of like actions. Wesley’s intense religious experience of God’s pardoning grace at 
50 As Clooney suggests, “texts” are not restricted to written documents, but may very well include 
“images, practices, doctrines, [and] persons” (Comparative Theology, 11).
51 One tool for discussing Wesley’s development has been to divide his life into three stages: the “early 
Wesley” (up to 1738), the “middle Wesley” (1738-1765), and the “mature Wesley” (1765-1791). Part of my 
suggestion here is to consider this division as demonstrative of Wesley’s stance on active habituation. Doing 
so reveals a remarkable consistency with Maddox’s characterizations of these three phases of Wesley’s life. 
See Maddox, Responsible Grace, 20.
52 See Maddox, “A Change of Affections,” 5-8.
53 See Mark Mealey, “John Wesley,” 245-248. Mealey correctly claims that what appears to be an affinity 
between Wesley’s epistemology and Locke’s is more accurately described as Wesley’s epistemological inher-
itance of the Aristotelian tradition. For more on the tenacity of Aristotelian thought at Oxford University, 
see Alasdair MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities: A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradi-
tion (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 93-95.
54 See Heitzenrater, Wesley and the People Called Methodists, 37-64.
177
Aldersgate in 1738 (inaugurating Wesley’s second phase of development) may then be seen 
as a result of his developing frustration with active habituation. In this light, the Moravian 
emphasis on receiving the gift of God’s rectifying grace was no doubt soothing to Wesley’s 
soul—for a time. Wesley’s frustration with active habituation would eventually yield to 
a frustration with Moravian “passive receptivity” in the form of quietism and antinomi-
anism. Consequently, Wesley’s “mature position” is a sort of via media on active habitua-
tion—one achieved not by averaging his two earlier perspectives, but by maximizing both 
within their proper purviews.
 On the one hand, Wesley himself anecdotally verifies Aquinas’s account of natural 
active habituation: Wesley’s upbringing in an active habituation of moral rectitude tena-
ciously endures through his middle period (with its own emphasis on receiving God’s gra-
cious pardon). On the other hand, Wesley’s frustration during his earlier years is proof of 
the limits of actively habituating our natural capacities in order to acquire gracious habitus/
tempers. Understanding this can help to explain how, in the height of his “Protestant-lean-
ing” middle phase (1738-1760s), Wesley was busy shaping the Methodist societies around 
the structures of accountable practice outlined in the “General Rules”—that is to say, how 
a period emphasizing “gifted habit” could yield “active habituation.” 55 Properly under-
stood, the Methodist societies were the loci for experiencing God’s grace and for active 
55 See “General Rules and Rules of the Band Societies” in Works 9:67-79. Wesley’s 1743 “The Nature, 
Design, and General Rules of the United Societies” (Works 9:69-75) opens with a brief history of the rise 
of the Methodist society and then proceeds to the “three general rules”: doing no harm, doing good, and 
faithfully using the means of grace. Under each rule are several practices that characterize what Wesley 
means by each heading. These practices, however, bear uncanny resemblance to the pattern of holy living 
from the prior decade at Oxford.
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habituation in the means of God’s grace.56 The balance is indicative of Wesley’s mature, 
nuanced position on active habituation. Clearly, natural active habituation is effective, but 
not with respect to a supernatural end, for which God’s empowering grace is required. 
Alternatively, active habituation in grace is tantamount to holiness, to growing in grace 
and in “every Christian temper.”57 Thus it is the mature Wesley who asserts in 1785 that 
“there is no opposition between these—‘God works; therefore do ye work’—but on the 
contrary the closest connection, and that in two respects. For, first, God works; therefore 
you can work. Secondly, God works; therefore you must work.”58
 Given the nature of habitus/tempers as enduring dispositions (durability) that per-
tain to the manner and quality of characteristic human actions (morality) and are recipro-
cally shaped by characterizing human actions (active habituation), it stands to reason that 
they are the bedrock for any discussion proceeding into the themes of grace or virtue. It 
also stands to reason that, given a negative spin, habitus/tempers strike at the heart of the 
matter when humans act contra bonum.
56 It may further be noted that the social structuring of accountability, active habituation, and growth 
in grace within the Methodist societies under Wesley’s headship rather remarkably exemplifies Aristotle’s 
observations regarding the connection of friendship, character-formation, and good actions. For example, 
Nicomachean Ethics, IX.12 (1172a10-15): “the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their com-
panionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other; for 
from each other they take the mould of the characteristics they approve—whence the saying ‘Noble deeds 
from noble men’.” This is W. D. Ross’s translation of Nicomachean Ethics, as provided in The Complete Works 
of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
57 Wesley, Notes, 2 Peter 3:18. This note, which is uncharacteristically long for Wesley, is a poignant 
summary of his moral psychology, especially in light of his moral-theological emphasis on holiness and 
happiness through “the heavenly tempers” that comprise the mind of Christ.
58 Wesley, Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.2, in Works 3:206. The text for the 
sermon is Philippians 2:12-13, which Wesley is here summarizing as “God works; therefore do ye work.”
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2. Sin and Evil
A. General Observations
 In order to avoid diving head-first into the nearly-bottomless subject of “sin” in 
Wesley’s and Aquinas’s theologies, we should first establish some of the basic parame-
ters of that discussion. Most broadly, there is the issue of topical division. “Sin” is bound 
up with the concept of “evil”—malum, as Aquinas renders it59—and yet the two are not 
identical.60 Furthermore, Wesley and Aquinas divide sin into two categories: first, there 
is original sin, which bears indiscriminately and collectively upon all humans as a kind 
of principle informing our ways of acting; second, there are actual or personal sin, which 
are actions for which an individual is responsible (and guilty). Those actual, personal sins 
may be divided yet again into various categories and their consequent degrees of culpa-
bility (which Wesley’s and Aquinas’s theological inheritors could then debate, exploit, or 
codify). And so it stands to reason that “sin” is no simple topic for Wesley and Aquinas. It 
59 It is worth noting that the Latin malum functions as a noun and as an adjective (neuter), being trans-
lated principally as “bad,” according to both English meanings. Similarly, its contrary—bonum, “good”—
operates in both linguistic spheres. Theologically-speaking, of course, malum can be interpreted as “evil” 
(again, both nominally and adjectivally). But, as we shall see in Aquinas, malum is a concept that must be 
read in light of bonum.
60 Both theologians make the classical (philosophical) distinction between “natural evil” and “moral 
evil”—or, as Aquinas phrases it, malum poenae and malum culpae. What Aquinas means by malum poenae 
is essentially physical, penal, and/or natural evil—the evil that is suffered (cf. Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s 
Summa Theologiae, 116). So, where Wesley adds a third category of evil—“penal evil”—we should read it 
together with “natural evil,” which is how Wesley himself essentially does. For Aquinas’s mature position 
on the subject, see ST I.48.5-6; cf. DM, q. 1, aa. 4-5. Wesley’s attention to formal theodicy is located more 
in his early works, such as the 1730 Sermon 140, “The Promise of Understanding,” II.1 (in Works 4:285) 
and his written correspondence with his father, Samuel, from that time: John Wesley to the Revd. Samuel 
Wesley, December 19, 1729, in Works 25:240-242; John Wesley to the Revd. Samuel Wesley, December 11, 
1730, in Works 25:257-259; and John Wesley to the Revd. Samuel Wesley, January 15, 1731, in Works 25:264-
267. It may even be argued that Wesley’s “preoccupation” with theodicy at this time results from his father’s 
fascination with the subject.
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is complicated, nefarious, elusive—like an infectious disease that stands in vital need of 
medicinal, therapeutic remediation.61
 While original sin and actual sin will be addressed below, let us return for a moment 
to the question of “evil” and its relation to “sin” for Wesley and Aquinas. If we accept the 
premise that actual sin is “in act,” and original sin seems to be “in principle” toward acting, 
then where does “evil” fit in? What is it? On Aquinas’s account, nothing. More specifically, 
given Aquinas’s teaching regarding the convertibility of goodness and being, “evil” does 
not exist entitatively; rather, malum “is the very privation of a particular good.”62 In other 
words, Thomas metaphysically precludes ontological evil, arguing instead that what we 
consider malum is actually privatio boni, a fundamental lack of goodness. But again, since 
goodness and being stand in essential relation to one another, there cannot “be” an abso-
lute fundamental lack of goodness vis-à-vis being.
 In addition to this metaphysical account is a psychological/appetitive one. As 
Nicholas Lombardo observes, for Aquinas, “Moral evil is found only in rational creatures 
and consists in the voluntary choice of something disordered and contrary to one’s telos.… 
Hence evil can be defined not just as a privation of goodness, but also as a frustration of 
appetite and the consequent disintegration of being, insofar as evil blocks appetite from 
61 Instructively, both Wesley and Aquinas employ the analogy of sin as a disease or infection. Randy 
Maddox draws attention to the infirmity/therapy theme within Wesley’s doctrine of sin and salvation in 
Responsible Grace, 74. Rik Van Nieuwenhove likewise observes Aquinas’s frequent description of sin as a 
“sickness of the soul,” which bears critical implications for Thomas’s moral-theological psychology and 
soteriology. See Van Nieuwenhove, “‘Bearing the Marks of Christ’s Passion’: Aquinas’ Soteriology,” in The 
Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 282-284.
62 Aquinas, DM, q. 1, a. 1. Cf. ST I.48-49, where Aquinas makes the same essential argument.
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attaining its natural telos.”63 By consequence, Aquinas not only argues against the possi-
bility of sheer evil—“nothing can be essentially bad”64—he further articulates a position 
wherein malum (of any degree) can only “exist” because there is something good inform-
ing it. In short, “evil” is no positive “thing” for Aquinas.
 Uncovering Wesley’s theodicy65 is a bit more complicated. Many representative 
passages are lodged in texts from his early career, where he is frequently citing or summa-
rizing others’ theological works. Indeed, the early Wesley (paraphrasing works by Hum-
phrey Ditton and Archbishop William King) offers a fairly standard theodicy, denouncing 
Manichean dualism, emphasizing God’s perfection and providence, gradating the perfec-
tion of Creation, and grounding evil in our deviant use of liberty without inculpating God 
for endowing us with that capability.66 But a theme that he mentions in 1730 as an example 
of evil—the fall of Lucifer—becomes for the late Wesley the source of evil in general and 
63 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 30.
64 This is Thomas Gilby’s translation of ST I.49.3, in St. Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts, ed. and 
trans. Thomas Gilby (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), 170, emphasis added. Cf. Gilby’s translation 
of SCG III, 11 (Gilby, 168).
65 It bears mentioning that, while the present topic does fit under the heading “theodicy,” I am by no 
means attempting a comparative theodicy between Wesley and Aquinas here. This brief sketch is but a 
preface to the ensuing hamartiological discussion, which itself falls short of a full-scale study.
66 John Wesley to the Revd. Samuel Wesley, December 19, 1729, in Works 25:240-242, is essentially a syn-
opsis of a portion of Ditton’s appendix to Discourse concerning the Resurrection of Jesus. Wesley first alludes to 
and then paraphrases Archbishop William King’s De Origine Mali in his correspondence with his father in 
the winter of 1730/1 (Works 25:258, 264-267). Both accounts point to the improper or deficient use of liberty 
as the origin of moral evil. However, King’s version seems to inculpate the nature of materiality as inherently 
defective, “and from this necessarily flows generation and corruption” (Wesley’s paraphrase, Works 25:265). 
Between these letters, Wesley preaches Sermon 140, “The Promise of Understanding,” at Oxford, in which 
he again lays out a typical Augustinian theodicy (see II.1, Works 4:285-286). Here, he underscores that our 
virtue and happiness (note the Aristotelian themes!) is predicated on the selfsame capacities that issue in our 
sin and evil. Wesley’s larger point in this sermon is that we don’t ultimately comprehend such inscrutable 
matters as God’s providence and the origin of evil, and this is for the sake of engendering humility within us 
to stave off the pride of Lucifer (III.2, Works 4:287-288).
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the fall of humans in particular. In response to the classic question of theodicy—Unde 
malum?—Wesley replies straightforwardly in 1781:
It came from ‘Lucifer, son of the morning’: it was ‘the work of the devil.’ ‘For the 
devil,’ saith the Apostle, ‘sinneth from the beginning;’ that is, was the first sinner in 
the universe; the author of sin; the first being who by the abuse of his liberty intro-
duced evil into the creation.… [He] was self-tempted to think too highly of himself. 
He freely yielded to the temptation, and gave way first to pride, then to self-will.67
He corroborates the position nine years later, further indicating the transmission of evil 
from the devil to humans:
When Satan had once transfused his own self-will and pride into the parents of 
mankind, together with a new species of sin—love of the world, the loving the 
creature above the Creator—all manner of wickedness soon rushed in, all ungod-
liness and unrighteousness.… From the devil the spirit of independence, self-will, 
and pride, productive of all ungodliness and unrighteousness, quickly infused 
themselves into the hearts of our first parents in paradise.68
These two late sermons follow his earliest accounts in attributing “evil” to an abuse of 
liberty; but, whereas the early Wesley primarily connects this deviant liberty to humans, 
the late Wesley appears to attach it first to Lucifer and then to humans.69 Notably, Wesley 
seems to conflate “evil” with the devil’s temperament and vices, which are then “trans-
fused” and “infused” into humans. “Evil” becomes a positive principle, and, as we shall see 
67 Sermon 62, “The End of Christ’s Coming,” I.8, in Works 2:476. It must be noted that Aquinas does 
enumerate “the devil” as one of the “causes” of sins in humans, but we must also observe his qualification. 
“The devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by 
reason of whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin” (ST I-II.80.4). Aquinas main-
tains that the devil can lead us to sin by persuasion and by proposition (ST I-II.80.1), but that “the devil can 
nowise compel man to sin” (ST I-II.80.3; emphasis added). Cf. DM, q. 3, aa. 3-5.
68 Sermon 128, “The Deceitfulness of the Human Heart,” I.1, 3, in Works 4:152, 154.
69 However, cf. Sermon 57, “On the Fall of Man,” §1, in Works 2:400-401. Wesley opens this 1782 sermon 
with the question, “But why is there sin in the world?” His answer is profoundly direct: “Because man was 
created in the image of God”—humans have been made with the capacity for knowing and loving and 
choosing what is good, yet choose evil instead. The “anomalous” presence of this sermon and its theodicy 
from the late Wesley does not discredit a hypothesis that Wesley’s theodicy shifts later in his life; rather, it 
confirms a larger hypothesis that Wesley remains frustratingly ambiguous throughout.
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below, joins with original sin to take on a certain substantive quality. Wesley’s occasional 
description of salvation as a rooting-out of this principle of sin lends credibility to the pos-
sible charge of reifying evil and sin.70 In short, “evil” can be a positive “thing” for Wesley.
 This apparent difference between Aquinas and Wesley on the ontological status of 
“evil” raises a question in light of how they both employ medical (even epidemiological) 
language to discuss sin.71 What is the nature and scope of the disease, and just how “bad” 
is it? “Know your disease!” exhorts Wesley, immediately adding, “Know your cure!”72 
The two are, of course, intimately related.73 The goal is to return (to) the health that the 
infection took away. As in medicine, much depends on an accurate diagnosis—here, the 
analysis of original sin and actual sin for Wesley and Aquinas. This prognosis of evil and 
the diagnosis of sin finally give way to an evaluation (and re-evaluation) of the severity and 
consequences of the disease itself, which is the goal of the final section of this chapter. The 
cure itself—the “therapy of the soul”74—is then the theme of Part II.
70 For example, see Sermon 76, “On Perfection,” III.9 (Works 3:85), in which Wesley describes perfec-
tion as salvation from all sin and “to be totally delivered from [the devil or his works], to have sin rooted out 
both of your life and your heart.” See also Sermon 92, “On Zeal,” III.2, in Works 3:316. Wesley is here arguing 
that true zeal (as the fervent love of God) is contrary to negative dispositions such as hatred, prejudice, 
bigotry, persecution, bitterness—“unholy tempers” that are “the works of the devil” (III.1). But pride may 
still remain (for a time) in a Christian, “as this is one of the last evils that is rooted out when God creates all 
things new.” In these instances, as in others, Wesley freely talks about a human inclination “to evil,” further 
reifying a conflated notion of “evil” and “sin” vis-à-vis “moral evil.”
71 See note 61, above.
72 Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” III.5, in Works 2:185.
73 For example, appendicitis is treated by surgically removing the appendix, but one would never dream 
of such a procedure to treat pneumonia!
74 Wesley gives this phrase (borrowed from Plato) in the original Greek: θεραπεία ψυχῆς. For Wesley, it 
is the best description of the true nature of Christian religion, “God’s method of healing a soul which is thus 
diseased.” See Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” III.3, in Works 2:184.
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B. Original Sin
 The starting-point for understanding Wesley and Aquinas on original sin turns out 
to be neither a discussion of the nature of evil nor their common analogy of sin-as-infec-
tion (both noted above). Rather, it begins with in the opposite doctrine—that of original 
justice or original righteousness.75 This is best understood as a gratuitous prelapsarian 
perfection consisting in the rectitude of our faculties, i.e., being rightly-ordered internally 
(an integral moral psychology) and externally (to God).76 It is this doctrine that stands 
behind the first section of Wesley’s early sermon “The Image of God,” wherein God’s 
image within humanity cumulatively results in our happiness, for all our faculties are 
fully-satisfied with their proper objects.77 The doctrine is further on display in Wesley’s 
pivotal sermon “Justification by Faith”:
In the image of God was man made; holy as he that created him is holy, merciful 
as the author of all is merciful, perfect as his Father in heaven is perfect. As God 
is love, so man dwelling in love dwelt in God, and God in him.… Such then was 
the state of man in paradise. By the free, unmerited love of God he was holy and 
happy; he knew, loved, enjoyed God, which is (in substance) life everlasting. And 
in this life of love he was to continue for ever if he continued to obey God in all 
things.78
75 Both phrases are legitimate translations of the Latin iustitia originalis. As with its Greek equivalent 
δίκη, the Latin iustitia is a rich concept that integrates justice and righteousness; it is a full-yet-fluid compat-
ibility with respect to something else that 
76 For more background on the concept, see the entries for “original justice” and “original sin” in Karl 
Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary, ed. Cornelius Ernst, trans. Richard Strachan (New 
York: Herder & Herder, 1965), 328-331. Cf. “original righteousness” and “original sin” in Cross and Living-
stone, eds., The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 1195-1197.
77 Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” I, especially I.4, in Works 4:293-295. In his introductory editorial 
comment, Albert Outler mentions that Wesley, in developing the first section of this sermon, was clearly 
“working from the tradition of ‘original righteousness’” (Works 4:290).
78 Sermon 5, “Justification by Faith,” I.1, 4, in Works 1:184-185.
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Aquinas’s account of prelapsarian perfection likewise stresses both rational and affective 
rectitude.79 However, the mature Aquinas clearly argues that original justice primarily 
“belongs to the will. And original justice, which united the will to God, produced an over-
flowing of perfection into other powers, namely, that knowledge of truth enlightened 
the intellect, and that the irascible and concupiscible appetites received direction from 
reason.”80
 The condition of original justice is the consequence of God’s grace engaging and 
enabling the first human to flourish in righteousness.81 Aquinas most clearly articulates 
this in De Malo, which represents his mature theological position regarding evil. “Original 
justice includes sanctifying grace,” he argues, adding, “I think that it is true that human 
beings were created with purely natural powers.… For the rectitude of grace accompanies 
the rectitude of human nature.”82 This compatibility of nature and grace means that, on 
Aquinas’s account, original justice was meant to be a supernatural inheritance within the 
79 In ST I.95.1, the rectitude of original justice is presented in rational terms: the material is subject to 
the immaterial, the lower faculties to the higher, and the highest (reason) to God. But in ST I-II.82.3, Aqui-
nas shifts terms: “the whole order of original justice consists in man’s will being subject to God.”
80 DM, q. 3, a. 7. This progressive integration of the faculties—oriented by a God-oriented will—paral-
lels the portrait that Wesley draws in Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” I.1-4, in Works 4:293-295.
81 For an excellent summary statement of Aquinas’s teaching, see Dauphinais and Levering, Knowing 
the Love of Christ, 39.
82 DM, q. 4, a. 2. In the Leonine (Latin) version, this is Aquinas’s “ad 22.” But in Regan’s recent English 
translation, the massive article is sub-divided into four topical series of objections and contraries. There, 
this is found in the first reply to the arguments in the section “On the Contrary, III.” It is also worth noting 
that Aquinas’s tone in this response is unusually direct and personal. As a person, Aquinas is quite nearly 
absent from his works. (The grammatical first person of the Latin respondeo, which Aquinas employs thou-
sands of times over, can hardly be taken as “personal.”) For Aquinas to deviate from his standard “academic 
absence” is akin to breaking the fourth wall in theater. We must therefore attend to the exception with added 
consideration.
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human species. God had intended this righteousness to be transmitted as something dis-
tinct from—yet appropriate to—human nature.83
 Tracing a similar position within Wesley’s writings is slightly more challenging. 
Based on Wesley’s early sermon “The Image of God,” it would seem that Adam’s overall 
perfection and sanctity was naturally consequent to the perfection of Adam’s faculties.84 
However, in a later description of Adamic perfection, Wesley is clear that “by the free, 
unmerited love of God [Adam] was holy and happy.”85 Is this gracious, though? Wesley’s 
answer requires us to recognize an integral correlation running throughout his entire 
theological enterprise: the virtual synonymy of grace and love. Numerous examples of this 
apposition surface in his Notes, bespeaking his intentional, unprompted commentary that 
grace is “free love.”86 To return to the question, when Wesley writes that original righ-
teousness is “by the free, unmerited love of God,” it is equivalent in every respect to “by 
the grace of God.”
 A consequence of this common teaching on grace as the cause of original righ-
teousness is that the concept of an ungraced “natural state”—of humans existing as 
“mere nature”—is a fabrication. Within Wesleyan circles stands the decades-old position 
of Umphrey Lee: “for Wesley the ‘natural man’ is a logical abstraction” that “does not 
83 ST I-II.82.2; cf. ST I.100.1.
84 Wesley, Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” I.4, in Works 4:295.
85 Sermon 5, “Justification by Faith,” I.4, in Works 1:184-185.
86 See Notes, Galatians 1:5; 2:21; Ephesians 1:6; 1 Peter 4:10; and Revelation 22:21. This last reference is 
to the final verse of the New Testament, and ultimately serves as Wesley’s final scriptural comment: grace 
is love.
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exist.”87 Lee bases his conclusion on Wesley’s finely-honed teaching on prevenient grace 
in the sermon “On Working Out Our Own Salvation.” “There is no man that is in a state of 
mere nature,” Wesley avers. “There is no man, unless he has quenched the Spirit, that is 
wholly void of the grace of God.”88 The present tense and indicative mood of Wesley’s line 
challenges us to understand the underlying teaching as timelessly true.
 Aquinas’s interpreters have also arrived at similar conclusions. Commenting on 
Aquinas’s account of original justice vis-à-vis original sin, Eileen Sweeney offers this: 
“What is strange about Aquinas’s view is that a purely ‘natural state’ of humankind has 
strictly speaking never existed; before the fall nature had a kind of supernatural strength, 
and, after that, nature is somewhat, though not radically, depleted.”89 The explanation 
behind Aquinas’s “strange” position, Sweeney admits, has to do with the earlier obser-
vation that, for Aquinas (as for Wesley), original sin is like a disease that drains its host 
of vitality.90 To be sure, the apparent oddity lies in the unique iconicity of human nature: 
humans, says Aquinas, have as the end of their nature a supernatural good (beatitude) 
87 Umphrey Lee, John Wesley and Modern Religion (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1936), 124. Lee reit-
erates himself on the following page: “the ‘natural man’ is only a logical fiction” (125). Responses to Lee’s 
observation have been qualifiedly receptive, as in the case of Ken Collins. Collins takes Lee’s point as correct, 
but immediately adds concessive clauses and qualifications—including a lengthy footnote that attempts to 
walk back Lee’s original claim. See Collins, The Theology of John Wesley, 74 and n164.
88 Wesley, Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.4, in Works 3:207. Cf. Sermon 57, 
“On the Fall of Man,” I.3, in Works 2:403-404. In this paragraph, Wesley wants to draw our attention to the 
profundity and immediacy of God’s grace within the Genesis account of the Fall.
89 Eileen Sweeney, “Vice and Sin (Ia IIae, qq. 71-89),” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 158. Sweeney’s reference to a partial depletion 
of nature refers, more accurately, to Aquinas’s discussion of sin’s corruptive consequences on the good of 
human nature (bonum humanae naturae), which is threefold (ST I-II.85). That subject will be addressed in 
the closing section of the present chapter.
90 Sweeney, “Vice and Sin,” 157-159.
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that requires supernatural help (grace).91 Accordingly, to lose or to fall short of the gra-
ciously-enabled good of human nature does not mean that we somehow “revert to mere 
nature,” as though it were some kind of “neutral state” between “good” and “bad.” Instead, 
it means that our nature is incapable of naturally attaining the good that naturally befits 
it—which is, paradoxically, “unnatural.”
 The notion informing Aquinas’s perplexing position is the formal dynamic within 
his account of original sin: the privation of the grace of original justice.92 Sean Otto has 
described it well in a recent article on Aquinas’s doctrine of original sin:
One must, therefore, think of original sin in terms of a privation of grace, as a lack 
of a supernatural gift, rather than as a fault or biological defect. We must not, of 
course, understand this to mean that we are now in a pure state of nature; such 
cannot be the case. Original sin does not belong to human nature by right any 
more than original justice did. Sin is not natural; it is…a disordering of nature.93
On the whole, the privation of original justice (and its grace) is Aquinas’s most encom-
passing description of original sin.94 On the one hand, it seamlessly integrates with the 
abovementioned sin-as-illness analogy.95 On the other hand, it is a means by which Aqui-
nas is able to incorporate (and modify) previous theological positions on original sin.96 In 
91 This point “bookends” the Prima Secundae. ST I-II.1-5 is a treatise on the final end of human nature 
(beatitude), while ST I-II.109-114 is a treatise on the divine means to that end (grace).
92 ST I-II.82.4
93 Sean A. Otto, “Felix Culpa: The Doctrine of Original Sin as Doctrine of Hope in Aquinas’s Summa 
Contra Gentiles,” The Heythrop Journal 50, no. 5 (September 2009): 784.
94 Aquinas brings up the “privation thesis” in ST I-II.81.5 ad 2, and then reiterates it in every single 
article of q. 82.
95 In ST I-II.82.1 ad 1, Aquinas compares this to the bodily habit of health and sickness. Cf. Rudi A. te 
Velde, “Evil, Sin, and Death: Thomas Aquinas on Original Sin,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 162.
96 See, for example, DM, q. 4, a. 2, which features at least four “versions” of original sin—concupis-
cence, ignorance, privation (of original justice), and punishment and moral fault.
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fact, Aquinas borrows this “privation thesis” from Anselm,97 while relegating Augustine’s 
concupiscence-based version to the status of a material cause.98 Aquinas’s decision here 
must be viewed as an intentional consequence of his integrated affective moral psychol-
ogy over against Augustine’s highly-passional model. The passions do indeed have their 
place within Aquinas’s moral psychology, but not in such a way that we are enslaved to 
them and their concupiscence.
 A similar (if not stronger) tendency is on display in Wesley’s explicit language of 
original righteousness, which he inherits immediately from the 39 Articles of Religion 
of the Church of England.99 Article IX (“On Original or Birth Sin”) attempts a balance 
between neo-Pelagianism and Puritan hyper-Calvinism, while including both the “priva-
tion thesis” and the classical Augustinian tradition of concupiscence (just like Aquinas).100 
However, when Wesley redacts these Articles for North American Methodists in 1784, he 
entirely omits the second half of the article, which emphasizes the concupiscence of the 
flesh and justifies God’s wrath and condemnation.101 In other words, Wesley intentionally 
97 DM, q. 4, a. 2. Cf. ST I-II.82.1 obj. 1.
98 See DM, q. 4, a. 2, response and replies to the first set of objections and contraries. Cf. ST I-II.82.3. In 
both works, Aquinas significantly modifies (and mitigates) Augustine’s thesis by way of subordinating it to 
the “privation thesis.” This subordination also applies to the “ignorance thesis,” as seen in ST I-II.82.3 ad 3; 
DM, q. 3, a. 7; and DM, q. 4., a. 2 (second set of objections).
99 Thus, in Sermon 7, “The Way to the Kingdom,” II.1 (Works 1:225), and in Sermon 17, “The Circumci-
sion of the Heart,” II.1 (Works 1:409), Wesley is quoting directly from Article IX of the Church of England. 
The same is true in the 1742 tract The Principle of a Methodist, §2, in Works 9:50.
100 For an excellent introduction and explication of the Articles of Religion, see E. J. Bicknell, A Theo-
logical Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, 3rd ed., ed. H. J. Carpenter (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1955). For the chapter on “The Nature of Man,” see 171-198.
101 For a comparison of Wesley’s redaction to the original 39 Articles, see Thomas C. Oden, Doctrinal 
Standards in the Wesleyan Tradition: Revised Edition (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2008), 130-148.
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silences the Augustinian tones of original sin within his own Anglican tradition, effec-
tively leaving untouched the tradition of the privation of original righteousness.102 
 Part of Wesley’s inherited tradition is, of course, the interpretation of original sin 
as an “infection of nature,” which we need now to consider in greater detail. Nearly all 
of Wesley’s interpreters acknowledge the presence of this theme, and many propose its 
priority within Wesley’s teaching on original sin—and for good reason.103 Wesley naturally 
adopts the 39 Articles’ language of original sin as an “infection of nature,”104 variously 
interpreting it as a “leprosy”105 and (most frequently) as a “disease” or “sickness.”106 But 
since the disease bespeaks the nature and the need of the cure, Wesley rounds out his 
teaching on original sin with the complementary language of “medicine,” therapy, and the 
102 In the Latin version of Article IX, the phrase depravatio appears twice. The first time it is translated 
“corruption of nature,” whereas the second time it reads “infection of nature.” Wesley deletes this second 
instance because it is included in the second half of the Article, not because he disagrees with the idea of 
original sin as an infection or, by extension, as an infectious privation. In truth, privation is not the dominant 
reading of original sin within Wesleyan circles, though there are a few notable exceptions (see Section 3 of 
the present chapter, below).
103 For example, Maddox, Responsible Grace, 73-83; Outler, Theology in the Wesleyan Spirit, 33-37, 52-53; 
Barry E. Bryant, “Original Sin,” in The Oxford Handbook of Methodist Studies, 522-539, especially 523-524 
and 533-534; and Lindström, Wesley and Sanctification, 19-54, especially 41-44. Colin W. Williams and Ken-
neth J. Collins both obliquely identify Wesley’s theme but draw no particular attention to it. ). Interestingly, 
Williams and Collins spend considerably more time discussing John Calvin’s views on original sin than on 
Wesley’s own infection-motif. See Williams, John Wesley’s Theology Today, 47, 51, 55; and Collins, The The-
ology of John Wesley, 65, 69, 106.
104 Sermon 13, “On Sin in Believers,” I.3, in Works 1:318; The Doctrine of Original Sin, Part II, I.18, III.11, 
and III.19, in Works 12:236, 255, 271 (respectively).
105 Sermon 21, “Sermon on the Mount, I,” I.4, in Works 1:477-478.
106 Sermon 54, “On Eternity,” §16, in Works 2:367; Sermon 95, “On the Education of Children,” §§4-5, 12, 
in Works 3:349-350, 351; Sermon 109, “The Trouble and Rest of Good Men,” Proem and II.5, in Works 3:533, 
539; Sermon 26, “Sermon on the Mount, VI,” III.13, in Works 1:586.
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great “Physician.”107 In fact, Wesley’s sermon “Original Sin” (a distillation of his lengthy 
1757 treatise of the same name) exhibits all of his nuanced descriptions of the doctrine.108 
Consider this classic excerpt:
the proper nature of religion, of the religion of Jesus Christ…is θεραπεία ψυχῆς, 
God’s method of healing a soul which is thus diseased. Hereby the great Physician 
of souls applies medicine to heal this sickness; to restore human nature, totally 
corrupted in all its faculties. God heals all our atheism by the knowledge of him-
self, and of Jesus Christ whom he hath sent; by giving us faith, a divine evidence 
and conviction of God and of the things of God.… By repentance and lowliness of 
heart the deadly disease of pride is healed; that of self-will by resignation, a meek 
and thankful submission to the will of God. And for the love of the world in all its 
branches the love of God is the sovereign remedy. Now this is properly religion, 
“faith thus working by love,” working the genuine, meek humility, entire deadness 
to the world, with a loving, thankful acquiescence in and conformity to the whole 
will and Word of God.109
In addition to establishing original sin as an infection, the passage also captures well what 
the disease actually infects. Observe how Wesley describes the infection in relation to 
the characteristic faculties of human nature: atheism corresponds to the intellect, while 
pride, self-will, and worldly loves all pertain to the will.110 Elsewhere, Wesley adds anger, 
truth-aversion, injustice, and cruelty to this list.111 The nearly-exclusive affective focus is 
107 Sermon 17, “The Circumcision of the Heart,” I.5, in Works 1:404; Sermon 69, “The Imperfection of 
Human Knowledge,” II.8, in Works 2:581; Sermon 122, “Causes of the Inefficacy of Christianity,” §2, in Works 
4:87; Sermon 95, “On the Education of Children,” §4, in Works 3:349; and Sermon 109, “The Trouble and 
Rest of Good Men,” Proem, in Works 3:533.
108 Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” especially III.1-3, in Works 2:183-184. Cf. Wesley’s treatise The Doctrine of 
Original Sin, Preface, §4, in Works 12:158.
109 Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” III.3, in Works 2:184.
110 Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” III.1, 3, in Works 2:182-183.
111 Sermon 95, “On the Education of Children,” §§5-11, in Works 3:349-351. Also, Wesley here expands 
“worldly loves” (§8) by way of Augustine’s triplex concupiscentia: the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and 
the pride of life (cf. 1 John 2:16). See Outler’s lengthy footnote (Works 1:226-227n64).
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not accidental, especially considering Wesley’s affective moral psychology.112 In this vein, 
original sin is distemper—a misguided, disordered proclivity for “not-God.”113
 Aquinas, too, is explicit that original sin particularly infects our volitional, appe-
titive abilities (rational as they are).114 The infection inheres to the very essence of the 
soul, resulting in the deterioration of the faculties of the rational nature of humans. The 
harmony that had once existed is now cacophonous, and the capacities no longer operate 
integrally.115 With original justice having been “taken away from the will”—the formal 
element in original sin, according to Aquinas—“the intellect’s knowledge of truth and the 
irascible and concupiscible appetites’ direction by reason are deficient.”116 The results of 
the will’s internal disarray may be viewed as the “symptoms” of the infection of original 
sin: “inordinate movements of desire, anger, and other emotions…, very often obscuring 
reason and enticing it.… And the more human beings were corrupted in these things, the 
more fully they withdrew from knowing and desiring spiritual and divine goods.”117
112 If “free will” results from the proper co-operation of intellect and will (as argued above), then original 
sin will affect this “capacity” as well. On the one hand, we are “free” because there isn’t any external necessity 
making us to act this way or that. On the other hand, we are not “free” because original sin, as an internal 
habit, disposes us to disorder. The capacity is in-tact, but its use has been corrupted.
113 See Sermon 46, “The Wilderness State,” §2, in Works 2:205. But cf. Sermon 76, “On Perfection,” I.1 
(Works 3:72), which seems to give priority to the corruption of the understanding, from which flows disor-
dered affections. The positions are not contrary, though; instead, they underscore the degree of integration 
of the faculties of human nature, especially in terms of acting.
114 Aquinas, ST I-II.83.4 ad 1; cf. DM, q. 4, a. 5.
115 See ST I-II.83.3; and ST I-II.82.2 ad 2-3.
116 DM, q. 3, a. 7.
117 CT, I.192, 194. Recall that CT is Aquinas’s unfinished attempt at a non-technical theological manual 
for his confrère Brother Reginald et alia.
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 If the presentation of original sin to this point sounds remarkably similar to the 
affective category of habitus/tempers described above, it is for good reason. Not only can 
a habitus mean the inclination of a power to act, it can also be
the disposition of a complex nature, whereby that nature is well or ill disposed to 
something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second nature, as in 
the case of sickness or health. In this sense original sin is a habit. For it is an inordi-
nate disposition, arising from the destruction of the harmony which was essential 
to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, 
by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health.118
We may note Aquinas’s language of health and the disease of dispositional inordinacy, 
which both describe the consequence that the privation of original justice has on our com-
plex human nature. However, if habitus/tempers and actions are reciprocally related, how 
is it that all people have contracted this sickness of disposition, even prior to our own 
personal acts?119
 Aquinas very much adheres to the historical reality of our first parents, meaning 
that their first sin—an action involving their intellects, wills, and God’s precept—is his-
torical. This is peccatum per originem, which has reverberated throughout human nature 
ever since the Fall.120 To explain how this has come to pass, Aquinas essentially turns to 
metaphysics:
All men who are born of Adam can be thought of as a single man (possunt consider-
ari ut unus homo) insofar as they agree in the nature that they receive from the first 
parent.… The many men descended from Adam are, as it were, many members 
of one body.… The disorder that exists in this man, who has been generated from 
118 ST I-II.82.1. Emphasis added.
119 Aquinas very clearly accepts the ubiquity of original sin as a doctrine of the Catholic faith, as seen in 
ST I-II.81, a. 1 and a. 3. Aquinas’s appeals to “the Catholic faith” in DM (q. 1, a. 4; and q. 5, a. 4) are more in 
terms of original sin and punishment.
120 See ST I-II.81.
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Adam, is voluntary not by his own will, but by the will of the first parent, who 
moves, by a motion of generation [motione generationis], all those who are derived 
by origin from him (qui ex eius origine derivantur), in the way that the soul’s will 
moves all the members to their acts.… Original sin is a sin of this person only inso-
far as this person receives his nature from the first parent; hence, it is called a sin 
of the nature.121
Aquinas appeals to this “metaphysical man” to explain how guilt (culpa) may be transmit-
ted by original sin without personal voluntariness or action (the remedy of which is infant 
baptism).122 The principle further confirms the inherent relationality of human nature: 
we each partake of what is common to our nature, whether good (e.g., the imago Dei, our 
rational soul, etc.) or bad (e.g., the infection of our nature, physical deterioration, etc.).123 
The habitual and the relational thus converge in the doctrine of original sin: “the whole 
of the human race is to be regarded as an extended moral self, of which Adam’s will is the 
primary principle.”124
 Wesley makes use of a different (albeit related) exegetical tool to explain the source 
and transmission of original sin. This is the idea of Adam as a “federal head” or represen-
tative of human nature. The instances where Wesley speaks this way point to the idea he 
wishes to underscore: Adam is our “common head,” a “representative of the whole human 
121 ST I-II.81.1 (Freddoso). Again, Freddoso’s translation smooths out some of the awkward syntax. The 
emphasis and the Latin parentheticals are his; I have added the bracketed Latin to draw attention to Aqui-
nas’s precise language of motion.
122 See how Aquinas begins his response (ST I-II.81.1) by appealing to a Catholic practice.
123 For more on Aquinas’s analogical account of transmission of original sin, see Sweeney, “Vice and 
Sin,” 158.
124 Te Velde, “Evil, Sin, and Death,” 156.
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race,” a “public person.”125 This is due to a typological parallelism he reads between Adam 
and Christ, which he explains in his 1757 treatise The Doctrine of Original Sin:
the state of all mankind did so far depend on Adam that by his fall they all fell into 
sorrow and pain and death, spiritual and temporal.… All these expressions demon-
strate that Adam (as well as Christ) was a representative of all mankind. And that 
what he did in this capacity did not terminate in himself, but affected all whom he 
represented.126
Some of Wesley’s interpreters have read his use of Adam’s “federal headship” as evidence 
of a Calvinist flair in Wesley’s teaching on original sin.127 However, if we take Wesley at 
his word (that Adam’s sin has come to affect all who share in that common humanity), his 
actions (that he distances himself from Reformed federalism because it smacks of imputed 
righteousness),128 and his inheritance (that the easiest way to trace “federal headship” to 
Wesley is through Hugo Grotius, a Remonstrant!),129 a Calvinist interpretation is hardly 
in the running. Instead, it would seem that Wesley’s allusion to Adam’s “federal headship” 
has more in common with Aquinas’s “metaphysical man” interpretation than it does with 
Calvin. This is especially true as it underscores both the relationality inherent to human 
125 Sermon 5, “Justification by Faith,” I.7, in Works 1:186; and Notes, Romans 5:14.
126 Wesley, The Doctrine of Original Sin, Part III, VI.1-2, in Works 12:326-328. Randy Maddox’s editorial 
note explains the context of the excerpt—that Wesley is rebutting Jeremy Taylor’s critique of federalism 
“not to defend ‘federal theology,’ but to clarify the ‘sense’ in which [Wesley] wants to talk about Adam and 
Christ as representative of humanity” (Works 12:326n61).
127 See in particular Lindström, Wesley and Sanctification, 29. Collins (The Theology of John Wesley, 
67-68) draws attention to the Calvinist undertones, with a nod to Lindström. This must be considered in 
light of Collins’s tendency of interpreting Wesley in Reformed/evangelical terms.
128 See Maddox’s editorial introduction to Wesley’s The Doctrine of Original Sin, in Works 12:150-151.
129 Outler notes an echo of Grotius in Wesley’s Sermon 5, “Justification by Faith,” I.7 (Works 1:18 n22).
196
nature (i.e., that which is common) and the relation between the common nature and its 
personal affective-dispositional effects.130
 Where Wesley and Aquinas converge in their “analogical” accounts of the trans-
mission of original sin from Adam to all humans, they also converge in outdated, uncon-
ventional, even appalling biology. Perhaps it is a consequence of approaching original 
sin as an infection that original sin actually becomes an infection—or, at the very least, 
evolves a biological aspect. Employing such a biology, Aquinas locates the active principle 
of a human soul in the father.131 This is not to say that a human soul is transmitted by way 
of generation; instead, “the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of 
the rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits the human nature from 
parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it.”132 In fact, both human 
nature and the culpa of original sin are virtually (virtute) in the semen.133 So it is the active 
130 It was mentioned above that Aquinas’s “metaphysical man” analogy “justifies” the transmission of 
guilt to Adam’s posterity. So, too, can the analogy of Adam’s federal headship. See Maddox, Responsible 
Grace, 76-79; cf. Maddox’s editorial introduction to Wesley’s Doctrine of Original Sin, in Works 12:149-150. 
It would appear that both analogies bespeak a juridical reading of original sin. However, the conclusion is 
not unassailable: by substituting “consequence” for “guilt,” we don’t limit the consequence of original sin 
to guilt alone—although “guilt” may still be one of the consequences of original sin. This also agrees with 
Aquinas’s and Wesley’s theological commitments: the guilt of original sin is taken away by baptism (Aqui-
nas) or by prevenient grace (Wesley). See Aquinas, ST I-II.81.1; 81.4 ad 2; and John Wesley to John Mason, 
November 21, 1776, in Works ( Jackson), 12:453. Especially because of the troubling biological accounts of the 
transmission of original sin, this modification can help in tempering unsound physicalist interpretations of 
the transmission of original sin.
Let us also recall how Wesley characterizes “tempers” as enduring dispositions of the soul, where 
“dispositions” is an affective category. Considered in light of Wesley’s further description of the affective 
consequences of original sin, it is not unacceptable to claim original sin as a kind of (or, rather, as the genus 
of ) unholy temper(s) within Wesley’s scheme. See, for example, Sermon 59, “God’s Love to Fallen Man,” §1, 
in Works 2:423. In all Wesley’s accounts, original sin is certainly a durable disposition!
131 See ST I-II.81.5 (especially ad 1). There is no sheltering Aquinas from accusations of dualistic gender 
stereotyping: males represent the active and rational-spiritual; females, the passive and material.
132 ST I-II.81.1 ad 2.
133 ST I-II.81.1 ad 3.
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power as contained within the seed of Adam that “moves” all subsequent posterity toward 
a disposition to sin.134 Even though Aquinas seems to proscribe this exact thesis in his 
initial statements,135 he does not relent from his position regarding original sin and the 
ratio seminalis.
 Wesley’s own biological account takes two primary forms. The first, which fea-
tures in the first and the last decade of his ministerial career, basically amounts to a physi-
cal transmission of arteriosclerosis—whether as a part of our inherited corporeality,136 or 
the atheromatous consequence of ingesting the toxic juices of the forbidden fruit.137 The 
second, which appears more consistently in his career, plays upon the idea that we were all 
contained within and “have sprung from the loins of Adam.”138 The result is a fairly explicit 
“traducian” account of the soul’s origin and, consequently, of the transmission of original 
sin.139 The troubling matter has less to do with Wesley’s traducianism or his “in the loins 
of Adam” explanation than it does with the loss of the analogical sense of these biological 
134 See ST I-II.81.4.
135 See the first portion of Aquinas’s response in ST I-II.81.1.
136 See Wesley, Sermon 57, “On the Fall of Man,” II.5, in Works 2:407-408. “Thus are the seeds of death 
sown in our very nature,” an elderly Wesley (1782) concludes in this paragraph.
137 See Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” II.1, in Works 4:296-298. “The fruit of that tree alone of whose 
deadly nature he was forewarned seems to have contained a juice, the particles of which were apt to cleave 
to whatever they touched,” the young Wesley (1730) conjectures. “Some of these, being received into the 
human body, might adhere to the inner coats of the finer vessels.”
138 See Sermon 15, “The Great Assize,” II.4, in Works 1:361. Cf. Sermons 45, “The New Birth,” I.4, in 
Works 2:190; 57, “On the Fall of Man,” II.9, in Works 2:411; and 59, “God’s Love to Fallen Man,” §§1, 12, in 
Works 2:423, 432-433.
139 Wesley specifically embraces this “traduction of souls” in a short essay “On the Origin of the Soul,” 
The Arminian Magazine 5 (1782): 146-149, 195-197. As Maddox rightly observes (Responsible Grace, 80 and 
n112), the essay is not an extract of Henry Woolner’s The True Original of the Soule (1641); rather, Woolner is 
the chief influence on Wesley’s piece.
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accounts. Where Wesley shifts from the idea of “like” to “equal,” he forfeits his claim that 
he “cannot tell” or “account for” the “determinate manner [in which] sin is propagated.”140
 At any rate, we may conclude that, for Wesley and Aquinas, original sin is lik-
ened to an infectious disease that attaches to our human nature (especially the will) and 
infects all people. It disposes us away from the summum bonum by disordering our natural 
capacities—an important point to bear in mind as we move to consider actual sin. In this 
sense, original sin is best understood in habitual terms, where the habit has been fostered 
through the acts of human nature going back to the Fall. As a corollary (albeit a bleak one), 
original sin also expresses the inherent relationality of human nature.
 These aspects may all be traced back to the brute fact that it is because of God’s 
image within us that we can sin in the first place: because we have the capacity for judging 
and for discursive reasoning, we are able to consider multiple avenues for acting; because 
we have a “rational appetite,” a will constituted by a host of responsive “affections” with-
out the strictures of metaphysical necessity, we are able to choose this or that. Original 
sin bends that capacity toward act—not toward God and the good, but in contrary, frag-
mented, and destructive directions—and this is personal sin.
140 Wesley, The Doctrine of Original Sin, Part III, VII.1, in Works 12:329. Cf. “On the Origin of the Soul,” 
197. Wesley is drawing a parallel between the generation and the regeneration of souls. Whereas Jesus speaks 
of regeneration in terms of a “blessed reality” that yet remains a “mystery unknown, as to the manner of it,” 
Wesley reasons that the same may (must?) pertain to the generation of our souls—and thus to original sin as 
a “mystery unknown.”
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C. Actual Sin141
 Based on the earlier observations regarding the reciprocity of human acts and hab-
itus/tempers,142 it stands to reason that Wesley and Aquinas describe a similar relationship 
between original sin and actual sin—as a disposition to its like acts. Thus, Aquinas treats 
original sin in three of the ten questions he devotes in Summa Theologiae to the various 
causes of actual sin (peccatum).143 As mentioned above, Aquinas can approach original 
sin as an inordinate type of affective habitual disposition that inclines us to like acts, viz., 
sins.144 Likewise, Wesley is clear that “from this infection of our nature (call it ‘original sin’ 
or what you please) spring many, if not all, actual sins.”145 Note, too, how Wesley draws 
particular attention to “irregular desire” and “the corrupt bias of the will,” which incline us 
(without necessity) to sinful actions.146 From these initial remarks, we may already discern 
two related aspects of actual sin for Wesley and Aquinas. First, as opposed to original sin, 
141 The term “actual sin” is primarily used to distinguish this form of sin from original sin. Both Wesley 
and Aquinas use the term in this manner to convey the sin for which we are personally responsible (as 
opposed to collectively responsible, as with original sin).
142 See Section 1, “Human Acts and Habitus/Tempers,” above.
143 Aquinas, ST I-II.81-83, which is nestled in a greater discussion of the causes of sin (qq. 75-84), and a 
still-greater discussion on evil habits, vices, and sins (qq. 71-89). Aquinas briefly returns to the topic of orig-
inal sin in q. 89 (with respect to venial sin), and twice again in the Tertia Pars (III.1.4, regarding the purpose 
of the incarnation vis-à-vis the remittance of sin; and III.52.7, regarding children who die with unremitted 
original sin).
144 See ST I-II.77.4 on the procession of sin from inordinate desire; cf. ST I-II.82.1. See ST I-II.50.1 on the 
proportionality between a habit and an act.
145 Wesley, The Doctrine of Original Sin, Part II, III.11, in Works 12:255. Wesley continues this point in 
III.12-13 (256-257). Wesley consistently employs language of “springs from” and “flows from” for concepts 
related to affective habitual dispositions and the like.
146 The Doctrine of Original Sin, Part II, III.11, in Works 12:255-256. “The corrupt bias of the will” portion 
comes from David Jennings’s A Vindication of the Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin (1740), which Wesley 
frequently and freely cites.
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actual sin is in actu; it stresses action over mere inclination. Second, actual sin inherently 
engages those faculties that are required for any human act: intellect and will, and the free 
use of both. However, what makes an act moral or immoral is the peculiar province of the 
will—which, unfortunately, suffers the most from original sin.
 But what exactly is “sin” actually or personally? Wesley offers this crisp definition 
in a pastoral letter to one Mrs. Bennis, a Methodist society-member:
Nothing is sin, strictly speaking, but a voluntary transgression of a known law of 
God. Therefore every voluntary breach of the law of love is sin; and nothing else, if 
we speak properly. To strain the matter farther is only to make way for Calvinism. 
There may be ten thousand wandering thoughts and forgetful intervals without 
any breach of love, though not without transgressing the Adamic law. But Calvin-
ists would fain confound these together. Let love fill your heart, and it is enough!147
Wesley’s opening qualification—that he is defining sin “strictly speaking”—is likely to 
catch our attention first. This “strictly speaking” corresponds to what he describes else-
where as “sin properly so called, that is, ‘a voluntary transgression of a known law,’” which 
differs from “sin improperly so called, that is, ‘an involuntary transgression of a divine 
law, known or unknown.’”148 The dividing line between these two categories is volition, 
147 John Wesley to Mrs. Bennis, June 16, 1772, in Letters (Telford), 5:322. The early Methodists’ interest 
in defining sin (especially vis-à-vis Wesley’s doctrine of Christian perfection) is seen throughout Wesley’s 
correspondence, particularly after 1760. Cf. John Wesley to John Hosmer, June 7, 1761, in Works 27:260; and 
John Wesley to Miss March, May 31, 1771, in Letters (Telford), 5:255.
148 Wesley, “Thoughts on Christian Perfection” (1760), Q. 6, in Works 13:61-62 (emphasis original). The 
text, which employs the question-and-answer format, is drawn from the 1758 and 1759 Conferences that 
Wesley convened annually with his Methodist preachers. (For more information on this treatise, including 
its historical context, see Paul W. Chilcote’s introductory comment in Works 13:54-56.) Although a verbatim 
juxtaposition of “proper” and “improper” sins does not appear in Wesley’s sermons, the notion is nonethe-
less visible in the following: Sermon 1, “Salvation by Faith,” II.6, in Works 1:124 and n58; Sermon 8, “The 
First-fruits of the Spirit,” II.8, in Works 1:241; Sermon 13, “On Sin in Believers” (editorial introduction), in 
Works 1:315; Sermon 18, “The Marks of the New Birth” (editorial introduction), in Works 1:416; Sermon 40, 
“Christian Perfection,” I.7, in Works 2:103; Sermon 41, “Wandering Thoughts” (editorial introduction), in 
Works 2:125; and Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” III.6, in Works 2:165 and n63.
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i.e., whether or not the action is voluntary.149 In light of the earlier findings regarding the 
nature of genuine human acts, this crucial volitional criterion should be expected in Wes-
ley’s notion of actual sin. Without volition, an act is not “moral,” strictly speaking; and if 
it is not a moral quantity, it cannot be a “sin.” But not all of Wesley’s interpreters have rec-
ognized this, especially those utilizing modern, social-scientific hermeneutics that skirt 
Wesley’s theological anthropology and moral psychology.150
 When we turn to Aquinas’s notion of actual sin for comparison, we again find the 
common thread that “voluntariness is essential to sin.”151 In fact, when Aquinas comes to 
consider the fittingness of Augustine’s definition of sin (“a word, deed, or desire contrary 
to the eternal law [of God]”), he book-ends his acceptance of Augustine’s definition by 
149 For a recent study of Wesley’s hamartiological taxonomy with respect to this categorical “plumb line 
of human volition,” see Mark K. Olson, “John Wesley’s Doctrine of Sin Revisited,” Wesleyan Theological 
Journal 47, no. 2 (Fall 2012): 53-71, especially 60.
150 For example, Theodore Runyon’s brief treatment of “the nature of sin” in The New Creation (86-88) 
takes Wesley’s definition of “actual sin,” labels it “rationalistic” (and representative of Enlightenment com-
mitments), conflates “rational” with “conscious” (which seems too limiting a notion of sin for Runyon), and 
subjects the resulting myopic caricature to the likes of Freud and Marx. What Runyon has apparently over-
looked is that Wesley’s “rationalistic” definition is both fitting and not: fitting, in Aquinas’s sense, where the 
rational soul (both intellective and affective!) makes us unique as humans; unfitting, in an Enlightenment 
sense, where rationality can be viewed against affectivity.
Runyon’s underdeveloped critique—that Wesley has effectively restricted sin to conscious acts alone—
receives deeper analysis in a later piece by a pair of Wesleyan-inclined psychologists. See Scott F. Grover and 
Brad D. Strawn, “John Wesley and Psychological Research on the Unconscious: Toward a Reconceptualiza-
tion of Wesleyan Sin,” in Wesleyan Theology and Social Science, 129-142. Grover and Strawn bring modern 
cognitive psychology to bear upon the question of unconscious sin. They ultimately conclude that Wesley’s 
definition of actual sin along conscious lines is inadequate because it fails to account for “unconsciously 
motivating parts of the individual” that may contribute to, and perhaps constitute, actual sin (133; cf. 138). 
The concept for which they seem to be grasping is the underlying dynamic of Wesley’s theological anthro-
pology—an affectional moral psychology informed by a tradition of tempers and habits—which is puzzling, 
given Grover and Strawn’s section intended to address this precise subject (132-133). Had they had a better 
grasp of this rich theological tradition, Grover and Strawn surely would have come much closer to locating 
certain “unconscious” elements already contained within Wesley’s hamartiology. As it stands, their account 
of automatic responses approaches a kind of psycho-biological determinism, which Wesley would surely not 
be willing to concede!
151 Aquinas, ST I-II.71.5. It is hard to understate the exhausting frequency with which Aquinas reiterates 
the will’s necessary involvement in actual sin in this treatise (ST I-II.71-89).
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asserting the will’s involvement as the sine qua non of actual sin.152 Aquinas’s consistent 
volitional emphasis is of primary importance to understanding his overall doctrine of sin, 
but it is not his only rubric. In fact, the second criterion in Aquinas’s definition of actual 
sin, viz., the lack of conformity with a due measure, seems to equivocate between multiple 
rubrics. Let us consider Aquinas’s full response to Augustine’s proposed definition:
sin [peccatum] is nothing else than a bad [malus] human act. Now that an act is a 
human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above, whether it be voluntary, 
as being elicited by the will, e.g., to will or to choose, or as being commanded by 
the will, e.g., the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is 
evil through lacking conformity with its due measure: and conformity of measure 
[commensuratio] in a thing depends on a rule [regulam], from which if that thing 
depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: one is 
proximate and homogeneous, viz., the human reason; the other is the first rule 
[prima regula], viz., the eternal law, which is God’s reason, so to speak. Accord-
ingly Augustine includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining to the 
substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says 
“word,” “deed,” or “desire”; the other, pertaining to the nature of evil [rationem 
mali], and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, “contrary to the 
eternal law.”153
Just a few lines later, he offers this further clarification: “The theologian considers sin 
chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to 
reason.”154 So which is it?
152 ST I-II.71.6 co. and ad 2. Cf. DM, q. 2, especially aa. 1-3. In both works, Aquinas rightly notes that 
Augustine, too, underscores the centrality of the will in sin. But it is of utmost importance that, while Aqui-
nas inherits Augustine’s definition (from Against Faustus, XXII, 27) as a part of Catholic doctrine, his axial 
hamartiological theme is the role played by the will in sinning.
153 ST I-II.71.6.
154 ST I-II.71.6 ad 5. The same kind of “disciplinary distinction” is on display in DM q. 2, a. 2, where 
Aquinas begins his reply by delimiting the terms malum, peccatum, and culpa. Malum (“evil, bad”) is the 
most general term: any privation of an intended good, order, etc., is malum. Peccatum (“sin”) pertains to acts 
that are disordered or inordinate, though not necessarily voluntary. Culpa (“moral wrong”) takes the notion 
of peccatum and adds voluntariness, “since we do not impute any disordered act to anyone as moral wrong 
unless the act is within the person’s power.” (Note volition as the mediating factor.) “And so sin [peccatum] 
is evidently more general than moral wrong [culpa],” Aquinas concludes, “although the common usage of 
theologians takes sin and moral wrong to be the same.”
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 Both. Later in the Summa, Aquinas unpacks the relationship between the eternal 
law and the natural law, which is to say, between God’s reason and human reason.155 But 
at this point (ST I-II.71), Aquinas already hints at this relationship by giving primacy to 
Divine reason. Divine reason, which is equivalent to eternal law, is also the very root of 
all human goodness.156 When “we choose to act in accordance with what is good for us 
considered as human beings,”157 we are acting in accordance with natural law—which, 
Aquinas maintains, is a participation in the eternal law.158 Therefore, the transgression of 
the rule of human reason is tantamount to the transgression of God’s own reason (intellect 
and will) and God’s very ordering of Creation (providence).159
 We have already seen how Wesley, too, construes sin in terms of transgressing 
the law—but which law? Wesley quickly excludes both the ceremonial law and certain 
culturally-bound codes of law from the term.160 He also rejects that the law in question is 
the “perfect” or “Adamic” law, which only pertained to humans in a state of prelapsarian 
perfection.161 Rather, the law that Wesley has in mind is the moral law, which is the clearest 
155 See ST I-II.91-94.
156 See ST I-II.19.4.
157 Davies, Saint Thomas’s Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary, 214.
158 Aquinas, ST I-II.91.2.
159 See ST I-II.91.1.
160 See Wesley, Sermon 34, “The Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law,” §§1-I.2, in Works 
2:4-6. By “ceremonial law,” Wesley means that handed down by Moses. An example of a “culturally-bound” 
code of law is that of ancient Rome.
161 See John Wesley to John Hosmer, June 7, 1761, in Works 27:260. It is telling that Wesley essentially 
“prorates” the law to the capacities of the nature of the human in question.
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expression of God’s will for Creation.162 In a manner entirely consonant with Aquinas’s 
notion of “eternal law,” Wesley maintains that the moral law articulate the very heart and 
mind of God—i.e., God’s essential nature.163 What’s more, “the original of the law of God” 
was “coeval with [human] nature,”164 which aligns with what Aquinas has to say regarding 
natural law (ideally considered).165
 For the present discussion, it is important to note the relationship of this law to 
love—or, rather, the role that love plays in the practical doctrine of actual sin. For Wesley, 
it is the moral law that is established through faith, thereby making it the true “perfect 
law—of love established through faith.”166 We can now see that the hallmarks of Wesley’s 
teaching on actual sin “properly called” are plainly (and fully) laid out in his correspon-
dence with Mrs. Bennis (as given above): “Nothing is sin, strictly speaking, but a volun-
tary transgression of a known law of God. Therefore every voluntary breach of the law of 
love is sin; and nothing else, if we speak properly.” By this account, actual sin is properly 
distinguished by way of the engagement of the will and the transgression of love’s law.
162 See Sermon 34, “The Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law,” III.5-10, in Works 2:12-14. 
Cf. Vickers, Wesley, 88.
163 See Sermon 34, “The Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law,” II.3, 6, in Works 2:9-10.
164 Sermon 34, “The Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law,” I.4, in Works 2:7. Note the past 
tense, was, because (original) sin has since obscured “the original of the law of God” within our nature.
165 For an excellent, brief summary of Aquinas on natural law (ST I-II.91 and 94), see DeYoung, McClus-
key, and Van Dyke, Aquinas’s Ethics, 153-155. They make well the point that the natural law has essentially 
shifted from a description of human nature functioning in full-accordance with its proper end to a prescrip-
tion for human beings to flourish (154).
166 See Wesley, Sermon 35, “The Law Established through Faith, Discourse I,” §3, in Works 2:21. Cf. 
Notes, James 1:25.
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 Approaching actual sin through the twofold lens of volition and love can also aid 
in mapping Aquinas’s distinction of mortal sin and venial sin onto Wesley’s notion of 
“proper” and “improper” sin. While it is true that Albert Outlet has attempted such a cor-
relation of these hamartiological categories, he has done so under the pretense that venial 
sin is involuntary sin, per se.167 Aquinas’s position is not altogether clear on this matter.168 
This is compounded by the variety and flexibility of Aquinas’s terms. Peccatum (“sin”) is 
any disordered act, but it is only because of the engagement of the will that it becomes 
culpa (“moral wrong”). Theologians frequently use the two terms synonymously—unlike 
moral philosophers, he adds.169 Still, Aquinas himself uses the language of peccatum almost 
exclusively throughout ST I-II.71-89, where he clearly intends it to carry all the volitional 
gravity of culpa! So, technically speaking, an “involuntary venial peccatum” could exist 
within Aquinas’s scheme, but it does not harmonize well with the overall trajectory of his 
theological Summa. For this reason, it seems as though Aquinas would not be so hasty to 
consider “venial” and “involuntary” as synonymous with respect to actual sin.
 For Aquinas, “venial” is most intelligible as a category of actual sin that does not 
take away or run contrary to the habit of charity.170 Charity is the kind of unity of fellow-
167 See Albert Outler’s magisterial “Introduction” to Wesley’s sermons, in Works 1:65, 81. See also Out-
ler’s commentary in Works 1:241n58 (Sermon 8, “The First-fruits of the Spirit,” II.8); Works 1:315 (Sermon 
13, “On Sin in Believes”); and Works 1:320n16 (Sermon 13, “On Sin in Believers,” II.2).
168 Compare what he writes regarding the sacrament of penance (ST III.84.2 ad 3); the division of venial 
sin with mortal sin (ST I-II.88.1, and qq. 88-89 in general); how venial sin can belong to the sense appetites, 
i.e., without the command of reason or the will (DM, q. 7, a. 6); and yet how venial sin can only exist in 
creatures who have the use of liberum arbitrii (ST III.87.2).
169 As noted above, Aquinas asserts these points in DM, q. 2, a. 2.
170 See ST I-II.88.1 ad 2; cf. III.87.2
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ship and participation that we have with God—the essence of flourishing, of being “fully 
alive.”171 Sin, as a disease, robs the soul of its vitality, whether terminally and completely, 
as with mortal sin, or proximately and partially, as with venial sin.172 The implication of 
Aquinas’s distinction may be seen by testing it against Wesley’s own taxonomy with respect 
to Christian perfection.173 Wesley’s mature position is that a Christian may be so “perfect” 
as not to commit sin—that is, “sin properly so called,”174 or what Aquinas would classify 
as “mortal sin.”175 Wesley’s critical move is to hedge perfection in terms of his definition of 
“sin improperly so called”:
(3) I believe there is no such perfection in this life as excludes these involuntary 
transgressions, which I apprehend to be naturally consequent on the ignorance 
and mistakes inseparable from mortality.… (5) I believe a person filled with the 
love of God is still liable to these involuntary transgressions. (6) Such transgres-
sions you may call “sins” if you please. I do not, for the reason above mentioned.176
Bearing in mind how, for Wesley, Christian perfection is synonymous with love,177 we 
may conclude that “improper sin” does not necessarily take away from “the law of love” 
171 See, for example, ST II-II.23.1; cf. ST I-II.1.8 and I-II.3.8.
172 ST I-II.88.1.
173 This turn to perfection is essentially Mark Olson’s agenda (minus the comparison with Aquinas) in 
“John Wesley’s Doctrine of Sin Revisited.”
174 This notion can be found in many of Wesley’s (mature) works, including the following: A Plain 
Account of Christian Perfection, in Works 13:132-191; Sermon 76, “On Perfection,” especially II.9-14, in Works 
3:79-82; and “Thoughts on Christian Perfection,” especially qq. 3-7, in Works 13:54-80.
175 See, for example, Aquinas, ST I-II.72.5; I-II.74.4; and II-II.184.2.
176 Wesley, “Thoughts on Christian Perfection” (1760), Q. 6, in Works 13:62. Note how Wesley continues 
his reply (to q. 6) by adding that, before the Fall, humans were not capable of such transgressions—a point 
that Aquinas upholds with respect to Adam’s prelapsarian inability to commit venial sin (ST I-II.89.3). In 
that state of innocence, any sin would have been “mortal.”
177 This point saturates Wesley’s works from the fullness of his career. Clear examples may be found in 
Sermon 76, “On Perfection,” I.8, in Works 3:75; and A Plain Account of Christian Perfection, §6, in Works 
13:138-139.
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that now governs humans.178 Turning back to Aquinas, we find an identical argument and 
logic: Christian perfection pertains to charity and corresponds to the absence of mortal 
sin; however, the sojourning perfect are still liable to commit venial sin.179 As such, we 
have good reason to consider Aquinas’s “venial sin” and Wesley’s “sin improperly so 
called” analogously, though not synonymously.180 The strength of this case rests in the 
shared belief that proper/mortal sin is voluntary and destroys the habitus/temper of love 
in the agent.
 Finally, it should be noted that this treatment of actual sin has taken for granted 
the activity involved therein. Clearly, Wesley’s language of “transgression” and “breach,” 
like Aquinas’s “actual” and his appropriation of Augustine’s definition, bespeaks active sins 
of commission—sins by way of something that we do positively. However, Wesley and 
Aquinas each maintain that there are also sins of omission—sins by way of a neglected 
duty, especially for doing good.181 As we have already determined, the nature of sin for 
178 Wesley, “Thoughts on Christian Perfection” (1760), Q. 6, in Works 13:62.
179 Aquinas, ST II-II.184.2, and ad 2 (respectively). By “sojourning perfect” I mean what Aquinas has in 
mind when he discusses “illi qui sunt in hoc vita perfecti”—those who are perfect in this life, but who are 
still journeying on their way to full, heavenly perfection.
180 A determination of the equivalency of these terms—not just functionally, but also semantically—is 
beyond the scope of the present study. But, of the few studies that compare Wesley and Aquinas explicitly, 
one addresses this exact topic. See John E. Colwell, “Offending in Many Things: A Comparison of John 
Wesley and Thomas Aquinas on the Nature of Sin in the Believer,” in Wesley Papers: Papers Presented to 
the Wesley Fellowship Conference in 2000, ed. Paul Taylor (Ilkeston, UK: The Wesley Fellowship in Associa-
tion with Moorley’s Print & Publishing, 2002), 3-14. Though Colwell is neither Methodist nor Catholic, his 
paper exemplifies the kind of discussion that can occur between Wesleyans and Thomists. For more on the 
relationship of mortal/venial sin and “sin im/properly so called,” see Colón-Emeric, Wesley, Aquinas, and 
Christian Perfection, 28-29, 108-110, and especially 157-162.
181 For example, see Wesley’s Sermon 14, “The Repentance of Believers,” I.14, in Works 1:343-344; 
Sermon 19, “The Great Privilege of Those that are Born of God,” III.1, in Works 1:441; Sermon 35, “The Law 
Established through Faith, I,” III.8, in Works 2:31-32; and Sermon 46, “The Wilderness State,” especially 
II.2-3, in Works 2:208-209. For Aquinas, see especially ST I-II.71.5-6, as well as its parallel, DM q. 2, aa. 1-2. 
Interestingly, Aquinas begins with the issue of sins of omission (even before he formally accepts Augustine’s 
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Wesley and Aquinas necessarily involves the will, and this applies to sins of omission, too. 
Therefore, Aquinas concludes,
we only impute omission as sin when it has an intrinsic voluntary cause, not an 
intrinsic cause of any kind. For if an intrinsic involuntary cause, for example, fever, 
were to prevent a person from doing what the person should do, the argument 
would be the same as in the case of an extrinsic cause doing so. Therefore, for 
the omission of a duty to be a sin, it is required that a voluntary act cause the 
omission.182
In truth, this further subdivision of sin according to “commission” and “omission” does 
not offer any additional insight into what Wesley and Aquinas have to say about actual sin 
on the whole. Inasmuch as the will contributes to every sin, even sins of omission could be 
regarded as “commissions,” as “acts” instigated by the will. Still, the bottom-line remains: 
sin, per se, must be voluntary.
3. Conclusion: Depravity or Deprivation?
 Where does this leave us, then? Given all that we have discussed concerning Aqui-
nas and Wesley on human nature—God as our beginning and end, God’s image as unique 
human identifier, our composite nature, our intellect and will, moral freedom, moral 
action, moral habituation, and sin in its many guises—where do we stand? And what 
might iconic dignity have to contribute to the conversation? The answer to these ques-
tions may, in fact, reside in the substance of another: Are humans depraved or deprived? 
definition) in both of these works. Technically, he says, a sin of omission does not have to involve an action, 
insofar as it regards its essence; as to its cause, “then an act needs to be required for any sin, even one of omis-
sion” (DM, q. 2, a. 2). For a further discussion, see Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, “Thomas Aquinas,” in 
T&T Clark Companion to the Doctrine of Sin, ed. Keith L. Johnson and David Lauber (London: Bloomsbury 
T&T Clark, 2016), 199-216, especially 200-202. 
182 Aquinas, DM, q. 2, a. 2.
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The distinction is a technical one, but it strikes at the heart of the matter of human nature 
as we come to experience it today. We begin with Aquinas because his position may serve 
as a fixed point for comparing Wesley’s own stance. Perhaps more importantly, though, 
Aquinas also antedates the pivotal Protestant Reformation (and Catholic Counterrefor-
mation) that would come to shape Wesley’s theological anthropology and the question of 
human depravity.
 Having discussed the nature, causes, and types of sin in a logical manner,183 Aqui-
nas then turns his attention to sin’s effects, which he addresses in terms of “the good of 
human nature.” This good, according to Aquinas, is threefold:
First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties 
that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since 
man has from nature an inclination to virtue…this inclination to virtue is a good of 
nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of human nature 
in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature.184
We may further consider the threefold good of human nature in light of the comparable 
triplex imago Dei (ST I.93.4). That division more or less parallels how Aquinas under-
stands us humans to experience God. Cumulatively, these all cohere with his theological 
scheme of nature, grace, and glory, as represented in the following diagram.
183 Aquinas, ST I-II.71-84 and 88-89.
184 ST I-II.85.1. In the parallel passage from DM (q. 2, aa. 11-12), Aquinas does not employ this threefold 
interpretation of the good of human nature. Rather, he frames his articles in terms of “the suitable disposi-
tion or aptitude for grace” (a. 11), which sin diminishes but does not destroy. Due to this limited framing, the 
DM does not distinguish between aspects of human nature that are destroyed, diminished, or undamaged. 
As we shall see below, such is not the case with ST.
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Good of Nature
Principles of Nature
Inclination to Virtue
Original Justice
Image of God
Image of Creation 
Image of Re-Creation
Image of Likeness
Experiences of God
Capacity 
Actual, Habitual
Actual, Perfect
States
Aptitude of Nature 
Conformity of Grace
Similitude of Glory
Diagram 4. Aquinas’s Threefold Good of Nature, Imago Dei, Experience of God, and States
This parallel interpretation can help us to see with greater depth and clarity what Aquinas 
actually has to say about the consequences of original sin upon human nature. Because 
of “the sin of our first parent,” says Aquinas, “the third good of nature [original justice] 
was entirely destroyed,” totaliter est ablatum.185 Actual sin, which is contrary to virtue,186 
diminishes the inclination to virtue (the second good of nature). This is because the per-
formance of an act (a sin) further inclines the agent to perform similar acts (additional 
sins).187 However, primum bonum naturae nec tollitur nec diminuitur per peccatum—“the 
first good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin.”188 In other words, even in 
our sin (original or actual), we retain the principia naturae, including the powers of the 
soul described in the previous chapter.
 The rationale behind this statement is perhaps the most important element of 
Aquinas’s overall theological anthropology. Human beings are singularly unique from the 
185 ST I-II.85.1. Emphasis added.
186 See ST I-II.71.1.
187 ST I-II.85.1.
188 ST I-II.85.1 (my translation). Cf. ST I-II.85.4, where Aquinas comes at this same trio of natural goods 
by way of “privation of mode, species, and order.” The “good belonging to the very substance of nature…is 
neither destroyed nor diminished [nec privatur nec diminuitur] by sin.… The good of the natural inclination…
is diminished by sin…but is not entirely destroyed [sed non totaliter tollitur] by sin.… The good of virtue and 
grace…is entirely taken away [totaliter tollitur] by (mortal) sin.”
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entirety of the material Creation: no other material thing possesses a rational soul, by 
which God’s image peculiarly dwells within humanity.189 As such, the inclination to virtue 
(i.e., the second good of human nature, which is diminished by actual sin) befits (convenit) 
humanity. Our rationality enables us to act according to reason, which is the essence of 
acting virtuously. “Now sin cannot entirely take away from man [non potest totaliter ab 
homine tolli] the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable 
of sin [non esset capax peccati]. Therefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be 
destroyed entirely [totaliter tollatur].”190
 To be clear, Aquinas does not think we somehow “escape” from sin unscathed. We 
really are wounded (vulneratus) according to our nature and deprived (destitutus) of the 
proper ordering of our faculties. Without its proper ordering to truth, reason exchanges 
prudence for ignorance. Malice overcomes justice as the will is deprived of its ordering to 
goodness. As our core faculties suffer, our passions go unchecked: fortitude gives way to 
weakness and temperance yields to concupiscence. All this occurs through the collective 
loss of original justice, which had held our faculties in a harmonious balance and God-ori-
entation. These consequences also result from our personal sins, which cloud the mind, 
harden the will, hinder us from acting well, inflame the passions, and incline us to future 
sins.191 Indeed, the very splendor of the soul—the light of reason and the light of divine 
189 See Chapter 2, above. Recall that Aquinas considers angels to be the possessors of a rational soul; 
however, says Aquinas, angels are not material creatures.
190 ST I-II.85.2. In ad 3 of this article, Aquinas offers an illustration: even a blind person retains the 
aptitude for sight, since this pertains to human nature as such. A human is, by definition, an animal, of which 
the aptitude for sight is common. So the capacity remains even though the aptitude is unactuated.
191 ST I-II.85.3 co. and ad 1.
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grace—is now tarnished by sin.192 Still, this stain (macula) of sin is not something positive 
within the soul, as though it were “some thing”; rather, it signifies a privation of our iconic 
splendor due to the effects of sin.193 
 Wounded, stained, diminished, deprived—but not depraved. “Nothing can be 
wholly and perfectly bad,” including people.194 Even an unbeliever who lacks faith retains 
an element of the good of nature, says Aquinas. “It does not follow that they sin in every-
thing they do.”195 As created in God’s image, we cannot produce an effect the likes of which 
effectively alters—in this case, negates—our nature. If we could, we would be caught in 
a sort of paradox ad infinitum, where the consequence is denied by the cause and vice 
versa.196 We cannot “sin away” this fundamental good of human nature: that we have been 
made in God’s image.197 Therefore, if Aquinas’s great axiom is gratia non tollit naturam, 
sed perficit,198 its corollary would have to be malum non tollit naturam, sed inficit—just as 
“grace does not destroy nature but perfects it,” so “evil does not destroy nature but infects 
it.”
192 ST I-II.86.1. Recall that actual sin, according to Aquinas, transgresses two “rules”—viz., that of 
human reason and that of divine reason (ST I-II.71.6)—which are the selfsame sources of our splendor.
193 ST I-II.86.1 ad 3. This conclusion should be self-evident given Aquinas’s thesis regarding evil as the 
privation of good.
194 ST I.49.3.
195 ST II-II.10.4; cf. Aquinas, Super ad Romanos [Commentary on Romans], 14:23, lect. 3.
196 See ST I-II.85.6 s.c., that whatever God has made in us is natural to us and vice versa.
197 Mortal sin does not entirely corrupt the good of nature; see ST II-II.10.4.
198 Aquinas first introduces this principle in ST I.1.8 ad 2; its recurrence throughout the Summa Theolo-
giae, both verbatim and in principle, is incalculable.
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 It is against this Thomistic picture of deprivation that we now consider Wesley’s 
portrait, which starts with his own triplex imago Dei.199 Because of original sin, humans 
have lost the moral image of God entirely.200 It is this emphasis on the loss of the moral 
image of God (the rectitude of the soul tantamount to original righteousness) that Wesley 
describes as “the entire corruption of our nature.”201 On this point, Wesley fully aligns with 
Aquinas’s third “good of human nature”: whatever had existed in terms of our righteous 
state with God, now it is gone. Without grace, the perfection and goal of human nature is 
unattainable.
 The consequences of this loss reverberate throughout Creation itself, meaning the 
political image suffers as well.202 “As man is deprived of his perfection, his loving obe-
dience to God,” writes Wesley, “so brutes [non-human material creatures] are deprived 
of their perfection, their loving obedience to man.”203 However, Wesley admits that our 
priestly relationship to Creation and to other species is not entirely corrupted. Some spe-
cies, “those we commonly term domestic animals, retain more or less of their original dis-
199 See Chapter 2, Section 2a, above.
200 See Wesley, Sermon 62, “The End of Christ’s Coming,” I.10, in Works 2:477. Cf. Sermon 57, “On 
the Fall of Man,” §1-I.4, in Works 2:400-405; and Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” I.5 and II.1, in Works 2:175-176.
201 Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” I.4, in Works 2:190. As Wesley points out in the same paragraph, this 
teaching is also the very “foundation of the new birth.” Without the corruption or loss there would be no 
need for restoration.
202 Again, Wesley’s borrowed notion of the political image, as a species of the imago Dei, is woefully 
underdeveloped in his Works. Based on the single clause (!) he offers in “The New Birth,” I.1 (Works 1:188), 
this image entails humanity’s dominion over Creation. See Chapter 2, Section 2 (above) for a fuller treat-
ment of Wesley’s threefold explication of the image of God within human nature.
203 Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” II.2, in Works 2:443.
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position, and (through the mercy of God) love [humans] still and pay obedience to [us].”204 
Admittedly, Wesley’s political image of God does not map cleanly on to Aquinas’s second 
“good of human nature” (inclination to virtue), with one exception: both are diminished 
but not destroyed.205 So, while the moral image is obliterated and the political image is 
debilitated, what is the fate of the natural image?
 Ambiguity abounds for a number of reasons. First, Wesley has a tendency to employ 
the phrase “the image of God” as a shorthand for “the moral image of God.”206 Accordingly, 
Wesley can cast the very goal of religion in terms of a restoration of the image of God207 that 
has been lost through original sin.208 Second, Wesley demonstrates a certain ambivalence 
toward the doctrine of total depravity. On the one hand, he denigrates “human nature” in 
204 Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” II.2, in Works 2:443. One may speculate whether Wesley’s 
position here may owe more to personal experience than to doctrine or tradition. Over the course of his 
decades of itinerant ministry, Wesley likely traveled about 250,000 miles on horseback (or coach, in his final 
years). This certainly would have afforded him plenty of personal experience working with and caring for 
domestic animals!
205 Whether Wesley’s political image could be developed constructively in conversation with Aquinas’s 
discussion of the inclination to virtue—especially in terms of the role of the virtues in contributing to the 
common good of the polis—thus remains a topic for further investigation.
206 For example, consider this passage from Sermon 22, “Sermon on the Mount, II,” II.2, in Works 1:495. 
“Righteousness (as was observed before) is the image of God, the mind which was in Christ Jesus. It is every 
holy and heavenly temper in one; springing from as well as terminating in the love of God as our Father and 
Redeemer, and the love of all men for his sake.”
207 As Albert Outler notes in Works 2:185n70, “the recovery of the defaced image of God is the axial 
theme of Wesley’s soteriology.” He then refers readers to a number of examples, which, though by no means 
exhaustive, suffices to convey Wesley’s concern: Sermon 1, “Salvation by Faith,” §1, in Works 1:117-118; 
Sermon 5, “Justification by Faith,” I.4, in Works 1:184-185; Sermon 12, “The Witness of Our Own Spirit,” §16, 
in Works 1:309-310; Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” III.1, in Works 2:194-195; Sermon 85, “On Working Out 
Our Own Salvation,” §2, in Works 3:200; and Sermon 129, “Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels,” I.3, in 
Works 4:164.
208 See, for example, Wesley, Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” §4, in Works 2:173. Cf. Sermon 45, “The New 
Birth,” I.3-4, in Works 2:190. However, in Sermon 57, “On the Fall of Man,” II.7 (Works 2:410), Wesley does 
separate the moral from the natural image of God: “In that moment [i.e., the Fall] he lost the moral image of 
God, and, in part, the natural.”
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a number of sermons, describing the species as “filled with all manner of evil,” “void of all 
good,” “wholly fallen,” and “totally corrupted.”209 These valuations pertain to the moral 
and soteriological worth of human capacities in a sinful state and resemble the Calvinistic 
doctrine of total depravity.210 On the other hand, Wesley freely identifies Calvinism as “the 
direct antidote to Methodism (the doctrine of heart-holiness),”211 fearing (in 1744) that the 
Methodists “have leaned too much toward [it].”212 To be sure, Wesley famously admits that 
he does “not differ from [Calvin] an hair’s breadth” on justification; but, as Wesley writes in 
a letter to John Newton in 1765, the same may not be said of the doctrine of perfection.213
209 Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” III.2, in Works 183-184. Cf. Sermon 6, “The Righteousness of Faith,” II.5, 
in Works 1:211-212; Sermon 17, “The Circumcision of the Heart,” II.1, in Works 1:409; Sermon 30, “Sermon 
on the Mount, X,” §7, in Works 1:653; Sermon 34, “The Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law,” 
§2, in Works 2:5; Sermon 48, “Self-denial,” I.3, in Works 2:242; and Sermon 141, “The Image of God,” IV.2, 
in Works 4:302.
210 See the entry for “total depravity” in Cross and Livingstone, eds., The Oxford Dictionary of the 
Christian Church, 1633. In describing the doctrine of total depravity as “Calvinistic,” I am not claiming that 
the teaching originates with Calvin. Rather, “Calvinism” reflects Wesley’s own language and 18th century 
Anglican context.
211 The “Large” Minutes (1780, 1789), QQ. 75-76, in Works 10:934. These “minutes” derive from the 
annual conferences of the Methodists as first convened by Wesley in 1744. Their subject, as set down in the 
records of that first meeting, is “doctrine, discipline, and practice” (Works 10:120). The catechetical style 
(question-and-answer) and subsequent collation of minutes turned the gathered materials into a sort of 
“Methodist manual,” which took on the de facto name “‘Large’ Minutes.”
212 “Large” Minutes, QQ. 77-78, in Works 10:935, with cross-reference to the “Large” Minutes of 1770/1772, 
Q. 79.18, in Works 10:908. Given the follow-up questions and answers, the subject of this statement seems to 
be the relationship between justification and works, which includes bona fide works of nonbelievers.
213 John Wesley to John Newton, May 14, 1765, in Works 27:427. This point raises an interesting question 
based on Wesley’s description of “the analogy of faith” in a 1761 letter to George Downing. For Wesley, the 
“analogy” involves the organic integration of the “three grand scriptural doctrines”: “original sin, justifica-
tion by faith, and holiness consequent thereon.” The question is whether a Calvinistic scheme detrimental 
to holy perfection might also pose equivalent problems to the other two doctrines. In other words, although 
Wesley does not target a Calvinist anthropology of original sin, has he not implicated it in his bold stance 
on perfection (contra Calvin) and its effect on justification (and works)? See John Wesley to the Rev. George 
Downing, April 6, 1761, in Works 27:250. For Wesley’s explicit connection of these doctrines to “the analogy 
of faith,” see Notes, Romans 12:6. See also Outler’s comments (and references) on Sermon 5, “Justification 
by Faith,” §2, in Works 1:183n3.
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 At any rate, Wesley is clear that sin214 hampers the various operations of the fac-
ulties of the natural image of God. We reason neither purely nor impeccably,215 but this 
does not leave us intellectually incapacitated. Reason is still able to infer the “existence 
of a powerful and eternal Being…from these his works, grand and magnificent, though in 
ruin. Consequently, these leave the atheist ‘without excuse.’”216 Alone, such knowledge is 
insufficient for salvation, although it may point beyond itself (like an icon) to a gracious 
and salvific relationship with God.217 Sin also maligns the tempers, disorders the passions, 
and clouds the will with improper desires.218 This is a far more serious matter because it 
strikes at the moral-volitional heart of sin. As discussed in the previous chapter, Wesley 
somewhat addresses this issue in his watershed sermon “On Working Out Our Own Sal-
vation,” in which he discusses the universal gifts of conscience and prevenient grace.219 
214 Here, “original sin”—though actual sin contributes to an ongoing sinning disposition.
215 For example, see Wesley’s pair of sermons on reason: Sermon 69, “The Imperfection of Human 
Knowledge,” in Works 2:567-586; and Sermon 70, “The Case of Reason Impartially Considered,” in Works 
2:587-600. These may be considered rejoinders to an elevated humanism that Wesley witnessed in his 18th 
century Western European context.
216 Wesley, The Doctrine of Original Sin, Part III, Sect. 3, III.8, in Works 12:315. For a similar notion, see 
Wesley, A Survey of the Wisdom of God in the Creation; or, A Compendium of Natural Philosophy: In Five 
Volumes, 4th ed. (London: J. Paramore, 1784), 2:151. Finally, in his opening line to Sermon 85, “On Working 
Out Our Own Salvation,” Wesley states matter-of-factly that “some great truths, as the being and attributes 
of God, and the difference between moral good and evil, were known in some measure to the heathen 
world; the traces of them are to be found in all nations; so that in some sense it may be said to every child of 
man” (§1, in Works 2:199).
217 Hints of this may be seen in the “Large” Minutes of 1770/1772, Q. 79.18, in Works 10:908-909. This 
comes in the context of discussing entanglements with Calvinist doctrine.
218 One characteristic example is Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” II.7-11, in Works 2:179-182. According to 
Wesley, we are full of pride, do not seek God’s will, and place creatures above the Creator. Moreover, we are 
marked by the triplex concupiscenta of 1 John 2:16: the desires of the flesh (sensory pleasure), the desire of 
the eye (imaginations), and the pride of life.
219 See above, Chapter 3, Section 2; and Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” II.1 and 
III.4, in Works 3:203-204, 207.
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Quite understandably, this has led many of Wesley’s interpreters to read his doctrine of 
prevenient grace as a kind of antidote to the (Calvinistic) doctrine of total depravity.220
 This observation points to a third source of ambiguity regarding the fate of Wes-
ley’s “natural image of God”: the impact of Wesley’s interpreters. It has become custom-
ary to describe Wesley’s stance on original sin overwhelmingly in Calvinistic terms. This 
typically results in the unquestioned ideological elision of original sin and total depravi-
ty.221 However, these two concepts are not necessarily equivalent. For example, Aquinas 
upholds a doctrine of original sin without total depravity. But this point is typically lost on 
Wesley’s interpreters who lack exposure to the kinds of theological traditions that accept 
original sin but reject total depravity—traditions like Roman Catholicism, for one.222 In 
220 Outler weaves a characteristically elegant sentence to this effect in Theology in the Wesleyan Spirit, 37: 
“And yet (and there’s always a ‘not-yet’ whenever Wesley tilts toward any extreme), he immediately yokes 
the doctrine of total depravity with its antidote (where ‘total’ means that all of the humanum is ‘depraved,’ 
rather than that none of it is anything but depraved): (1) God’s own therapeia psychēs (his curative activity 
within our hearts) and (2) God’s universally active initiative in calling sinners to authentic repentance and 
self-knowledge.” Maddox describes this combination of total depravity and prevenient grace as “the result-
ing actual human situation” within Wesley’s theology. See Maddox, Responsible Grace, 92-93. Accepting this, 
Collins further acknowledges that Wesley and many eastern theologians “end up in a similar ‘place,’ with 
humanity gifted to receive and respond to grace,” although the journeys follow “much different routes” and 
arrive “at very different times.” See Collins, The Theology of John Wesley, 72-73. Note that Collins comments 
here that eastern theologians tend not to embrace total depravity, unlike Wesley.
221 The starkest example of this is found in Cell, The Rediscovery of John Wesley, 285: “Now Wesley 
always understood the doctrine of Original Sin in the sense of total depravity.… The doctrine of original 
sin, the doctrine of total depravity is essential, fundamental to the Gospel. It is a necessary inference from 
perfectly typical facts that original sin or total depravity is an essentially Methodist doctrine.” Cell concludes 
that paragraph by chiding interpreters of Wesley who “substitute personal predilections for Wesleyan affir-
mations, and where the exposition is made without adequate historical information” (286). This statement 
is ironic considering that Cell provides no textual support for his opening claim.
222 This points back to the earlier remark on the relative dearth of studies that approach Wesley through 
a Catholic lens. Up until around the time of Vatican II, Wesley was generally evaluated in traditional 
(Reformed) Protestant garb, with comparisons to Luther and Calvin dominating the landscape. Around that 
time, too, came the impetus to generate a critical edition of Wesley’s Works—one that could unveil his many 
sources and nuance his thought. The ensuing decades (e.g., Outler, in the 1970s and 80s; Maddox, in the 
1990s and 2000s) thus witnessed Wesleyan theological scholarship that read Wesley in distinctively East-
ern/Orthodox tones. Only very recently have studies working with Wesley and Roman Catholic thought 
(especially that of Aquinas) emerged.
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other words, the “conversation partners” of Wesley’s interpreters plays no small part in 
how respective portraits of Wesley emerge vis-à-vis original sin and total depravity.223
 It is therefore unsurprising that George Croft Cell, Harald Lindström, Colin W. 
Williams, Leo G. Cox, and Kenneth J. Collins have all read Wesley’s doctrine of original 
sin in terms of “total depravity”—each and every one has read Wesley in light of Calvin!224 
“Since Wesley taught a doctrine of original sin similar in many respects to the Protestant 
Reformers,” writes Collins, “he obviously denied that human beings possess natural free 
will.”225 The perniciousness of Collins’s account may be the way he links what he perceives 
to be Wesley’s doctrine of total depravity with his larger aim: emphasizing the sovereign, 
“free,” and irresistible grace of God for Wesleyan theology.226 But this is precisely where 
Wesley pushes back so strongly:
Only suppose the Almighty to act irresistibly, and the thing [universal holiness] is 
done; yea, with just the same ease as when ‘God said, Let there be light; and there 
was light.’ But then man would be man no longer; his inmost nature would be 
changed. He would no longer be a moral agent, any more than the sun or the wind, 
as he would no longer be endued with liberty, a power of choosing or self-determi-
nation. Consequently he would no longer be capable of virtue or vice, of reward or 
punishment.227
223 Without a doubt, this statement holds true for the present study, too!
224 As demonstrated in these authors’ principal works: Cell, The Rediscovery of John Wesley, 273-296; 
Lindström, Wesley and Sanctification, 19-54; Williams, John Wesley’s Theology Today, 47-56; and Collins, 
The Theology of John Wesley, 49-86. See also Leo G. Cox, “John Wesley’s Concept of Sin,” Bulletin of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 5, no. 1 (March 1962): 18-24.
225 Collins, The Theology of John Wesley, 78. In this passage, Collins attempts to distinguish (and dis-
tance!) Wesley’s position from Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, leaving Protestant thought in 
general, and Reformed thought in particular, as his chief lens for reading Wesley.
226 This comes through especially in Collins, The Theology of John Wesley, 70-82. Not unlike Cell in The 
Rediscovery of John Wesley, 285-286, Collins’s larger project rushes in to cloud his interpretation of Wesley.
227 Wesley, Sermon 63, “The General Spread of the Gospel,” §9, in Works 2:488-489; cf. Sermon 68, 
“The Wisdom of God’s Counsels,” §4, in Works 2:553.
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A few years later, Wesley essentially offers a final word on the matter: “Therefore (with rev-
erence be it spoken) the Almighty himself cannot do this thing. He cannot thus contradict 
himself, or undo what he has done. He cannot destroy out of the soul of man that image of 
himself wherein he made him.”228 The irony of the situation is that “total depravity” inter-
preters would have us believe that, in our utter impotence, we can (and do!) exert a certain 
omnipotence in defacing the image of God from our nature—even though, according to 
Wesley, God Almighty can do no such thing. Is our power of sinning greater than God’s 
power of creating? The complication vanishes if humans have not fallen “absolutely,” viz., 
into “total depravity.”
 Against the majority opinion of Wesley as an adherent to total depravity stand a few 
notable exceptions, all of which engage the thought of Jacob Arminius.229 Arminius (1559-
1609), a Dutch Remonstrant, is frequently presented in theological contrast to Calvin on 
the topics of predestination, atonement, free will, and grace.230 On such terms, it is telling 
that Wesley identifies himself as an “Arminian.”231 Now, it is frequently said that Arminian 
228 Sermon 67, “On Divine Providence,” §15, in Works 2:540-541.
229 In addition to the two articles that will be discussed below, see the following resources: M. Elton 
Hendricks, “John Wesley and Natural Theology,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 18, no. 2 (Fall 1983): 7-17; and 
Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, A Theology of Love: The Dynamic of Wesleyanism (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill 
Press, 1972), 211. It is worth noting that Wynkoop’s younger brother, Carl Bangs, published his extensive 
study on Arminius the prior year. See Carl Bangs, Arminius: A Study in the Dutch Reformation (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1971).
230 For brief synopses of Jacob (or James) Arminius’s life and thought, see “Arminius, Jacobus,” in 
Biographical Dictionary of Christian Theologians, 30-31; and Roger E. Olson, “Arminianism,” in The Cam-
bridge Dictionary of Christian Theology, 34-35. For longer treatments, see Carl Bangs, Arminius; and Roger 
E. Olson, Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006).
231 Perhaps the clearest example of this is The Arminian Magazine, a periodical that Wesley begins in 
1778 to offset the theological imbalance toward Calvinist atonement and election. The inaugural issue begins 
with “A Sketch of the Life of Arminius,” The Arminian Magazine 1 ( January 1778): 9-17.
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theology accepts the first tenet of five-point Calvinism (total depravity), while rejecting 
the remaining four (unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and the 
perseverance of the saints). However, the assumption seems tentative at best, given that 
Arminius himself is a proponent of the privation thesis.232 In other words, he is actually 
aligned far more with Aquinas’s teaching than with Calvin’s! Wesley appears never to have 
seen this aspect of Arminius’s theology.233 However, a few of Wesley’s interpreters have 
seen the connection, which points to the corrective possibilities of Arminius’s teaching 
upon Wesley’s doctrine of original sin.
 The two best studies on the subject—articles by Vern A. Hannah234 and Leon N. 
Hynson235—both find within Arminius a theological source sympathetic to Wesley and 
many Wesleyans. Arminius, they contend, can help Wesley to avoid the problematic ten-
dency of portraying original sin in ontological and substantive terms by instead under-
standing original sin as the deprivation of original righteousness.236 After pointing out the 
232 Arminius, “Private Disputation XXXI,” §10, in The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 2, trans. James 
Nichols (Auburn, NY: Derby & Miller, 1853), 79.
233 In his “To the Reader” (from the first issue of The Arminian Magazine), Wesley actually names 
Thomas Aquinas (§9; vii-viii), but in a negative light—as one of the “patrons of particular redemption” 
(along with Roman Catholics generally and Augustinians specifically). It would seem that, had Wesley spent 
more time with Arminius (or with Aquinas!), he would not have been so rash in his appraisal.
234 Vern A. Hannah, “Original Sin and Sanctification: A Problem for Wesleyans,” Wesleyan Theological 
Journal 18, no. 2 (Fall 1983): 47-53.
235 Leon O. Hynson, “Original Sin as Privation: An Inquiry into a Theology of Sin and Sanctification,” 
Wesleyan Theological Journal 22, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 65-83.
236 Hannah does so by citing and discussing Arminius’s “Private Disputation, XXXI,” in “Original Sin 
and Sanctification,” 48-49. Hynson goes a step further by connecting Arminius’s teachings to those of 
Thomas Aquinas, with whom Hynson finds full agreement, in “Original Sin as Privation,” 68. Of course, the 
theme of original justice is present in Wesley’s own writings, but neither author seizes on this interpretive 
opportunity.
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incongruity between a Reformed doctrine of original sin and an Arminian conception 
of grace and responsibility (both of which Wesley seems to uphold), Hannah comes to 
his central claim: “It makes better sense to see the condition of the posterity of Adam in 
terms of a privation of any positive orientation to God than it does in terms of a positive 
corruption or depravation.”237 This is because a “traditional view of original sin” (i.e., total 
depravity) corresponds with an emphasis on sanctification as a crisis, which “undermines 
the essential Wesleyan and scriptural emphasis of process and human responsibility, and 
contributes to a chronic immaturity among many Christians.”238 Similarly, Hynson finds 
Arminius’s theology of original sin to be “more adequate” than Wesley’s and his successors’ 
precisely because Arminius frames the problem of original sin “in ethical and relational 
categories,” which better suits Wesley’s doctrine of sanctification.239
 Admittedly, the foregoing seems to niggle over a single vowel—depravation versus 
deprivation. (The ecumenical wisdom at Nicaea reminds us, though, that a single iota, ι, 
can make a world of difference.240) The real magnitude of the distinction is this: a misinter-
pretation of Wesley regarding the “durability” of the capacities of the natural image of God 
spills over into the means of actualizing God’s grace, especially in terms of the virtues.241 
237 Hannah, “Original Sin and Sanctification,” 49.
238 Hannah, “Original Sin and Sanctification,” 51.
239 Hynson, “Original Sin as Privation,” 68-69.
240 The First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea (325) famously debated the difference between the Greek 
terms ὁμοούσιος and ὁμοιούσιος. The typographical difference is, of course, a single iota—ι—but it signified 
the doctrinal difference between Jesus Christ being “of the same substance” as God the Father and Jesus 
Christ being “of the similar substance” as God the Father.
241 Let us remember that Wesley himself is not altogether clear about the durability of these capacities 
of the natural image of God.
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If we caricature Wesley’s portrait of humanity, all subsequent doctrines premised upon 
theological anthropology suffer the alteration. This is why we must distinguish between 
a capacity and its use, between the natural and the moral images of God, between deprav-
ity and deprivation. Wesley certainly denies the postlapsarian perfect use of the faculties 
proper to the natural image of God, but he does not for a moment find these faculties to 
have been destroyed altogether. “To say that man is without the Spirit/sanctifying grace/
original righteousness is not identical with the assessment that man is depraved, corrupt, 
diseased or degraded,” argues Hynson.242 For this reason, Arminius’s concept of privation 
“offers a superior construct for recognizing the value of this human existence, deprived as 
it is”—namely, “having lost the spirit of God, man still mirrors the divine glory.”243
 This is the cornerstone of iconic dignity: however injured or diseased we are 
because of sin, the image of God still remains inscribed in our nature. At the very least, 
Arminius’s own insights confirm the contribution that Aquinas brings to Wesley (and 
Wesleyans) in theological comparison. With that in mind, we are compelled to make the 
following conclusion: Wesleyans should reject the doctrine of total depravity as self-negating, 
self-abasing, and God-scoffing. The teaching of the entire corruption of human nature both 
precludes the human ability to sin244 and purports the power of humans to sin as somehow 
242 Hynson, “Original Sin as Privation,” 69.
243 Hynson, “Original Sin as Privation,” 77.
244 “But why is there sin in the world?” asks Wesley. “Because man was created in the image of God.” See 
Sermon 57, “On the Fall of Man,” §1, in Works 2:400-401.
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being greater than God’s power to create us graciously.245 The result is a quasi-heretical 
belief system that does not accurately portray humans as we are.246
 To summarize, because iconic dignity emerges as a key hermeneutical trajectory 
when comparing the theological anthropologies of Wesley and Aquinas, we are therefore 
called to embrace Aquinas’s privative view of original sin as more consonant with Wesley’s 
overarching theological concerns and Arminian tradition than the Reformers’ depraved 
alternative. As we shall see in Part II, it is precisely this theologically iconic dignity that 
comes to the surface as Wesley and Aquinas consider the life of grace in the human soul.
245 God “cannot destroy out of the soul of man that image of himself wherein he made it,” writes Wesley 
in Sermon 67, “On Divine Providence,” §15, in Works 2:541. If God did, Wesley discusses elsewhere, “then 
man would be man no longer; his inmost nature would be changed.” Sermon 63, “The General Spread of the 
Gospel,” §9, in Works 2:488.
246 As Wesley ardently defends, true religion is founded on “the inmost nature of things, the nature of 
God and man, and the immutable relations between them.” John Wesley to the Author of The Craftsman, 
July 8(?), 1745, in Works 26:149.
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CHAPTER 5: 
ICONIC DIGNITY AND NATURE—NON-HUMANS1
But the great lesson which our blessed Lord inculcates here, and which he 
illustrates by this example, is that God is in all things, and that we are to see 
the Creator in the glass of every creature; that we should use and look upon 
nothing as separate from God, which indeed is a kind of practical atheism; 
but with a true magnificence of thought survey heaven and earth and all that 
is therein as contained by God in the hollow of his hand, who by his intimate 
presence holds them all in being, who pervades and actuates the whole created 
frame, and is in a true sense the soul of the universe.
—John Wesley2
 Earlier in this study I noted that we would be regarding nature in a limited sense: 
human nature, i.e., theological anthropology. But, as I hope to demonstrate now, iconic 
dignity presses against that prior delimitation, compelling us to extend the conversation 
beyond mere humanity. Without losing our foregoing focus on theological anthropol-
ogy, we move now to consider briefly non-human nature in Wesley and Aquinas. This 
points to the explanatory and interpretive power of iconic dignity as an emergent trajec-
tory—namely, as we consider it in light of non-human nature, it mitigates Wesley’s darker 
anthropological tones while pressing Aquinas to reexamine (what amounts to) his ecologi-
cal ethic vis-à-vis his theological convictions. What we have, then, is a manifestation of the 
1 A rudimentary version of this chapter was presented to the Wesleyan Studies Unit at the 2018 Annual 
Meeting of the American Academy of Religion (Denver, CO) on November 19, 2018, as “Iconic Dignity and 
Non-Human Nature: Wesley and Aquinas in Constructive Eco-Theological Dialogue.” The theme of the 
session was “Ecology and Creation in Wesleyan and Methodist Perspectives.”
2 Wesley, Sermon 23, “Sermon on the Mount, III,” I.11, in Works 1:516-517.
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way iconic dignity operates to advance the dialogue both faithfully and fruitfully, even in 
directions that Wesley and Aquinas leave fairly underdeveloped.
 Now, as far as Wesley and Aquinas are concerned, nature is more of a principle 
than a “thing”—more metaphysics than physics, as it were. Both ecology and an ecolog-
ical reading of nature are anachronistically foreign to these two premodern theologians.3 
Instead, when Wesley and Aquinas discuss what we might call “nature” (i.e., the natural 
world), they employ terms such as “creation,” “creatures” (both “animate” and “inani-
mate”), or “the world.” In other words, it is a thoroughly theological concept: creation 
and its creatures are defined by their relationships (which necessitate difference) with the 
Creator. The same is naturally true of us humans, meaning that the theological concern of 
Creation binds together all that God has made—but in what way? To answer this question, 
we will consider how Aquinas and Wesley each portray non-human nature (including the 
destiny thereof ) and the symbiotic effect iconic dignity can have upon those portraits.
 In Chapter 2, we encountered Wesley’s and Aquinas’s commonly-held view regard-
ing materiality and its implicit goodness (as created by God). We also encountered the 
special place of human beings within that material creation, predicated on our having been 
formed in and according to God’s own image. Informing these two positions, however, is 
an underlying notion of a gradated “scale” of beings, such that every niche between the 
most-basic material elements and the Triune God is occupied—all of which is according 
to God’s great wisdom. In Aquinas, this idea is expressed as a hierarchical ordering of 
3 For example, Rachel Caron released Silent Spring in 1962—171 years after Wesley’s death. The book is 
often considered a watershed (if not inaugural) publication in the field of environmentalism.
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beings by God and toward God according to their natures and proper acts.4 Thus, Aqui-
nas’s teleology also involves subsidiarity:
So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for its own 
proper act and perfection, and the less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that 
are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature 
exists for the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire universe, 
with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it 
were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God.5
The substance of this passage runs throughout Aquinas’s works,6 meriting much of the 
contemporary criticism that Aquinas is highly anthropocentric and, by extension, woe-
fully utilitarian with respect to non-human natures. Such an indictment of Aquinas is 
unmistakably consistent with Lynn White’s infamous criticism of Western Christianity 
as “the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen.”7 Without mentioning Aquinas, 
White’s argument clearly establishes the terms of discourse for all subsequent studies on 
Aquinas and ecology.
4 See, for example, Aquinas, CT I, 100-102.
5 Aquinas, ST I.65.2. Cf. SCG III, 78 (especially §§1-2); and CT I, 123-125.
6 Additionally, see ST I.20.1 ad 3; ST I.65.1; ST I.96; ST I.102; SCG II, 82; SCG III, 79, 81, 112; DV, q. 5, 
a. 6; DP, q. 5, art. 9; and Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum [Commentary on the Apostles’ Creed], a. 1 (“I 
believe in one God, etc.”), trans. Joseph B. Collins (New York: Wagner, 1939). CT I, 148 is particularly rep-
resentative and is worth quoting here at length: “[That God made all things for the sake of humans] is also 
clearly evident to one who considers the very order of things. For things made by nature are so constituted 
by nature to be acted upon as they are acted upon, and we perceive that less perfect things submit to being 
used by more excellent things. For example, the earth nourishes plants, plants nourish animals, and animals 
submit to being used by human beings. Therefore, nonliving things exist for the sake of living things, plants 
for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of human beings. And since I have shown that an intellectual 
nature is superior to a material nature, the whole of material nature is ordered to an intellectual nature. But 
of intellectual natures, the one closest to a material substance is the rational soul, which is the form of a 
human being. Therefore, the whole of material nature seems to be in some way for the sake of human beings, 
inasmuch as they are rational animals. Therefore, we see that the perfection of the whole material creation 
depends in some way on the perfection of human beings.”
7 Lynn White, “The History of Our Ecological Crisis,” Science 155 (March 1967): 1205.
227
 In a recent article on Aquinas and environmental ethics, Marie I. George offers 
an annotated bibliography of recent studies attempting to develop a Thomistic environ-
mental ethics.8 The fact that George’s own lengthy study ultimately drifts into the kind 
of anthropocentric and utilitarian account of Aquinas that she and her predecessors have 
attempted to avoid is telling. Willis Jenkins has provided a far-more-hopeful account by 
arguing for a Thomistic valuation of non-human nature for its own sake—but not before 
recognizing the twin hallmarks of the logic of domination within Aquinas: anthropocen-
trism and instrumentalism.9 Thus, Francisco Benzoni’s subsequent rejoinder to Jenkins 
justifiably proceeds along these two critiques: “any Thomistic environmental ethic must 
be [i.e., cannot escape from being] consistently anthropocentric, where this means that 
nonhuman creatures are finally instruments to the human good.”10 In fact, Ryan Patrick 
McLaughlin has recently argued that Thomas Aquinas “establishes the parameters of the 
dominant tradition” of Christianity’s approach to non-human animals. “Where Aquinas’s 
view of nature and teleology intersect,” McLaughlin has detected “a theocentric cosmol-
ogy that grounds…an anthropocentrism in which all corporeal nonhumans exist for the 
8 See Marie I. George, “Aquinas on the Goodness of Creatures and Man’s Place in the Universe: A Basis 
for the General Precepts of Environmental Ethics,” The Thomist 76 (2012): 74-76n3.
9 See Willis Jenkins, “Biodiversity and Salvation: Thomistic Roots for Environmental Ethics,” Journal 
of Religion 83, no. 3 ( July 2003): 401-420. Like Jenkins, other positive portrayals of Aquinas’s supposed 
environmental concern have had to slog through the same two critiques. See Jill LeBlanc, “Eco-Thom-
ism,” Environmental Ethics 21, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 293-306; and Jame Schaefer, “Valuing Earth Intrinsically 
and Instrumentally: A Theological Framework for Environmental Ethics,” Theological Studies 66 (2005): 
783-814.
10 Francisco Benzoni, “Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics: A Reconsideration of Providence 
and Salvation,” Journal of Religion 85, no. 3 ( July 2005): 446-476. Jenkins somewhat addresses Benzoni’s 
critique in Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), especially 115-151.
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well-being of the entire human community.”11 Ecological consideration is reduced to mere 
preservation for the sake of human nourishment and knowledge (recalling Aquinas’s 
experimental epistemology); at most, human concern for Creation itself, as intrinsically 
valuable, is secondary.12
 Ultimately, it seems that Aquinas’s perceived anthropocentrism and utilitarian 
view of non-human nature may be chalked up to the destiny he sees for Creation. Although 
Aquinas abandoned his work (and died) before composing an anticipated “Treatise on 
Last Things” for the Summa Theologiae, we have enough from his other works to piece 
together a Thomistic eschatology.13 For our purposes, the contours of that eschatology are 
relatively straightforward: in the consummate state of glory, material creatures—plants, 
animals, “and other such mixed material substances”—will not remain, for the material-
ity of non-human nature is not suitable to perpetuity.14 In fact, the only material objects 
remaining in the eschaton are those necessary for the perfection of the whole: the heav-
11 Ryan Patrick McLaughlin, Christian Theology and the Status of Animals: The Dominant Tradition and 
Its Alternatives (Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 6. McLaughlin also provides his own catalogue 
of contemporary critics of Aquinas’s “eco-theological legacy,” including the likes of Peter Singer, Richard 
Ryder, Gary Steiner, Robert Wennberg, Andrew Linzey, and Paul Santmire (8-9).
12 McLaughlin, Christian Theology and the Status of Animals, 8, 14-15. McLaughlin’s point regarding the 
temporal nourishment and knowledge/use of non-human animals may be seen in DP, q. 5; CT I, 156, 159, 170; 
and, most explicitly, ST I.96.1 ad 3. McLaughlin’s purpose in detailing Aquinas’s paradigmatic stance toward 
non-human animals (8-20) is to break free from its anthropocentrism and “conservationism” by highlighting 
alternative traditions. Like Benzoni, McLaughlin finds Jenkins’s argument for an Aquinas-based intrinsic 
valuation of non-human nature to be wanting (16).
13 The “Treatise on Last Things” included in the redacted “Supplement” to the ST is actually drawn from 
Aquinas’s commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, written in the mid-1250s. The material was collated 
posthumously (purportedly by Reginald of Piperno, Aquinas’s longtime companion) so as to “complete” the 
Summa Theologiae. But, as one of Aquinas’s earliest compositions, his commentary on Lombard’s Sentences 
is not regarded as representative of his mature theological thought.
14 See Aquinas, DP, q. 5, a. 9; SCG IV, 97; CT I, 170; and ST Supp.91.5.
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enly bodies (though they shall then cease their motion); the four elements, in which may 
be thought to contain all the substantial “ingredients” of the cosmos; and human beings, 
whose immortal (rational) souls are integrally united with their physical bodies.15 Again, 
all this is the case because the created world exists for the sake of sustaining human beings 
until they reach the state of consummate perfection, where we no longer require physi-
cal nourishment or any intermediary to reveal to us God’s nature.16 In short, non-human 
nature would seem to be a means to an end that only rational beings can enjoy. Once this 
point is conceded, so Aquinas’s ecologically-minded critics would say, there is no real or 
ultimate reason for humans to tend to Creation.17
 However, a different tone emerges in Aquinas’s “practical” works.18 For example, 
in parts of De Potentia, Aquinas accepts the endurance of the created universe as a result of 
God willing its existence for God’s sake and for its own sake (propter se ipsum).19 This would 
15 See DP, q. 5, a. 9; SCG IV, 97; ST Supp.91.5; and especially CT I, 170. See also DP, q. 5, a. 7, on the 
elements as essential to the universe; and a. 10, on the substantial unity of the human soul and its material 
body. See also SCG II, 82, on the mortal and material souls of “brutes” (i.e., non-human animals). Of the 
three orders of souls (vegetative, sensory, and rational), only the rational is immaterial and immortal; there-
fore, only those possessing a rational soul (i.e., humans and angels) will endure.
16 See CT I, 156, 159, 160, and 170; cf. ST Supp.91.5.
17 Such is the gist of Benzoni’s article. Aquinas does not mitigate matters in ST I.102.3, where he asks 
whether humans were placed in paradise “to dress it and keep it” (Gen. 2:5). The objections take the neg-
ative, the sed contra offers scripture (Gen. 2:5) in the affirmative, but Aquinas’s own response dithers with 
Augustine’s metaphorical reading of the passage—from which, Aquinas claims, “the replies to the objec-
tions are made clear.” Aquinas sets himself up to affirm our stewardship of Creation, then fumbles.
18 By “practical” I have in mind Aquinas’s sermons, commentaries, and disputations—the latter genre 
being academic, the former genres being popular, pietistic, and expository. Also, note how Wesley’s theo-
logical output consists almost exclusively of these kinds of “practical” works: sermons, commentaries, cor-
respondence, journals, and occasional tracts.
19 Aquinas, DP, q. 5, a. 4. To will something for its own sake, says Aquinas, is to will that it always exist. 
Furthermore, Aquinas finds no contradiction between God willing something to be for God’s own sake and 
God’s willing something to be for its own sake.
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seem to contradict the earlier point of a subordinated valuation of non-human nature 
by humans. Instead, Aquinas here esteems the created universe as intrinsically valuable 
by virtue of its valuation by God (which is tantamount to its God-ordination). After all, 
being is good, for being is a participation in God.20 Furthermore, the entire created uni-
verse—whether angel, human, animal, vegetable, or element—“is ordered to God as its 
end, insofar as God’s goodness is represented in the whole and parts through a sort of 
imitation [imitationem divina bonitas representatur], and this for God’s glory.”21 Elsewhere, 
commenting on the Apostles’ Creed, Aquinas exhorts us to examine Creation, which will 
lead us to know and to give thanks for God’s majesty, drawing us to the right use of created 
goods (rebus creatis) and the recognition of the true dignity of humanity: preesset omnibus, 
subsit Deo—first among created things, subject to God.22 “Thus you are a steward, not 
a lord,” preaches Aquinas on Luke 16:1. “I have said that stewards [villici] are managers 
[administratores], like angels and people. And since we are people, let us say that the care 
for the regulation of the goods is commissioned to man.”23 Without entirely disqualifying 
anthropocentric criticisms, these works (at the very least) reinterpret the character and 
proper acts of human beings toward non-human nature. Both humans and non-humans 
reflect the glory and goodness of God. So, while God has additionally graced humans with 
the iconic dignity of God’s own image, it is for the sake of distributing that grace to others; 
20 See ST I.5.1 and 3; and ST I.6.4.
21 ST I.65.2, Freddoso’s translation. Cf. CT I, 101, which concludes, “all things have been made in order 
to be likenesses of the divine goodness.”
22 Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum, art. 1 (section on “benefits”).
23 Aquinas, Sermon 15, “Homo quidam erat dives,” Part II, 2.2, and Part III, 1, in The Academic Sermons, 
trans. Mark-Robin Hoogland (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 224-225.
231
God entrusts us to ourselves not for our own sakes but for the sake of seeking God’s glory.24 
In light of iconic dignity, then, Aquinas’s perceived anthropocentrism carries with it the 
responsibility of humanity to reflect God’s own glory both in and to Creation.
 When we turn to Wesley on the subject of non-human nature, we find him begin-
ning in much the same place as Aquinas—a cosmological “chain of being.” However, 
Wesley adopts a Christian Platonic notion thereof (as opposed to Aquinas’s Aristotelian 
version), the net effect of which is monumental to the present discussion.25 Wesley, unlike 
Aquinas, upholds the immortality of animals’ souls.26 Consequently, Wesley optimistically 
locates non-human creatures in the eschatological New Creation. The starkest example of 
this is Wesley’s sermon “The General Deliverance,” in which he sets down at least two 
theses that run counter to much of what we find in Aquinas: that God very much cares for 
non-human nature, and that non-humans will not be annihilated.27 As Wesley writes, God 
sees “‘the earnest expectation’ wherewith the whole animated creation ‘waiteth for’ that 
final ‘manifestation of the sons of God’: in which ‘they themselves also shall be delivered’ (not 
by annihilation: annihilation is not deliverance) ‘from the’ present ‘bondage of corruption, 
24 Sermon 15, “Homo quidam erat dives,” Part III, 2.1-2.2, in Academic Sermons, 226, 228.
25 See Wesley, Sermon 56, “God’s Approbation of His Works,” I.14, in Works 2:396-397, and n40.
26 Wesley explicitly lays out this claim in Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” I.5, in Works 2:441. 
Aquinas explicitly denies “Plato’s theory that the souls even of brute animals are immortal” in SCG II, 82, 
§8. Wesley’s position on the “souls of brutes” indeed spans his entire theological career, beginning with 
the topic of one of his lectures for his Master’s degree (1726/1727) and stretching well into his most-mature 
sermons in the 1780s. On the development of this theme over Wesley’s career, see Randy L. Maddox, “Antic-
ipating the New Creation: Wesleyan Foundations for Holistic Mission,” The Asbury Journal 62, no. 1 (Spring 
2007): 49-66, especially 59-60.
27 Wesley, Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” in Works 2:436-450.
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into’ a measure of ‘the glorious liberty of the children of God.’”28 Wesley further speculates 
that all creatures (human and non-human alike) might “ascend” on the chain of being.29 The 
idea is that, in the New Creation, humans will regain the full and proper (prelapsarian) use 
of their faculties, and may very well acquire new capacities akin to the angels, i.e., advancing 
“a degree” up the chain of being. Similarly, animals will regain their proper (Edenic) ori-
entation to humans and to one another, and may very well acquire new capacities akin to 
human beings, e.g., articulate speech, higher cognitive functions, and even beatitude. All 
this bespeaks God’s just, merciful regard for Creation “in proportion to that measure of 
his own image which [God] has stamped upon [everything that he hath made].”30 Wesley’s 
uncharacteristic speculation is but a species of the kind of consideration he would have all 
humans give to non-human nature—that such a survey of God’s Creation would humble 
us with “the amazing power, wisdom, and goodness of the great Creator,” inspiring us to 
“wonder, love, and praise.”31
28 Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” III.1, in Works 2:445. Emphasis added.
29 Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” III.6, in Works 2:448. It should also be noted that Wesley’s 
speculative thesis here owes largely to his exposure to the Swiss naturalist Charles Bonnet, whose work 
Wesley encountered in the 1770s. For more on Wesley’s use of Bonnet, see Maddox, “Wesley’s Engagement 
with the Natural Sciences,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Wesley, especially 172.
30 Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” III.5, in Works 2:448; cf. III.8-9, in Works 2:448-449. In the 
context of its encompassing sermon, this would seem to indicate that, to a certain extent, all of Creation 
bears the imago Dei.
31 The conjunction of humility and worship encapsulates Wesley’s purpose in collating A Survey of the 
Wisdom of God in the Creation for the Methodists. The quote comes from its “Preface” (§7; 1:vii-viii), which 
is reprinted in Works ( Jackson), 14:302. For an insightful contemporary Wesleyan ecology drawn from 
Survey, see Marc Otto and Michael Lodahl, “‘We Cannot Know Much, But We May Love Much’: Mystery 
and Humility in John Wesley’s Narrative Ecology,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 44, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 
118-140. Otto and Lodahl argue (136-137) that Wesley’s Survey conveys three related theological themes: (1) 
God’s intentional design and providence of Creation (contra atheism); (2) our limited knowledge of God’s 
Creation, resulting in humility (contra deism); and (3) the call to doxology (pro responsible relationship). 
The net effect is a constructive Wesleyan ecology that “gratifies” nature.
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 Now, when Wesley surveys Creation, he rarely considers non-humans isolated 
from humans.32 Arguably, this is attributed to the way Wesley envisions ideal humans 
operating within Creation: as God’s mercy is over all God’s works, so God “directs us to be 
tender of even the meaner creatures, to show mercy to these also.”33 According to God’s 
providence in Creation, humanity was “God’s viceregent upon earth, the prince and gov-
ernor of this lower world; and all the blessings of God flowed through him to the inferior 
creatures. Man was the channel of conveyance between his Creator and the whole brute 
creation.”34 We are regents, not regnant. The “dominion” of Genesis 1:28 is, for Wesley, 
always tempered by stewardship.35 So Wesley forcefully comments on the parable of “The 
Unjust Manager,” “None of these temporal things are yours: you are only stewards of them, 
not proprietors: God is the proprietor of all; he lodges them in your hands for a season: 
but still they are his property.”36 As representatives, stewards, “economists” (οἰκονόμοι) 
of Creation, “we are to see the Creator in the glass of every creature; …we should use and 
look upon nothing as separate from God” but instead “survey heaven and earth and all that 
is therein as contained by God in the hollow of his hand.”37 As contemporary Wesleyan 
32 All of Wesley’s “ecological” sermons present aspects of his theological anthropology. See Sermon 56, 
“God’s Approbation of His Works,” in Works 2:387-399; Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” in Works 
2:436-450; and Sermon 64, “The New Creation,” §18, in Works 2:509-510.
33 Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” §1, in Works 2:437. Wesley is here drawing from Psalm 145:9 
as found in the Book of Common Prayer.
34 Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” I.3, in Works 2:440; cf., II.1, in Works 2:442.
35 See Maddox, “Anticipating the New Creation,”56-58.
36 Wesley, Notes, Luke 16:12.
37 Sermon 23, “Sermon on the Mount, III,” I.11, in Works 1:516-517. Note Wesley’s personal “icon” lan-
guage in his use of “the glass of every creature.” At this point in the sermon, Wesley is addressing the beat-
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eco-theologian Michael Lodahl concludes, “the goodness of creation is ‘a charge to keep,’ 
a calling to be fulfilled; we are charged with considerable responsibility to co-labor with 
God toward the goodness of creation.”38
 Recently, Wesleyan theologians have dovetailed Wesley’s burgeoning ecological 
sensibilities with his otherwise-underdeveloped anthropological notion of the political 
image of God manifest in humanity. Theodore Runyon was one of the first to make the 
firm connection between the “political image” and “environmental stewardship.”39 Since 
then, Laura Bartels (Felleman) has critiqued Runyon’s reading for being too confident in 
its approach; she instead offers a “humbler” version of this image.40 Michael Lodahl per-
haps strikes a balance between Runyon and Bartels by subordinating the task of “recov-
ering the political image” to a “renewal in ‘the whole image of God’,” and positioning the 
political image much closer to the natural image so that the affectional responsibility of 
Wesley’s moral psychology involves “the human role of representing the Creator.”41 But, 
considering Wesley’s relative lacuna on the political image, it would seem to be a flimsy 
foundation for mining an ethic even remotely adequate for addressing today’s ecological 
concerns. However, what little Wesley does say about the political image is instructive—if 
we approach it in light of our prior observations.
itude concerning “the pure in heart” who “shall see God” (Matt. 5:8). Wesley further interprets this line to 
mean that “the pure in heart see all things full of God” (I.6, in Works 1:513 and 513n25).
38 Lodahl, God of Nature and of Grace, 217. Emphasis in original.
39 See Runyon, The New Creation, 200-207.
40 See Laura A. Bartels, “The Political Image as the Basis for Wesleyan Ecological Ethics,” Quarterly 
Review 23, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 294-301.
41 See Michael Lodahl, “Wesley and Nature,” in Wesleyan Theology and Social Science, 21-31.
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 In his 1760 sermon on “The New Birth,” Wesley expresses the political image in 
terms of Genesis 1:26: it describes our dominion and governance of the created world.42 
Without an analysis of Wesley’s appraisal of non-human nature informing and interpret-
ing our role of responsibility both in and to Creation, any Wesleyan ecological ethic will 
be caught woefully flat-footed, likely to be set aside, like Aquinas (at least according to 
his detractors), for intimations of “dominion” and any attendant anthropocentrism. But if 
we extend Wesley’s economic principle of stewardship to non-human nature, “the focus 
of Wesley’s environmental ethic is better characterized as theocentric than anthropocen-
tric,” Maddox remarks. Wesley depicts “the ideal relationship of humanity with creation…
as one of modest stewardship, where we devote our distinctive gifts to upholding God’s 
intentions for the balance and flourishing of all creation.”43
 In other words, taken together, a Wesleyan posture toward non-human nature 
connects the cultivation of gifts and grace in tending to God’s Creation. To be sure, the 
pairing of “gifts and grace,” though conventionally descriptive of ministerial formation in 
the Wesleyan tradition,44 is equally suitable for characterizing our relationships as humans 
to non-human creatures. Consider the implications: if the political image is the point of 
departure for Wesleyan ecology; and if Wesleyan ecology has a ministerial habitus of 
42 Wesley, Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” I.1, in Works 2:188. Outler’s note (188n5) indicates Wesley’s 
debt to Isaac Watts for the term “political image,” which Outler interprets as “social.”
43 Maddox, “Anticipating the New Creation,” 57.
44 Wesley employs “gifts and grace” as an interpretive tool for characterizing the ministerial habitus in 
his 1756 “An Address to the Clergy,” in Works ( Jackson) 10:480-500. The subject also comes up in the Min-
utes of 1746 as part of an examination of potential preachers. See Q. 15 from August 2, 1746, in Works 10:177. 
The tradition of examining candidates for ministry exists to this day in many Wesleyan traditions, including 
the United Methodist Church.
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employing our gifts and grace to convey God’s blessings upon Creation; then the political 
image of God may be seen as a sacerdotal role and identity for humans within Creation. This 
reframing suggests a Christological component to Wesleyan ecology vis-à-vis Wesley’s 
concept of humans as channels of grace for all of Creation. Wesley’s operative Christology 
follows a classical division into Christ’s three “offices”: prophet, priest, and king.45 Here, 
the mediatorial character of Christ’s priestly office parallels Wesley’s concept of humans as 
channels of grace for Creation.46
 The shift to a sacerdotal exegesis of Wesley’s political image essentially reinter-
prets ecological “dominion” in light of the incarnate Dominus and suggests a Christolog-
ical aspect to our ecological vocation. Accordingly, Jesus’ priestly prayer for his disciples 
reflects both the stewardship of caring for what is God’s ( John 17:6) and the manner of 
transmitting God’s glory for the sake of the whole ( John 17:22). Christ, the very Image of 
God, therefore illumines our task as God’s images: we are dignified to be icons of God’s 
glory throughout Creation. If, as Wesley contends, “man is deprived of his perfection, his 
loving obedience to God, so brutes are deprived of their perfection, their loving obedience 
to man,”47 then Christ’s graciously rehabilitating work restores and perfects human rela-
tionships with God, one another, and Creation. In other words, what sin takes away from 
45 The division occurs throughout Wesley’s theological output. See Notes, Matthew 1:6; Matthew 11:28-
29; John 17:3; Philippians 3:8; 2 John 7; Revelation 5:6. See Sermon 36, “The Law Established through 
Faith, Discourse II,” especially III.1, in Works 2:41. See A Letter to a Roman Catholic, §7, in John Wesley 
(ed. Outler), 494. See John Wesley to the Rev. Samuel Furley, September 15, 1762, in Works 27:302-304. 
See the Methodist Conference Minutes, Q. 15 from August 2, 1745, in Works 10:152. For more on Wesley’s 
Christology and his interpretation of Christ’s offices, see Deschner, Wesley’s Christology; for Christ’s priestly 
mediation, see Deschner, 169-172; cf. Maddox, Responsible Grace, 110-111.
46 See Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” in Works 2:436-450.
47 Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” II.2, in Works 2:443.
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nature (broadly understood), grace restores in a manner that enjoins human responsibil-
ity for Creation and its perfection.
 In short, iconic dignity makes non-human nature an interest sympathetic to Wes-
ley’s and Aquinas’s theological anthropologies. However, the true symbiosis is achieved 
by bringing Wesley’s and Aquinas’s ecological positions back into conversation with their 
respective anthropologies and with one another. So, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
Wesley’s theological anthropology can press up against a doctrine of total depravity when 
the shadow of sin (original and actual) is loosed upon our nature. Our conclusion, though, 
was that Wesley’s bleaker anthropological moments actually stand at odds with the interior 
logic of his theological perspectives and with the more-optimistic purview of Aquinas’s. 
But now, if we allow iconic dignity to expand the discussion to include non-human nature, 
we encounter a rapturous optimism undergirding Wesley’s Creational outlook48—and we 
must allow its resplendence and responsibility to reflect back upon Wesley’s anthropology 
and forward “to include all of creation.”49 To be sure, this may be seen as a corollary of 
Wesley’s “realized eschatology”: as Wesley blurs the boundaries between grace and glory 
(i.e., seeing a foretaste of future glory being realized presently), his eschatologically-based 
ecological vision is a present task to enact.50 As such, iconic dignity is not only an anti-
48 It is worthwhile to note that Wesley’s “ecological” works almost exclusively come from the elderly 
Wesley, in which he is clearly his most “speculative.” There is something to be said about this observation, 
though: the elderly Wesley has become enraptured with God’s Creation, giving us a model for how we could 
live with gratitude and awareness of God’s works.
49 See Margaret A. Flowers, “Toward a Wesleyan Theology of Environmental Stewardship” (paper pre-
sented at the Wesleyan Theological Society annual meeting, March 13-15, 2008, Duke University, Durham, 
North Carolina).
50 For more on Wesley’s realized eschatology, see Clarence L. Bence, “Processive Eschatology: A Wes-
leyan Alternative,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 14, no. 1 (Spring 1979): 45-59; Michael Lodahl, “Wesleyan 
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dote to Wesleyan guises of total depravity, it also pushes us to act presently in and for 
God’s Creation with humility and empowerment by staving off the extremes of pride and 
despondency.51
 In the final analysis, then, Wesley’s eschatological menagerie can resonate happily 
with many of Aquinas’s own theological priorities. As we have seen, Aquinas’s theological 
anthropology underscores the gracious, indelible dignity of human nature, predicated on 
the indwelling of the imago Dei. Additionally, Aquinas’s metaphysics of participation cou-
ples with his understanding of divinely-ordered participated cosmic perfection to demon-
strate a viable foundation for his theology to host an ecological ethic. Wesley’s contribu-
tion is to challenge Aquinas to recognize and activate the latent capacity for Creational 
stewardship without falling prey to anthropocentrism. Part of this is an active concern 
for the physical and spiritual livelihood of animals and other non-human species.52 That 
task begins with Wesley’s own idiomatic expression of iconic dignity: “we are to see the 
Creator in the glass of every creature”—to which Aquinas might profitably reply, “quoque 
nos includendum.”53
Reservation about Eschatological ‘Enthusiasm’,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 29 (1994): 52-63; Maddox, 
Responsible Grace, 246-247.
51 Bartels voices the problem of presumptive pride within Runyon’s ecological reading of Wesley’s polit-
ical image (Bartels, 294-296, 298), while Otto and Lodahl positively frame Wesley’s narrative ecology with 
the theme of humility (Otto and Lodahl, 126-134).
52 As noted above (n26), Wesley’s stance on the souls of animals develops from his Oxford days through-
out his career, eventually terminating in an eschatological vision of the redemption of all Creation. His belief 
evidently gains enough practical traction that he is entreated by an anonymous correspondent to advocate 
for the proto-animals-rights lobby of the day. See Wesley’s Journal entry for July 16, 1756 (Works 21:67-69), 
in which he approvingly includes an excerpt of the letter.
53 Wesley, Sermon 23, “Sermon on the Mount, Discourse III,” I.11, in Works 1:516. Aquinas’s hypotheti-
cal reply (“we are to be included, too”) reminds us of the mutual exchange that informs iconic dignity as an 
emergent theological trajectory.
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PART II. GRACE
By ‘the grace of God’ is sometimes to be understood that free love, that unmer-
ited mercy, by which I, a sinner, through the merits of Christ am now rec-
onciled to God. But in this place it rather means that power of God the Holy 
Ghost which ‘worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure.’ As 
soon as ever the grace of God (in the former sense, his pardoning love) is man-
ifested to our soul, the grace of God (in the latter sense, the power of his Spirit) 
takes place therein. And now we can perform, through God, what to man was 
impossible.
—John Wesley1
CHAPTER 6: 
THE NATURE OF GRACE
 What is grace? What is its design and dynamic? What is its nature and its relation-
ship to our nature? And how does it work—in us, for us, through us, with us? These are the 
questions we aim to answer in the present chapter, which seeks to sketch the nature and 
dynamic of grace in the theologies of Wesley and Aquinas. We are most interested here in 
how grace is construed particularly in terms of the theological anthropology established 
in Part I—the soul and its faculties, an affective moral psychology, actions and habits. It 
is no accident that this is a similar trajectory to that established in our treatment of sin in 
Aquinas and Wesley. As we shall see, grace is not only the antidote to sin, it far surpasses 
any and all of the deficiencies for which sin lays claim in our lives. Or, in the language of 
1 Wesley, Sermon 12, “The Witness of Our Own Spirit,” §15, in Works 1:309. The “in this place” to which 
Wesley refers is 2 Corinthians 1:12, the subject of his sermon.
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iconic dignity, grace not only restores us to God’s favor and image, it also elevates us to the 
dignity and happiness of partaking in the love of God.2
1. The General Nature of Grace
 Well over half a century ago, E. Gordon Rupp famously framed Wesley’s theology 
in terms of an “optimism of grace.”3 This, Rupp went on to explain, defended Wesley’s 
theology from a neo-Pelagian Enlightenment “optimism of nature” (Deist humanism) as 
well as a hyper-Reformed predestinarian “pessimism of grace” (double predestination). 
Missing from Rupp’s typology, though, was the “pessimism of nature” position—perhaps 
because he had essentially collapsed it into Wesley’s own “optimism of grace,” as though it 
were a tacit (but necessary) justification for Wesley’s confidence in the work of grace. Yet, 
as we contested back in Chapter 4, Wesley’s stance on human nature needn’t be painted in 
such pessimistic hues, especially when held in constructive conversation with Aquinas’s 
theology. That chapter culminated in a call for Wesleyans to discard the tattered and ill-fit-
ting garb of total depravity as theologically inconsistent with, and practically detrimental 
to, the purview of iconic dignity. Then, by expanding the scope of “nature” in Chapter 5, 
2 On grace’s restoration of God’s favor and image, see Wesley, Sermon 1, “Salvation by Faith,” §1, in Works 
1:117; Sermon 16, “The Means of Grace,” II.6, in Works 1:383; Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” 
III.5, in Works 2:164; Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” II.1, in Works 3:203-204; and Notes, 
2 Corinthians 8:9; Titus 3:5; 2 Peter 3:18. On grace’s elevating function, especially in terms of dignity and 
happiness, see Wesley, Notes, John 1:14. Aquinas brings together these two elements of grace—healing and 
elevating—early in his treatment of grace in ST I-II.109.9. Of all the various lenses through which Aquinas 
views grace in ST I-II.109-114, he remains utterly consistent in emphasizing grace’s twin roles: the healing 
and the elevating our nature.
3 E. Gordon Rupp, Principalities and Powers: Studies in the Christian Conflict in History (New York: 
Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952), 91-94. Cf. Donal Dorr, “Total Corruption and the Wesleyan Tradition,” 
Irish Theological Quarterly 31, no. 4 (October 1964): 316.
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we encountered Wesley’s radically optimistic vision of the eschatological cosmos—“na-
ture” writ large. At the same time, we also engaged with Aquinas’s nuanced “optimism of 
(human) nature,” marked as it is by sin’s sickness and our inability to attain our highest, 
spiritual end.4 Then, in Chapter 5, we surveyed Aquinas’s rather pessimistic eschatological 
vision of nature, heeding Wesley’s contribution to ecological stewardship in terms familiar 
to Aquinas’s own thought.
 In short, not only does an optimist/pessimist paradigm of nature tend to flatten 
the nuance of Wesley’s and Aquinas’s theological anthropologies, it may also give the false 
impression that an “optimism of grace” is only visible by contrasting it with a so-called 
“pessimism of nature.” The strength and scope of Wesley’s doctrine of grace is not rooted 
in a naturalistic pessimism but instead in the sheer gratuity of the God of Love. Like-
wise, Aquinas’s doctrine of grace is not somehow a Christianized extension of humanistic 
optimism; rather, he espouses a robust doctrine of grace that takes seriously our created 
capacity—and practical impotence—for beatitude. The emerging picture is one of the 
dignity afforded by grace to nature as we, God’s icons, are enveloped by and participate in 
God’s loving fellowship.5
4 Alister E. McGrath notes the development of Aquinas’s anthropological thought, including Aquinas’s 
“growing pessimism concerning humanity’s natural faculties.” McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Doc-
trine of Justification, 3rd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 136.
5 The specific relationship between nature and grace in Wesley and Aquinas will be addressed below in 
Section 3, which takes up the broader subject of grace’s dynamics.
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A. Wesley on the General Nature of Grace
 In 1982, Albert Outler wrote a landmark essay for the Seventh Oxford Institute of 
Methodist Theological Studies, in which he famously argued that Wesley’s 
axial theme, which organizes all else in his thought, is grace, and the focus of all 
his thinking about grace is on the order of salvation. The real measure of Wes-
ley’s mind is the consistency and clarity with which he managed the connections 
between this axial theme and all the other facets of his thought.6
Since then, some of the most-prominent publications on Wesley’s theology have centered 
(at least in part) on his doctrine of grace.7 Indeed, Wesley’s theological focus is so pro-
nounced that he has even been heralded as a “theologian of grace.”8 So how, then, does 
Wesley discuss the general nature of grace?
 In the simplest of terms, Wesley takes grace to mean God’s love9 and favor.10 Note 
that both terms are used as nouns, not adjectives: love and favor are Wesleyan synonyms 
6 Outler, “A New Future for Wesley Studies,” 48-49.
7 The best examples would have to be Maddox, Responsible Grace; John B. Cobb, Jr., Grace and Respon-
sibility: A Wesleyan Theology for Today (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1995); Collins, The Theology of John 
Wesley; and H. Ray Dunning, Grace, Faith and Holiness: A Wesleyan Systematic Theology (Kansas City, MO: 
Beacon Hill Press, 1988). For a fuller listing, see Kenneth J. Collins, A Wesley Bibliography, 6th edn. (Wilm-
ore, KY: First Fruits Press, 2017).
8 See Robert V. Rakestraw, “John Wesley as a Theologian of Grace,” Journal of the Evangelical Theologi-
cal Society 27, no. 2 ( June 1984): 193-203. Rakestraw’s purpose in the article is clear: “to present John Wesley 
as the eminent theologian of grace he is” (194), with emphasis on presenting Wesley as a “real” (i.e., top tier, 
respectable, legitimate) theologian. Such an agenda was comma of the era; see, for example, Outler, “John 
Wesley: Folk-Theologian.”
9 On the grace of God understood as God’s love, see the following sermons: Sermon 6, “The Righteous-
ness of Faith,” II.8, in Works 1:213; Sermon 12, “The Witness of Our Own Spirit,” §15, in Works 1:309; Sermon 
90, “An Israelite Indeed,” I.5, in Works 3:284; Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” §2, in Works 3:544; and Sermon 
144, “The Love of God,” §3, in Works 4:332. From Wesley’s Notes, see his comments on the following verses: 
Luke 15:32; John 1:16; Romans 1:7; Romans 4:16; 2 Corinthians 8:9; Galatians 1:15; Galatians 2:21; Ephesians 
1:6; Jude 21; Revelation 22:21. From his other works, see John Wesley to the Author of The Craftsman, July 
8(?), 1745, in Works 26:150.
10 On the grace of God understood as God’s favor, see the following sermons: Sermon 1, “Salvation by 
Faith,” §1, in Works 1:117; Sermon 6, “The Righteousness of Faith,” I.12, in Works 1:209; Sermon 9, “The 
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for grace, i.e., they pertain to grace’s essence. Furthermore, love and favor are both rela-
tional terms, signifying that, for Wesley, the nature of divine grace has at its core a concern 
for personal relationship. Mildred Bangs Wynkoop certainly reads Wesley this way: his is 
“a theology of love,” one “infused with a personal experience of God’s grace,” in which the 
dynamic is inherently relational—God’s grace never removes the integrity of the person, 
but instead enhances it.11 For Wynkoop,
Wesley’s fundamental point of view, the characteristic which made it identifiable 
from other points of view, is the conviction that [our] relationship to God and 
God’s relation to [us] is a personal relationship and that all facets of theology and 
life partake of this personal nature and must be interpreted in this light.12
Note that Wynkoop’s thesis in no way contradicts Outler’s on Wesley’s “axial theme.”13 
Rather, since Wesley views grace as God’s love and favor, Wesley’s theology of grace nec-
essarily implies a relational-personal hermeneutic.
Spirit of Bondage and of Adoption,” III.1, in Works 1:260; Sermon 16, “The Means of Grace,” II.6, in Works 
1:383; Sermon 26, “Sermon on the Mount, VI,” III.13, in Works 1:568; Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of 
Salvation,” III.5, in Works 2:164; and Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” II.1, in Works 
3:204. From Wesley’s Notes, see his comments on the following verses: Luke 2:40; Luke 15:32; Acts 14:26; 
Romans 1:7; Romans 5:2; Romans 11:6; 2 Corinthians 8:9; Ephesians 1:7; Hebrews 4:16; Revelation 1:4. 
From his other works, see John Wesley to Elizabeth Hardy, April 5, 1758, in Works 27:120. Some references 
to grace as God’s favor also tether the concept to a restoration of and in God’s image. Such is the case with 
Notes, 2 Corinthians 8:9, and Sermon 16, “The Means of Grace,” II.6.
Wesley also speaks of grace in terms of mercy, but rarely separated from his language of favor. Rather, 
within Wesley’s “lexicon of grace,” mercy could appear as a subset of favor. On mercy’s relationship to grace 
and favor, see the following sermons: Sermon 1, “Salvation by Faith,” §1, in Works 1:117; Sermon 6, “The 
Righteousness of Faith,” II.8, in Works 1:213; Sermon 12, “The Witness of Our Own Spirit,” §15, in Works 
1:309; Sermon 16, “The Means of Grace,” II.6, in Works 1:383; Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salva-
tion,” I.1, in Works 2:156; and Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” I.1, in Works 3:202. From 
Wesley’s Notes, see Ephesians 1:7, Titus 3:5, 2 John 3, and Jude 21. From Wesley’s other publication, see The 
Principles of a Methodist (1742), §3, in Works 9:51.
11 Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, A Theology of Love, 100. This hermeneutic runs throughout the book.
12 Wynkoop, A Theology of Love, 100.
13 See Outler, “A New Future for Wesley Studies,” as quoted above. Notice, Wynkoop published A Theol-
ogy of Love a full decade before Outler’s essay—suggesting that Outler’s cadence and language (i.e., “facets”) 
may have been influenced, if not borrowed, from Wynkoop!
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 Another of Wesley’s idioms for grace involves the term free.14 Wesley uses this 
adjective in a slightly different manner than the other terms: whereas he understands that 
grace is love and favor, he portrays grace as free—especially when qualifying or asserting 
a key theological distinction. Such is the case in his polemical 1739 sermon “Free Grace.”15 
Here, Wesley famously proclaims that “the grace or love of God, whence cometh our salva-
tion, is free in all, and free for all.”16 By “free in all,” Wesley means that grace is unmerited, 
gratuitous, and independent of our actions: in “no way depending on any power or merit 
in man, but on God alone.”17 On this point, Wesley and the Calvinistic George White-
field were in agreement, and it shows: Wesley only devotes one of his 30 paragraphs (§3) 
to grace as “free in all.” Alternatively, Wesley devotes the remaining 90% of his sermon 
(27 of 30 paragraphs) to championing grace as “free for all”—universally provided by God 
to all humans, as opposed to Whitefield’s Calvinistic limitation of God’s salvific grace to 
14 On the grace of God described as free, see the following sermons: Sermon 1, “Salvation by Faith,” §1, 
in Works 1:117; Sermon 5, “Justification by Faith,” IV.9, in Works 1:199; Sermon 6, “The Righteousness of 
Faith,” II.8, in Works 1:213; Sermon 12, “The Witness of Our Own Spirit,” §15, in Works 1:309; Sermon 16, 
“The Means of Grace,” II.6, in Works 1:383; Sermon 26, “Sermon on the Mount, VI,” III.13, in Works 1:586; 
Sermon 35, “The Law Established through Faith, I,” II.3, in Works 2:27; Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way 
of Salvation,” I.1, in Works 2:156; and Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” §§2-3, in Works 3:544-545. From Wesley’s 
Notes, see his comments on the following verses: Romans 1:7; Romans 3:24; Romans 4:16; Romans 5:20; 
Romans 5:21; Romans 9:24; 1 Corinthians 12:2; 2 Corinthians 8:9; Galatians 1:15; Galatians 2:21; Galatians 
6:8; Ephesians 1:6; Ephesians 1:7; Titus 3:5; Revelation 4:11; Revelation 22:21. From Wesley’s other works, 
see Doctrinal Minutes, August 2, 1745, Q. 23, in Works 10:790; and John Wesley to the Author of The Crafts-
man, July 8(?), 1745, in Works 26:150.
15 Wesley, Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” in Works 3:542-563 (including the appended hymn on “Universal 
Redemption,” almost certainly written by Charles Wesley). Albert Outler’s editorial introduction helps to 
paint the scene and circumstances of this charged sermon: Wesley and George Whitefield, who had been 
united in their evangelical revivalism, are now facing a doctrinal fracture that focuses on the issue of predes-
tination in light of Wesley’s Arminianism and Whitefield’s Calvinism (542).
16 Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” §2, in Works 3:544. Note the equation of “grace” and “love,” as opposed to 
the twofold distinction of grace being “free in all” and “free for all.”
17 Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” §3, in Works 3:545.
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the elect.18 Bringing an eight-pronged argument, Wesley strikes at the very roots of “‘the 
horrible decree’ of predestination,”19 by which only a select number are irresistibly and 
infallibly chosen by God for salvation, leaving the rest to preterition and reprobation.20
 Fifteen years after “Free Grace,” Wesley is polemically milder but equally as 
staunch. He opines in his Notes (almost bewilderedly), “It is strange that any whom [God] 
has actually saved, should doubt the universality of his grace.”21 Another 20 years after 
that, he is unapologetically intransigent in launching a new publication, The Arminian 
Magazine, with the express purpose of circulating “some of the most remarkable Tracts on 
the Universal Love of God, and his willingness to save all men from all sin.”22 The Maga-
zine would continue well past Wesley’s years as a legacy of his unfaltering, enduring belief 
in God’s grace as universally offered to all humans.23
 Still later in life, Wesley pens what is perhaps his most important sermon, “On 
Working Out Our Own Salvation,” in which he sets down his “most complete and careful 
exposition of the mystery of human-divine interaction, his subtlest probing of the paradox 
of prevenient grace and human agency.”24 Late in this sermon, Wesley concisely presents 
18 Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” §§4-30, in Works 3:545-563.
19 Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” §26, in Works 3:556. As Outler indicates (556n65), Wesley is referencing 
John Calvin’s Institutes (III.xxiii.7): “decretum quidem horribile.” Wesley’s sevenfold attack is given in §§10-26.
20 Cf. Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” §9, in Works 3:547.
21 Notes, 1 Timothy 2:3. Recall, Wesley’s Notes were first published in 1754.
22 Wesley, “To the Reader,” §4, The Arminian Magazine 1 (1778): iv. The Magazine’s subtitle further 
manifests the theme: “Consisting of Extracts and Original Treatises on Universal Redemption.”
23 The Arminian Magazine ran for 20 volumes (1778-1797) before becoming The Methodist Magazine in 
1798. Until his death in 1791, Wesley was the Magazine’s editor.
24 Outler, “Introduction” to Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” in Works 3:199.
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his nuanced position on the universality of grace, which necessarily includes a concomitant 
argument on the resistibility of grace: “there is no man, unless he has quenched the Spirit, 
that is wholly void of the grace of God.… Every man has a greater or less measure of this 
[prevenient grace], which waiteth not for the call of man.”25 All people are the recipients 
of God’s grace, but not all people use God’s grace: “no man sins because he has not grace, 
but because he does not use the grace which he hath.”26 In other words, Wesley’s sophis-
ticated doctrine of grace maintains that we can frustrate God’s grace—we can reject it, 
resist it.27
 The universality of grace, coupled with its resistibility, not only (further) distances 
Wesley from classical Calvinism,28 it also prevents grace’s universality from becoming uni-
versalism. Because God’s grace is not limited to a predetermined elect, it behooves each 
person to “work out your own salvation with fear and trembling” (Phil. 2:12), “otherwise 
[God] will cease working.”29 If a person remains in this resistive state, salvation will not—
25 Wesley, Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.4, in Works 3:207.
26 Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.4, in Works 3:207.
27 For more on Wesley’s belief in the resistibility of God’s grace, see the following: Sermon 63, “The 
General Spread of the Gospel,” §11-12, in Works 2:489 and 489n29; Notes, John 6:44, Acts 26:19; Journal, 
August 24, 1743, in Works 19:333; Predestination Calmly Considered, §81, in Works 13:315; and The Question 
‘What Is an Arminian?’ Answered, §8, in Works 13:408.
28 If we accept the “TULIP” acrostic of classical Calvinism—Total depravity, Unconditional election, 
Limited atonement, Irresistible grace, and Perseverance of the saints—then Wesley undercuts both L and I.
29 Wesley, Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.7, in Works 3:208.
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cannot—ensue.30 Genuine human autonomy, whether responding or resisting to grace, 
precludes universalism.31
30 See Wesley, The Question ‘What Is an Arminian?’ Answered, §8, in Works 13:408: “The Calvinists hold, 
secondly, that the saving grace of God is absolutely irresistible; that no man is any more able to resist it than 
to resist the stroke of lightning. The Arminians hold that although there may be some moments wherein 
the grace of God acts irresistibly, yet in general any man may resist, and that to his eternal ruin, the grace 
whereby it was the will of God he should have been eternally saved.” Wesley composed this in 1770.
31 Given the apparent bravado of this statement, a few observations and objections are worth noting.
(1) Wesley himself does “allow, God may possibly, at some times, work irresistibly in some souls. I believe 
he does. But can you infer hence that he always works thus in all that are saved?” Wesley, Predestination 
Calmly Considered, §81, in Works 13:315 (Wesley’s emphasis). He admits as much elsewhere, too: The Ques-
tion ‘What Is an Arminian?’ Answered, §§7-10, in Works 13:407-408; Sermon 63, “The General Spread of the 
Gospel,” §12, in Works 2:490; and Journal, August 24, 1743, in Works 19:332-333. But in each case, we must 
attend to Wesley’s overly-hedged grammatical constructions, including his profuse subjunctives, condition-
als, and rhetorical questions. We should come to appreciate the epistemological and theological humility (or 
ignorance) he brings to the question of whether God may act irresistibly. But this should not overshadow 
the thrust of his August 24 Journal entry: “that the grace of God both before and after those [irresistible] 
moments, may be, and hath been, resisted; and that, in general, it does not act irresistibly, but we may 
comply therewith or may not” (Works 19:332).
(2) Some of Wesley’s interpreters have taken certain liberties with Wesley’s concession of the possibility 
of momentarily irresistible grace. Such is the case with Kenneth J. Collins, who argues for the logical neces-
sity of Wesleyan irresistible grace as a consequence total depravity. “In other words,” Collins writes in The 
Theology of John Wesley, “to deny that prevenient grace is irresistible in terms of graciously restored faculties 
is also to deny that Wesley held a doctrine of total depravity” (81). However, Collins is only throwing down 
the gauntlet that we have already picked up: as we saw above in Chapter 4, Wesleyans must reject a doctrine of 
total depravity. On Collins’s own terms, by rejecting total depravity, the logical necessity of irresistible grace 
vanishes. However, the way in which Collins frames grace’s irresistibility—that it is prevenient grace that is 
unilaterally irresistible, as a subspecies of “free grace”—further complicates matters in two ways, which are 
as follows.
(2a) It belittles human nature as created in the image of God. If the irresistible action of prevenient grace 
is the sine qua non of “responsible personhood and accountability” (Collins, 81), then such irresistible preve-
nient grace likewise comes to indicate “that-before-which-we-simply-are-not.” For what it’s worth, Wesley 
certainly sees grace working in God’s acts of creation. Moreover, as Wesley states in Sermon 1, “Salvation 
by Faith,” §1, humanity had no say in whether or not “it was free grace that ‘formed man of the dust of the 
ground, and breathed into him a living soul’, and stamped on that soul the image of God” (Works 1:117). For 
Wesley, the image of God is a product of God’s grace. Included in that image is the “natural image,” human 
nature constituted by its particular faculties—faculties whose existences are not destroyed by means of 
(original) sin. The logical disjunction in Collins’s argument is the correlation of (prevenient) grace’s “irre-
sistibility” with the “creatureliness” of humanity graced with the image of God.
(2b) There is resistible grace prior to (and following) those potential moments of irresistible grace, as 
Wesley indicates in his Journal entry for August 24, 1743 (above). But Collins’s notion of prevenient grace 
working irresistibly to “reestablish… [the] faculties that constitute responsible personhood and accountabil-
ity” (81) necessarily precludes such resistible grace prior to possible irresistible grace. Like Wesley, we can 
(and should) acknowledge that God’s grace may indeed work irresistibly at various times, including God’s 
grace prior to irresistible grace! Collins’s reading is likely a symptom of his tendency to read Wesley in light 
of the continental reformers, which he explicitly does to conclude his section on prevenient grace (82).
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 In addition to grace as love and favor, free in all and free for all, and universal and 
resistible, Wesley offers a final paired motif vis-à-vis grace’s general effects: pardon and 
power.32 We encountered this pairing at the outset of the present chapter, in the excerpt 
from Wesley’s sermon on “The Witness of Our Own Spirit.”33 The motif ties together 
much of what we have observed so far regarding Wesley’s understanding of the nature 
of grace, although it is important to point out that pardon and power pertain uniquely 
to the grace of God that is received by an individual. In other words, since God’s grace 
is universal, so, too, is the offer of grace’s pardoning and empowering effects; but, since 
God’s grace is resistible, the actual pardon and power requires our receptive response. 
That said, grace as pardon entails God’s loving, unmerited mercy, which effects a cer-
tain change in our status before God. The application of Christ’s meritorious atonement 
(through the personal appropriation of faith) renders us “favorable” before God. Grace 
as power commences with pardon, but aims to empower a qualitative change in our fac-
ulties and, as a result, our actions. Wesley expresses this aspect of grace in terms both 
pneumatological and moral.34 In his sermon on “The Means of Grace,” Wesley draws up a 
similar distinction in slightly different terms. Grace delivers us from sin’s guilt and power 
32 In light of the previous point—grace as universal, free for all—we could alliteratively add presence to 
Wesley’s pardon and power. Marjorie Suchocki creatively plumbs Wesley’s emphasis on divine presence as a 
hermeneutic for exploring Wesleyan grace. The idea is that Wesley’s stress on God’s gracious ubiquity (and 
ubiquitous grace!) should broaden Wesleyans’ interpretations of grace from a narrower redemptive focus 
to a broader creative one. Thus, the universal presence of God is both creative and gracious. See Suchocki, 
“Wesleyan Grace,” in The Oxford Handbook of Methodist Studies, 540-553.
33 Wesley, Sermon 12, “The Witness of Our Own Spirit,” §15, in Works 1:309.
34 Note Wesley’s use of Philippians 2:12-13 in appealing to the moral empowerment effected by grace in 
the process of salvation. Cf. Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” in Works 3:199-209, which 
takes its text from this same passage.
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(pardon), and it restores us to God’s favor and image (power).35 As Randy Maddox elabo-
rates, grace-as-pardon pertains to the juridical/forensic soteriological focus of the Western 
(Latin) church, whereas grace-as-power typifies the therapeutic accent of Eastern (Greek) 
soteriology. Moreover, Maddox contends that it is this latter, Eastern/therapeutic/power 
emphasis that becomes Wesley’s dominant theological focus with respect to grace.36
 In sum, for Wesley, God’s universally-offered grace may be received or resisted, 
for this pertains to the very nature of love. If resisted, future offerings of grace are not 
precluded, although repeated rejection would tend to form a “grace-resisting” habit. If 
received, grace takes root and begins the relational process of healing the sin-sick soul. 
Represented as a diagram, grace, for Wesley, would look like the following.
love
favor
free
universal
resistible
Grace…
…saves from sin’s…
(pardon)
…restores to God’s…
(power)
…guilt
…power
…favor
…image
Diagram 5. The General Nature of Grace for Wesley
35 Wesley, Sermon 16, “The Means of Grace,” II.6, in Works 1:383.
36 See Maddox, Responsible Grace, 84-87. The Western/Eastern interpretation runs throughout Respon-
sible Grace, as does the present approach to grace as pardon and power.
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B. Aquinas on the General Nature of Grace
 As we noted in Chapter 2, since its introduction in the 1950s, Marie-Dominique 
Chenu’s Neoplatonic scheme of exitus-reditus has become a near-inescapable structural 
analysis of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae—but not without its gracious detractors.37 Thirty 
years ago, Thomas F. O’Meara voiced his own reservations with Chenu’s scheme—join-
ing the likes of Schillebeeckx, Seckler, Hayen, Pesch, Persson, and La Font—by arguing 
for the primacy of grace as a theological structure (not merely a formal structure) of the 
Summa Theologiae.38 “The presence of grace in the ST is much wider than its location [ST 
I-II.109-114] would indicate,” O’Meara contends. 
The multiple mystery (designated as “grace”) appears at such key moments that 
the reader may come to see grace as a central theological motif and as an organi-
zational principle of the entire Summa Theologiae.… The structure of the opening 
questions of the ST in their dynamic movement from one divine realm to another 
displays what we might call a pattern of crescendo. Questions or articles build to 
preliminary climaxes [that create a] pattern of crescendo to grace.39
Thus, O’Meara argues, “all of the Secunda Pars is a treatise on grace” (a bold statement!), 
in which I-II.109-114 is positioned as “an arch or a capstone.”40 It is neither Aquinas’s first 
37 See Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas. The work was first published in French in 1950 as 
Introduction à l’étude de S. Thomas d’Aquin.
38 Thomas F. O’Meara, “Grace as a Theological Structure in the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas,” 
Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 55 (1988): 130-153. O’Meara addresses Chenu’s basic structural 
analysis, as well as these six subsequent scholars’ analyses, in the introduction of this article (130-134).
39 O’Meara, “Grace as a Theological Structure,” 132, 137.
40 O’Meara, “Grace as a Theological Structure,” 144, 143. O’Meara’s bold claim is defensible in light of 
Aquinas’s various “treatises” in the colossal Secunda Pars. Aquinas famously opens with the “Treatise on the 
Last End,” which is our beatific telos of fellowship with God (ST I-II.1-5) and only attainable through the gift 
of grace (ST I-II.109). The intervening questions may seem to digress into a multifaceted moral philosophy 
(ST I-II.6-108), but the truth of the matter is that Aquinas is here framing the terms and concepts of his 
moral theology. He discusses human acts, passions, and habits (ST I-II.6-54) to prepare his discussion of 
virtues and vices (ST I-II.55-89). We might say that, with ST I-II.62, Aquinas crescendos with an overview 
of the theological virtues, which are predicated on gratia and phrased in terms of habitus. The “Treatise on 
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nor last word on grace; yet, having been situated at the precise midpoint of the Summa, 
Aquinas’s six questions on grace are unquestionably a theological zenith, representing his 
most-mature reflection on the relationship of the divine with the human.
 How, then, does Aquinas come to understand the general nature of “grace”? 
Aquinas himself addresses this question in all of his major works,41 answering it in terms 
remarkably similar to those of Wesley—freely-given love and favor. Consider this repre-
sentative excerpt from Summa Theologiae:
According to the common manner of speech, “grace” is usually taken in three ways. 
First, for anyone’s love [pro dilectione alicuius], as we are accustomed to say that the 
soldier is in the good grace [gratiam] of the king, i.e., the king looks on him with 
favor [gratum]. Secondly, it is taken for any gift freely bestowed [pro aliquo dono 
gratis dato], as we are accustomed to say, “I do you this act of grace [gratiam facio].” 
Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given freely [gratis dati], inasmuch 
as we are said to be grateful [gratias] for its benefits. Of these three the second 
depends on the first, since one bestows something on another freely [gratis] from 
the love [ex amore] wherewith he receives him into his good graces [gratum]. And 
from the second proceeds the third, since from benefits bestowed freely [gratis] 
arises gratitude [gratiarum].42
Law” that follows (ST I-II.89-108) culminates with a treatment of the New Law (ST I-II.106-108), which 
could just as well function as the first three questions to his “Treatise on Grace” (ST I-II.109-114), for the 
New Law is the law of grace. Aquinas ends where he begins: our supernatural happiness made possible 
only through God’s grace. As such, the entire Secunda Secundae, which addresses the theological virtues 
(ST II-II.1-46), the cardinal virtues (ST II-II.47-170), the gratuitous graces (ST II-II.171-182), and the states 
of Christian living (ST II-II.183-189), becomes the out-working of grace working in and with us. Therefore, 
nearly 60% of the questions of the Summa Theologiae (303 questions in the Secunda Pars, compared to 119 in 
the Prima and 90 in the unfinished Tertia) may truly be said to orbit a gracious axis. The percentage expands 
even more once we read his treatment of the sacraments (ST III.60-90) as conduits of grace.
41 In chronological order, see DV, q. 27, a. 1; SCG III.150; CT I.143, 214; and ST I-II.110.1.
42 ST I-II.110.1 co. I have modified the Benziger translation to avoid multiple cognates of “grace” in the 
English translation. The bracketed inclusion of the Latin text clearly demonstrates Aquinas’s point that the 
ways we talk about “grace” are all connected.
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In other words, Aquinas unpacks three senses of “grace” according to its ingratiatory 
nature (loving favor), the gratuitous manner in which it is given (freely), and the response 
of gratitude it elicits (thanksgiving).
 Of these three senses, the third (gratitude) is only mentioned in the Summa Theo-
logiae in this manner.43 The second (freely-given) appears in all of Aquinas’s major works 
and is substantively identical to Wesley’s notion of grace as “free in all.” Aquinas elaborates 
this meaning in the earlier Summa Contra Gentiles:
Since what is given a person, without any preceding merit on his part, is said to be 
given to him gratis, and because the divine help [divinum auxilium] that is offered 
to man precedes all human merit [meritum humanum praeveniat], as we showed, 
it follows that this help is accorded gratis to man, and as a result it quite fittingly 
took the name grace.44
Both Wesley and Aquinas preclude merit from the gratuity of grace.45 (Aquinas’s actual 
position likely would have surprised Wesley, given the typical 18th century Anglican car-
icature of Roman Catholic soteriology.46) At any rate, Aquinas’s genuine defense of the 
gratuitous, free, and unmerited nature of grace is equally suited to Wesley’s own theology.
43 This may be an instance of Aquinas’s doctrinal development, as can be the case with Aquinas’s works 
from the mid-1260s onward. That he presents the first two senses of “grace” (ingratiating and gratuitous) 
throughout his career is altogether unsurprising, especially in light of the way he comes to his first division 
of grace along identical lines (see ST I-II.111.1). Whether he is developing grace in a third sense (gratitude-re-
sponse) in the Summa Theologiae remains unclear, for Aquinas omits this sense of grace from his taxonomy 
in ST I-II.111. But note how Wesley develops “gratitude” as a facet of “true religion”: “True religion is right 
tempers towards God and man. It is, in two words, gratitude and benevolence: gratitude to our Creator 
and supreme Benefactor, and benevolence to our fellow-creatures. In other words, it is the loving God with 
all our heart, and our neighbour as ourselves.” Wesley, Sermon 120, “The Unity of the Divine Being,” §16, 
in Works 4:66-67. Cf. Sermon 94, “On Family Religion,” I.3, in Works 3:336; and Sermon 70, “The Case of 
Reason Impartially Considered,” II.9, in Works 2:598.”
44 Aquinas, SCG III.150.
45 Cf. Wesley, Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” §3, in Works 3:545.
46 The typical Anglican posture toward Rome seemed to misconstrue the role of merit and good works 
as presented at the Council of Trent, especially Session VI, “On Justification” ( January 13, 1547). This is all 
253
 For Aquinas, the most important of these three senses of grace is certainly the first: 
divine favor rooted in love.47 “Given that a creature’s good comes from God’s will,” Aqui-
nas begins, “it is from the love by which God loves a creature that any good at all flows into 
the creature.”48 In order to differentiate instances of human gratuity from divine gratuity, 
Aquinas draws attention to the iconicity of human nature. Any goodness, graciousness, 
favor, or love that we demonstrate is the result of God’s goodness, graciousness, favor, 
and love. Now, God loves creatures in different ways, all according to their natures. God 
loves all living things with a general (communis) love since, by existing, any living thing 
necessarily participates in God’s esse. But God loves rational creatures—humans—with 
a special kind of love that draws us to participate in the divine good itself.49 Expressed dif-
ferently, Aquinas emphasizes how God’s gratuitous love essentially dignifies human nature 
by willing for us God’s own essential goodness—which, we should note, is an end that 
exceeds our capacities.50 As Brian Davies summarizes,
the more surprising given the “holy living” tradition in which Wesley was fostered. Wesley’s rather censori-
ous remarks regarding Roman Catholicism are on display in a string of various publications in Works ( Jack-
son) 10:80-177. In Jackson’s configuration, the leading entry thereof—Wesley’s irenic Letter to a Roman 
Catholic (10:80-86)—seems to belie the more contentious tone that is to follow. However, Outler places the 
open letter at the very end of his 1964 anthology John Wesley (492-499). This editorial choice may very well 
have been a reflection of the ecumenical embrace of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), of which Outler 
was an official observer.
47 Aquinas devotes over half of his response in ST I-II.110.1 to this primary meaning of “grace” as God’s 
ingratiating love. The same is true in SCG III.150 (§§2-4); DV, q. 27, a. 1 co. (second half ); and CT I.143 
(closing). Cf. CT I.214, where Aquinas again discusses the gratus/gratis distinction, but with reference to 
Christ’s grace (i.e., hypostatic grace, not habitual grace).
48 ST I-II.110.1 co.
49 For more on grace as a participation in Godself, see Melissa Eitenmiller, “Grace as Participation 
according to St. Thomas Aquinas,” New Blackfriars 98 (November 2017): 689-708. See also Rudi te Velde, 
Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), 160-165.
50 ST I-II.110.1 co.
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Aquinas thinks that grace is at work when people come to be virtuous in this way 
[i.e., for beatitude]. That is what he means by ‘grace’ primarily. For him it is the 
work of God in human beings raising them above their human nature to the point 
where they become sharers in the divine nature.… In his view, grace is the result 
of God’s action in drawing me to himself. It is not just a help to my acting on my 
own. It is what there is when I am wholly the end product of what God is doing.51
By way of grace, God essentially dignifies us to participate in God’s own loving favor, 
radiantly personifying divine gratuity in human iconicity.
 Up to this point, we have been examining what has commonly been described as 
grace’s elevating role within Aquinas’s theology: God’s grace makes it possible for human 
nature to be elevated (elevetur) in order to be and to act on a supernatural level, according 
to its divine destiny.52 Recall that, at the outset of Prima Secundae, Aquinas establishes the 
teleology of human nature. Like all natures, we act for an end; unlike other natures, our 
end, beatitude, lies beyond our nature in God alone.53 At the other end of Prima Secundae, 
Aquinas addresses how we come to be elevated to operate beyond our nature. It is by God’s 
grace alone, which is super-natural. Aidan Nichols describes this aspect of salvific grace 
in Aquinas’s theology (gratia elevans) as a “transfiguration—our receiving that kind of 
wholeness, integrity, health that go with becoming transformed creatures.”54 This kind 
of transformed living is precisely the super-abundance of life promised by Christ through 
51 Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 264, 267.
52 Aquinas specifically employs the term elevetur in ST I-II.109.9 co. It is highly relevant that he uses 
the passive voice here: humans cannot elevate themselves, but must instead be elevated. In fact, in q. 109, 
Aquinas investigates ten different moral-theological activities with an eye to whether or not a human can 
perform them without God’s grace. His prognosis is bleak on every count (aa. 1-10).
53 ST I-II.2.8 co.
54 Nichols, Discovering Aquinas, 101.
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grace ( John 10:10). It is one that does not destroy our nature but instead requires it for the 
fullness of its perfection.55
 Whether cast in a prelapsarian or a postlapsarian setting, the elevation of grace is 
necessary for human nature to attain its beatific end. But on this side of the Fall, Aquinas 
argues, we need more than just elevation to a supernatural state; we need healing for the 
wounds inflicted on our nature by the disease of sin.56 Aquinas’s consistency is on full 
display here as he extends his earlier medical motif of sin as a disease to his interpretation 
of grace as medicinal, therapeutic, restorative, sanans. Where sin’s stain (macula) has left 
the soul in a state of macular degeneration, the light of grace shines an illuminating clarity 
(decor). Where sin has disordered the will’s proper orientation to God, thereby corrupting 
its natural good, God draws the will back to Godself, graciously restoring its right order. 
And where sin has bankrupted us by the debt of punishment (reatus poenae), grace par-
dons the debt.57 Accordingly, Nichols designates this facet of Thomistic grace “redemp-
tion, our receiving back the sort of wholeness, integrity, health that befits creatures of God 
who are (in this formal perspective, then) not so much transformed as healed.”58
55 This is, of course, the crux of the so-called Thomistic axiom: gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, 
“grace does not destroy nature but perfects it” (ST I.1.8 ad 2). Alongside this dictum stands one of Aquinas’s 
replies to a subsequent question: sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam, et 
ut perfectio perfectibile, “for just as faith presupposes natural cognition, thus grace presupposes nature, and 
perfection the perfectible” (ST I.2.2 ad 1). A fuller treatment of the relationship of nature and grace will be 
given below in the third section of this chapter.
56 This idea runs throughout Aquinas’s “Treatise on Grace,” especially ST I-II.109.
57 ST I-II.109.7. Note how this “triple loss” wrought by sin does not entail a total corruption of human 
nature; cf. ST I-II.109.2 co.
58 Nichols, Discovering Aquinas, 101.
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 Notice that in describing grace according to its healing (sanans) and elevating (elev-
ans) “modes,” Aquinas comes to the conclusion that grace pertains to the very essence of 
the soul (in essentia animae), not just to one particular faculty or power thereof.59 This is 
not to say that grace leaves our faculties unaffected. To the contrary, grace “perfects the 
intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the affections by the fire of charity.”60 Grace, 
for Aquinas, is a certain quality of the soul, “a certain habitual condition (habitudo)” 
upon which the infused virtues rely in order to produce actions befitting divinity, which 
is beyond our natural capacities.61 So, grace’s healing and elevation is graciously infused 
into the soul as a quality, a sort of habit capable of supernatural existence and action—yet, 
precisely as habit, positioned somewhere between a potency and an act. As we discussed 
in Chapter 4, a habit must be activated.
 This kind of actuation represents yet another way in which Aquinas views grace: 
as God’s auxilium (help, aid), which causes a certain movement of the soul (motus animae) 
“sweetly and promptly [suaviter et prompte] to acquire [consequendum] eternal good.”62 
59 ST I-II.110.4. Cf. ST I-II.110.3, where Aquinas draws out the significance of such a position in marking 
off virtue from grace: grace is prior to virtue.
60 ST I-II.79.3 co. Note the similarity to Wesley’s Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” 
III.4: “Everyone has sooner or later good desires…. Everyone has some measure of that light…[which] 
enlightens every man that cometh into the world” (Works 3:207). As Wesley argues in this paragraph, it is 
prevenient grace that illuminates the intellect and delights the will.
61 ST I-II.110.3 ad 3 (Freddoso). In keeping with the stark ontological distinction between humans and 
God, Aquinas (using Aristotelian categories) makes it clear that grace is an accidental, not a substantial, 
form in the soul: we do not become God (or even gods) but instead come to participate in God’s nature by 
virtue of God’s grace. See ST I-II.110.2 ad 2.
62 ST I-II.110.2 co. Compare this line with Wesley, Notes, John 6:44: “No man comes to me, unless my 
Father draw him—No man can believe in Christ, unless God give him power: he draws us first, by good 
desires. Not by compulsion, not by laying the will under any necessity; but by the strong and sweet, yet still 
resistible, motions of his heavenly grace.”
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Such a “motive” conceptualization of grace harkens back to Aquinas’s first demonstra-
tive argument for God’s existence, the argument from motus to the First Mover (God).63 
Like the Five Ways, Aquinas’s doctrine of grace also borrows heavily from Aristotelian 
thought: first, in the development of a habituated moral psychology, under which grace is 
understood habitually; second, in the application of Aristotelian physics (and metaphys-
ics) to explain the actualization, as motus, of that habitual grace.
 This approach to God’s grace—as divine auxilium and motus—represents a key 
development in Aquinas’s doctrine of grace.64 Early in his career, Aquinas had largely 
understood grace much like those before him: as an infused habit of the soul, as the 
indwelling and sanctifying favor of God. But with the Summa Contra Gentiles (early 
1260s), Aquinas begins to add this Aristotelian element of motus—sympathetic as it was 
63 ST I.2.3.
64 A number of studies investigating Aquinas’s doctrine of grace have drawn out this developmental 
aspect of Aquinas’s theology in terms of the contemporaneous rediscovery of Aristotle. The most-famous 
study is probably Henri Bouillard’s Conversion et grâce chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin (1944), which argues for a 
significant shift in Aquinas’s thought during the 1260s as he encountered various newly-discovered writings 
in philosophy and theology—including Aristotle. Around the same time as Bouillard, Bernard Lonergan 
published a series of essays in Theological Studies (September 1941-December 1942) that would become 
Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert 
Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). Lonergan considers Aquinas’s inherited theological 
tradition(s) and the ways in which he (as a representative of High Scholasticism) transcended that inheri-
tance by means of Aristotelian thought. Joseph P. Wawrykow, too, follows historical-theological lines, with 
particular focus on Aquinas’s mature teaching on grace. See Wawrykow, God’s Grace and Human Action: 
‘Merit’ in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 164-177. 
Cf. Wawrykow, “Grace,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 192-221, where Wawrykow again tackles the 
question of Aquinas’s doctrinal development. More recently, Shawn M. Colberg has addressed the theme 
theologically in one of the most-comprehensive analyses of auxilium in Aquinas’s thought. See Colberg, 
“Aquinas and the Grace of Auxilium,” Modern Theology 32, no. 2 (April 2016): 187-210. Finally, Simon Fran-
cis Gaine has recently explored the contribution of Aristotelian thought (including motus and auxilium) to 
Aquinas’s mature doctrine of grace. See Gaine, “Aristotle’s Philosophy in Aquinas’s Theology of Grace in 
the Summa Theologiae,” in Aristotle in Aquinas’s Theology, ed. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 94-120.
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with Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings, which Aquinas was then reading.65 By the time 
Aquinas completes the Prima Secundae (ca. 1270), the auxilium/motus motif is completely 
integrated with his mature theological anthropology and moral psychology. This makes 
the motus of divine auxilium the natural complement to God’s graciously-infused habitual 
gift (habituale donum).66 As such, “Thomas is able to hold together Augustine’s earlier 
emphasis on grace as healing the effects of sin, God’s medicinal action in us to cure us 
and lead us back to himself, with Aristotle’s philosophy of nature with its emphasis on the 
integrity, rationality, and dynamism of each nature.”67
 Does all this merit for Aquinas the title “theologian of grace”? It wouldn’t be wrong 
to answer in the affirmative, especially considering the absolute necessity of grace within 
Aquinas’s theological teleology.68 Grace is indispensable for true human happiness, for 
beatitude with and in God. Perhaps the best demonstration of this fact is given by Aquinas 
himself, as he enumerates grace’s fivefold effects on the soul.69 To collate these five effects 
with the preceding overview, we may illustrate the nature of grace within Aquinas’s theol-
ogy in the following manner.
65 See SCG III.147-150. Wawrykow provides a helpful overview and analysis of Bouillard’s main points 
regarding Aquinas’s development, including this important shift beginning with SCG. See Wawrykow, God’s 
Grace and Human Action, 35-40.
66 See, for example, ST I-II.111.2; cf. ST I-II.110.2.
67 Philip McCosker, “Grace,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Summa Theologiae, ed. Philip 
McCosker and Denys Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 212.
68 See ST I-II.109 (all articles) on the necessity of grace, and compare this to the “Treatise on the Last 
End” for humans (ST I-II.1-5).
69 ST I-II.111.3 co.
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Diagram 6. A Visual Overview of Aquinas’s Divisions of Grace
Excursus: Aquinas and Universal Grace?
 There is one difficulty in giving Aquinas the appellation “theologian of grace,” 
and it becomes evident by comparing him with Wesley. For the mature Aquinas, grace 
does not seem to be offered universally, i.e., Wesley’s grace that is “free for all.”70 In his 
sermon on “Free Grace,” Wesley polemically squares off with the doctrine of predes-
tination, which, for him, is synonymous with “reprobation.” This fact is telling for the 
present discussion since it is Aquinas’s doctrine of predestination (and reprobation) 
that precludes a doctrine of universal grace.71 But, as Joseph Wawrykow astutely dis-
70 Recently, Anglican Lee Gatiss has revealed the enduring influence of Peter Lombard’s Sentences on 
Aquinas’s limited interpretation of “grace for all.” See Gatiss, “Grace Tasted Death for All: Thomas Aquinas 
on Hebrews 2:9,” Tyndale Bulletin 63, no. 2 (November 2012): 217-236. As Gatiss explains, Aquinas follows the 
Lombard’s distinction between the sufficiency and efficiency of grace “for all”: grace is sufficient for all people 
absolutely since Christ is the Savior of all (1 Tim. 4:10); but grace is only efficient for the predestined elect since 
only these actually receive God’s salvific grace. Peter Lombard’s distinction was an attempt at a via media 
between universalist and particularist emphases in the doctrine of the atonement (Gatiss, 228-230). However, 
this “alternative” advances a doctrine of limited atonement akin to classical Calvinism, which Wesley rejects.
71 For Aquinas’s mature treatment of predestination, see ST I.23. This question fits into a larger series of 
questions in which Aquinas is addressing God’s will and its execution (ST I.19-24). Predestination (q. 23) is 
the particular species of God’s providence that pertains to rational creatures (humans). Providence (q. 22) is 
the broader ordering and implementation of God’s justice and mercy (q. 21). These, then, are manifestations 
of God’s love (q. 20), which is located in God’s will (q. 19). The major point in relation to grace is that grace 
is the implementation of the ordering of predestination as God’s special providence of rational creatures. See 
Wawrykow, “Grace,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 200-201.
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cerns,72 such was not always the case for Aquinas. In his earliest works, like his Scriptum 
on Lombard’s Sentences, Aquinas basically outlines an optimistic humanism in which 
God’s general grace is offered universally. By free choice, any human may reject or accept 
this grace—which, if accepted, unfolds as habitual grace. No further infusions of grace 
are necessary, and a person may continue—and even grow—in grace unto eternal life. 
“Considerations of predestination are much less explicit in the Scriptum’s version of sal-
vation, and hardly integral to the depiction of grace,” writes Wawrykow. Simply, God 
desires that all people be saved and then provides the necessary means for all people to be 
saved. For the early Aquinas, “the initiative and principal responsibility for the person’s 
salvation lies squarely with that person, although the structure of salvation is dependent 
upon God’s prior commitments to take human activity with full seriousness.”73
 But maturation brings exposure and change.74 Upon encountering the elderly 
Augustine’s anti-Pelagian works, Aquinas recognizes in his own portrait of grace the 
object of Augustine’s rebuke—universality coupled with divine response to human ini-
tiative! The younger Aquinas’s anthropological optimism, with its correlate doctrine of 
grace, yields to an Augustinian doctrine of grace, with its correlate anthropology, bringing 
a greater emphasis on God’s initiating and sustaining action in the life of grace. So stark 
is this change that it requires a new vocabulary: where grace had been exclusively habit-
72 Wawrykow, “Grace,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 206-209. Wawrykow’s account here relies 
on his earlier God’s Grace and Human Action, but is more accessible and direct in its argument.
73 Wawrykow, “Grace,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 207.
74 The particulars of this paragraph are taken from Wawrykow, “Grace,” 206-209, who is (critically) 
drawing from Bouillard’s Conversion et grâce. According to Wawrykow (God’s Grace and Human Action, 
37-38), Bouillard argues that it was Augustine’s De Praedestinatione Sanctorum and De Dono Preservatione 
that came to influence Aquinas in the 1260s.
261
ual in the early Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles begins to incorporate the idea of God’s 
assistance (auxilium) as a kind of motus upon which we humans continually depend. By 
Summa Theologiae, Aquinas develops a rather robust doctrine that weaves together both 
senses of grace—i.e., as an infused disposition (habitus) and as divine actualization (auxil-
ium/motus)—along with an uncompromising doctrine of predestination by grace for those 
whom God has infallibly elected.75 In other words, grace as auxilium/motus and grace as 
universally-available exist in an inverse reciprocal relationship in Aquinas’s theological 
development. As the former enters, the latter recedes—and then vanishes. Consequently, 
what Aquinas has to say about grace in ST I-II.109-114 must be filtered through what he 
also has to say about predestination, reprobation, and the like.76
 When Aquinas addresses the broad question of predestination in Summa Theolo-
giae, he begins by defining it as the divine “direction [transmissionis] of a rational creature 
towards the end of life eternal.… For to destine is to direct or send [destinare est mittere].”77 
Not only does this establish predestination as a subset of God’s providence, it also casts 
predestination in the language of motus, which prefigures the explicit link between pre-
destination and grace in the second article (a. 2, ad 4). The third article (on reprobation) 
follows Aquinas’s typical logic of “explanation through differentiation”: he develops rep-
robation as the inverse of predestination, which is of utmost importance to the nature of 
75 See Aquinas, ST I-II.112.3 on the infallible will of God in reference to grace and election.
76 Aquinas very clearly establishes the relationship between predestination and grace in ST I.23.2 ad 
4: “predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object [praedestinatio 
importat respectum ad gratiam, ut causae ad effectum, et actus ad obiectum].” Aquinas’s syntactical parallelism 
in this reply, along with the substance of ST I.23.3 ad 2 (and the entirety of ST I.23), reasonably leads us to 
conclude that Aquinas understands predestination to effect grace causally.
77 ST I.23.1 co. The parenthetical references in the remainder of this paragraph all pertain to ST I.23.
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grace. If predestination is about moving (transmissionis, motus) an individual to a super-
natural end by causing grace, and if reprobation functions as predestination’s opposite, 
then reprobation is signaled by divine dereliction (derelictionis a Deo), grace’s desertion 
(a gratia deseritur), God’s voluntary permission of human downfall (voluntatem permit-
tendi aliquem cadere in culpam), the human inability to obtain grace (non possit gratiam 
adipisci)—in essence, God’s “not-grace,” “not-motion.”78
 Aquinas later confirms this reading while addressing the cause of spiritual blindness 
and hardness of heart. God does not cause the movement (motus) of the soul to become 
averse to God and to cling to evil, but God does cause a withdrawal of grace (subtractio 
gratiae) resulting in spiritual darkness.79 Furthermore, Aquinas continues,
it is by [God’s] own judgment that God does not emit the light of grace to those 
[lumen gratiae non immittit illis] in whom there is an obstacle to it. Hence, it is not 
only the one who posits the obstacle to grace who is a cause of the withholding 
of grace [subtractionis gratiae], but also God, who by His own judgment does not 
posit the grace (qui suo iudicio gratiam non apponit).80
So, while predestination entails a gracious trans-missio to eternal life (God’s positive 
motus), reprobation entails the per-missio to fall (God’s non-motus) coupled with the 
absence of im-missio (God’s anti-motus) and a sub-missio to the sub-tractio of grace (God’s 
negative motus).81 Very clearly, then, the mature Aquinas has abandoned his earlier stance 
on grace’s universality, exchanging it for the ascendant concept of grace as limited auxil-
78 ST I.23.3 co., ad 2, ad 3 (respectively).
79 ST I-II.79.3 co. Note Aquinas’s explicit language of motus here.
80 ST I-II.79.3 co. (Freddoso). The parenthetical is part of Freddoso’s original; the bracketed Latin is my 
addition. In the Benziger edition, non immittit is translated as “withhold.”
81 See ST I.23.1 co.; ST I.23.3; and ST I-II.79.3 co.
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ium/motus. The result is a stark doctrine of predestination and reprobation.82 To employ 
Rupp’s “optimism/pessimism” typology from earlier, Aquinas essentially trades his earlier 
“optimism of nature” for a mature “pessimism of grace.”83 Aquinas’s mature position does 
not even escape John Wesley:
In Roman Catholic countries…the patrons of Particular Redemption are very 
numerous.… The whole body of Dominican and Augustine friars, with several other 
religious orders, are, to a man, firm and zealous asserters of Particular Redemp-
tion.… And it would be no wonder, if all Romanists…should be of that opinion; 
considering the profound reverence they have for Thomas Aquinas, a more vehe-
ment defender of the Decrees, than their grand saint, Augustine.84
It is also worth mentioning that this excerpt represents Wesley’s singular substantive 
engagement with Thomas Aquinas’s theology.85
82 Wawrykow claims that “Aquinas does not advocate what later (as in Calvin) came to be called ‘double 
predestination.’… Rather, he makes the damned themselves responsible for their going to hell.” Wawrykow, 
“Grace,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 201. Technically speaking, Wawrykow is correct: Aquinas 
limits predestination to positive election by God; reprobation is Aquinas’s term for the second prong of clas-
sical “double predestination.” Setting aside semantics, Wawrykow is attempting to disprove any symmetry 
between election and damnation within Aquinas’s theology—but, based on what we have just encountered, 
that seems quite difficult. If God chooses to withhold or withdraw grace from someone according to the 
divine intellect and will, then that is according to God’s providence. When referring to humans, that prov-
idence is predestination. Consequently, predestination and reprobation are ineluctably bound in Aquinas’s 
mature theology.
83 Rupp, Principalities and Powers, 91-92. Rupp duly credits the phrase “pessimism of grace” to the 
Catholic historical theologian Henri Rondet.
84 John Wesley, “To the Reader,” §9, Arminian Magazine 1 (1778): vii-viii. This is from Wesley’s editorial 
introduction to the first edition of the Arminian Magazine. In the closing paragraph, Wesley adds a brief 
comment on the potential offensiveness of the magazine’s titular Arminianism. The magazine’s subtitle 
(“Consisting of Extracts and Original Treatises on Universal Redemption”) makes Wesley’s own position 
clear: the doctrine of “Absolute Predestination” is anathema (viii).
85 There is one additional known mention of Aquinas in Wesley’s Works—an oblique reference to “the 
[metaphysical] depths of the Schoolmen, the subtleties of Scotus or Aquinas”—in his 1756 “An Address to 
the Clergy,” in Works ( Jackson), 10:492. Wesley’s believes his clerical audience ought to be acquainted with 
“that useful science,” metaphysics, though not necessarily to the extent of Aquinas or Scotus (492). Since 
this reference does not actually engage any of Aquinas’s thought, we may safely conclude that the remark 
from the Arminian Magazine is Wesley’s singular substantive “engagement” with Aquinas.
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 Finally, it bears asking whether or not Aquinas’s mature teaching on particular 
grace amounts to a doctrine of irresistible grace. Predestination and reprobation are man-
ifestations of divine providence, so they fall under the will of God. Since “nothing resists 
the divine will…it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, 
but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.”86 As such, grace 
would appear to be irresistible—or, at the very least, the grace of auxilium/motus seems 
to be.87 But later, in the “Treatise on Grace,” Aquinas appears to belie this thesis, claiming 
instead that “the first cause of a lack of grace [defectus gratiae] comes from us, whereas 
the first cause of the reception of grace [collationis gratiae] comes from God.”88 While this 
statement fits with Aquinas’s doctrine of evil, it stands at odds with his view of the infalli-
bility of God’s will. In fact, Aquinas upholds the argument of God’s infallible bestowal of 
the grace as auxilium/motus, which prepares us to receive grace as habitus, in the body of 
the very same article (ST I-II.112.3). As ambiguity about grace’s resistibility persists, one 
thing is relatively clear: when predestination, reprobation, and auxilium/motus take on a 
greater role in Aquinas’s later works, universal grace fades away. With the emphatic shift 
to grace as God’s action (auxilium), our potential resistance to God’s particular redeeming 
activity also recedes.
86 ST I.19.8 ad 2. Q. 19 investigates the will of God in a general sense; q. 22, God’s providence; q. 23, 
predestination. Aquinas’s ordering of materials manifests the topical relationships of these doctrines.
87 Habitual grace in the early Aquinas tends to emphasize human initiative in the process of salvation, 
with God responding in and with grace. With the advent of auxilium/motus in the later Aquinas, the empha-
sis shifts to divine initiative in the process of salvation, while maintaining room for humanity to respond to 
grace. In broad terms, the shift comes to prioritize the sovereignty of God. For more on the dynamics of 
grace within Aquinas’s theology, as well as how the divisions of grace pertain to these dynamics, see the 
following two sections of the present chapter.
88 ST I-II.112.3 ad 2 (Freddoso).
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2. Typologies of Grace
 In the present section, the task before us is to unpack in greater detail how Aquinas 
and Wesley each explain God’s grace. In so doing, Aquinas and Wesley both describe grace 
in multifaceted ways, which can give the impression that, for them, grace is somehow 
divisible. For this reason, a prefatory caveat is essential: “grace is one”;89 a distinction 
“does not divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects.”90 Like its divine source, grace 
is always to be regarded as an essential unity with myriad effects. In other words, grace 
is grace is grace; the adjectives we append are but our expressions of the experiences of 
God’s empowering work in our lives.
 This section will begin with Aquinas for two reasons. First, the ways in which 
Aquinas divides grace really are best understood immediately in light of the ways in which 
he understands the nature of grace, which we have just treated. Second, since some of the 
terminology of the divisions of grace is common to Aquinas and Wesley, a chronological-
ly-ordered analysis can aid in the comparative task by demonstrating some of the ways in 
which certain terms come to express slightly different realities for Aquinas and Wesley.
89 Wesley, Notes, Romans 12:6. Cf. Notes, Romans 1:7. To be sure, Wesley occasionally pluralizes “grace.” 
From his sermons, see Sermons 45, “The New Birth,” II.4, in Works 2:193; Sermon 59, “God’s Love to Fallen 
Man,” I.7-8, in Works 2:429-430; and Sermon 76, “On Perfection,” I.6, in Works 3:75. From his commentar-
ies, see Notes, Romans 13:14; Colossians 4:12; 2 Peter 1:5; and 2 Peter 3:18. From his devotional publications, 
see A Collection of Prayers for Families (1745), Friday Morning, in Works ( Jackson), 11:253-255. In all of these 
cases, “graces” essentially means “Christian tempers” or “virtues.” Albert Outler observes nearly as much in 
Works 2:429n5, going so far as to draw an immediate comparison to Aquinas! For an apparent exception to 
this “graces as virtues” language, see Wesley, Notes, Luke 15:32.
90 ST I-II.111.3 ad 2. Cf. ST I-II.111.2 ad 3.
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A. Aquinas’s (Binary) Divisions of Grace
 Summa Theologiae not only represents Aquinas’s most-mature teachings on vari-
ous doctrinal matters, it also tends to be his most comprehensive text—and this certainly 
applies to his exposition of different “kinds” of grace. As we shall see below, Aquinas pro-
ceeds by division (literally, “double-seeing”), but his multiple pairings amount neither to 
mere repetitions of the same idea nor to subset hierarchies. Rather, Aquinas’s divisions of 
grace in the Summa amalgamates the principal elements from his earlier works while adding 
his later discoveries and doctrinal developments. The first division Aquinas addresses, 
gratia gratum faciens (sanctifying grace) and gratia gratis data (gratuitous grace), is repre-
sentative of his theological inheritance, as is half of the second division, gratia habitualis 
(habitual grace). We encountered the other half of the second division, gratis actualis/
auxilium (actual grace), in the previous section and will explore it further here. Out of 
this second division, Aquinas develops a third: gratia operans (operative grace) and gratia 
cooperans (cooperative grace). The final division, gratia praeveniens (prevenient grace) 
and gratia subsequens (subsequent grace), then seems to be a pair that orders the various 
effects of grace in a temporal-soteriological manner. We turn now to Aquinas’s first (and 
longest-standing) division of grace.
i. Gratia Gratum Faciens (Sanctifying Grace) and 
Gratia Gratis Data (Gratuitous Grace)
 Earlier in this chapter we unpacked Aquinas’s general understanding of the nature 
of grace according to the various senses of gratia. There we saw how Aquinas regularly 
takes gratia to mean (a) God’s ingratiatory favor, and (b) the gratuitously free manner in 
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which that favor is given. This enduring twofold sense of grace is the backbone of Aqui-
nas’s first major division of grace: gratia gratum faciens (sanctifying) and gratia gratis data 
(gratuitous).91 Aquinas explains the division accordingly:
And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united [coniungitur] 
to God, and this is called “sanctifying grace” [gratia gratum faciens]; the other is 
that whereby one man cooperates [cooperatur] with another in leading [reducatur] 
him to God, and this gift is called “gratuitous grace” [gratia gratis data], since it 
is bestowed on a man beyond the capability of nature [supra facultatem naturae], 
and beyond the merit of the person [supra meritum personae]. But whereas it is 
bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather that he may cooperate in the 
justification of another, it is not called sanctifying grace.92
As Aquinas makes clear later in this article, the definition of “gratuitous grace” does not 
somehow mean that “sanctifying grace” (or any grace, for that matter) is within our natu-
ral capability or merit.93 Rather, this first division distinguishes the grace that immediately 
leads to union with God from that which mediately leads to another’s potential relation-
ship with God. Another way of putting this is that gratia gratum faciens is the grace that 
actually makes us favorable (gratus) to God, while gratia gratis data is mediated through 
various gifts of the Spirit working in certain individuals to bring other people to God.94
91 This first division occurs in ST I-II.111.1. For references from Aquinas’s other major works that demon-
strate this principal division of grace, see the notes from the preceding section.
92 ST I-II.111.1 co.
93 ST I-II.111.1 ad 3.
94 See ST I-II.111.4, where Aquinas dissects the list of such gifts in 1 Corinthians 12:8-10: wisdom (cogni-
tion of divine matters); knowledge (cognition of human matters); faith (doctrinal certitude, as for teaching 
others); healing (divine work aimed at bodily health); working miracles (divine work aimed to manifest 
divine power); prophecy (revelation of divinely-known future contingents); spiritual discernment (revela-
tion of divinely-known secrets of the heart); tongues (proclamation in various languages); and interpreta-
tion of tongues (understanding of various languages).
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 To be sure, “gratuitous grace” (gratia gratis data) is not Aquinas’s focus in the 
“Treatise on Grace” (ST I-II.109-114).95 A possible reason for this is that the gratuitous 
graces (gratias gratis datas) do not apply to humanity as a whole, but only a particular 
subset.96 Additionally, Aquinas takes sanctifying grace to be more excellent (dignior, excel-
lentior, nobilior) than gratuitous grace because it immediately joins a person to humanity’s 
ultimate goal: participation in God’s nature.97 Conversely, since gratuitous grace is only 
preparatory (praeparatoria) to that goal, and since it is better to attain a goal than to antic-
ipate it, sanctifying grace is “superior.” All this is to say that, when Aquinas discusses the 
nature, dynamics, and effects of grace in ST I-II.109-114, he has at the forefront of his mind 
gratia gratum faciens—the sanctifying grace that “makes us graced.”
ii. Gratia Habitualis (Habitual Grace) and 
Gratia Actualis/Auxilium (Actual Grace)
 When we addressed Aquinas’s general observations on the nature of grace above, 
we observed the way he came to develop the idea of grace as an auxiliary motion, a divine 
help beyond the infusion of a supernatural habit by which we could then will and oper-
95 Again, ST I-II.111.4 is the only of the 44 articles in the treatise that addresses gratuitous grace in 
its own right; ST I-II.111.1 and ST I-II.111.5 both mention gratuitous grace, but only in comparison with 
sanctifying grace. ST I-II.111.4 is thus a short prelude to the much-later “Treatise on Gratuitous Graces” (ST 
II-II.171-178), which proceeds along the same exegetical method (of 1 Corinthians 12) as ST I-II.111.4.
96 See ST II-II.171, proem. The same logic applies to Aquinas’s comparison between “active” and “con-
templative” lives (ST II-II.179-182) and the various “duties and states of life” (ST II-II.183-189). To generalize, 
Aquinas is referring to different aspects and vocations of religious life in qq. 171-189. As such, we might 
colloquially describe possessors of gratuitous grace as extraordinarily “gifted” in addition to being “graced.”
97 ST I-II.111.5. Aquinas’s shifting language in this article is puzzling. The objections use dignior; the sed 
contra and respondeo both use excellentior; and the replies use nobilior (ad 2 uses nobilior and excellentior). In 
other words, he argues with dignior, responds with excellentior, and refutes with nobilior. It is unclear what 
Aquinas may be trying to convey with these roughly-synonymous terms.
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ate on a divine plane. That ideological development is the very substance of the second 
division of grace that Aquinas offers in Summa Theologiae: habitual grace (gratia habitu-
alis) and actual grace (gratia actualis/auxilium).98 Recall that habitual grace had been the 
“standard” method of describing the working of God’s grace in Aquinas’s time. It was also 
common among Scholastics to view “sanctifying grace” and “habitual grace” as virtual 
synonyms.99 Such a perspective is clearly evident in Aquinas’s earlier works.100 But by the 
time he composes the final questions of the Prima Secundae, Aquinas has developed a 
second understanding of the way in which God aids us through God’s gratuitous will. He 
still thinks of grace as a “quality of the soul [qualitas animae],”101 a “habitual gift divinely 
bestowed on us [habituale donum nobis divinitus inditum],”102 and “infused by God into 
the soul [a Deo animae infunditur].”103 However, he comes to add a notion of grace as “a 
98 The distinction runs throughout ST I-II.109-114. In q. 109, auxilium appears in every single article and 
is typically tethered to the idea of motus. In q. 110, a. 2, Aquinas truly and formally establishes the division 
between actual/motive grace and habitual grace. Then, in q. 111, a. 2, Aquinas draws on the formal distinc-
tion made in q. 110, a. 2, to set up his third distinction—which we will be addressing next.
99 Some modern commentators have maintained this Scholastic predilection in discussing the develop-
ment of Aquinas’s doctrine of grace. Such is the case for Alister McGrath, who interprets “actual grace” as 
gratia gratis data and “habitual or sanctifying grace” as gratia gratum faciens (Iustitia Dei, 138).
100 See, for example, Aquinas, DP, q. 27, a. 5, where he questions the singularity or multiplicity of sanc-
tifying/ingratiatory grace (gratia gratum faciens) in the soul. In his response, Aquinas exclusively discusses 
grace as infused habitus. His replies to the difficulties further expand the conversation: to the first, he pro-
vides an account of operative and cooperative grace that sets the stage for what he comes to say a full decade 
later in ST I-II.111.2; but to the third, he offers the first glimpses into what will become the grace and motus 
of auxilium. In this third reply, Aquinas also seems to be hinting at the same kind of distinction regarding the 
prelapsarian/postlapsarian need for grace that is featured in his later works.
101 ST I-II.110.2.
102 ST I-II.111.2 co.
103 ST I-II.110.2 co.
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movement of the soul [motus animae],”104 and, more specifically, “a divine assistance by 
which God moves us to will correctly and act correctly [divinum auxilium quo nos movet 
ad bene volendum et agendum].”105 This is, of course, God’s auxilium by divine motus.
 In addition to what has already been said on Aquinas’s doctrinal development 
regarding grace, it is profitable to consider this maturation in light of his fully-fledged 
moral psychology. To put Aquinas’s argument briefly, intellect and will are both required 
for a human action. The will provides the motivating power because it is, by nature, an 
appetite that is drawn to (or “affected,” affectus) external goods. Repeated actions form 
dispositions to certain ways of being and acting. As these become more durable, they 
become habitus, which sit somewhere between potency and action. Habitus thus dispose 
us to act stably, consistently, agilely—in ways an “unaffected” soul simply cannot. How-
ever, habitus alone do not entail action; they must “be reduced” from their quasi-potenti-
ality by way of motion. Of course, God is the First Mover of all things, and where Aquinas 
wants to arrive with auxilium as it relates to grace is tantamount to where he arrives with 
motus as it relates to nature: the movement helps to actualize the habit.
 But there is a twofold difficulty when we move from the natural to the gracious. 
First, human nature cannot of its own accord produce actions consonant with the super-
naturality of grace. It is impossible for us to habituate ourselves toward our final and best 
end. Instead, we require an infused habitus of grace, which heals and informs the soul with 
God’s rectitude (iustitia Dei—this being “justification”). This gracious infusion makes us 
104 ST I-II.110.2 co. By this, Aquinas means that auxilium is not a quality of the soul.
105 ST I-II.111.2 co. (Freddoso).
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favorable to God (gratum faciens) with respect to our essence (esse) and elevates us to 
be able to produce gracious actions (operatio).106 Habitual grace is the means “whereby 
corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds 
meritoriously of everlasting life, which exceed the capability of nature.”107
 Second, because we are human, we need God’s ongoing help to strengthen our 
wills internally (interius confirmando voluntatem), to empower our outward actions (exte-
rius facultatem operandi), and to move us to will and act correctly (nos movet ad bene volen-
dum et agendum). In other words, we need God’s motus elevatus.108 However, since sin has 
also corrupted us this side of the Fall, we also need God’s auxilium to cancel the debt of sin 
(remissio culpae) and to transform our prior sinful inclinations to good-willing tendencies 
(voluntas incipit bonum). In other words, we need forgiveness and conversion.109
 By way of grace, God’s maximal actuality meets us in our nature, heals its diseases, 
and elevates our “active potency” to a divine plane.110 Since human nature is altogether 
inferior to the divine nature, whether we are “at full capacity” in a so-called state of “inte-
gral nature” or corrupted in our postlapsarian state, we are incapable of making even the 
106 See ST I-II.111.2 co. Cf. ST I-II.110.2.
107 ST I-II.109.9 co. 
108 ST I-II.111.2 co.
109 For the forgiveness (remissio) of sins, see ST I-II.113.2 co.; for the conversion (conversio) of the will 
from willing malum to willing bonum, see ST I-II.111.2 co. See also Wawrykow, “Grace,” in The Theology of 
Thomas Aquinas, for a discussion on the scope of auxilium (194-199) and the contours of conversion (196-
198, 204-209).
110 As Aquinas unswervingly avers in ST I-II.109, a supernatural goal requires a motus that lies beyond 
our nature and its faculties. As human, our faculties are limited capacities. We are not pure actuality (actus 
purus), so we need God’s gracious help even to approach our divine end. Only God’s “capacities” are fully 
actualized and actual—thus, they are more appropriately called “attributes,” not “capacities.”
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first gesture toward good and toward God. Grace therefore acts as an assistive motion 
(auxilium motus) by inaugurating a transformation of soul and preparing it to receive the 
infusion of habitual grace.111 Granted, inasmuch as grace is a habitus in the soul, a graced 
individual “has” (habere) a supernatural esse that is capable of supernatural operatio. But 
in order to continue in the state of grace and act in a manner worthy of (dignus) eternal life, 
we require ongoing additional auxilia from God.112 Therefore, auxilium is not so much 
a “supplement” to Aquinas’s longstanding concept of habitual grace as it is a full-orbed 
“complement” thereto. Divine assistance may be “auxiliary,” but it is certainly not “ancil-
lary.” It is an integral part of the symbiotic relationship between the habit and the actual-
ization of grace.
iii. Gratia Operans (Operative Grace) and 
Gratia Cooperans (Cooperative Grace)
 In response to the question of the division of grace into “operative” and “coopera-
tive,” Aquinas signals to us the relationship he has in mind between grace as habitus and 
auxilium and grace as operans and cooperans:
As was explained above, there are two ways in which grace can be thought of: (a) 
as a divine assistance [auxilium] by which God moves us to will correctly and act 
correctly, and (b) as a habitual gift [habituale donum] that is poured into us by God. 
Now grace taken in either of these senses is appropriately divided into operating 
grace [gratia operans] and cooperating grace [gratia cooperans].… In the case of that 
effect in which our mind is moved but is not effecting the movement, whereas God 
111 See ST I-II.112.2 co., where Aquinas clearly states that some preparation or disposition is required to 
receive the gift of habitual grace. This is God’s prior helping motion, auxilium. Auxilium does not require 
any preparation because it is not a form or quality of the soul. Cf. Wawrykow, “Grace,” in The Theology of 
Thomas Aquinas, 196-199. 
112 Wawrykow, “Grace,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 198-199.
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alone is effecting the movement, the operation is attributed to God and the grace 
is accordingly called operating grace. On the other hand, in the case of that effect in 
which our mind is both effecting the movement and being moved, the operation is 
attributed not only to God but also to our soul and the grace is accordingly called 
cooperating grace.113
Each distinction diversifies the other, resulting in the specification of four types of grace 
here: (1) operative actual grace; (2) operative habitual grace; (3) cooperative actual grace; 
and (4) cooperative habitual grace. Given this interweaving of divisions, we could reason 
that, as Aquinas comes to expand the essence of grace in the individual by way of auxil-
ium/motus, he also comes to reshape the traditional separation of grace as operative and 
cooperative. Such is precisely the case, and the task before us now is to tease out that 
doctrinal development in order to understand better these four expressions of grace in 
Aquinas’s mature thought.
 Aquinas offers us a clue as to the heritage of the operative-cooperative distinction 
in the sed contra of this article, where he cites Augustine: “God, by cooperating with us, 
perfects what He began by operating in us [cooperando perficit quod operando incipit], 
since He who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing, begins by operating that 
they may will.”114 Augustine’s bisection has a certain temporal aspect to it: grace begins to 
operate so that we can will; it then cooperates when we will.115 It also comports with the 
113 ST I-II.111.2 co. (Freddoso).
114 ST I-II.111.2 s.c. The reference is to Augustine’s De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, an anti-Pelagian work 
from late in his career. In chapter 17, Augustine provides the kernel of the doctrine of cooperative grace: 
cooperando perficit quod operando incipit. For more on this and other related works by Augustine, see Augus-
tine: On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings, trans. and ed. Peter King 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
115 This kind of temporal implication, compounded over 750 years of interpretation, could very well 
account for the parallels that seemed to develop between grace as operative/cooperative and grace as pre-
venient/subsequent, especially in early Scholasticism. See Colberg, “Thomas Aquinas and the Grace of 
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young Aquinas’s exclusive understanding of sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens) as an 
infused habitus. As we noted earlier, though, the shift from a “habitus-only” paradigm to 
the “habitus-and-auxilium” version, first seen in Summa Contra Gentiles, finds its fullest 
expression in Summa Theologiae. Thus, Aquinas certainly includes habitual grace in this 
operational division, but he devotes significantly less space to the subject. He also opts to 
develop Augustine’s teaching vis-à-vis Aristotelian categories. Like any form, replies Aqui-
nas, habitual grace has two effects: being (esse) and operation (operatio). Where habitual 
grace essentially makes us favorable to God (gratam Deo facit) by healing or justifying the 
soul (animam sanat vel iustificat), it is operative. Where habitual grace effects meritorious 
works that also proceed from our free will (ex libero arbitrio), it is cooperative. Accordingly, 
operative habitual grace is the formal principle of justification, i.e., the state of being just; 
cooperative habitual grace is the formal principle of meritorious acts, i.e., the subsequent 
manifestation of God’s gracious infusion of our souls.
 Up to this point, Aquinas very much follows Augustine’s trajectory in De Gratia 
et Libero Arbitrio. But notice where Aquinas references Augustine in this article—the 
sed contra, not the respondeo.116 While Augustine’s authority serves to substantiate the 
division of operative and cooperative grace, Aquinas evidently has something more in 
Auxilium,” 197; cf. Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, which Colberg cites to note the development of Aquinas’s 
thought on grace. According to Colberg, this “allows Thomas to conceive of both habitual grace and auxil-
ium as operative and cooperative” (197n35).
116 This observation points to the logic and structure of summae as a Scholastic genre. A sed contra 
often (though not exclusively) shifts the foundation presented in the objections by appealing to scripture or 
tradition. It is not necessarily the author’s stated position (respondeo), but it may serve as a general introduc-
tion to that response. For more on Aquinas’s use of the summa genre, with a general overview on reading 
the Summa, see Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, “Reading the Summa Theologiae,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to the Summa Theologiae, 9-22. For a tighter focus on Aquinas’s quaestio-form method, see John 
Marenbon, “Method,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Summa Theologiae, 74-82.
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mind than a “habitus-only” approach to grace’s dynamic. Specifically, he has in mind the 
concept of auxilium/motus, which Aquinas treats at length in this article on operative and 
cooperative grace.
 Aquinas begins his discussion of operative and cooperate auxilia with yet another 
twofold distinction—acts of the will according to their interiority or exteriority. Interi-
orly, actual grace is strictly God’s motus on a passive soul. This is especially (praesertim) 
the case of the conversion of the soul from willing malum to willing bonum. “Inasmuch 
as God moves [movet] the human mind to this act, it is called operating (actual) grace.”117 
Exteriorly, Aquinas’s focus is on the performance of meritoriously good actions at the 
behest of the human will. But “since God, too, assists us with respect to this act—both 
by interiorly strengthening the will to arrive at the act [interius confirmando voluntatem 
ut ad actum perveniat] and by exteriorly providing the power to operate [exterius facul-
tatem operandi praebendo]—the grace is called cooperating grace.”118 Whether operative 
or cooperative, actual grace is to be taken as God’s gratuitous motion that moves us to 
meritorious good. As operative, auxilium forgives sin,119 inaugurates the soul’s conversion, 
and moves the soul to receive habitual grace.120 As cooperative, auxilium fortifies the soul 
to produce truly good acts that are both genuine and genitive with respect to human nature 
(see Chapter 4).
117 Aquinas, ST I-II.111.2 co. (my translation).
118 ST I-II.111.2 co. (Freddoso).
119 ST I-II.113.2. In this article, Aquinas identifies “the remission of sin” with “justification.”
120 For a discussion of operative auxilium, see Wawrykow, “Grace,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 
196-197.
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 Finally, a few implications of grace as operative and cooperative are in order. First, 
habitual grace (whether operative or cooperative) is infused only once because it is a 
formal quality of the soul. It is only distinguished as operative or cooperative according 
to its effects, not according to a plurality of phenomena.121 Second, operative auxilium 
would appear to be singular as well, inasmuch as it is considered “especially” as conver-
sion. However, since perseverance in grace is not automatically achieved by a singular 
infusion of God’s grace, a fall from grace is possible. Since perseverance in grace requires 
our cooperation, it would seem to necessitate subsequent operative auxilium—but not an 
additional infusion of habitual grace (whether operative or cooperative). Third, coopera-
tive auxilium is multiple, manifold, ongoing—and fully characteristic of Aquinas’s mature 
doctrine of grace. Again, actual grace complements habitual grace: as God’s cooperative 
auxilia actualize and deepen the divine habitus within us, we come to share in the super-
abundance of “grace upon grace” ( John 1:16).
iv. Gratia Praeveniens (Prevenient Grace) and 
Gratia Subsequens (Subsequent Grace)
 The final division of grace—prevenient and subsequent—is probably Aquinas’s 
most straightforward. Like the first division, this one proceeds according to the gracious 
effects it produces, of which Aquinas names five: healing the soul, willing the good, doing 
the good, persevering in good, and attaining glory (see Diagram 6, above).122 The order 
121 ST I-II.111.2 ad 4.
122 ST I-II.111.3 co. Although Aquinas presents only five effects of grace in us, his list is not intended 
to be exhaustive (see ad 3). Rather, the list is indicative of the kinds of effects wrought by grace in the soul 
according to the overall nature of grace.
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of these effects is important to understanding what Aquinas means by praeveniens and 
subsequens. Where grace causes a first/former effect in us, it is “prevenient” with respect 
to a second/later effect. Where grace causes a second/later effect in us, it is “subsequent” 
with respect to a first/former effect.123 The implication is that the life of grace begins with 
the gracious healing of the soul and aims at the gracious attainment of glory in heaven. 
Aquinas acknowledges as much when he states that subsequent grace pertains to glory, 
while prevenient grace is that “whereby we are at present justified.”124 Accordingly, the 
prevenient/subsequent distinction of grace encapsulates an abbreviated Thomistic via 
salutis, which fully corresponds with his view of Christian life as a present journey (in via) 
to our future heavenly homeland (in patria).125
v. A Visual Overview of Aquinas’s Divisions of Grace
 By way of conclusion, the best way to express Aquinas’s various divisions of grace 
is visually. The following diagram depicts these divisions, with an eye towards Aquinas’s 
general observations regarding the nature of grace. It is important to bear in mind that, 
although Aquinas gives many nuanced divisions of grace, he never waivers from the essen-
tial unity of grace. Rather than reduce his divisions into a tight system, I have therefore 
allowed Aquinas’s own idiom(s) for grace come through in this visual arrangement.
123 ST I-II.111.3 co. Notice that Aquinas numerically orders these five effects.
124 ST I-II.111.3 ad 2.
125 See ST I-II.111.3 ad 2 for Aquinas’s explicit mention of in via and in patria.
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Focus on being (esse)
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Elevates the soul (elevans) 
Formal principle of 
meritorious acts (i.e., the 
act of doing justly)
Focus on doing (operatio)
Diagram 7. A Visual Overview of Aquinas’s Divisions of Grace
B. Wesley’s (Threefold) Division(s) of Grace
 When it comes to the task of distilling a Wesleyan taxonomy of grace, two factors 
have come to predominate the discussion. First, the study of Wesley’s doctrine of grace 
typically unfolds soteriologically. Wesley’s forms of grace are usually considered in light of 
certain phases or milestones in the way of salvation. While such an approach is in keeping 
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with Wesley’s prevailing theological focus,126 it has the unfortunate consequence of flat-
tening Wesley’s doctrine to a mere checklist of graces—or, at the very least, of relegating 
his doctrine to an individualized experience of salvation.127 Second, explications of Wes-
ley’s doctrine of grace typically delineate three forms—prevenient grace, justifying grace, 
and sanctifying grace128—which then correspond with the soteriological pattern of the 
first caveat. Again, the delineation is not without textual warrant (as we shall see below), 
but we must understand here that it is not Wesley’s only way of explaining grace. In fact, it 
is not even his most common expression.
 Therefore, in the present section, we will attempt to unpack Wesley’s division(s) 
of grace in a manner that seeks to avoid the concomitant limitations of the two aforemen-
tioned approaches.129 However, it is imperative to note here that the following typological 
126 Wesley displays his soteriological focus implicitly in his arrangement of his published sermons, where 
“Salvation by Faith” boasts the pole position. But Wesley also makes this focus explicit, as in his 1746 “Pref-
ace” to Sermons on Several Occasions: “I want to know one thing, the way to heaven—how to land safe on 
that happy shore.… I have accordingly set down in the following sermons what I find in the Bible concerning 
the way to heaven, with a view to distinguish this way of God from all those which are the inventions of men” 
(§§5-6, in Works 1:105-106). As Albert Outler notes, Wesley reprints this preface verbatim in every collection 
of his sermons published in his lifetime. In so doing, Wesley “stress[es] soteriology as the focus of his entire 
theology” (Outler, in Works 1:103).
127 This statement may come as a shock to some Wesleyans—and as heresy to others! However, the 
explicit agenda that Wesley sets before the first Methodist Conference (1744) is the consideration of “doc-
trine, discipline, and practice” (Works 10:120). For Wesley, doctrine is a corporate practice, and the experi-
ence of salvation is to be interpreted socially—for example, within the Methodist societies. For a discussion 
of the fuller embodiment of experience conveying doctrine within an ecclesial setting, see Russell E. Richey, 
Doctrine in Experience: A Methodist Theology of Church and Ministry (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 2009).
128 A stark example is a palatably-distilled doctrinal expression of the United Methodist Church itself, 
published on the denomination’s website. See “Our Wesleyan Heritage,” The United Methodist Church, 
accessed April 18, 2018, http://www.umc.org/what-we-believe/our-wesleyan-heritage. Related to this 
statement is a three-part series on Wesleyan grace, complete with multimedia. See Joe Iovino, “The Wes-
leyan Concept of Grace,” The United Methodist Church, last modified March 2, 2018, accessed April 18, 
2018, http://www.umc.org/topics/the-wesleyan-concept-of-grace.
129 This should not be taken as an attempt to discredit the content of either approach. First, soteriol-
ogy as a whole is deserving of its own focused treatment, where Wesley’s doctrine may be compared with 
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presentation and analysis of Wesley’s constellations of grace are not meant to be competing 
or even alternate systems of grace. As we shall see by the end of this section, although Wes-
ley’s terminological arrangements of grace are unique from one another, they nonetheless 
represent Wesley’s unified understanding of grace. Accordingly, I have not attempted to 
flatten Wesley’s nuanced depictions of grace for the sake of systemization, but have instead 
left Wesley to speak for himself in his own language.
i. The “Doctrines/Degrees Model”: 
Prevenient, Justifying, and Sanctifying Grace
 By and large, the most frequent manner of discussing Wesley’s teaching on grace is 
according to a threefold division: grace as prevenient,130 justifying, and sanctifying. Let us 
call this the “doctrines/degrees model”—for reasons that will become clear in what fol-
lows. As mentioned above, this model is not without merit. Wesley offers this exact divi-
sion at least twice in his published Works—most-famously in his definition of “means of 
grace” in his 1746 sermon of the same name,131 and in a 1740 entry from his Journal where 
he discusses the Lord’s Supper as conveying all three types of grace.132 It may be worth 
Aquinas’s on equal footing. The current chapter seeks to establish the nature of grace for each theologian, 
not their soteriologies. Second, the “prevenient, justifying, sanctifying” model of Wesleyan grace is indeed 
addressed here as one way Wesley discusses grace—but it is not the only approach presented.
130 Note that Wesley employs the term “preventing grace,” and that “prevenient grace” is a term that Wes-
leyans have adopted in order to reduce confusion from a more-colloquial understanding of “prevention.” Of 
course, “prevenient” may be more precise in rendering the Latin participle praeveniens. Still, we will take 
“preventing” and “prevenient” to be synonymous for this section.
131 Wesley, Sermon 16, “The Means of Grace,” II.1, in Works 1:381. “By ‘means of grace’ I understand 
outward signs, words, or actions ordained of God, and appointed for this end—to be the ordinary channels 
whereby he might convey to men preventing, justifying, or sanctifying grace.”
132 Journal, June 28, 1740, in Works 19:159. “I showed at large, (1) that the Lord’s Supper was ordained by 
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noting that both references occur in a sacramental context involving the mediation of grace 
according to its various kinds. Wesley also mentions “justifying grace” alongside “sancti-
fying grace” (but without “preventing grace”) in his sermon “A Call to Backsliders.”133 So, 
how does a handful of references yield a generally-accepted “doctrines/degrees model”?
 One possibility comes from Wesley’s additional doctrinal triads. One such triad 
is Wesley’s “three grand scriptural doctrines” of original sin, justification, and regenera-
tion.134 A similar trio comes from an earlier open-letter apologia for Methodism, in which 
Wesley enumerates the movement’s “constant doctrines” as repentance, faith, and holi-
ness.135 Without much theological tinkering, these similar doctrinal sets could then be 
collated with Wesley’s (mature) “way of salvation,” consisting of prevenient grace, justi-
fication, and sanctification.136 Since salvation is “by grace (τῇ χάριτί)…through faith (διὰ 
πίστεως)” (Eph. 2:8),137 we could surmise that the doctrinal “road markers” along the way 
also signify “grace markers.” Accordingly, repentance is the act that answers the stain of 
original sin and is made possible by prevenient grace; faith is the means of justification and 
God to be a means of conveying to men either preventing or justifying, or sanctifying grace, according to their 
several necessities.”
133 Sermon 86, “A Call to Backsliders,” I.3, II.6, in Works 3:216, 225.
134 See John Wesley to the Rev. George Downing, April 6, 1761, in Works 27:250.
135 Wesley, The Principles of a Methodist Farther Explained (1746), VI.4, in Works 9:226-227. In this 
passage, Wesley famously likens Methodism’s three “constant doctrines” to a house: “The first of these we 
account, as it were, the porch of religion; the next, the door; the third is religion itself.”
136 See Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salvation” (1765), especially I.1-4, in Works 2:156-158. Cf. 
Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation” (1785), II.1, in Works 3:203-204, for an even more devel-
oped, precise, and concise description of this via salutis.
137 Ephesians 2:8 is Wesley’s text for Sermon 1, “Salvation by Faith,” and Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way 
of Salvation”—both of which are critical for ascertaining Wesley’s soteriology and its development.
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is made possible by justifying grace; holiness is the consequence of regeneration and is made 
possible by sanctifying grace.138
 A second and related line of reasoning undoubtedly comes from the secondary 
literature. Wesleyans have struck upon this “doctrines/degrees model” as a convenient 
soteriological hermeneutic for Wesley’s doctrine of grace.139 While the precise prove-
nance of the “doctrines/degrees model” is not altogether clear, it does not appear as a 
hermeneutical structure until the middle of the twentieth century—or, in Albert Outler’s 
terminology, “Wesley Studies, Phase II.”140 For example, George Cell’s The Rediscovery 
of John Wesley (1935) only mentions this model once in passing.141 William Cannon’s The 
Theology of John Wesley (1946), which arguably stands at the forefront of “Phase II” stud-
138 These details and their textual sources are helpfully organized in Ted A. Campbell, Wesleyan Beliefs: 
Formal and Popular Expressions of the Core Beliefs of Wesleyan Communities (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 
2010), 73-82, 84, especially the chart on 77.
139 Modern examples might include Kenneth J. Collins, The Scripture Way of Salvation: The Heart of 
John Wesley’s Theology (Nashville: Abingdon Books, 1997); Runyon, The New Creation; and Ted A. Camp-
bell, Methodist Doctrine: The Essentials, Revised Edition (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2011). While Maddox 
employs the “doctrines/degrees model” in Responsible Grace, it is mostly limited to his discussion of the 
means of grace (192-229).
140 See Outler, “A New Future for Wesley Studies,” especially 36, 39. In brief, “Phase I” is “by Methodists 
and for Methodists,” and its task was to link Methodism and Wesley himself. “Phase II” is marked by “(1) 
the concern to rescue Wesley from his Methodist cocoon, and (2) to probe more deeply into one or another 
basic aspect of his thought and praxis” (39). This is the context for many mid-twentieth-century studies 
connecting Wesley to other (Protestant) thinkers, or tying him doctrinally to other (Protestant) traditions. 
One fruit of “Phase II” has been the ongoing publication of a critical edition of Wesley’s Works, making it 
possible to engage Wesley (and with Wesley) in a far more nuanced and intricate manner. Phase III would 
then be characterized by the magisterial “Theologies of John Wesley” texts of the past 25 years that unpack 
Wesley’s theology according to a meta-concept or hermeneutic.
141 Cell, The Rediscovery of John Wesley, 334. Observe that Cell’s citation—“Sermons 44, 12, etc.”—is 
woefully incomplete and inaccurate (334n12)! According to Cell’s index of “Wesley’s Published Sermons” 
(415-418), “Sermon 12” represents “The Means of Grace,” while “Sermon 44” represents Wesley’s second 
discourse on “The Witness of the Spirit.” As we have seen, “The Means of Grace” does support the “preve-
nient, justifying, sanctifying” model of grace; however, “The Witness of the Spirit, Discourse II,” features 
no such division of grace. One truly wonders what Cell had in mind by “etc.,” too.
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ies, frequently discusses “justifying grace,” but he takes this as a synonym for “faith.”142 
Colin William’s John Wesley’s Theology Today (1960) approaches Wesley’s theology and 
doctrines through an ordo salutis, but he does not interpret Wesleyan grace according 
to the threefold “doctrines/degrees model.”143 Robert Chiles’s Theological Transition in 
American Methodism (1965) marks a turning point, for it is here that we finally come to see 
a broad-based explication of “Wesleyan Free Grace” according to “God’s Atoning Grace,” 
“Prevenient Grace,” “Justifying Grace,” and “Sanctifying Grace.”144 By the 1980s, the lan-
guage weaves its way into the critical apparatus of the Bicentennial Edition of Wesley’s 
Works,145 as well as the United Methodist Church’s theologically self-defining statements 
in The Book of Discipline.146
142 See William Ragsdale Cannon, The Theology of John Wesley: With Special Reference to the Doctrine 
of Justification (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1946), 115; cf. 248. Cannon’s focus on justification 
explains his frequency of discussing “justifying grace.” His treatment of “preventing grace” is also expected, 
given its sheer significance to the substance and style of Wesley’s theology. Curiously, though, Cannon never 
mentions “sanctifying grace.”
143 Williams, John Wesley’s Theology Today. This work, which was written with a clear eye toward the 
ecumenical dialogue that would characterize the era, became a standard text in Wesleyan theology up 
through the 1990s. Note, Williams does not use the phrase “doctrines/degrees model.”
144 Robert E. Chiles, Theological Transition in American Methodism: 1790-1935 (New York: Abingdon 
Press, 1965), 145-148, 148-153, 153-154, 154-157 (respectively). Chiles’s longest section is devoted to preve-
nient grace, which operates as the Wesleyan premise for free will. By Chiles’s account, the transition from 
“free grace” to “free will” amounts to a modernizing abandonment of the theological, gracious, and entirely 
unmerited underpinnings of Wesley’s doctrine of grace.
145 The publication of the Works changed hands in 1984 from Oxford University Press (which published 
only four volumes) to Abingdon Press (the current publisher). Abingdon’s output then began (in 1984) with 
four volumes of Wesley’s sermons (vv. 1-4), all under Albert Outler’s editorship. Within those volumes, one 
begins to see the “doctrines/degrees model” take hold as an interpretive theological device. For example, 
Outler brings up God’s “prevenient, justifying, and sanctifying activities” in commenting on the opening 
lines of Wesley, Sermon 1, “Salvation by Faith,” in Works 1:117n5. The motif is not necessarily overwhelming 
or overtly recurring, but it is present and has remained so.
146 In 1972, four years after the formation of the United Methodist Church out of the merger of the 
Methodist Church and the Evangelical United Brethren Church, the new denomination’s Book of Disci-
pline included an essay entitled “Our Theological Task” (¶70). Under the leadership of Albert Outler, the 
document had been written in lieu of synthesizing the prior doctrinal statements of the merging traditions. 
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 In any event, Wesley’s repeated stress on the role of prevenient grace (especially to 
distance himself from Calvinism) is a solid indication that it must be included in any truly 
“Wesleyan” explication of grace.147 As the grace that precedes human action, offsets certain 
effects of original sin, and grants the spark of personal- and God-awareness, prevenient 
grace brings an individual to repentance before God.148 Following this is “proper Christian 
salvation,” which Wesley takes to mean justification and sanctification. The former remits 
sin’s guilt and restores God’s favor, while the latter uproots sin’s power and restores God’s 
image.149 
Under the heading “Distinctive Emphases of United Methodists,” the 1972 statement included “the primacy 
of grace,” which developed the ideas of prevenient grace, as well as grace’s “active cause” in justification and 
sanctification. See The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church, 1972 (Nashville: The United Meth-
odist Publishing House, 1972), ¶70. For the 1988 Book of Discipline, the United Methodist Church radically 
revised “Our Theological Task” (¶105), while adding another essay on “Our Doctrinal Heritage” (¶102). It 
is “Our Doctrinal Heritage” that spells out the “doctrines/degrees model” of grace (prevenient, justifying, 
sanctifying) precisely as one of the “Distinctive Wesleyan Emphases” (¶102). Since 1988, “Our Doctrinal 
Heritage” and “Our Theological Task” have been included in all United Methodist Disciplines. See The Book 
of Discipline of the United Methodist Church, 1988 (Nashville: The United Methodist Publishing House, 1988), 
¶¶102, 105; and The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church, 2016 (Nashville: The United Methodist 
Publishing House, 2016), ¶¶102, 105.
N.B.: The United Methodist Discipline has been published quadrennially since 1968 by the United 
Methodist Publishing House in Nashville. As with many constituting texts, citations are given according to 
numbered paragraphs. Hereafter, this text will be cited simply as Discipline (year), ¶ (number).
147 This may be demonstrated by the prevalence of Wesley’s doctrine of prevenient grace in a number 
of dissertations over the past two 50 years: J. Gregory Crofford, “Streams of Mercy: Prevenient Grace in 
the Theology of John and Charles Wesley” (Ph.D. diss., University of Manchester, 2008); David T. Fry, 
“Grace Enough: An Exposition and Theological Defense of the Wesleyan Concept of Prevenient Grace” 
(Ph.D. diss., Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2014); Eldon Ralph Fuhrman, “The Concept of Grace 
in the Theology of John Wesley” (Ph.D. diss., State University of Iowa, 1963); Robert Vincent Rakestraw, 
“The Concept of Grace in the Ethics of John Wesley” (Ph.D. diss., Drew University, 1985); and Charles 
Allen Rogers, “The Concept of Prevenient Grace in the Theology of John Wesley” (Ph.D., Duke University, 
1967).
148 Kenneth Collins discusses these functions (as well as other benefits) of prevenient grace in The 
Theology of John Wesley, 77-82. Here, Collins specifically engages Rogers’s dissertation, “The Concept of 
Prevenient Grace in the Theology of John Wesley,” 96.
149 See Wesley, Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” II.1, in Works 3:204. Note again 
Wesley’s use of Ephesians 2:8.
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 Again, while soteriology is not the explicit focus of the present chapter, it is valu-
able to pause for a moment to appreciate Wesley’s differentiation between justification 
and sanctification. These “two grand branches”150 of salvation bespeak a tacit, nuanced 
division within Wesley’s doctrine of grace.
[ Justification] is not the being made actually just and righteous. This is sanctifi-
cation; which is indeed in some degree the immediate fruit of justification, but 
nevertheless is a distinct gift of God, and of a totally different nature. The one 
implies what God does for us through his Son; the other what he works in us by his 
Spirit.151
Like Aquinas, Wesley draws our attention to grace’s soteriological effects in order to enun-
ciate (albeit implicitly) grace’s various expressions or types. Wesley’s “for us”/“in us” dis-
tinction broadly resonates with Aquinas’s pairing of operative and cooperative grace from 
earlier—and, to a certain extent, with Aquinas’s sequential account of prevenient and 
subsequent grace. Similarly, it is possible to approach justifying grace (“for us”) from a 
forensic/legal perspective and sanctifying grace (“in us”) from a restorative/therapeutic 
perspective. Within Wesley’s own theological vocabulary, these would then correspond 
with the notion of grace as pardon (“for us”) and grace as power (“in us”). Lastly, Wesley’s 
“for us”/“in us” distinction echoes his earlier characterization of “free grace” as “free in 
all” and “free for all.” Because God’s grace is free for all (universal scope), God wills to 
do for us (i.e., “on our behalf ”) what is free in all (unmerited, freely given). Thus, by God 
working in us and with us, we may become participants in the divine nature (2 Pet. 1:5). 
To combine Wesley and Aquinas, since God’s operative action works for us by way of the 
150 See Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” II.1, in Works 3:204.
151 Sermon 5, “Justification by Faith,” II.1, in Works 1:187. 
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Son (as “justifying grace”), God’s cooperative action may then work in us (as “sanctifying 
grace”) by way of the Spirit.
 To summarize, although the prevenient–justifying–sanctifying division of grace 
occasionally appears in Wesley’s own works, the standardization of this threefold interpre-
tation is much more attributable to Wesleyan theologians and commentators over the past 
50 years or so.152 Within this model, “preventing or prevenient grace…elicits a first longing 
for God; justifying or pardoning grace…brings an individual into a saving relationship; 
and sanctifying or sustaining grace…enables continued growth in faith and production 
of faith’s fruits.”153 Again, due to the parity between the “doctrines/degrees model” and 
Wesley’s soteriological foci, the structure appears organic even though it is not Wesley’s 
customary idiom.
152 One could very easily draw a comparison to the so-called “Wesleyan Quadrilateral”—a construct 
first articulated in “Our Theological Task” in the 1972 Book of Discipline to describe the interplay of Scrip-
ture, Tradition, Reason, and Experience that characterizes Wesley’s theological content and style. Although 
Wesley himself neither employed the term “quadrilateral” nor explicitly referenced all four “sources” 
together in one work, the idea is that the later construction is genuinely a Wesleyan theological expres-
sion without being located in Wesley’s exact words. Similarly, the “doctrines/degrees model” of Wesleyan 
grace stems from Wesley’s own idioms (on two occasions, verbatim), but is largely a collated distillation by 
Wesleyans of Wesley himself. For more on the role of the “Wesleyan Quadrilateral” in contemporary Wes-
leyan-Methodist theological reflection, see Andrew C. Thompson, “Outler’s Quadrilateral, Moral Psychol-
ogy, and Theological Reflection in the Wesleyan Tradition,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 46, no. 1 (Spring 
2011): 49-72; and Gunter et al., Wesley and the Quadrilateral. See also Albert C. Outler, “The Wesleyan 
Quadrilateral in Wesley,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 20, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 7-18; Leon Hynson, “The 
Wesleyan Quadrilateral in the American Holiness Tradition,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 20, no. 1 (Spring 
1985): 19-33; and William J. Abraham, “The Wesleyan Quadrilateral in the American Methodist-Episcopal 
Tradition,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 20, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 34-44.
153 Karen B. Westerfield Tucker, “Wesley’s Emphases on Worship and the Means of Grace,” in The Cam-
bridge Companion to John Wesley, 228.
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ii. The “Traditions/Dynamics Model”: 
Preventing, Accompanying, and Following Grace
 Whereas the foregoing division of Wesleyan grace as prevenient, justifying, and 
sanctifying rarely appears verbatim in Wesley’s voluminous theological output, another 
constellation occurs with far more textual frequency. This is the threefold division of grace 
as preventing, accompanying, and following, which, for the sake of comparison, let us call 
the “traditions/dynamics model.” As noted earlier, although this model is distinguished 
from the “doctrines/degrees model” of grace, it is not meant to be isolated therefrom. 
For Wesley (as for Aquinas), grace is always whole, always one; accordingly, the models 
of grace, though unique, are nonetheless unified. The purpose of this section is thus to 
uncover the particular provenance of this “traditions/dynamics model” and to identify its 
contributions to Wesley’s overall understanding of God’s grace.
 In the first place, the “traditions/dynamics model” helps to trace the theological lin-
eage of Wesley’s doctrine of grace. One distinct theological tradition standing behind this 
model is the Arminianism that Wesley self-consciously adopts.154 In late 1608, Arminius 
famously set down his opinions about God’s grace and predestination in his Declaration of 
Sentiments. Arminius begins his article “On God’s Grace” with a threefold understanding 
of grace’s nature that could double as a synopsis of Aquinas’s own mature doctrine. First, 
grace is “an unearned divine favorable disposition” of God toward us sinners—God’s 
gratum given gratis. Second, grace is the “infusion of a holy disposition”—a habitus char-
acterized by the theological virtues and “inclined to good desires that lead to the actual 
performance of what is good.” Third, grace is the “perpetual assistance and continued aid 
154 See Wesley’s “Introduction” to the first issue of The Arminian Magazine (1778).
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of the Holy Spirit” acting upon the infused disposition to cooperate with us in performing 
God’s will—that is, auxilium.155 Arminius then continues with an effects-based division 
of grace: “I ascribe to grace the beginning, the continuance, and the consummation of 
all good,” asserting that even a regenerated person is helpless to think, will, or do any-
thing good “apart from this preventing and awakening, this continuing and cooperating 
grace.”156 After asserting genuine human moral autonomy and rejecting its opposition to 
God’s activities (which Wesley and Aquinas likewise affirm), Arminius concludes with 
the scripturally-evident human ability to resist and reject grace. Fundamentally, all three 
theologians subscribe to Augustine’s Philippians-based understanding of grace working in 
us to will (ut velimus) and with us to act (ut faciamus).157
 As discussed above, Aquinas’s exposure to Augustine’s late position is direct; Wes-
ley’s, however, is mediated by way of his Church. A staunch Anglican presbyter, Wesley 
echoes his Church’s articulation that we can neither produce nor even prepare for faith 
“without the grace of God preventing us [nos praeveniente], that we may have a good will 
[ut velimus], and working with us [et cooperante], when we have that good will.”158 Such is 
155 James Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, Section 2, “The Grace of God,” in W. Stephen Gunter, 
Arminius and His Declaration of Sentiments: An Annotated Translation with Introduction and Theological 
Commentary (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2012), 140-141.
156 Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, 141.
157 Cf. Augustine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, c. 17.
158 Article X, “Of Free Will,” The Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion (1563). For more on the Articles, see 
Bicknell, A Theological Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. Bicknell notes (172) 
the Augustinianism the second half of Article X, which was adopted in 1553; the first half, which stresses post-
lapsarian depravity and human incapacity, was added from the Confession of Württemberg a decade later.
In 1784, Wesley transmitted this Article (as part of a condensed personal revision of the Thirty-Nine 
Articles) nearly verbatim to North American Methodists who, as a result of American independence, were 
facing the formation of a new denomination outside of the Church of England. Along with his version of the 
Articles, Wesley included a revision of the Book of Common Prayer (titled Sunday Service for the Methodists 
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Arminius’s own sentiment: “Among those causes [of faith’s performance] I consider the 
preventing, accompanying and succeeding [subsequent] grace of God.… ‘Those persons 
will be saved…who…believe by the assistance of his preventing grace, (I add and of his 
accompanying grace,) and…persevere by the aid of his subsequent grace.’”159 Here is a 
verbatim precursor to Wesley’s “traditions/dynamics model” of grace, complete with a 
robust notion of God’s continuing gracious auxilia.
 Having traced some of the theological strands informing Wesley’s understanding 
of grace, we may now turn to identify the “traditions/dynamics model” within Wesley’s 
own writings. Among the numerous instances of the “traditions/dynamics model” of 
grace are passages from Wesley’s entire corpus, including his Notes, sermons, and trea-
tises. The starkest example comes from Wesley’s longest work, his 1757 The Doctrine of 
Original Sin, which takes direct aim at Jeremy Taylor’s rejection of original sin. As Randy 
Maddox describes in an editorial introduction to the treatise, Wesley exhibits his Armin-
ian commitments more so here than in his other works. Since Taylor’s position stems 
from discarding Calvinism for a “rationalist form of Arminianism” premised on “a naively 
optimistic view of human nature,” Wesley counters with an “evangelical Arminianism” 
rooted in the good news of grace.160 Wesley writes the following:
in North America), and a compendium of Methodist doctrinal texts: Wesley’s standard Sermons and New 
Testament Notes, the “Large” Minutes of the Methodist Conferences (which would become the Methodist 
Discipline), and a collection of Hymns & Psalms. For more on these doctrinal transmissions within Method-
ism, see Oden, Doctrinal Standards in the Wesleyan Tradition.
159 Arminius, Apology against Thirty-One Defamatory Articles, Article IV, in The Works of James Armin-
ius, 1:288. Arminius is here quoting (and modifying!) Fulgentius, the 6th century bishop of Ruspe (in North-
ern Africa).
160 Maddox, “Introduction,” in Works 12:117. Emphasis added.
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You say, ‘[God’s] aids are so far from supposing the previous ineptitude of our 
minds’ (to the being ‘born again’) ‘that our previous desire of the Spirit’s assistance 
is the condition of our receiving it.’ But who gave us that desire? Is it not God ‘that 
worketh in us to will’, to desire, as well as ‘to do’? His grace does accompany and 
follow our desires; but does it not also prevent, go before them? After this we may 
ask and seek farther assistance. And if we do, not otherwise, it is given.161
Wesley covers much doctrinal terrain in this brief paragraph, which begins with a quote 
from Jeremy Taylor’s Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin. Taylor’s argument is that we may 
receive God’s gracious help merely by having desired to receive it beforehand—a desire, 
according to Taylor, that is within our natural abilities. Wesley retorts rhetorically from 
his deep Arminian conviction that grace must heal the soul before (praeveniens) the soul is 
capable of expressing any positive desires (ut velimus). Thereafter, grace may accompany 
(comitans) and follow upon (sequens) our actions as subsequent auxilia, so that we may 
work out (ut faciamus) our own salvation (Phil. 2:12-13).162
 It should then come as no surprise that another principal text for discerning Wes-
ley’s “traditions/dynamics model” is his 1785 sermon on Philippians 2:12-13, “On Working 
Out Our Own Salvation.” In this sermon, Wesley bookends his argument regarding the 
dynamics of grace at work in the totality of our salvation with this preventing–accompany-
ing–following model of grace. Wesley opens with a focus on God’s operation (that we may 
will and do), and the emphasis echoes his earlier notion of grace as free in all—entirely 
161 Wesley, The Doctrine of Original Sin: According to Scripture, Reason, and Experience (1757), Part II, 
VI.2, in Works 12:300-301. Emphasis original.
162 Without even mentioning the explicit and implicit cross-references between Wesley, Arminius, the 
Church of England, Aquinas, and Augustine, there is no denying the fact that all these theologians and 
traditions have in mind Philippians 2 when discussing the inter-workings of God and humans. The basic 
dynamic informing this common reading could be expressed by the Greek ἵνα, the Latin ut, or the English 
so that: God has done something so that (ἵνα, ut) we may do something.
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unmerited, wholly gratuitous. Such grace undercuts pride and signifies the principle of 
iconicity at the heart of Wesley’s doctrine of grace.
Nothing can so directly tend to hide pride from man as a deep, lasting conviction 
of this [God’s working in us to will and to do (Phil. 2:13)]. For if we are thoroughly 
sensible that we have nothing which we have not received, how can we glory as if 
we had not received it? If we know and feel that the very first motion of good is 
from above, as well as the power which conducts it to the end—if it is God that not 
only infuses every good desire, but that accompanies and follows it, else it vanishes 
away—then it evidently follows that ‘he who glorieth must glory in the Lord.’163
In the sections that follow, Wesley lays out the essential contours of his soteriology. This 
begins with the omnipresence of God’s universal, prevenient grace—an invaluable gift, 
often mistaken for “natural conscience.”164 The portrait of “preventing grace” parallels 
Wesley’s former description of grace as free for all, which makes the human contribution 
to the work of salvation both possible and necessary. In other words, because God’s grace 
universally prevents us (praeveniens), we are enabled to move toward God in such a way 
that God’s grace may then accompany us (comitans) in working with God toward the full-
ness of salvation that follows (sequens).165 Wesley then concludes with this exhortative 
ascription:
Go on in virtue of the grace of God, preventing, accompanying, and following you, 
in ‘the work of faith, in the patience of hope, and in the labour of love’.… [And may 
God] ‘make you perfect in every good work to do his will, working in you what 
163 Wesley, Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” I.4, in Works 3:203.
164 Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.4, in Works 3:207. Wesley outlines his basic 
soteriology in II.1 (Works 3:203-204).
165 We must not overlook the “with-ness” at the heart of accompanying (comitans) grace. As evidenced 
in both the English and Latin constructions, this is not some kind of monergistic or unilateral grace; rather, 
the very language implies a degree of equality between humanity and divinity. This would suggest grace as 
elevating (elevans), either prior to or concurrent with grace as accompanying (comitans), so that the “co–” 
signifies a genuine “with-ness.” On a still-deeper level, the very notion of God’s gracious accompaniment is 
the dynamic undergirding the Incarnation: God moving toward (ad—) in order to be with (co—).
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is well-pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever and 
ever!’166
His return to the “traditions/dynamics model” of grace complements the focus established 
from the sermon’s outset. 
 Wesley does not limit this “traditions/dynamics model” to the Philippians 2 
pericope, though—nor even to exclusively soteriological interests. For example, Wesley 
employs the model of grace’s prevenience, accompaniment, and succession to discuss 
our proper stewardship of God’s grace,167 the sequence of grace(s),168 the performance 
of good actions,169 the regenerative animation of the soul by God,170 the Spirit’s witness 
166 Wesley, Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.8, in Works 3:209.
167 Wesley, Sermon 51, “The Good Steward,” III.6, in Works 2:296. Wesley very compellingly reads 
Luke’s parable of the unjust steward in terms of our tending to the grace entrusted to us by God. Therefore, 
in addition to being preventing, accompanying, and following, God’s grace is also accountable. “Thy Lord 
will farther inquire [of us to give an account of our stewardship]: … Above all, wast thou a good steward of 
my grace, preventing, accompanying, and following thee? Didst thou duly observe and carefully improve 
all the influences of my Spirit? Every good desire? Every measure of light? All his sharp or gentle reproofs? 
… Didst thou from thenceforth present thy soul and body, all thy thoughts, thy words, and actions, in one 
flame of love, as an holy sacrifice, glorifying me with thy body and thy spirit? … It remains only that thou 
be rewarded to all eternity according to thy works.” It might also be noted here that, in this last sentence, 
Wesley seems to be advocating a doctrine of merit!
168 Wesley, Notes, 2 Peter 1:5. Wesley’s note is uncharacteristically lengthy, which should signal for us its 
importance. Here, even though grace is taken in the plural (as gratuitous dispositions), the basic sequencing 
holds: “Our diligence is to follow the gift of God, and is followed by an increase of all his gifts.… In this most 
beautiful connection, each preceding grace leads to the following; each following, tempers and perfects 
the preceding. They are set down in the order of nature, rather than the order of time. For though every 
grace bears a relation to every other, yet here they are so nicely ranged, that those which have the closest 
dependence on each other are placed together.”
169 Wesley, Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” III.8, in Works 2:166. Wesley’s point is that we 
cannot effect any good thing prior to God’s grace; in repentance, we are convinced of this “helplessness, of 
our utter inability to think one good thought, or to form one good desire; and much more to speak one word 
aright, or to perform one good action but through his free, almighty grace, first preventing us, and then 
accompanying us every moment.”
170 Wesley, Sermon 17, “The Circumcision of the Heart,” II.4, in Works 1:411. Faith is the root of our good 
works as Christians, but such is effected by grace: “He alone can quicken those who are dead unto God, can 
breathe into them the breath of Christian life, and so prevent, accompany, and follow them with his grace as 
to bring their good desires to good effect.”
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to us being children of God,171 and even the intercession of divine illumination for spiri-
tual comprehension.172 In all of these instances, Wesley consistently holds together three 
central beliefs: (1) God has initiated divine-human relationship by graciously preceding 
any action on our behalf; (2) God acts in order that we may come to co-act with God; and 
(3) having been elevated by grace, we are called to a vita elevans, an elevating life. Grace 
imposes a certain moral-theological responsibility—one that accompanies and follows on 
God’s gracious pardon and empowering grace.
iii. Excursus: Convincing Grace
 Within Wesley’s theological output, there are still other “types” of grace that do 
not fit into either of the aforementioned models.173 One particular type—“convincing 
grace”—is worth discussing here because it potentially connects with Aquinas’s mature 
understanding of grace as auxilium. Although “convincing grace” appears only once in 
171 Wesley, Sermon 10, “The Witness of the Spirit, Discourse I,” II.2-4, in Works 1:277-278. Wesley aims 
here to distinguish “the real testimony of the Spirit” from an ignorant presumptuousness or disillusioned 
spiritual pride. The Scriptures, says Wesley, “describe in the plainest manner the circumstances which go 
before, which accompany, and which follow, the true, genuine testimony of the Spirit of God with the spirit 
of a believer” (II.3), thereby laying “down those clear, obvious marks as preceding, accompanying, and 
following that gift” (II.4).
172 Wesley, Sermon 48, “Self-denial,” I.1, in Works 2:241. Having established that self-denial is utterly 
foreign to worldly logic, Wesley implores his reader to “let fervent prayer then go before, accompany, and 
follow what you are now about to read, that it may be written in your heart by the finger of God, so as never 
to be erased.” Lest this example be dismissed as a human activity and not “grace,” prayer is a principal means 
of God’s grace. Cf. Sermon 16, “The Means of Grace,” III.1-6, in Works 1:384-386.
173 For example, there appear to be two circumstances wherein Wesley discusses “saving grace”: first, 
works where Wesley is engaging a Calvinist notion of “saving grace,” such as Predestination Calmly Consid-
ered, in Works 13:258-320; and second, in quoting a line from one of his Charles’s hymns (“The o’erwhelming 
power of saving grace”), Hymn 9, st. 10, in the 1780 Collection of Hymns, in Works 7:90-92. Outler notes 
that “this was one of Wesley’s favourite expressions during his later years” (Works 2:489n27), citing ample 
evidence from Wesley’s Journal.
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Wesley’s Works, the instance comes from the monumental sermon “On Working Out Our 
Own Salvation” in a section that offers an abbreviated via salutis. As Wesley writes,
salvation begins with what is usually termed (and very properly) ‘preventing 
grace’;* including the first wish to please God, the first dawn of light concerning 
his will, and the first slight, transient conviction of having sinned against him. All 
these imply some tendency toward life, some degree of salvation, the beginning of 
a deliverance from a blind, unfeeling heart.… Salvation is carried on by ‘convincing 
grace’,* usually in Scripture termed ‘repentance’, which brings a larger measure of 
self-knowledge, and a farther deliverance from the heart of stone. Afterwards we 
experience the proper Christian salvation…consisting of those two grand branches, 
justification and sanctification.174
Although brief, Wesley’s description here of “convincing grace” reveals two things: explic-
itly, convincing grace may be understood within scriptural to effect repentance; implicitly, 
convincing grace is an extension or subspecies of prevenient grace that gives rise to the 
experience of “proper Christian salvation,” i.e., justification and sanctification. Within the 
“doctrines/degrees model” of grace, convincing grace functions as the instigating factor in 
elevating one’s experience of God’s grace from “prevenient” to “justifying.” However, by 
approaching convincing grace from the perspective of the “traditions/dynamics model,” 
we may come to appreciate a deeper, implicit nuance to Wesley’s mature understanding of 
grace that links up with Aquinas’s mature notion of grace as auxilium.
 In the excerpt from “On Working Out Our Own Salvation” given above, Albert 
Outler offers editorial footnotes to two key terms, “prevenient grace”175 and “convincing 
grace”176 (both marked in the quotation above with asterisks [*]). Together, both notes 
174 Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” II.1, in Works 3:203-204.
175 See Outler’s note in Wesley, Works 3:203n24.
176 See Outler’s note in Wesley, Works 3:204n25.
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point to a deeper understanding of what Wesley may be suggesting about the dynamics of 
grace and the provenance of such an understanding. The note to “prevenient grace” begins 
with a standard explication: it is the preceding work of the Spirit to draw the human will 
to God. Following this, though, Outler references works by two English divines, Thomas 
Manton (1620-1677) and William Tilly (1675-1740), which serve to indicate Wesley’s theo-
logical inheritance. Manton marks out three species of grace: gratia praeveniens, operans, 
and co-operans—preventing, working, and co-working. By “preventing grace,” Manton 
means something slightly different from both Wesley and Aquinas; it is the grace of 
conversion and the infusion of grace in the soul. “Working grace” then strengthens the 
infused habitus, and “co-working grace” is divine assistance that we require in order to 
act.177 Thus, Manton’s “preventing grace” is closest to Aquinas’s “habitual grace,” whereas 
Manton’s “working grace” and “co-working grace” are closest to the operative and coop-
erative forms of Aquinas’s auxilium.
 Outler continues his commentary on Wesley’s terminology by pointing the reader 
to William Tilly’s first sermon on Philippians 2:12-13.178 In his early days at Oxford (at least 
50 years before “On Working Out Our Own Salvation”), Wesley actually “abstracted” and 
preached five of Tilly’s sermons, including this one on Philippians 2.179 Tilly’s use of “pre-
venting grace” lies somewhere between Manton’s and Wesley’s own mature understand-
ing thereof. Specifically, Tilly emphasizes preventing grace’s volitionally softening effects; 
177 See Outler’s note in Wesley, Works 3:203n24, which cites Manton’s 1681 Works.
178 See again Outler’s notes in Works 3:203n24 and 204n25. The reference is to Tilly’s 1702 “Sermon 
VIII.”
179 See “Appendix C: Sermons Abridge from Other Authors,” in Works 4:531. See also Charles A. Rogers, 
“John Wesley and William Tilly,” Proceedings of the Wesleyan Historical Society 35 ( June 1966): 137-141.
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but, where Tilly goes on to describe “assisting grace” as a sort of cooperative auxilium, 
Wesley employs the language of “convincing grace.”180
 What are we to make of this doctrinal and historical lattice? It seems too much to 
suppose that Manton or Tilly had in mind a Thomistic doctrine of grace when composing 
their respective works, but it is quite likely that Wesley had in mind Manton and/or Tilly 
when describing preventing and convincing grace. However, viewing Wesley’s singular 
instance of “convincing grace” through the lens of the “traditions/dynamics model” prof-
itably suggests that this otherwise-anomalous type of grace is, in fact, a Wesleyan form 
of auxilium. For Wesley, God’s convincing grace actualizes the volitional effects of pre-
venting grace in the form of repentance. The inclusion is necessary in order to preclude 
the possibility of universalism as an implication of the universality of preventing grace. 
Wesley seems to be saying here that God’s universally-offered preventing grace instills a 
gracious semi-habitus that restores some of the proper functionality of our faculties—but 
preventing grace stands in need of the actualization of “convincing grace” if we are to be 
open to justifying grace and sojourn along the via salutis.181 Thus, the effect of Wesley’s 
“convincing grace” is similar to Aquinas’s notion of “conversion” (an operative auxilium) 
that leads to the justification of the soul (an operative habitus).182
180 See Outler’s notes in Wesley, Works 3:203n24 and 204n25.
181 The language is a bit tricky here, especiallysince Wesley and Aquinas always view grace as “one” and 
not “many.” See note 70, above, on the use of “sufficient” and “efficacious” grace. In those terms, we might 
say that prevenient grace is soteriologically “sufficient” but not necessarily “efficacious.”
182 Cf. Colberg, “Aquinas and the Grace of Auxilium,” 196-200.
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iv. A Visual Overview of Wesley’s Divisions of Grace
 To recap, at least two different models of grace are evident in Wesley’s theology. 
The first version, the “doctrines/degrees model,” follows Wesley’s basic soteriology and 
accomplishes key soteriological milestones. Thus, in the “doctrines/degrees model,” 
prevenient grace offsets certain losses caused by the Fall, and non-coercively ushers in 
human response to the point of repentance. Justifying grace (through faith) then effects 
justification—a state of righteousness that God works “for us, in forgiving our sins.”183 
Finally, sanctifying grace (through faith, now working through love) works with us and 
“in us, in renewing our fallen nature” and restoring the full image of God, which is our 
sanctification.184 The pattern is largely temporal and sequential, and the structure follows 
an “enablement–operation–cooperation” template.
 The “traditions/dynamics model” certainly operates in service of Wesley’s soterio-
logical scheme but it is deeply and directly rooted in the traditions that inform Wesley’s theo-
logical milieu. As with the “doctrines/degrees model,” the “traditions/dynamics model” 
begins with God’s preceding, non-coercive enablement of all humans by way of preventing 
grace. This makes it possible that all people may be saved, since all people may respond to 
God’s initial grace through repentance as the actualization of preventing grace (by means of 
convincing grace). At this point, grace accompanies us, pardons us, and makes us favorable 
183 Wesley, Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” §1, in Works 2:187; cf. Sermon 5, “Justification by Faith,” II.1, 
in Works 1:187.
184 Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” §1, in Works 2:187. In “The New Birth,” Wesley’s focus is on the regen-
eration of the sermon’s title, and so he speaks about this work of God as “new birth” instead of “sanctifica-
tion.” Of course, regeneration is, for Wesley, the inauguration of sanctity. The passage from “Justification by 
Faith” makes the link clear. See also Wesley, Sermon 1, “Salvation by Faith,” §1, upon which Albert Outler 
comments the following: “The restoration of our corrupted and disabled ‘image’ to its pristine capacity is, 
indeed, the goal of Wesley’s ordo salutis” (Works 1:117-118).
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(gratum), thereby restoring our right-relationship with God. Furthermore, accompanying 
grace personally engages us humans by enabling and eliciting our genuine responses that 
flow from a Christ-formed habitus. This is the essence of “having the mind of Christ Jesus,” 
of being accompanied by God’s grace, so that we may accompany Christ in “walking as he 
walked.”185 Accordingly, a life of grace always aims at continuation and growth, and it is 
God’s following grace that works with us to bring us to holiness and happiness.
 It is indeed tempting to conflate these two models of Wesleyan grace into one cohe-
sive Wesleyan system such as the following: prevenient grace = preventing grace; justify-
ing grace = accompanying grace; and sanctifying grace = following grace.186 However, as 
mentioned at the outset, such an attempt at systemization runs the risk of over-flattening 
the distinct emphases and dynamics of each division. This is not to say that the “traditions/
dynamics model” stands as an alternative or a competitor to the “doctrine/degrees model” 
of Wesleyan grace.187 For now, the wisest approach is to hold the models together in a 
visual arrangement—as was done for Aquinas’s divisions of grace.188 We may observe how 
185 Throughout his career, Wesley repeatedly fuses together (over 50 times!) Philippians 2:5 and 1 John 
2:6 to form this hendiadys of the pattern of true Christianity. For more on this recurring theme, see Richard 
P. Heitzenrater, “The Imitatio Christi and the Great Commandment: Virtue and Obligation in Wesley’s Min-
istry with the Poor,” in The Portion of the Poor, 49-63, especially 58.
186 This kind of flattened configuration would then neatly align with the earlier alliterative description 
of grace as presence, pardon, and power.
187 We should note that it is not even clear whether Wesley is aware of these different models or their 
subtle differences and emphases within his own theology of grace. That question may prove fruitful as a 
topic for future research. Doing so could also reveal the circumstances (and underlying rationale) of Wesley’s 
employment of the various models of grace.
188 Note, Aquinas’s own systematization of grace features more divisions (with less explanation!) than 
Wesley’s. For another “possible model of Wesley’s thinking” on grace, see Scott Kisker, “Justification, the New 
Birth, and the Confusing Soteriological Passages in John Wesley’s Writings,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 52, 
no. 2 (Fall 2017): 55. Kisker’s diagram is effective in portraying the “doctrines/degrees model” of Wesleyan 
grace, but does not take into full consideration the “traditions/dynamics model” of grace within Wesley.
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and where the two models of Wesleyan grace overlap by correlating them with Wesley’s 
other theological foci. In the remaining sections of the present chapter, the relationship 
and significance of these Wesleyan models of grace will become clear, especially as they are 
held in creative and constructive comparative dialogue with Aquinas’s own constellations.
Prevenient Grace
Enabling presence
Restores responsibility
Renders us capable
Universal
Justifying Grace
Forensic pardon
Remits sins
Renders us favorable
Operative
Sanctifying Grace
Therapeutic power
Renews imago Dei
Renders us happy/holy
Cooperative
Repentance Justification
God’s work “for us”
Sanctification
God’s work “in us”
Convincing Grace
God’s assistance (i.e., operative 
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Actualization of preventing grace
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Concomitant with justification
Analogous to sanctification
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Denotatively cooperative (comitans)
Following Grace
Perfecting (“full”), sanctifying (“holy”), and 
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Diagram 8. A Visual Overview of Wesley’s Divisions of Grace
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3. The Dynamics of Grace
 Already we have begun to notice some of the dynamics of grace within Wesley 
and Aquinas—for example, the concept of divine initiative and human response, or grace 
as both operative and cooperative. Presently, it is appropriate to make these dynamics 
clearer by unearthing what is at stake for each theologian. What are their concerns? How 
do they understand the relationship of nature to grace? What does it mean to “grow in 
grace”? And how might this pertain to meritorious works? The answers to these questions 
may be traced back to content covered above, making the present task more a matter of 
clarity and emphasis than of introducing new material.
 Let us begin by framing the overall subject in terms of Wesley’s and Aquinas’s 
respective ecclesiastical heritages. On the one hand, the (Roman) “Catholic” concern has 
generally been to maintain the freedom of the human will alongside the operations of 
divine grace. Such is Aquinas’s focus later in his career, as in q. 113 of Prima Secundae and 
q. 6 of De Malo.189 On the other hand, the (Continental) “Protestant” concern has gener-
ally been to emphasize salvation by grace through faith alone (sola fide) and not by works. 
This basic teaching informs nearly every sermon bearing Wesley’s name, especially those 
treating Ephesians 2:8 directly.190 Even though these are extremely broad, oversimplified 
189 See Aquinas, ST I-II.113, where he addresses grace’s operative effect of justifying a sinner, in which 
God moves the will without coercion. Related to this question is DM, q. 6, which regards the issue of causal 
necessity between divine action and human autonomy. Aquinas composes both questions while teaching 
at the University of Paris in 1270—where, it will be recalled, controversy had erupted on the subject. For 
more, see Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, especially 94-118. Cf. Davies’s “Introduction,” On Evil [De Malo], 
especially 35-43.
190 See Wesley, Sermon 1, “Salvation by Faith,” in Works 1:109-130; and Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way 
of Salvation,” in Works 2:153-169.
301
generalizations, they imply a common concern that is theologically definitive for Wesley 
and Aquinas: “What we do matters, and God enables us to do good and to do it well.”
 Wesley expresses this common concern and its central dynamic with unparalleled 
clarity in “On Working Out Our Own Salvation”: “For, first, God works; therefore you 
can work. Secondly, God works; therefore you must work.”191 In a mere fifteen words, 
Wesley summarizes the quintessence of the doctrine of grace—its operations, dynam-
ics, and implications. Grace is demonstrative of the divine initiative in both Creation and 
Redemption, and it stands as a basic Wesleyan tenet that God’s initiative is the very cause 
of our response and the source of our goodness. Without it, we are unable to think, will, 
or perform anything good.192 But because “God worketh in you; therefore you must work: 
you must be ‘workers together with him’ (they are the very words of the Apostle); oth-
erwise he will cease working.”193 God’s initiating grace universally and operatively “pre-
vents” us, which makes it both possible and necessary “to work out our own salvation.”194 
The method of our response-work is cooperative and communal, taking the shape of the 
three “General Rules” of the Methodist societies: abstain from evil; maintain good works; 
and attend on all God’s ordinances, viz., the means of grace.195 At stake for Wesley is the 
191 Wesley, Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.2, in Works 3:206.
192 See Wesley, Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” III.8, in Works 2:166; and Sermon 85, “On 
Working Out Our Own Salvation,” I.4, and III.3, in Works 3:203, 206.
193 Wesley, Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.7, in Works 3:208.
194 The divine initiative must have a certain monergistic aspect to it, since our very existence is pred-
icated upon God’s action, not our own. That said, nothing about salvation is automatic for Wesley; the 
necessity of co-laboring conditions cooperative grace and, therefore, salvation itself.
195 See John and Charles Wesley, “The Nature, Design, and General Rules of the United Societies” (1743), 
in Works 9:67-75. Note the specific allusion to Philippians 2:12 in §2 (69).
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avoidance of antinomianism, quietism, and enthusiasm—“looking for the end” of religion 
“without using the means” of grace.196 Thus, Wesley’s particular configuration of grace 
bespeaks a dynamic of unequaled practical importance for the shape of Christian living 
under the Methodist design.
 Like Wesley, Aquinas argues for the absolute necessity of grace in order to know 
truth, to will good, to do good, to love God, to abstain from sin, and so forth.197 Aquinas 
notably emphasizes this in his later writings, where he develops the idea of grace as auxil-
ium. The motus afforded by the gratuity of God’s auxilium calls to mind the Prime Mover 
of Aquinas’s “Five Ways.” That is to say, Aquinas establishes the primacy of the divine ini-
tiative in the doctrine of grace hundreds of articles before the “Treatise on Grace”—in the 
second question of the Summa!198 By an operation of auxilium, God non-coercively moves 
the human soul to prepare it for receiving the habitus of grace. Thereafter, God’s assistive 
196 The quotation is from Wesley’s response, recorded in the “Large” Minutes of Conference (1770-1772), 
to Q. 35, “Why are not we more holy?” He answers: “Because we are enthusiasts, looking for the end without 
using the means” (Works 10:889). The issue of antinomianism was on the agenda of the first Methodist 
Conference (1744), where it was addressed (Q. 18-20) alongside Calvinism (Q. 17) as an enticement towards 
which the Methodists had leaned (Works 10:130). For Wesley’s long-form argument on the necessity of using 
the means of grace, see Sermon 16, “The Means of Grace,” in Works 1:376-397.
197 See Aquinas, ST I-II.109, which articulates ten different acts (one per article) that we are impotent to 
perform without God’s grace. See ST I-II.114.5 on our inability to merit “first grace” for ourselves.
198 See ST I.2.3 for Aquinas’s “Five Ways,” the first of which is “the argument from motion.” See Peter 
Kreeft, Practical Theology: Spiritual Direction from Saint Thomas Aquinas (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2014). Kreeft expresses well the divine initiative of grace within Aquinas’s theology and is worth quoting 
here at some length: “God loved nature and human nature into being. He saved it at an infinite and incom-
prehensible cost. He continues to love it, use it, and perfect it. Nature after grace is indeed raised to a far 
higher dignity, worth, joy, and power than it is in any non-religious philosophy or in any other religion. But 
nature before grace is nothing. It does not exist. Nature itself is a result of grace, for creation was an act of 
grace. How could the universe contribute anything at all to its own creation? How could we deserve to be 
created before we even existed? And how could we possibly take the very first step toward grace, the step of 
humility and repentance, unless God’s grace came first to prompt us? That is the clear teaching of Scripture, 
shocking and humbling as it is to our natural pride; and St. Thomas is totally scriptural. He never tries to 
edit and correct divine revelation. Everything positive in the ‘new’ theologies of Luther and Calvin was 
essentially a rediscovery of elements of Thomistic theology” (144).
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grace cooperates with the human soul (now infused with a gracious habitus) toward the 
actual performance of good per se.199 At stake for Aquinas is the avoidance of heresy pro-
mulgated by certain interpreters of Aristotle and condemned by the bishop of Paris in 
1270.200 At the heart of that controversy is the basic relationship between philosophy and 
theology or, more-broadly, between nature and grace.
 Aquinas’s teaching on the dynamic between nature and grace has become so well-
known theologically that it is simply referred to as “the Thomistic axiom”: gratia non tollat 
naturam sed perficiat, “grace does not destroy nature but perfects it.”201 Indeed, as a testa-
ment to nature’s perennial value, grace presupposes nature.202 Thomas Gilby captures this 
sentiment well in summarizing the relationship between the “natural” and “supernatural” 
within Aquinas: “The supernatural does not derogate from the natural, but witnesses to 
our human dignity, for if impotent of ourselves to scale the heights, our impulse is towards 
them. It is this nobility that grace takes, and makes capable of glory.”203 Granted, Gilby’s 
accent is more on dignity than iconicity. Still, Gilby’s insight suggests that grace appreci-
ates the dignity in human nature by virtue of the imago Dei, actualizes the value thereof 
199 See ST I-II.112.2, on the preparation of the soul to receive grace. The reception of habitual grace 
requires preparation—the preparation of actual grace moving the free choice of the soul.
200 For more on “Latin Averroism” and the intense disputes in Paris surrounding the 1270 and 1277 
condemnations by its bishop, Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D’Aquino, 272-285. 
201 Aquinas, ST I.1.8 ad 2.
202 See ST I.2.2 ad 1: sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam, et ut perfec-
tio perfectibile, “for just as faith presupposes natural cognition, thus grace presupposes nature, and perfec-
tion the perfectible.”
203 Thomas Gilby, “Appendix 8: Natural and Supernatural,” in Summa Theologiae, Vol. I: Christian The-
ology (Ia. 1), ed. Thomas Gilby (Cambridge: Blackfriars, 1964), 101. Gilby also notes here the comparison to 
DV, q. 12, a. 3 ad 12.
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through healing and elevation, and augments it to surpassing glory in heavenly beatitude. 
To blend Gilby’s terms with those of the present study, dignity ought not derogate from 
iconicity.
 Wesley himself expresses a similar view of the relationship between nature and 
grace in his commentary on John 1:14:
we are made partakers of [grace and truth], when we are accepted through the 
Beloved. The whole verse might be paraphrased thus: And in order to raise us to 
this dignity and happiness, the eternal Word, by a most amazing condescension, 
was made flesh, united himself to our miserable nature, with all its innocent infir-
mities.… In all he appeared full of grace and truth.204
This passage reveals three important aspects of Wesley’s doctrine when read stereoscop-
ically with Aquinas. First, Wesley does in fact afford to human nature a certain dignity, 
although it is more consequent upon grace than it is self-standing. Still, the dynamic of 
grace is unmistakably elevating (elevans), as in Aquinas. Second, Wesley’s emphasis here 
trends more toward iconicity than dignity. If there ever was for Wesley a dignity “native” to 
our species, it has clearly been exchanged for “our miserable nature”—to which the divine 
dignity has been united in the form of Christ, the true Icon of God. Third, this excerpt 
adequately portrays what amounts to Wesley’s overall ambivalence on the relationship 
between nature and grace, which oscillates between contrariety and continuity.
 On the one hand, Wesley routinely portrays nature and grace as “two contrary 
principles.”205 “By nature ye are wholly corrupted,” he exhorts, but “by grace ye shall be 
204 Wesley, Notes, John 1:14.
205 See, for example, Sermon 13, “On Sin in Believers,” III.3 and V.1, in Works 1:322, 332; Sermon 43, 
“The Scripture Way of Salvation,” I.6, 8, in Works 2:159, 160; and his famous “Aldersgate experience,” as 
recounted in his Journal, May 24, 1738, in Works 18:247.
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wholly renewed.”206 Such statements are intended to drive a wedge between nature and 
grace, likely to undercut deistic, atheistic, or overly-humanistic moral anthropologies. But 
on the other hand, Wesley very nearly approximates the Thomistic axiom in discussing 
“Christian meekness” in the Beatitudes: “It does not destroy but balances the affections, 
which the God of nature never designed should be rooted out by grace, but only brought 
and kept under due regulations.”207 In a similar vein, Wesley argues how God’s work nei-
ther diminishes nor forces the faculties of our nature, but instead enlightens, strengthens, 
and invigorates them—all “without depriving any[one] of that liberty which is essential to 
a moral agent.”208
 Grace is, therefore, a moral matter: it involves human behavior on a divine plane.209 
Since grace does not destroy nature (our faculties and their functioning), the hallmarks of 
Wesley and Aquinas’s moral psychology likewise pertain to the dynamics of grace. The 
result is a moral-theological psychology of graced human acts in which “growth in grace” 
is both possible and providential.
 For Aquinas, growth in grace (augmentum gratiae) is possible inasmuch as grace 
is taken as a habitus of the soul. Habitus may grow and strengthen with repeated acts that 
206 Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” III.5, in Works 2:185; cf. Sermon 116, “What Is Man?” §11, in Works 4:24.
207 Sermon 22, “Sermon on the Mount, II,” I.3, in Works 1:489.
208 Sermon 63, “The General Spread of the Gospel,” §11, in Works 2:489. Wesley expends four para-
graphs to underscore the nature and dynamic of grace as cooperative, not coercive (§§9-12).
209 Wesley comments that “the end and design of grace…is to destroy the image of the earthy, and restore 
us to that of the heavenly” (Notes, 2 Peter 3:18). The “heavenly image” is taken here for the moral image of 
God, which has been corrupted by sin. Aquinas is even more explicit in this connection: he arranges the 
massive and moral Secunda Pars to apex with “grace” (ST I-II.109-114) as the pinnacle of “morals in general” 
(see ST I-II.114.10). What follows in Secunda Secundae is the explication of morality in particular according 
to specific virtues, beginning with the theological virtues (ST II-II.1-46).
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are proportional in intensity to the nature of the habitus.210 The same holds for infused 
habitus: “acts produced by an infused habit do not cause a habit but strengthen the already 
existing habit.”211 Since we are impotent to cause grace,212 we rely entirely on God’s oper-
ative initiative to infuse it habitually. Thereafter, habitual grace becomes “the principle 
of meritorious works,”213 which are the effect of cooperative grace. And it is under this 
heading—merit—that we find Aquinas’s teaching on the increase of grace.214
 Aquinas addresses merit in the final question of the “Treatise on Grace,” where 
he begins by affirming that we can merit a reward from God by employing a God-given 
operative power. This amounts to our gracious cooperation with and towards our divine 
end.215 That end—the goal of God’s gracious motion in us—is eternal life, and the way 
toward that end is the meritorious increase of grace (or charity).216 Now, for an act to 
be meritorious in this manner, it must flow from two sources: God’s gracious motion, 
which makes our works absolutely meritorious (ex condigno); and our free will (liberum 
210 Aquinas, ST I-II.52. In a. 1, Aquinas goes to great lengths to establish the fact that habits may increase 
in intensity and participation; a. 2 explains that this increase is not by way of addition (quantity) but intensity 
(quality); and a. 3 appeals Aristotle’s principle of “similar acts causing similar habits” to describe how acts 
proportional in intensity to the nature of their habitus may increase that habit. Articles 1 and 2 both point to 
a later question that takes up the issue of virtues (which are habitus) being greater or lesser in various people 
(ST I-II.66.1). This difference, which may also apply to the increase or decrease of a habit, is “on account of 
either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again 
a greater gift of grace” (ST I-II.66.1, emphasis added).
211 ST I-II.51.4 ad 3.
212 See ST I-II.109.1-10.
213 ST I-II.111.2 co.
214 See ST I-II.114, aa. 8 and 10.
215 ST I-II.114.1.
216 ST I-II.114.8. Cf. a. 4 on merit resting chiefly with the infused theological virtue of charity.
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arbitrium), which makes our works only proportionally meritorious (ex congruo).217 The 
dynamic is extremely important here and explains why it is that “merit” falls under “grace.” 
The dignity afforded the meritorious act (here, growth in grace) is properly predicated 
of God (as mover) and grace (as motion). But, because of our iconic participation in the 
divine nature wrought by grace, the “meritorious reward” of an act performed through 
the habitus of grace is an increase of grace ex condigno.218 The ex congruo contribution of 
our human nature does not derogate from the ex condigno virtue of God’s motion. God’s 
auxilium actualizes the infused habitus to provide the supernatural motion required for a 
supernatural act. In light of Aquinas’s habituated moral psychology, because congruously 
supernatural acts habituate the infused habitus of grace, the resulting increase of grace is 
equally merited and gratis.219
 For Wesley, growth is the clear responsibility of any recipient of God’s grace. 
Rather than discussing the possibility of growing in grace, Wesley singularly devotes his 
energy exhorting the necessity of such growth.220 The logic of Wesley’s perspective goes 
back to his view of grace. In terms of its nature, grace is both pardon (which links to justi-
217 ST I-II.114, aa. 3, 4, 6, 9.
218 ST I-II.114.8.
219 See also ST I-II.114.10, on the question of whether temporal goods fall under merit: “If temporal 
goods are considered as they are useful for virtuous works, whereby we are led to heaven, they fall directly 
and simply under merit, even as [an] increase of grace [does], and everything whereby a man is helped to attain 
beatitude after the first grace” (emphasis added).
220 Although Wesley gives no direct attention to the possibility of growth in grace, this is not to say 
that the constitutive elements for that discussion are absent from Wesley’s theology. To the contrary, given 
Wesley’s affectional moral psychology and its distinct resonances with Aquinas, it is quite conceivable to 
“reverse engineer” a Wesleyan rationale for the possibility of growing in grace. See Wesley, Sermon 38, “A 
Caution against Bigotry,” I.13, in Works 2:68; see also Randy Maddox’s discussion of “growth in grace” in 
Responsible Grace, 177-179.
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fication and being) and power (which links to sanctification and operation). In terms of its 
dynamics, grace entails the moral-theological injunction to “work out our own salvation” 
in response to God’s graciously empowering work. “This is the secret of heart religion—
at the present moment to work and to believe,” and this is what it means to “grow in grace 
every hour” by using “now all the grace you have.”221
 “Growing in grace” is, in Wesley’s view, tantamount to “doing good” according to 
the pattern of Christ.222 At first glance, this seems difficult to square with his explication of 
2 Peter 3:18: “But grow in grace—That is, in every Christian temper.”223 However, within 
Wesley’s affectional moral psychology, actions flow from tempers,224 meaning Christian 
tempers (should) issue in Christ-like actions. As such, good works are not optional; they 
are intertwined with the indispensability of growing in grace.
It is incumbent on all that are justified to be zealous of good works. And these are 
so necessary that if a man willingly neglect them, he cannot reasonably expect 
that he shall ever be sanctified. He cannot ‘grow in grace’, in the image of God, the 
mind which was in Christ Jesus; nay, he cannot retain the grace he has received, he 
cannot continue in faith, or in the favour of God.225
221 John Wesley to Ann Foard, October 14, 1767, in Letters (Telford) 5:65.
222 See Sermon 42, “Satan’s Devices,” II.7, in Works 2:151: “Buy up every opportunity of growing in 
grace, or of doing good.” The syntax indicates a relative clause, meaning “doing good” parallels “growing in 
grace.” This is further corroborated by Wesley’s numerous references to Acts 10:38 ( Jesus of Nazareth “went 
about doing good”). See the “Index of Scriptural References” to Wesley’s sermons, in Works 4:671; see also 
the second of the “General Rules,” in Works 9:67-79.
223 Wesley, Notes, 2 Peter 3:18.
224 See Sermon 26, “Sermon on the Mount, VI,” §1, in Works 1:573. Cf. Sermon 2, “The Almost Chris-
tian,” I.9, in Works 1:134; Sermon 12, “The Witness of Our Own Spirit,” §12, in Works 1:307; Sermon 33, 
“Sermon on the Mount, XIII,” III.12, in Works 1:698; Sermon 44, “Original Sin,” I.2, in Works 2:175; Sermon 
75, “On Schism,” II.14, in Works 3:65; and Sermon 76, “On Perfection,” I.3, in Works 3:73. See also Maddox, 
Responsible Grace, 69-70.
225 Wesley, Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” III.5, in Works 2:164.
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The multiple expressions Wesley strings together here are analogous to the ultimate telos 
of Christianity.226 Growth in grace by means of doing good with God’s ongoing, gracious 
assistance—embodied in Christ Jesus and animated through the ongoing inspiration of 
the Holy Spirit—leads to holiness and happiness.
 Another distinctive aspect of Wesley’s teaching on growing in grace is the way he 
links this vital development to his notion of stewardship. Using economic terms, Wesley 
admonishes us to “buy up every opportunity of growing in grace, or of doing good,” 
because the talents we have are actually God’s gracious gifts.227 If we desire additional gifts 
of grace, we must employ “the full exercise of every talent wherewith we are entrusted.”228 
The prudent employment of God’s grace will indeed be the basis of our future judgment 
before the Lord, where we must “approve” ourselves to be “faithful steward[s] of the pres-
ent grace of God.”229 It then “remains only that [we] be rewarded to all eternity according 
to [our] works.”230
 But this raises a potentially unnerving question: Does Wesley’s concept of growing 
in grace, which is couched in terms of stewardship and reward, amount to a doctrine of 
merit? The answer depends, of course, on the definition of “merit.” For Aquinas, “merit 
226 See Sermon 99, “The Reward of Righteousness,” I.6, in Works 3:405: “good works are so far from 
being hindrances of our salvation, they are so far from being insignificant, from being of no account in 
Christianity, that, supposing them to spring from a right principle, they are the perfection of religion.”
227 Sermon 42, “Satan’s Devices,” II.7, in Works 2:151.
228 John Wesley to Miss [ J.C.] March, September 15, 1770, in Letters (Telford) 5:200.
229 Sermon 42, “Satan’s Devices,” II.7, in Works 2:151. Wesley uses the verb “approve” in its outdated 
original sense, meaning “to prove” or “demonstrate.” It may also signify a degree or wordplay, since the 
context is our eschatological judgment: we await the Lord’s approval, yet we must also prove ourselves.
230 Sermon 51, “The Good Steward,” III.6, in Works 2:296.
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and reward refer to the same thing, for a reward is said to be a recompense given in return 
for work or labor, like a price [pretium].”231 At the same time, Aquinas is utterly clear that 
“the worth [pretium] of the work depends on the dignity of grace [dignitatem gratiae].”232 
We are only capable of meriting because it is an effect of cooperative grace. God’s gracious 
motion works together with the human will to produce something genuinely good.233 
According to this understanding, Wesley’s statements about growing in grace do suffi-
ciently add up to a doctrine of merit on par with Aquinas’s. Although we “cannot profit 
God,” Wesley comments on Luke 17, “our serving him is not unprofitable to us. For he 
is pleased to give by his grace a value to our good works, which in consequence of his 
promise entitles us to an eternal reward.”234 We could just as well rearrange the final sen-
tence to read as follows: “For he is pleased to give a value to our good works by his grace, 
which entitles us to an eternal reward in consequence of his promise.” Doing so further 
underscores the fundamental dynamic informing the cooperative task of growing in grace 
through gracious actions. In short, merit means deserving something we don’t deserve by 
doing something we can’t do using something that isn’t ours—and living in the blessed 
paradox that human nature may, indeed, come to partake of the divine.235
231 Aquinas, ST I-II.114.1 co. This is my own (loose) translation.
232 ST I-II.114.3 co.
233 This idea runs throughout ST I-II.114, from its prologue to its tenth and final article. All our power 
for well-doing is from God (a. 2 ad 3), so that meritorious acts flow jointly from our will and God’s grace.
234 Wesley, Notes, Luke 17:10. We could rightly rearrange the word order of the last sentence to read as 
follows: “For he is pleased to give a value to our good works by his grace, which entitles us to an eternal reward 
in consequence of his promise.”
235 As Long masterfully demonstrates in John Wesley’s Moral Theology, 195-202, Aquinas and Wesley 
both shape their moral theologies around 2 Peter 1:4 (“that you might be partakers of the divine nature”).
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4. Conclusion: A Comparative Summary
 This chapter has covered a hefty amount of material, which is due in no small part 
to the surpassing significance of grace in the theologies of Wesley and Aquinas. The pres-
ent section aims to pull together the key elements discussed in this chapter in order to 
compare Wesley’s overall teaching on grace with Aquinas’s. As we shall continue to see, 
even though the two theologians’ doctrines are not altogether identical, the strong com-
patibility points up further comparative agreement between Wesley and Aquinas.
 To recap, Wesley and Aquinas describe the nature of grace in very similar language. 
Grace is God’s love, given to us freely and favorably, so that we may become real partic-
ipants in God’s own nature. By grace, God’s love makes us lovely; God’s favor makes us 
favorable; God’s dignity dignifies us; God’s free gift sets us free; God’s gratuity gratifies us. 
In it, we find holiness and happiness, beatitude and felicity—the true end of our human-
ity that lies beyond our nature. This is our capax Dei, and it is rooted in the first truth of 
theological anthropology: we are created in and to God’s image—in order to image God. 
Again, since our calling is beyond our nature, we require God’s grace to “bring us up to 
God’s level.” Therefore, grace is elevating (Aquinas) and empowering (Wesley)—and this 
points to the gracious work of God within us. But since the disease of sin has infected the 
integrity of our nature and robbed us of a righteousness inheritance, we also require God’s 
grace to restore our health and to remit our offenses. Therefore, grace is healing (Aquinas) 
and pardoning (Wesley)—and this points to the gracious work of God for us.
 Next, Aquinas and Wesley exhibit various typologies of grace that are diversified 
according to different concerns and historical-theological traditions. Both firmly agree, 
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however, that, while the effects of grace are manifold, grace itself is singular. Aquinas first 
divides grace into “sanctifying” and “gratuitous,” focusing on the former, by which God 
“graces” a person directly. This may occur according to three rubrics: time, agency, and 
moral psychology. Temporally, sanctifying grace may be prevenient or subsequent; agen-
tially, it may be operative or cooperative; and psychologically, it may be habitual or actu-
al-motivating. Moreover, agency and moral psychology combine, resulting in Aquinas’s 
four key forms of grace: operative-actual, operative-habitual, cooperative-actual, and 
cooperative-habitual.
 Wesley’s theology admits of two slightly different triadic typologies of grace: the 
“doctrines/degrees model” of prevenient, justifying, and sanctifying grace, and the “tra-
ditions/dynamics model” of preventing, accompanying, and following grace. The “doc-
trines/degrees model” is far less common in Wesley’s own writings, but it has received far 
more attention from contemporary interpreters—especially in terms of its related linear 
soteriology. The “traditions/dynamics model” is much more prevalent in Wesley’s works 
and focuses less on attaining degrees of grace and more on the unfolding relational dynam-
ics of grace. In addition to these two models, Wesley discusses “convincing grace,” which 
is analogous to “repentance” and paves the way for God’s ensuing regenerative work.
 A common vocabulary for grace emerges from Wesley and Aquinas. In some cases, 
the common vocabulary bespeaks common underlying meanings, as when Wesley and 
Aquinas discuss the nature of grace. In other cases, the lexical similarity belies real seman-
tic distinction, as when Wesley and Aquinas discuss the kinds of grace. Thus, Wesleyans 
who read English translations of Aquinas (especially ST I-II.111) are likely to be confused by 
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the idea of “sanctifying grace” (gratia gratum faciens) effecting justification.236 Within the 
“doctrines/degrees model” of Wesleyan grace, sanctifying grace and justifying grace work 
toward discrete soteriological moments or states. A similar observation holds for transla-
tions of Aquinas’s gratia gratis data as “freely given grace.” In this case, though, both the 
original Latin and its standard English translations do not adequately convey the substan-
tive distinction Aquinas actually signifies with the division: gratia gratis data is the grace by 
which we work together with God to assist in bringing another person into an experience 
of God’s sanctifying grace.237 For Wesleyans and Thomists, all grace is “freely given.”
 These examples indeed point to the value of reading Aquinas in his native Latin, 
but even this (on its own) is insufficient for addressing Wesley and Aquinas’s most con-
sequential terminological difference—what they mean by grace’s prevenience. Wesley 
has in mind a significant doctrinal approach to “preventing grace”238 that distances his 
theology from other evangelical varieties. Aquinas only uses the term in referring to the 
temporal sequence of grace’s effects. A simple hypothetical question reveals what is really 
at stake for each theologian: “Before what does prevenient grace come?” For Aquinas, the 
answer is a straightforward “before the next grace—with the exception of the attainment 
236 To be sure, the common English translation “sanctifying grace” seems slightly to divert attention 
away from the nuanced dynamic of Aquinas’s Latin gratia gratum faciens. Perhaps a better (though admit-
tedly ambiguous) translation would be “gratifying grace.” This alteration could potentially help Wesleyans 
in coming to appreciate what Aquinas has to say about gratia gratum faciens without getting caught up in 
terminological-theological minutiae.
237 Again, for the sake of comparative dialogical reflection between Wesleyans and Thomists, gratia 
gratis data could be translated or explained along the lines of “evangelical grace” or “conducive grace.”
238 Here, the terms “preventing grace” and “prevenient grace” are to be understood as interchangeable. 
The choice to use “preventing” is simply out of acknowledgement that Wesley uses this particular word. 
Again, both “preventing” and “prevenient” are English translations/transliterations of the Latin praeveniens.
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of glory.” For Wesley, the answer is specific: “Before the activity of humans in general, and 
the good, free activity of humans in particular.” To reiterate, while Aquinas’s prevenient/
subsequent distinction very well serves his overarching in via narrative, Wesley’s concept 
of preventing grace conveys the doctrine of the universality of God’s gracious initiative 
toward salvation.239
 Notwithstanding terminological differences, Wesley’s and Aquinas’s divisions of 
grace still significantly parallel one another. The following chart, which accounts for both 
Wesleyan models of grace and all of Aquinas’s pairings, represents the striking similarity 
between Aquinas’s and Wesley’s typologies of grace.
Aquinas’s Types of Grace
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Convincing
Diagram 9. A Comparison of Wesley and Aquinas on Divisions of Grace
Two observations are worth noting here. First, although Aquinas’s point in the preve-
nient/subsequent distinction is perfectly logical (i.e., B comes before C, but also after A), 
239 This is not to say that the notion of in via is at all absent from Wesley’s theology. For example, see 
Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” in Works 2:153-169,; cf. Sermon 7, “The Way to the Kingdom,” 
in Works 1:217-232. Instead, it is a recognition of the way that Aquinas’s distinction between prevenient and 
subsequent grace aligns with the in via motif of Summa Theologiae.
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its equivocal nature makes it difficult to map. Any grace is subsequent except first grace; 
any grace is prevenient except final (glorifying) grace. Aquinas’s “prevenient grace” par-
allels Wesley’s “prevenient/preventing grace” as far as temporal and linguistic parity is 
concerned, but not much more. This brings us to a second—and serious—issue: Aquinas 
has no real equivalent to Wesley’s “preventing/prevenient grace.” As will be discussed 
in Chapter 7, Aquinas’s lacuna is, likewise, a desiderata—but it is also a genuine practi-
cal-theological praemonitio. Plainly, Aquinas has no place for “universal grace.” This sug-
gests a serious soteriological shortcoming—equal parts theological, anthropological, and 
moral—especially when compared with Wesley.
 Lastly, Aquinas and Wesley express the dynamics of grace in a common language 
(and with common meaning), yet each according to his own dialect. Aquinas exhibits a 
traditional Catholic concern in maintaining the freedom of the will alongside the efficacy 
of grace. Parallel to this concern stands Aquinas’s famous axiom on grace perfecting nature 
without destroying it. Wesley clearly represents the Continental Protestant emphasis of 
salvation by grace alone through faith, not works. To a degree, that concern corresponds 
with a doctrine of depravity that results in a severe demarcation of nature and grace. How-
ever, Wesley equivocates on the relationship of nature and grace: at times, they are dis-
sonant and incompatible (as in Continental Protestantism); at others, they are consonant 
and congruous (as in Aquinas).
 Both theologians clearly express the gratuity of grace in terms of the divine initiative 
that elicits and empowers our genuine human response. God operates graciously so that 
we may cooperate with God through grace. To put it differently, grace is a moral concept 
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that underscores our being and becoming, our acting and growing. For Aquinas, increase 
in grace (as habitus) is possible because God’s grace cooperates with us meritoriously. This 
increase in grace is also desirable because grace draws us closer to God, in whom our 
desires find their proper rest.240 For Wesley, growth in grace is possible—and necessary—
because of God’s gracious work for us and within us. The vital Wesleyan dynamic here is 
“stewardship”: we are stewards of God’s grace; our eternal reward is accountable to our 
prudent cooperation with God’s grace; and cooperating with God in this responsive (and 
responsible!) manner is itself the means to growing in grace. In other words, Wesley’s 
theology can accommodate a doctrine of merit that is grounded, like Aquinas’s, in God’s 
cooperative, empowering, and elevating grace.
 How, then, do Wesley and Aquinas compare with respect to the nature, types, 
and dynamics of grace? In the final analysis, the two are highly compatible, even comple-
mentary. This should come as no surprise given their remarkably similar teachings on 
humanity and its faculties, the affective nature of moral psychology, the process of acting 
and habituation, and the nature and effects of sin. Grace directly addresses the human 
condition, especially in our current state of debilitation. It is God’s presence, pardon, and 
power that works for us, in us, and with us to bring about true holiness and happiness. In 
short, grace is God’s prodigious investment in humanity—the instantiation of our true 
worth.
240 See Augustine, Confessions, I, 1: Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te, 
“you have made us for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you.”
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CHAPTER 7: 
ICONIC DIGNITY AND GRACE—UNIVERSALITY
 The purpose of the present chapter is to return to the desideratum of “universal 
grace” in Aquinas’s theology in hopes of constructing an authentically Thomistic account 
of gratia universalis in conversation with Wesley’s doctrine as well as Aquinas’s own 
Dominican identity and practices. As we saw in the previous chapter, Aquinas had main-
tained a place for universal grace and its correlated humanistic optimism in his earlier 
works, but later abandoned it after encountering some of Augustine’s very late writings.1 
Aquinas’s focus shifted from God’s indirect, universal offering of grace to all people (with 
soteriological responsibility falling to humanity), to God’s direct, active role in initiating 
human salvation by granting the assistance of grace to particular people while withholding 
it from others. Even though grace still fell under the doctrine of predestination, Aquinas’s 
modulated emphasis also lent more weight to its doctrinal opposite, reprobation.2
 Furthermore, we noted that the gravity of Aquinas’s mature position comes into 
sharp focus when compared to Wesley. Wesley, it will be remembered, champions univer-
sally prevenient grace—free grace for all—in the face of predestination and its corollary, 
reprobation. Having just compared Wesley and Aquinas on the nature, types, and dynam-
1 It should be noted that Aquinas was developing the notion of grace as auxilium/motus around the same 
time (the mid-1260s).
2 By “predestination,” Aquinas means God’s particular providence of rational creatures. Although it is 
the inverse of predestination, “reprobation” still falls under divine providence.
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ics of grace,3 we return to the nexus of theological difficulties entangling Aquinas’s mature 
position: Aquinas lacks an analogue to Wesley’s prevenient/preventing grace. As a result, 
Aquinas cedes the doctrinal locus of universal grace and is forced to accept a chilling 
doctrine of reprobation that ineluctably flows through God’s providence.4 Having swung 
from one extreme (humanistic Pelagianism) to another (deterministic Augustinianism), 
Aquinas deserves a third alternative—one that can uphold universal grace without divine 
dereliction.
 “There seems to be a plain, simple way of removing this difficulty without entan-
gling ourselves in any subtle, metaphysical disquisitions,” replies Wesley.5 The Wesleyan 
doctrine of universal prevenient grace is the very via media desiderata that complements 
Aquinas’s primary concerns about grace—God’s graciously operative initiative, human-
ity’s genuine moral responsibility, and our conjoint subsequent gracious cooperation—
3 See in particular Diagram 9, which compares Wesley’s typology of grace to Aquinas’s, as well as the 
commentary that follows it.
4 In ST I.19.6 ad 1, Aquinas attempts to avoid a doctrinal quagmire by appealing to John of Damascus’s 
distinction between the antecedent and consequent will of God (De Fide Orthodoxa, II, 29). According to 
God’s antecedent will, God desires all people to be saved (1 Tim. 2:4); but by God’s consequent will, God 
will justly punish those who reject God’s salvation. Matthew Levering comments that “to describe God’s 
will as ‘antecedent’ and ‘consequent’ signifies that God is the cause of predestination but is not the cause of 
reprobation. The cause of reprobation is the rational creature’s sin.” See Matthew Levering, Predestination: 
Biblical and Theological Paths (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 81. As Levering rightly notes (81nn63, 
64, 67), there is much scholarship surrounding Aquinas’s discussion of predestination and reprobation. 
However, the adequacy of Aquinas’s argument (which Levering seems to support) is uncertain, given his 
belief that spiritual blindness and hard-heartedness (excaecationis et obdurationis) is caused by “the move-
ment of the human mind in cleaving to evil and turning away from divine light” as well as “the withdrawal of 
grace (subtractio gratiae)” (ST I-II.79.3). Further, considering that “nothing resists the divine will” (ST I.19.8 
ad 2), it is difficult to imagine how the withdrawal of divine grace—which is decisively not commensurate 
with salvation—could be avoided by a human! It may again be argued that this comes down to the difference 
between the antecedent and consequent will of God, but appealing again to the same initial questionable 
teaching hardly solves the problem.
5 Wesley, Sermon 63, “The General Spread of the Gospel,” §10, in Works 2:489. Wesley is attempting 
to avoid metaphysical speculation in holding the scripturally-promised ubiquity of holiness and happiness 
together with genuine human autonomy and moral responsibility.
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without harboring divinely-sanctioned reprobation or limited election. To be clear, this 
proposal amounts to a call to reject Aquinas’s understanding of the limited availability of 
God’s grace because the teaching is inextricable from reprobation. The desire is that the 
ongoing comparative dialogue with Wesley’s theology can be a resource in developing a 
more-nuanced doctrine of grace for Aquinas that complements his convictions without 
agitating Wesley’s apprehensions.
 It may be tempting to appeal to Aquinas’s earliest works in order to resuscitate 
a principle of universal grace, or to speculate whether or not Aquinas might have devel-
oped a similar alternative had he lived longer. However, doing so would be unsatisfactorily 
inconclusive at best (as in the latter), if not naïvely Pelagian at worst (as in the former)! So, 
rather than treading these unavailing avenues, we should seek indicators that enjoin Aqui-
nas to exchange his teaching on limited grace and reprobation for a doctrine of universally 
prevenient grace similar to Wesley’s. This leads us to consider two such indicators from 
Aquinas’s theology: first, Aquinas’s very intentional choice to take the Dominican habit 
and become a preaching friar; and second, his mature teaching regarding a universal reli-
gious “inward instinct” (interior instinctus). These two indicators bring the historical-con-
textual details of Aquinas’s own life together with the doctrinal ruminations of Aquinas’s 
mature theology to illuminate a possible way for Aquinas to uphold universal prevenient 
grace—albeit, a possibility initialized through the dialogical insights of iconic dignity.6
6 Recall that the rejoinder at the end of Chapter 4—for Wesleyans to abandon the doctrine of total 
depravity—was predicated on the insights of iconic dignity as an interpretive trajectory emerging from the 
theological comparison between Wesley and Aquinas. The nature of bilateral theological dialogue must 
allow such give and take.
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 Regarding the first indicator, it is difficult to overstate the practical, vocational, 
and theological importance of Aquinas’s decision to join the Order of Preachers.7 When 
Aquinas took the Dominican habit in April 1244, the mendicant orders were still very 
much in their infancy.8 The choice would have shocked Aquinas’s family, who had been 
grooming him for the prestigious life of a Benedictine monk—not a poor, itinerant friar. 
Denys Turner expresses this juxtaposition well:
Dominicans preach and teach, the monks weep; Dominicans engage in no econom-
ically productive activity, the monks farm; Dominicans are beggars, the monks are 
economically self-supporting; Dominicans can count on no permanence of place, 
and if they preach, they preach to all comers off the street, whereas the monks are 
vowed to stability of place and belong to settled communities; Dominicans are 
city dwellers, the monks commonly rural; Dominicans are university men, their 
learning that of the schools; the monk’s schola is the cloister.9
There simply was little resemblance between the unconventional Dominicans and the 
familiar, noble guise of the Benedictine monk. Yet it was this intentional Dominican focus 
on the value of study, learning, disputation, and engaging intellectual opponents with their 
own tools and systems that seems to have particularly attracted Aquinas to the Order of 
Preachers.10 As Pierre Mandonnet has explained, the Dominicans were “the first religious 
Order vowed to an intense active life for the religious, intellectual, and moral service of 
7 See Brian Davies, “St. Thomas Aquinas as a Dominican,” New Blackfriars 60 (March 1979): 102-116; 
and Denys Turner, Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 8-46.
8 The Order of Friars Minor was established by St. Francis of Assisi in 1209, while the Order of Preachers 
was established by St. Dominic de Guzmán in 1216. The orders came to be denominated by their founders’ 
names—hence, the Franciscans and the Dominicans.
9 Turner, Thomas Aquinas, 17.
10 See Davies, “St. Thomas Aquinas as a Dominican,” 104.
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Christian society.”11 The Order was thus poised “to enter into the social life of the time” 
with their vocation, organization, education, and mobilization—all of which attracted 
Aquinas and typified his identity as a Dominican.12
 To the student of early Methodism, such portraits of the Dominicans may call 
to mind a picture of John Wesley: the Oxford don associating with the most-destitute 
urbanites, preaching to the masses in fields and mines, endlessly itinerating throughout 
the Methodist connection. For Wesley, though, these methods were practical-theologi-
cal embodiments of the doctrine of universal prevenient grace. They reflected his deep 
theological conviction of the iconic dignity of every body and soul to which he ministered, 
every heart to which he preached. This is why, in his famous sermon on “Free Grace” for 
all, Wesley begins his eightfold attack on predestination with its consequent invalidation 
of the theological practice of preaching.
But if [predestination or reprobation] be so, then is all preaching vain. It is needless 
to them that are elected. For they, whether with preaching or without, will infal-
libly be saved. Therefore the end of preaching, ‘to save souls,’* is void with regard 
to them. And it is useless to them that are not elected. For they cannot possibly be 
saved. They, whether with preaching or without, will infallibly be damned. The 
end of preaching is therefore void with regard to them likewise. So that in either 
case, our preaching is vain, as your hearing is also vain.13
11 Pierre Mandonnet, St. Dominic and His Work, trans. Mary Benedicta Larkin (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder 
Book Co., 1944), 175.
12 Mandonnet, 175.
13 Wesley, Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” §10, in Works 3:547-548. In the previous paragraph (§9), Wesley 
establishes that “election,” “preterition,” “predestination,” and “reprobation” are synonymous for him. Also, 
Outler’s editorial footnote, indicated above at the asterisk (*), sheds much light on Wesley’s own under-
standing of his vocation as a preacher; it is reproduced here: 
* “Cf. Jas. 5:19-20. See also Wesley’s letter to Christopher Hopper, Oct. 8, 1755: ‘You have one business 
on earth—to save souls.’ Also his letter to his brother Charles, Mar. 25, 1772: ‘Oh what a thing it is to have 
curam animarum [“the care of souls”]. You and I are called to this; to save souls from death, to watch over 
them as those that must give account.’ Also another letter to Charles, Apr. 26, 1772: ‘Your business as well as 
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The universal divine initiative of prevenient grace means that all people are potential 
recipients of salvation. Prevenient grace (for Wesley) thus becomes a soteriological anti-
dote to predestination and reprobation. Furthermore, it is because of prevenient grace 
that preaching “actually makes a difference.” On the one hand, preaching manifests divine 
gratuity by sharing the life-giving gospel without qualification or limitation. The invita-
tion to holiness and happiness radiates to all people. On the other hand, prevenient grace 
also means that God is always already present and active in one who hears the preaching. 
The grace of the word meets the grace of the recipient, giving practical testimony to God’s 
universal gracious initiative.
 Aquinas does not go this far in discussing the practice of preaching, but he does 
agree that gratuitous grace is conveyed in the articulated word of the sermo—as in preach-
ing.14 Recall that, for Aquinas, gratuitous grace (gratia gratis data) is given for the sake of 
leading someone else to union with God.15 Hence, the gracious gift of efficacious speech 
within one individual profits another by instructing their intellect, moving their affections, 
and stirring their desire to fulfill the substance of the sermo.16 The gratuitous grace given 
to one is for the sake of helping another toward gratia gratum faciens, sanctifying grace. 
Aquinas’s teaching here perfectly aligns with the purpose of the Dominican Order,
mine is to save souls. When we took priests’ orders, we undertook to make it our one business.’ See No. 142, 
‘The Wisdom of Winning Souls,’ II” (Works 3:547n19).
14 See Aquinas, ST II-II.177.
15 See ST I-II.111.1 and 4. Aquinas repeats this in ST II-II.177.1.
16 ST II-II.177.1. Aquinas denominates these three effects of the sermo as (1) doceat, “to teach,” (2) delec-
tet, “to please,” and (3) alliciantur, “to sway.”
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[which] was founded, from the beginning, especially for preaching and the salva-
tion of souls. Our study ought to tend principally, ardently, and with the highest 
endeavor to the end that we might be useful to the souls of our neighbors.17
Granted, this is not as radical as the doubly-graced notion of preaching suggested by Wes-
ley’s doctrine of universal prevenient grace. Still, Wesley’s own homiletic, pastoral, and 
theological concerns are audible in the distinctively Dominican thought of Friar Thomas 
Aquinas.18
 Beyond these considerations remains what is probably Aquinas’s earliest reflection 
on preaching. In a brief set of collations on Isaiah 41, Aquinas offers three motivators to 
preach: the impulse of faith (instinctus fidei), the incitement of zeal (stimulus zeli), and 
the greatness of the reward (magnitudo praemii).19 These highly affective motivators align 
with Aquinas’s moral psychology and organically express the inward impetus of preve-
nient grace inspiring one to preach. Aquinas offers scant support of his exposition, and, 
as far as we know, he never repeats this trio in later works. However, in his final years, 
another instinctus emerges—this time referring to a universal interior instinctus, which is 
the second indicator for our present consideration. 
17 Prologue, The Primitive Constitutions of the Order of Friars Preachers, in Saint Dominic: Biographical 
Documents, ed. Francis C. Lehner (Washington D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1964), 212.
18 On Aquinas as a preacher, see Joachim Walsh, “St. Thomas on Preaching,” Dominicana 5, no. 4 (March 
1921): 6-14; and V. F. O’Daniel, “Thomas Aquinas as Preacher,” The Ecclesiastical Review 42, no. 1 ( January 
1910): 26-36. Although both articles are now quite dated (if not a bit panegyric), they reveal Aquinas’s core 
homiletical concern to be the clear transmission of Christian truth for the sake of conversion and growth in 
sanctity. Preaching is a practical discipline, and it must have a practical focus; to that end, Aquinas puts great 
emphasis on the personal practices and discipline of the preacher—in essence, that a preacher practices 
what is preached. Compare this especially to the focus on “doctrine, discipline, and practice” from the 1744 
Minutes of the first Methodist annual conference, in Wesley’s Works 10:120.
19 Aquinas, Expositio super Isaiam ad Litteram (Commentary on Isaiah), c. 41, collations. For a complete 
English translation of this Commentary (with parallel Latin), see “Commentary on Isaiah,” trans. Joshua 
Madden, the Aquinas Institute, accessed June 20, 2018, https://aquinas.cc/173/513/1.
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 Late in his career (c. 1270, et seq.), Aquinas sporadically investigates the idea of 
a universal, quasi-natural inner impulse toward God—an interior instinctus.20 Aquinas 
generally links this instinct to matters of faith and religious practice as a certain natural 
tendency to worship God inwardly, even prior to the giving of the Law.21 In this way, the 
interior instinctus accords with the precepts of true religion that are outlined by the Law 
and the Commandments,22 and even the natural law.23 In fact, during his second Parisian 
regency (1269-1272), Aquinas stretches the interior instinctus “to the power of the first 
truth which illuminates and teaches man inwardly.”24 The significance of such an instinct 
20 To describe this inner instinct as “quasi-natural” is appropriate for two reasons: first, in the way 
that acts of virtue and even grace are “natural” to humans, since they are part of our design and (ideal) 
purpose; second, in the way that our human faculties are “natural” to us, especially in terms of the way 
Wesley describes “natural conscience” as really a consequence of “preventing grace.” See Sermon 85, “On 
Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.4, in Works 3:207. The prefix “quasi-” also stems from the fact that 
Aquinas does not discuss the interior instinctus very much, so our contemporary descriptions of it must 
remain tentative and qualified.
21 For example, see the following: ST II-II.2.9 ad 3, on the motivating inward instinct of the divine 
invitation to believe; ST II-II.10.1 ad 1, on the inward instinct not to thwart the truth of faith; ST II-II.93.1 ad 
2, on being instructed by an inward instinct how to worship God before the Law was given; ST II-II.122.4, 
on the interior prompting of the Holy Spirit to worship God inwardly, which is consistent with the revealed 
Law and the first principles of natural law; ST III.36.5, on the interior instinct of the Holy Spirit notifying 
Simeon and Anna of the birth of Christ; and ST III.60.5 ad 3, on the movement by inward instinct to wor-
ship God, including the sensible things to be employed therein. See also Aquinas, Super Evangelium Joannis, 
c. 6, lect. 5, in Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapters 6-12, 30-38, especially 32-33 (§935). Aquinas is 
commenting on John 6:44 to explain how a person may be drawn to God without compulsion; interiorly, 
this is accomplished through the interior instinctus. Note, too, the late composition of this commentary: c. 
1270-1272 (Paris).
22 See Aquinas, ST II-II.122.4, on the interior prompting of the Holy Spirit to worship God inwardly, 
which is consistent with the revealed Law.
23 See Aquinas, ST III.60.5 ad 3, on the movement by inward instinct to worship God, including the 
sensible things to be employed therein.
24 Aquinas, Quodlibet II, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3, in Quodlibetal Questions 1 & 2, trans. Sandra Edwards (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), 89. This quodlibet was disputed the first Christmas of Aqui-
nas’s Second Paris Regency, at the close of 1269. Aquinas began the Secunda Pars of the ST more or less upon 
arriving in Paris at the beginning of 1269—meaning this quodlibet came just before Aquinas penned the 
texts mentioned above from the Secunda Secundae that refer to the interior instinctus.
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can hardly be overstated. In effect, it names a certain God-ward instinct or tendency—a 
“natural” bent of our nature toward God.
 Recently, David Decosimo has indicated the potential of Aquinas’s interior instinc-
tus for informing a charity-driven Thomistic theological ethic. Decosimo makes a strong 
case for the generous (and genuine) inclusion of pagan virtue for Thomistic ethics—pre-
cisely because Aquinas’s “insistence on the universality of the religious impulse.” For the 
present purposes, Decosimo’s observations about the scope and substance of Aquinas’s 
interior instinctus are most illuminating:
Thomas believes every human has a religious inclination (interior instinctus). His 
remarks on this inclination are few, scattered, and ambiguous, but he imagines 
everyone as internally disposed to form some (ideally) true beliefs about God’s 
existence and character and to worship him.… He certainly thinks human exis-
tence and experience are such that everyone is oriented to a mystery and goodness 
transcending not only herself but the natural world. This religious impulse should 
lead to awe, honor, worship, and, especially, gratitude before that reality.25
First, as Decosimo highlights, the interior instinctus is a universal impulse, inclining every-
one to religious expression. Second, concludes Decosimo, among the consequences of the 
interior instinctus is a gratitude to and for that transcendent goodness, which we call God. 
As we examined earlier, Aquinas offers three interpretations of grace in Summa Theolo-
giae: loving favor, a freely-given gift, and the response of gratitude—viz., its nature, its 
dynamic, and our response to it.26 In other words, the gratitude evoked by the universal 
interior instinctus is a fitting human response to the freely-given gift of God’s loving-favor. 
25 David Decosimo, Ethics as a Work of Charity: Thomas Aquinas and Pagan Virtue (Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 2014), 230-231. Decosimo further argues that, for Aquinas, the suppression of this 
human instinct toward religion amounts to the sin of infidelitas (228-235).
26 See ST I-II.110.1 co.
326
Therefore, the interior instinctus may be seen as evidence of God’s grace (the stimulus of 
gratitude) on a universal level (ubiquitous religious inclination).
 Dermot Lane has gone one step further by connecting Aquinas’s universal instinct 
to a concept of universal grace. With particular reference to Aquinas, Lane expresses the 
bond between grace and faith in theology:
Every human being comes into the world graced by God.… [The early Fathers] 
spoke about the universal grace of God in the world as “first grace” which is com-
pleted by the “second grace” of Christ. It was Aquinas, however, who worked out 
a developed theology of the relationship that exists between the universal grace of 
God and the act of faith. Aquinas distinguished between interior grace and exte-
rior grace, between the inner invitation given to all and the outer expression of that 
contained in Christian revelation.27
It must be noted that the phrase “universal grace” (gratia universalis) does not appear 
within Aquinas’s own writings. The textual evidence from Aquinas that Lane supplies are 
instead those passages where Aquinas provides key insights on the interior instinctus.28 
Unfortunately, Lane offers no account of how Aquinas’s interior instinctus yields a doc-
trine of universal grace. This does not necessarily leave us without a plausible explanation, 
though. If Aquinas’s interior instinctus is a kind of proto-faith or quasi-natural tendency 
to theistic belief (although one still prone to error, incertitude, and imprecision29), then 
the instinct must in some way flow from grace because of its supernatural orientation. 
On its own, though, the interior instinctus is not salvific. It may indeed prefigure the basic 
27 Dermot A. Lane, The Experience of God: An Invitation to Do Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), 
80. Lane also references the Vatican II texts Gaudium et Spes (§§19, 22) and Lumen Gentium (§13).
28 E.g., ST II-II.2.9 ad 3; ST II-II.10.1; and Commentary on John, c. 5, lect. 6.
29 See Decosimo, Ethics as a Work of Charity, 230 and n79.
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tenets of the Law, but “its paltry fruit depends on experience, capacities, and context”30 
as opposed to the true vine of Christ and the revelation of the New Law of grace.31 Similar 
to this is Wesley’s own doctrine of prevenient grace: although it signifies a beginning of 
salvation, a degree of deliverance, and a tendency toward life, it does not of itself effect 
“Christian salvation,” properly speaking.32
 Additionally, Aquinas’s portrayal of the interior instinctus as a quasi-natural posi-
tive tendency to God calls to mind Aquinas’s threefold good of human nature discussed 
in Chapter 4.33 To reiterate, the first good is the constitution of our nature (including the 
faculties of the soul), the second is our natural inclination to virtue, and the third is the 
gift of original justice. While sin obliterates the third good and leaves the first unscathed, 
it only diminishes the second good, i.e., the natural inclination to virtue (inclinationem 
ad virtutem a natura). Following Augustine, Aquinas defines “virtue” as “a good quality 
of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use [which God 
works in us, without us].”34 A (sin-diminished) natural inclination to virtue is therefore a 
(sin-diminished) natural inclination to good. Is this by grace? On the one hand, original 
30 Decosimo, Ethics as a Work of Charity, 230.
31 See Aquinas, ST I-II.106-108, on the substance of the New Law—grace—and its relationship to the 
“Old Law.” These questions immediately precede the “Treatise on Grace” (qq. 109-114).
32 Wesley, Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” II.1, in Works 3:204. For a recent analysis 
of the salvific efficacy of prevenient grace in Wesley, see Stan Rodes, “Was John Wesley Arguing for Preve-
nient Grace as Regenerative?” Wesleyan Theological Journal 48, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 73-85.
33 Aquinas, ST I-II.85.1.
34 ST I-II.55.4. Aquinas indicates in the sed contra that this definition is drawn from Augustine’s De 
Libero Arbitrio, II.19. The final phrase (“which God works in us without us”) has been bracketed here to 
reflect Aquinas’s response, where he says that the phrase holds true for the infused and theological virtues, 
but not necessarily of the acquired virtues.
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righteousness is entirely gracious, since it entails the supernatural elevation of our nature. 
On the other hand, our natural faculties are essential to the nature of the human species.35 
But the natural inclination to virtue falls more in the middle—somewhere between nature 
and grace—much like the interior instinctus.
 Again, this kind of interstitial “somewhere between nature and grace” tendency is 
not a foreign concept within Wesley’s own theology. “More properly,” Wesley teaches, this 
is “prevenient grace”:
all the ‘drawings’ of ‘the Father’, the desires after God, which, if we yield to them, 
increase more and more; all that ‘light’ wherewith the Son of God ‘enlighteneth 
everyone that cometh into the world’, showing every man ‘to do justly, to love 
mercy, and to walk humbly with his God’; all the convictions which his Spirit from 
time to time works in every child of man.36
As Wesley writes elsewhere, this also includes “the first wish to please God, the first dawn 
of light concerning his will, and the first slight, transient conviction of having sinned 
against him. All these imply some tendency toward life,” for through them we become 
sensitive to “God and the things of God.”37 In other words, by grace, part of our nature 
as human beings is to be responsive to grace, to good, to God. The ubiquitous radiance 
of prevenient grace thus premises the dignity that we iconize. Alternatively, our iconizing 
of prevenient grace represents the very height of the dignity in which we participate rela-
tionally and synergistically with God. It is therefore because of the nature of God’s grace 
35 This statement does not take away from a sense of our constitutive faculties as a divine gift within our 
nature. Again, it is important to appreciate the way our nature and its faculties reflect God.
36 Wesley, Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” I.2, in Works 2:156-157.
37 Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” II.1, in Works 3:203-204. As Wesley continues 
later in the same sermon, “Everyone has sooner or later good desires.… Everyone has some measure of that 
light, some faint glimmering ray, which sooner or later, more or less, enlightens every man that cometh into 
the world” (III.4, in Works 3:207). Cf. Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” I.2, in Works 2:156-157.
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that there is a “grace of human nature”—a gratia praeveniens that enables our nature to 
be graced.
 What we have, then, is another instance of the perspective and explanatory power 
of iconic dignity—in this case, for Aquinas’s teachings on limited grace and reprobation. 
Iconic dignity charitably illuminates Aquinas’s doctrine as inconsistent with his own theo-
logical anthropology and, in light of Wesley’s own doctrine of (prevenient) grace, ulti-
mately untenable. As at the close of Chapter 4, the dynamic between Wesley and Aquinas 
is important: the one is not rebuffing or rectifying the other; instead, they correspond 
with one another to evoke mutual flourishing. Here, Wesley’s doctrine of prevenient grace 
calls to Aquinas’s gracious theological anthropology (especially the interior instinctus) to 
shed a collective light on Aquinas’s troubling restriction of grace and, consequently, his 
doctrine of reprobation. In concrete terms, too, Wesley figuratively calls to Aquinas as a 
fellow preacher—as a living conduit of God’s prevenient grace articulated in the Word of 
life abundant for all people. Therefore, this appeal for Thomists to abandon reprobation 
and the restriction of grace emerges from the catholicity of Wesleyan prevenient grace as 
the reverberation of “deep calling to deep” (Ps 42:7). It is, in effect, the mutual recognition 
of the iconic dignity in the heart of grace.
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CONCLUSION
 At this point in the study, we have already encountered a number of topical conclu-
sions, comparative summaries, and constructive suggestions, but we have yet to step back 
to (re)consider the whole. What are we to make of the theological comparison between 
Wesley and Aquinas? Or the nature–grace–virtue framework? Or iconic dignity itself? 
In this final chapter, we shall endeavor to answer these kinds of questions in four related 
movements: (1) the explanatory power and significance of iconic dignity; (2) the emergent 
characteristics and embodiments of iconic dignity; (3) a review of the desired outcomes 
in light of the foregoing comparative discoveries; and (4) a circling back to nature, grace, 
and virtue in order to point ahead to future work. As we shall see, what follows is rooted 
in the preceding, but it is also a piece of—and of a piece with—a larger endeavor to which 
it points.
1. The Explanatory Power and Significance of Iconic Dignity
 Why is iconic dignity significant—whether as the emergent trajectory of compar-
ing Wesley and Aquinas, or as a theological perspective for cultivating vitality, or even as 
a response to contemporary maladies? The answer lies in the explanatory power of iconic 
dignity. Although largely implicit up to this point, that power is now discernible as four 
forms of explanation: critical, comparative, constructive, and consequential.
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A. Critical Explanation
 This study critically identifies the underlying ailment of the present context as 
the diminution of iconic dignity. The problem materializes when we refuse to recognize 
the dignity of another as a fellow “icon of God.” As we neglect the fundamental dignity 
inherent to our nature, we also shirk responsibilities to God’s Creation as interdependent 
inhabitants of God’s Creation. By denying God’s providentially gracious image from being 
reflected in every human being for the sake of every part of God’s Creation, we dehuman-
ize ourselves, degrade what God has denominated “good,” and (in effect) “de-deify” God. 
Conversely, we have also become overly-adept at fashioning “dignity” in our own likeness 
and hoarding it for ourselves. Iconic dignity critically unpacks this example as an instance 
of “pseudo-dignity” because it lacks the corollary recognition of the true iconic rootage of 
our worth according to God’s image. These two distortions often merge together as the 
quintessence of “pride.”
 On these terms, iconic dignity critically and significantly explains the present con-
dition of our human nature, including the panoply of our capacities that we freely employ 
pro bono or pro malo. Such behaviors and tendencies are, of course, indicative of our affec-
tive moral psychology and its various passions. Without proper orientation, concupisci-
ble passions (sense-based attraction to simple good) can instead incite hatred or aversion 
toward others, while irascible passions (sense-based inclination to resist hindrances to 
attaining the simple good) can foment anger or fear toward others. Central to this theolog-
ical perspective is the balance intended between iconicity and dignity—a critical balance 
that appears particularly disrupted these days. Therefore, the critical explanatory capac-
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ity of iconic dignity also functions normatively, as a rubric for evaluating situations and 
our potential responses to them.
B. Comparative Explanation
 Iconic dignity powerfully demonstrates a comparative compatibility between 
Wesley and Aquinas that extends well beyond coincidental similarities. At its core, iconic 
dignity helps to establish a common theological language, perspective, and trajectory—
one of mutual exchange in which Wesley and Aquinas contribute to and receive from one 
another. Contribution helps to reveal one’s own strengths within an exchange. Recep-
tion also non-aggressively illuminates one’s own limitations by promoting fresh insights, 
potential alternatives, or unseen ways of addressing certain concerns. As Francis Clooney 
explains, through comparison “we understand each [participant] differently because the 
other is near, and by cumulative insight also begin to comprehend related matters differ-
ently” by “intuitively uncovering dimensions of ourselves that would not otherwise, by 
a non-comparative logic, come to the fore.”1 Comparison therefore aims at illumination 
and explanation, not dry analysis (sifting through similarities and differences to distill the 
essence of what’s being compared) or competitive evaluation (comparing for the sake of 
judging the “better” tradition).2
1 Clooney, Comparative Theology, 11.
2 See Clooney, Comparative Theology, 10-11. “In some instances this comparison may involve evalua-
tion,” Clooney notes, “but ordinarily the priority is more simply the dynamics of a back-and-forth learning. 
[Comparative theology] is a theological discipline confident about the possibility of being intelligently faith-
ful to tradition even while seeking fresh understanding outside that tradition” (11).
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 At its root, the theological comparison that informs iconic dignity has revealed 
Wesley and Aquinas as non-identical members of a common tradition. However basic, this 
observation should not be overlooked. Although their religious expressions differ in form 
and focus according to their respective contexts, Wesley and Aquinas are not “rivals.”3 By 
the same token, the entreaty for Wesleyans to abandon total depravity or for Thomists to 
adopt a form of universal prevenient grace is no vindication of one tradition over the other, 
but is instead the very fruit of comparison in the form of mutual exchange. Therefore, the 
comparative explanatory power of iconic dignity pertains more to a shared “rightness of 
heart” than to a triumphant “correctness of ideology.”4 The perspective of iconic dignity 
means that any encounter is an opportunity for deeper engagement and mutual exchange.
C. Constructive Explanation
 Comparison points to construction. As a construct, then, iconic dignity is hewn 
from the comparative theological bedrock of Wesley and Aquinas. Iconic dignity construc-
tively benefits from the strength of these two figures’ rich theological traditions and the 
fresh insights they afford when held in comparison. The theological perspective of iconic 
3 Compare this account of “explanatory power” with MacIntyre’s in Whose Justice? Which Rational-
ity? Having asserted early on “the necessary place of conflict within traditions” (11), MacIntyre concludes 
that “contending traditions of enquiry depend for their vindication upon the adequacy and the explanatory 
power” of those traditions and their adherents (403). For MacIntyre, “explanatory power” is much more 
synonymous with “evaluative” or “evincing” power—an argument’s cogency and justificatory force against 
a rival’s. This is to be expected since MacIntyre’s narrative begins in the Greek agōn (27).
4 This idea stands at the heart of Wesley’s irenic Sermon 39, “Catholic Spirit” (Works 2:79-95). Drawing 
from 2 Kings 10:15 (“Is your heart right, as my heart is with your heart? … If it is, give me your hand”), Wesley 
aims at a “catholic spirit” that focuses more on the convergence of practical expression than on divergence 
of dogmatic articulation. A similar tone is present in his public Letter to a Roman Catholic, penned a year 
before the sermon “Catholic Spirit”.
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dignity is therefore capable of addressing contemporary concerns without being driven 
by a modernizing focus on utility. The point is that “a comparative theology can itself be a 
truly constructive theology, a theological activity distinguished by its grounding in a faith 
perspective, and by its manner of proceeding, its serious and prolonged attention to more 
than one tradition, and by constructive theology arising from that comparative work, not 
apart from it.”5 Comparison for comparison’s sake is indeed intellectually stimulating, but 
it remains self-referential and lacking in transformative power without constructive work.
 Part of iconic dignity’s constructive work is its capability of fostering further doc-
trinal reflection and practical engagement between Wesleyans and Thomists, as well as 
those coming from other theological traditions.6 Ultimately, iconic dignity is aimed at the 
gracious cultivation and support of dignity in global life. As a transformative perspective 
for continued theological reflection, then, iconic dignity yields a constructive explanatory 
capacity that is sufficiently agile and powerful to address a myriad of contemporary and 
contextual concerns.
D. Consequential Explanation
 Finally, iconic dignity bears consequential explanatory power at multiple levels. 
Within the present study, for example, iconic dignity has led to the proliferation of com-
5 Clooney, Comparative Theology, 43.
6 Iconic dignity ought not be sequestered exclusively to theological dialogue between Wesley and Aqui-
nas. After all, its central motifs are biblical. But there would be cause for concern if iconic dignity, as a 
theological perspective constructed from the comparison of Wesley and Aquinas, were altogether isolated 
from that context, severing the vital tie between the concept and its lineage. Here we must heed MacIntyre’s 
indictment of “the forums of modern liberal culture,” which, over against his own standpoint of tradition, 
presupposes “the irrelevance of one’s history to one’s status as a participant in debate.” See MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 400.
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parative possibilities between Wesley and Aquinas. Not only has this effected structural 
reconsiderations of this dissertation, it has also demonstrated the capacity for lateral out-
growth, as in Chapters 5 and 7. Consequently, more comparative work between Wesley 
and Aquinas is both possible and necessary. One manifestation of this is the future expan-
sion of the work of this dissertation to include additional aspects of grace (i.e., soteriology 
and ecclesiology/sacraments) and the theological virtues. Further topics for others to 
consider in consequence of iconic dignity may include Christology, politics, eschatology, 
economics, angelology, ethics (vis-à-vis the moral virtues), and gender—all either within 
the theological comparison of Wesley and Aquinas or beyond it.
 Still more broadly, iconic dignity bears considerable explanatory power and signif-
icance for Christian communities that seek to understand God, humans, and Creation, and 
to live faithfully into that understanding. Inasmuch as every human reflects the image of 
God, every human is called to reflect upon that image and through that image. Reflection of 
this sort occurs within one’s own faith community and across traditional, denominational, 
and cultural borderlines. When extrapolated, the trajectory of iconic dignity also implies 
significance consequences for the world at large—not just for Wesleyans or Thomists, 
Methodists or Catholics, Christians or not, but all the inhabitants of God’s Creation.7 
Therefore, iconic dignity reflects a critical, comparative, constructive, and consequential 
theological perspective vested with inclusive explanatory power for the sake of abundant 
flourishing.
7 One such exploration was treated in Chapter 5—the ecological extension of iconic dignity for Wesley 
and Aquinas, as well as their inheritors. Further exploration is certainly possible, especially in the direction 
of (collaborative) Wesleyan-Thomistic engagement in interreligious dialogue.
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2. Emergent Characteristics and Practical Embodiments of Iconic Dignity
 At the very outset of this study, I claimed that theological perspective matters, 
especially in light of a world that consistently tends toward fragmentation. I then offered 
the thesis that a theological comparison of nature, grace, and virtue in John Wesley and 
Thomas Aquinas could yield a robust perspective capable of fostering true human dignity 
and vitality. Emerging from that rich comparison, I argued, is the invaluable theologi-
cal perspective that I termed iconic dignity. From that opening cluster of claims, I then 
explored a broad theological basis contributing to iconic dignity as a hermeneutic. I sought 
to explain each term—iconicity and dignity—in light of the broader Christian tradition, 
considering in particular both a biblical and an Eastern Patristic interpretation of these 
concepts. And, after noting Wesley’s and Aquinas’s indebtedness to these two sources, as 
well as their respective contexts and narratives, I proceeded with comparative heart of the 
study.
 Also from the outset, I called attention to how an icon rarely discloses the fullness 
of its meaning at a glance. The initial gaze is an invitation to experience an unfurling, 
emergent reality, ripe with possibilities and personifications. Hence, it would have been 
exceedingly difficult to express the characteristics of iconic dignity that emerge from theo-
logical comparison before that actual comparison (i.e., at the beginning of this study). For 
this reason, I acknowledged early on the eventual need to gather together elements and 
characteristics of iconic dignity gleaned from the comparative study of Wesley and Aqui-
nas. That time has now come.
337
 In what follows, seven emergent characteristics of iconic dignity will be developed 
from the foregoing comparison of Wesley and Aquinas. In order to avoid itemization or 
reductionism, these characteristics are grouped into two trios of related concepts—par-
ticipatory, relational, incarnational, and dynamic, encompassing, transformative—with 
loving as a culminating “capstone characteristic.” Ultimately, the purpose of developing 
these seven characteristics is to highlight existing practical embodiments of iconic dignity 
as well as to propose new paths to expand engagement with its theological perspective.8 It 
may also be noted that these emergent characteristics of iconic dignity strongly resonate 
with Randy Maddox’s own “seven desired aspects in a practical theology”: (1) disciplinari-
ly-unifying, (2) holistic, (3) praxis-driven, (4) transformative, (5) communal, (6) contex-
tual, and (7) occasional.9 This should come as no surprise given the self-styled practical 
nature of Wesley’s theology10 (under which Maddox stands) and iconic dignity’s core con-
cern with genuine human flourishing and transformation.
A. Participatory, Relational, Incarnational
 This first cluster of characteristics—participatory, relational, and incarnational—
collectively emphasizes a fundamental interconnectedness to which iconic dignity points: 
our connection to God, others, self, Creation. In Chapter 2, we saw how, for both Wesley 
8 The hope is to be inductive (deriving the “emergent characteristics”) and deductive (generating the 
“practical embodiments”) without being reductive!
9 Maddox, “The Recovery of Theology as a Practical Discipline,” 650-672.
10 See for example John Wesley’s “Preface” (§5) to A Collection of Hymns for the Use of the People Called 
Methodists (1780), in Works 7:74. Cf. Wesley’s 50 volume abridged anthology, A Christian Library (1749-
1755), subtitled, “Consisting of Extracts from and Abridgments of the Choicest Pieces of Practical Divinity 
Which have been Published in the English Tongue.”
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and Aquinas, all existing things necessarily participate in God’s own existence, which is 
the source of all existence. We also noted the commensurability of “being” and “good-
ness.” In other words, our being and our goodness are predicated upon our participation in 
God’s own existence and essential goodness. Furthermore, as we discussed in Chapter 5, 
the very nature of our humanity ad imaginem Dei suggests an awareness of this underlying 
participation in the form of a wise stewardship of Creation. Aquinas reminds us that all 
creatures bear a Trinitarian mark (vestigium Trinitatis),11 and Wesley reminds us “that we 
are to see the Creator in the glass of every creature,” looking “upon nothing as separate 
from God.”12 Whether with God, with others, with Creation, or with ourselves, the under-
lying dynamic here is relational participation.
 “Participation” extends beyond nature into grace as the means of actualizing the 
call to “relational holiness.”13 Chapter 6 resonated with a common theme for Wesley and 
Aquinas: God’s grace is for the sake of our participation in and relationship with God. 
By grace, God operates in us so that we may cooperate with God by grace. God pardons 
us in order that we may participate in God—which is to say, to experience God in rela-
tionship. In Wesley’s words, “first, God works; therefore you can work. Secondly, God 
works; therefore you must work.”14 Participatory grace is also the foundation for any dis-
cussion of merit within Wesley and Aquinas. A deeper implication of this is that what we 
11 Aquinas, ST I.45.7.
12 Wesley, Sermon 23, “Sermon on the Mount, III,” I.11, in Works 1:516-517.
13 For more on this concept from a Wesleyan tradition, see Thomas Jay Oord and Michael Lodahl, Rela-
tional Holiness: Responding to the Call of Love (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill Press, 2005).
14 Wesley, Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” III.2, in Works 3:206.
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do as human beings actually matters. There is merit (and demerit) in what we do. But, as 
addressed in Chapter 4, our capacity for greatness is also an indictment of our ability for 
malum. Without participating in grace, we are incapable of avoiding sin absolutely and 
attaining our beatific end, which is the relationship of our participatory iconicity of our 
dignified calling.
 Similarly, the call to join in God’s work is also a recognition of the incarnational 
nature of iconic dignity as a theological perspective. For example, integrated into the orga-
nization and discipline of early Methodism is Wesley’s practical-theological “expectation 
of participation in God’s ministry to body and soul.”15 In a pastoral letter to Alexander 
Knox in 1778, Wesley counsels that “it will be a double blessing if you give yourself up 
to the Great Physician, that He may heal soul and body together. And unquestionably 
this is His design. He wants to give you…both inward and outward health.”16 Eight years 
later, Wesley further stresses these twin ministerial foci in his poignant sermon “On Vis-
iting the Sick,” advising that visitations begin by “inquiring into [the] outward condition” 
of the sick. “Having shown that you have a regard for their bodies you may proceed to 
inquire concerning their souls.”17 Wesley’s lifelong concern for health—physical, mental, 
and spiritual—is further corroborated by the fact that his most-published work was not a 
15 Randy L. Maddox, “John Wesley on Holistic Health and Healing,” Methodist History 46.1 (October 
2007), 9.
16 John Wesley to Alexander Knox, October 26, 1778, in Letters (Telford), 6:327.
17 Wesley, Sermon 98, “On Visiting the Sick,” II.2 and 4, in Works 3:390, 391.
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“doctrinal text,” such as his Sermons or Notes, but Primitive Physic, a collation of inexpen-
sive naturally occurring medicines.18 As Maddox summarizes,
[Wesley] resisted the tendency to minimize the physical dimension of God’s heal-
ing work in the present world. He longed for Christians to see that participation 
in God’s present saving work involves nurturing both our souls and bodies, and 
addressing both in reaching out to others.19
Matter matters. We are coherent amalgams of materiality and immateriality. Iconic dig-
nity rejects the dualistic spiritual escapism of Gnosticism and Manicheanism and instead 
underscores a real, practical concern for bodies and a holistic orientation to life.
 In a recent study, Melanie L. Dobson has carried this kind of embodied focus over 
into a discussion of health as a genuinely-Thomistic habitus/virtue.20 Dobson rightly 
begins with the way that Aquinas frequently explains habitus in terms of sanitas, “health,”21 
which distinguishes health from a transitory, amoral quantity. “Health as a habit means 
that how we treat our beings matters; we are not disembodied rational minds, but we 
18 See Wesley, Primitive Physic: or, An Easy and Natural Method of Curing Most Diseases, in Works 
32:97-266. Originally published in 1747, Primitive Physic reached 23 editions by Wesley’s death in 1791, with 
an additional 14 editions published posthumously until 1859. From 1747-1781, the title was spelled “Prim-
itive Physick.” For more on Wesley’s Primitive Physic, see Deborah Madden, “A Cheap, Safe and Natural 
Medicine”: Religion, Medicine, and Culture in John Wesley’s Primitive Physic (New York: Rodopi, 2007). Cf. 
Madden, “Wesley as Advisor on Health and Healing,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Wesley, 176-189.
19 Maddox, “John Wesley on Holistic Health and Healing,” 9. Maddox also refers here to the work of 
Philip W. Ott, who has insightfully investigated the subject of health and wholeness within John Wesley’s 
ministry and Primitive Physic. See Philip W. Ott, “John Wesley on Health: A Word for Sensible Regimen,” 
Methodist History 18, no. 3 (April 1980): 193-204; Ott, “John Wesley on Health as Wholeness,” Journal of 
Religion and Health 30, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 43-57; and Ott, “John Wesley on Mind and Body: Toward an 
Understanding of Health as Wholeness,” Methodist History 27, no. 2 ( January 1989): 61-72. As Ott observes, 
Wesley’s language is predictably Cartesian when it comes to the relationship of the body and the soul, but 
Wesley’s practice is radically holistic and full-bodied. See Ott, “John Wesley on Mind and Body,” 62-66; Ott, 
“John Wesley on Health,” 196n15; and Ott, “John Wesley on Health as Wholeness.”
20 Melanie L. Dobson, Health as a Virtue: Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health (Eugene, 
OR: Pickwick Publications, 2014).
21 According to Dobson, Aquinas mentions “health” (san– ) 15 times in ST I-II.49-54, and all six ques-
tions mention “health” at least once. See Dobson, Health as a Virtue, 24.
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are enfleshed creatures whose flesh deserves and demands virtuous attention. Health as 
a habit means we join with God in a journey toward the greatest wholeness and wellbe-
ing we can experience in this life on earth.”22 Although Dobson does not support this 
particular claim with direct textual evidence from Aquinas, her argument is not without 
merit—especially when mediated through a hermeneutic of iconic dignity. From Aqui-
nas’s doctrines of God, Creation, humanity, and moral-theological psychology—all held 
in comparative dialogue with John Wesley—emerges an iconic perspective of participatory, 
relational, and incarnational dignity. Cumulatively, the perspective of iconic dignity pro-
vides a practicable foundation for the consequent programmatic work to which Dobson 
turns in the second half of her study.23
 More generally, G. K. Chesterton has also attested to the interrelated participa-
tory, relational, and incarnational elements characteristic of Aquinas’s theology. In his 
popular biography Saint Thomas Aquinas, Chesterton recounts the anecdote of Aquinas 
dining with King Louis IX of France. In an epiphanic outburst, Aquinas interrupted the 
quietude of the evening, declaring, “And that will settle the Manichees!” The significance 
of the otherwise-humorous tale, writes Chesterton, is Aquinas’s impassioned optimism, 
his devout belief, in life, in all its fruitfulness and flourishing, as something good, tangible, 
revelatory.24 Aquinas doesn’t just “settle the Manichees” of history, he situates himself 
22 Dobson, Health as a Virtue, 27.
23 Dobson divides her study into two parts: Part I, “Thomas Aquinas and Habits of Health,” lays out 
Aquinas’s basic theological anthropology and how “health” is incorporated therein; Part II, “Habits of 
Health in Christian Communities,” explores two communal embodiments of “habits of health”—the Clergy 
Health Initiative (for United Methodist clergy, and based out of Duke University), and Word Made Flesh (an 
evangelical missionary organization).
24 Chesterton, St. Thomas Aquinas, 74-95.
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against the Manicheanism of his day: Neoplatonism, hyper-Augustinianism, Catharism. 
With eloquent brilliance, Chesterton describes Aquinas as standing
vitally and vividly alone in declaring that life is a living story, with a great begin-
ning and a great close; rooted in the primeval joy of God and finding its fruition 
in the final happiness of humanity; opening with the colossal chorus in which the 
sons of God shouted for joy, and ending in that mystical comradeship, shown in a 
shadowy fashion in those ancient words that move like an archaic dance; “For His 
delight is with the sons of men” [Prov. 8:31].25
In so many words, Chesterton here describes in his vignette of Aquinas what we are calling 
the theological perspective of iconic dignity. In our case, of course, that vignette is fostered 
in comparison with Wesley’s theology, through which it gains strength and further explan-
atory power.26 Still, Chesterton’s comments corroborate the emergence of incarnational 
and relational characteristics from Aquinas’s theology for iconic dignity.
 Embodiments of iconic dignity as participatory, relational, and incarnational will 
be informed by a common participation in care for Creation, self, and neighbor. Because 
we are neither “encased souls” nor “hollow automatons,” the care of iconic dignity will 
focus on a kind of health and wholeness that aims at holistic sanitas. Sanitas is rooted in 
our bodies and our souls (Chapter 2), in all our faculties and our free, moral, responsible 
use thereof (Chapter 3), in our acts and habitus (Chapter 4), in our role in tending for the 
entirety of the created world (Chapter 5), in the gracious healing and elevating of our 
25 Chesterton, St. Thomas Aquinas, 91.
26 It is no trivial matter, then, that Chesterton perceives Calvinism as a later form of Manicheanism (83). 
While Aquinas had to deal with Neoplatonic, hyper-Augustinian, and Cathar iterations of Manicheanism, 
Wesley had to death with Calvinist and quietist (not to mention Deist and enthusiast) forms. The decisive 
question comes down to one’s theological perspective of Creation, the material world, bodies and senses, 
and how deeply we are called to engage (or escape) our present existence. Tellingly, Aquinas and Wesley 
strongly converge on a doctrinally affirmative position toward materiality that employs Aristotelian philos-
ophy and biblical theology.
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essential nature without undercutting it (Chapter 6), and in cooperation with God’s truly 
catholic purview of grace for all (Chapter 7).
 Happily, practical embodiments of iconic dignity’s participatory, relational, and 
incarnational characteristics already exist. For example, the past 40 years or so have wit-
nessed to an increased concern for ecological stewardship from a theological perspective. 
As seen in Chapter 5, iconic dignity can help to provide key background and theory for 
why Wesleyans and Thomists would (and should) work cooperatively for the care of 
Creation. Furthermore, iconic dignity is also consistent with some of today’s strongest 
eco-theological reflection. One of the best examples of shifting theological tides is Pope 
Francis’s 2015 encyclical letter Laudato Si’ (On Caring for Our Common Home).27 The 
encyclical aims at fostering universal participation in broad dialogue toward sustainably 
integral ecological stewardship (§§13-14, 137-162). Underscoring the interrelatedness of all 
things (§§66, 137), whether creaturely or socio-culturally (§§6, 138-146), Francis affirms the 
unique dignity of humanity (§43; cf. §§65, 69) as predicated upon our divine iconicity (§§65, 
67-69). However, the abuses we have wrought upon our natural and social environments 
are traced back to the anthropocentric notion that “human freedom is limitless” (§6). In 
other words, Francis describes an anthropology that has forsaken its fundamental iconic-
ity (cf. §§101-136).28 Francis’s rejoinder is an “integral ecology” (§§137-162) that begins with 
dialogical participation on a number of fronts (§§163-201) and culminates with integral 
27 Pope Francis, Laudato Si’. Encyclical Letter on Care for Our Common Home (Rome: Vatican Press, 
2015). Following convention, this encyclical employs sequentially numbered paragraphs, which will be cited 
parenthetically in the text.
28 Throughout Laudato Si’, Francis embraces a holistic anthropology, including an affective moral psy-
chology. The intellect stands out as a defining feature of human nature, but it is integrated with the affections 
of the will, the materiality of our species, and our interdependence within Creation.
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spiritual formation and education (§§202-246). As such, iconic dignity points to the eco-
logical vision of Laudato Si’, including its critical analysis of the present situation in light 
of anthropocentric distortion, as a strong example of its hermeneutical trajectory already 
being implemented today.
 Laudato Si’ also points to a second practical embodiment of these characteristics: 
the most recent series of ecumenical dialogues between the World Methodist Council and 
the Roman Catholic Church (Houston 2016). That round of dialogues resulted in a joint 
report entitled The Call to Holiness: From Glory to Glory, which explores anthropology, 
soteriology and grace, ecclesiology, eschatology, and doxology.29 Houston directly refer-
ences Laudato Si’ on three occasions (Houston §§22, 41, and the final prayer in the appen-
dix), but the encyclical’s impact can be felt throughout the sections on the human person 
in the order of Creation (Houston §§17-33).30 What’s more, Houston’s powerful articulation 
of a fundamental theological anthropology of iconicity and dignity (e.g., Houston §§15, 34) 
features clear resonances of the encyclical’s own anthropological portrait.31 Similarly, the 
29 The Call to Holiness: From Glory to Glory (Houston, 2016). As mentioned in the Introduction, this text 
will simply be referred to as “Houston.” Numerical citations refer to native paragraph numbers.
30 In §§22 and 48, Houston references the 2012 ecumenical text between the United Methodist Church 
and the Roman Catholic Church entitled Heaven and Earth are Full of Your Glory: A United Methodist and 
Roman Catholic Statement on the Eucharist and Ecology. Though pre-dating Laudato Si’ by three years, 
Heaven and Earth maintains a tight focus that is fully consistent with the 2015 encyclical—so much so that 
Houston weaves together the two documents (and scripture) in §22.
31 Prior to Houston, the nine ecumenical reports (1971-2011) mentioned “dignity” less than ten times 
combined. Most of those references came from the first dialogue in Denver (1971) and were likely the result 
of interacting with the texts of Vatican Council II. Houston (2016), however, employs the language of dignity 
thirteen times—nearly twice as many as Denver. I would suggest that part of the reason for this sudden 
uptick is the effect of Pope Francis’s Laudato Si’ (which references “dignity” 21 times) on the theological per-
spective and language of Houston’s dialogue. This isn’t to say that Laudato Si’ had an explicit or intentional 
effect on Houston, but it is to say that Francis’s pontificate has presented a posture of humility and dialogue 
that readily strengthens ecumenical work.
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topical flow of Houston’s theological anthropology radiates with clear overtones of partic-
ipation (§§6, 41, 64; sacramentally, see §§106-108, 115), incarnation (§§23-25, 34-42), and 
relationality (§§17-22).32 On the whole, Houston represents an already-present embodi-
ment of iconic dignity and further validates the viability of iconic dignity as a hermeneutic 
for continued dialogue.
 While additional contemporary examples of iconic dignity exist,33 we must also 
turn our gaze to future embodiments of iconic dignity as participatory, incarnational, and 
relational. By all means, realizations of iconic dignity will continue to press us forward in 
our ongoing incarnational work: such as upholding environmental conversation, human 
rights, and holistic human health, as well as eradicating human trafficking, genocide, 
forced mass migration, and poverty. Furthermore, since iconic dignity is to be predicated 
of every human individual, any work done in support of iconic dignity—whether per-
formed by religious or secular organizations, Christians or not, or any other categorical 
32 “Relationality” is, indeed, the leading anthropological motif in Houston (§§17-22) and follows upon 
the imago Dei motif (§§14-16).
33 Examples that come to mind are (admittedly) drawn from my own Wesleyan/Methodist tradition. 
See the 2009 foundation document and pastoral letter by the Council of Bishops of The United Methodist 
Church, God’s Renewed Creation: Call to Hope and Action, on environmental stewardship integrated with a 
holistic, relational anthropology and care for one’s neighbor. See also the World Methodist Council’s “Social 
Affirmation” (1986), and their resolutions “On Issues of Health” (2007) and “On Global Climate Change” 
(2009). Finally, over the past 15-20 years, Wesleyan theology has greatly expanded by engaging a host of 
cognate fields, including the natural and social sciences. For an early encounter, which emerged from the 
Society for the Study of Psychology and Wesleyan Theology (est. 1996), see “Psychology and Wesleyan 
Theology,” ed. Brad D. Strawn, special issue, Journal of Psychology and Christianity 23, no. 2 (Summer 2004). 
Many of the contributors to this special issue are also featured in the 2010 publication Wesleyan Theology 
and Social Science. Of particular interest to the present study of iconic dignity is how these scholars have 
diversified Wesleyan studies vis-à-vis moral psychology, affective-behavioral therapies, and habituation and 
virtue theory (often leading them to Aquinas!). This disciplinarily inclusive trajectory is no doubt attrib-
utable to the depth and breadth of Wesley’s own holistic theology, which easily and naturally combines 
natural sciences, spiritual disciplines, lifelong education, sacramentality, social analysis, medicine, religious 
community formation, and so forth.
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division—is essentially an act of recognizing and valuing the work of God in the world, 
and cooperating with God and with one another to augment that work.34 For the same 
reason, embodiments of iconic dignity will include continued intra- and inter-religious 
dialogue.35
 Two possible impediments stand in the way of further embodiments of this first 
trio of characteristics. First, there is the issue of scope. It will likely prove difficult for iconic 
dignity to address racism, sexism, ageism, and genderism as dehumanizing systems. Its 
particular methodology is geared more toward personal encounters and the encoun-
ters of persons. At the same time, embodiments of iconic dignity should begin within 
Wesleyan and Thomistic communities—precisely because these local communities are 
the fundamental loci for overcoming less-than-flourishing global tendencies. The future 
work of iconic dignity as a transformative theological perspective must therefore begin 
not at some impersonal systemic level, but rather in the very communities that inherit 
the traditions of Wesley and Aquinas. Implicit to this proposal is the humble recognition 
that Wesleyan and Thomistic communities have themselves contributed perspectives and 
practices injurious to genuine human flourishing.36
 Second, there is the issue of reception. This is the question of the practical trac-
tion of this comparative, dialogical work by the broader communities being represented. 
This obstacle also continues to challenge Methodist-Catholic ecumenical dialogue—if 
34 In the language of Christian theology, this is a fundamental meaning of worship.
35 Within a North Atlantic context, it is especially important that dialogue include Islamic voices to 
offset contemporary misperceptions and the biases that accompany those perspectives.
36 One such example of this will be addressed in the next section.
347
not every position text composed by representatives of a larger body.37 On its own, iconic 
dignity can’t simply “make it all this happen.” It requires the participation of relational, 
incarnate persons working together with genuine human freedom and the responsibil-
ity to employ it generatively. Again, practical engagement and embodiment will occur 
first at a grassroots level, wherein iconic dignity can (continue to) pave the way for better 
relationships between Wesleyans and Thomists. Granted, Methodist-Catholic bilateral 
dialogue continues to this day with the stated goal of “full communion in faith, mission 
and sacramental life.”38 Shy of that yet-unrealized goal, iconic dignity recognizes that “full 
communion” can never happen without “incarnational communion”—real, raw fellow-
ship and collaboration, which always finds its genesis in personal relationship.
B. Dynamic, Encompassing, Transformative
 The second trio of characteristics emerging from iconic dignity—dynamic, encom-
passing, and transformative—draws heavily from the portrait(s) of grace detailed in Chap-
ter 6, but not exclusively so. Thus, Chapter 2, which outlined the theological foundation 
for anthropology, depicted the God of Creation in whose image we have been created—a 
“God of power and might,” of self-effusive δύναμις, in whom all existing things participate. 
37 The Commission for dialogue between Methodists and Catholics has made this concern explicit 
toward the end of the most-recent Houston report (§173): “The Commission is mindful that our dialogue 
reports are not well known among Catholics and Methodists, and that the consensus and convergences 
these texts have registered have not had the transformative effect on our relations for which we had hoped. 
Convergence statements such as these hold rich potential but, in the end, they are only documents until 
the insights and understandings they carry are received. This leaves us with both a sense of urgency and 
an abiding hope that our and other efforts at reconciliation between divided Christians will contribute to 
fruitful engagement in our churches.”
38 Towards a Statement on the Church (Nairobi, 1986), §20.
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Chapter 3 enumerated the various human faculties as emblems of God imprinted on our 
nature—powers of intellect, volition, and freedom in acting. Through these powers we 
respond to and interact with God and with the entirety of Creation. Chapter 5 stretched 
the boundaries of God’s work to consider all of Creation as locus redemptionis—a glimpse 
of “heaven and earth…full of [God’s] glory.” Chapter 6 continued this trajectory, sketching 
God’s all-encompassing offer of initial grace—which, when received and applied, is truly 
transformative in our lives. Finally, Chapters 4 and 7 culminated with calls for doctrinal 
reflection and adjustment in light of the defining features of human nature and the nature 
and activity of God’s grace—that all may be “changed from glory into glory,” the glory of 
our “hosanna in the highest.”39
 More specifically, we say that iconic dignity is dynamic primarily because of the 
reflexive, dynamic character of grace. As we discussed at length in Chapter 6, Wesley and 
Aquinas strongly agree that God’s grace enables and elicits genuine human response; our 
response to God’s gracious initiative opens us to further growth in grace. This dynamic 
structure, coupled with a shared teleology and perfection realizable only in union with the 
Triune God, presses the moral aspect of grace. Grace makes true morality possible as holy 
and happy beatitudo. The possibility then makes actualization necessary, and the neces-
sity is realizable through growth. The goal of actual transformation and development is 
therefore an orientation of iconic dignity to action, practice, and power (δύναμις).
39 The quoted portions in this paragraph are taken from the ecumenical version of the Sanctus of the 
Eucharistic liturgy (International Consultation of English Texts, 1973). “Changed from glory into glory” is 
from the last stanza of Charles Wesley’s hymn “Love Divine, All Loves Excelling,” in Works 7:547, and the 
1989 United Methodist Hymnal (#384).
349
 We encountered Wesley’s expression of this in his description of the nature of 
grace according to pardon and power.40 Pardon emphasizes the forensic, operative, and 
instantaneous effect of grace, while power emphasizes the therapeutic, cooperative, and 
gradual work of grace. The first is a transformation of our nature, while the second is the 
development and actualization thereof. Similarly, Aquinas expresses dynamism in terms 
of operation and cooperation of the habitus of grace. Cooperative habitual grace is the 
formal principle of meritorious acts that are “actualized” by the auxilium/motus of ongo-
ing grace. Together, Wesley and Aquinas underscore a dynamism characteristic of iconic 
dignity through their doctrines of grace and human response.
 The next characteristic in this trio—encompassing—includes both the ubiquity of 
the imago Dei and the universality of grace. Iconic dignity offers a theological perspective 
that advances the sheer ubiquity of God’s image throughout the nature of humanity as the 
first premise of our dignity as human beings. Iconic dignity further upholds the univer-
sality of God’s initial and initiating grace, which sufficiently provides the opportunity of 
salvation for all people. This sufficiency becomes effective when we responsibly engage 
and cooperate with God through grace. Together, these establish the doctrinal and prac-
tical premises for iconic dignity’s encompassing theological perspective. The particular 
expressions of encompassing inclusion will naturally differ according to context and the 
wise determination of how best to enact it. However, we are sure to stifle inclusion where 
we restrict relationships, inhibit participation, or disregard embodiment.
40 See Diagrams 4 and 7 above.
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 That said, encompassing may seem somewhat indistinguishable from the first trio 
of characteristics, as though it were an alternative expression of our various existential 
connections. While conceptual overlap among these characteristics is to be expected, it 
is still possible to differentiate encompassing from the previous attributes by employing a 
simple taxonomy. The first group of emergent traits focuses more on our essential being—
“who we are”—as participatory, incarnational, and relational. Encompassing focuses more 
on operation—“what we do”—as effected by transformation (see below) and as evidence 
of dynamism (see above).41 In truth, dynamic is a sort of medium between being and oper-
ation: we are “wired” (being) to “do” (operation), and what we do shapes who we are. As 
Aquinas might put it, grace’s dynamic is such that God “does” (operation) to “in-form” us 
with new life (being) so that we can “do with God” (co-operation) and “actually become 
who we are” (elevation and enactment of a graced nature).
 This account fittingly leads us to the third characteristic of this trio: iconic dig-
nity emerges as a transformative theological perspective for encompassing and dynamic 
development. For Wesley and Aquinas, the most-familiar locus of transformation is the 
individual person, in whom spiritual change is nothing shy of miraculous. Aquinas helps 
point us to the metaphysical underpinnings of transformation—the literal “change of 
form” effected in the soul by grace and ordained to supernatural fellowship with God.42 
41 There is, of course, a third category—“how we do”—which is concerned with manner. For Aquinas, 
this is “morality”; for Wesley, “discipline.” This will be touched upon below, but a full treatment awaits an 
additional analysis of the moral-theological scheme of Wesley and Aquinas, including their conceptions of 
the theological virtues.
42 This idea runs throughout Aquinas’s theology, especially in his “Treatise on Grace” (ST I-II.109-114). 
The treatise begins with a highly-metaphysical discussion of form (q. 109) and proceeds with a tenfold list of 
activities we are unable to perform without grace (aa. 1-10). Having established the need for grace, Aquinas 
moves to describe grace itself as a certain quality of the soul in ST I-II.110.2 (Freddoso): “as regards those 
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Wesley helps point us to the experiential underpinnings of transformation—the “change 
of affections” effected in the soul by grace and ordained to Christian perfection.43 For both 
theologians, the transformation is essentially a habituation in, of, and toward holy affec-
tions or virtues.
 Furthermore, Wesley especially helps to expand the horizon of transformation to 
include the social dimension.44 In the introduction to his fourth discourse on the Sermon 
on the Mount, Wesley eloquently links the transformation of the individual (in affective, 
iconic, and teleological terms) to the practice of Christianity socially (socialiter). It is prof-
itable to consider his position at length:
The beauty of holiness, of that inward man of the heart which is renewed after the 
image of God, cannot but strike every eye which God hath opened, every enlight-
ened understanding.… [We] cannot but perceive how desirable a thing it is to be 
thus transformed into the likeness of him that created us.… We may say of this, 
in a secondary sense, even as of the Son of God himself, that it is ‘the brightness 
of his glory, the express image of his person’: …‘the beaming forth of his’ eternal 
‘glory’; and yet so tempered and softened that even the children of men may herein 
see God and live: …‘the character, the stamp, the living impression, of his person’ 
who is the fountain of beauty and love, the original source of all excellency and 
perfection.45
beings whom [God] moves in order that they might have an eternal supernatural good [ad consequendum 
bonum supernatural aeternum], He infuses into them certain forms, i.e., qualities [formas seu qualitates 
supernaturales], by which they might be moved agreeably and promptly [suaviter et prompte] by Him toward 
attaining that eternal good.”
43 See Maddox, “A Change of Affections,” 3-31. Maddox presents the phrase “a change of affections” in 
a double sense: (1) a description of John Wesley’s (mature) moral psychology and theological goal; and (2) 
the deviation by Wesley’s successors from that affective framework. The paragon of sanctity is the affective 
(and effective!) transformation of unholy tempers into holy ones through the habituated responsiveness of the 
heart to God and God’s work. Since words, deeds, and thoughts flow from one’s tempers (as habitual disposi-
tions), the development of holy tempers will result in a transformation of character into the pattern of Christ.
44 This expansion may even include the cosmic dimension. See Chapter 5 above on the holistic scope of 
Wesley’s notion of redemption, including the animal kingdom and the cosmic order. See also Wesley, Sermon 
64, “The New Creation,” in Works 2:500-510; and Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” in Works 2:436-450.
45 Wesley, Sermon 24, “Sermon on the Mount, IV,” §1, in Works 1:531-532.
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Following this, Wesley assumes the position of a rhetorical opponent who might argue 
that, in order to attain this goal, it would be best to worship God spiritually, mentally, 
contemplatively, without outward encumbrances—“‘to cease from all outward actions’; 
wholly to withdraw from the world; to leave the body behind us; to abstract ourselves 
from all sensible things.”46 While the young Wesley had been somewhat enchanted by 
hermitic Christian mysticism, he has decisively abandoned that by this discourse on the 
Sermon on the Mount. Indeed, Wesley’s sermon is a sort of manifesto “that Christianity is 
essentially a social religion”—it simply cannot be practiced individualistically.47
This is the great reason why the providence of God has so mingled you together 
with other [people], that whatever grace you have received of God may through 
you be communicated to others; that every holy temper, and word, and work of 
yours, may have an influence on them also. By this means a check will in some 
measure be given to the corruption which is in the world; and a small part, at least, 
saved from the general infection, and rendered holy and pure before God.48
Note Wesley’s consistent affective moral psychology, which extends here from personal 
holiness into social holiness by virtue of grace’s recipients responsibly stewarding and 
communicating God’s grace to others as personifications of “means of grace.”49 This fur-
46 Sermon 24, “Sermon on the Mount, IV,” §2-3, in Works 1:532.
47 Sermon 24, “Sermon on the Mount, IV,” §5, in Works 1:533. Cf. John’s “Preface” to the Wesley broth-
ers’ Hymns and Sacred Poems (1739), in Works 13:36-40, where he (in)famously writes that “the gospel of 
Christ knows of no religion but social; no holiness but social holiness” (§5, 39). Although written nine years 
later, “Sermon on the Mount, IV,” II.7, very clearly and conscientiously expands the argument from the 1739 
“Preface” into a full declaration of “social, open, active Christian[ity],” in Works 1:541.
48 Sermon 24, “Sermon on the Mount, IV,” I.7, in Works 1:537.
49 Wesley’s account of grace “checking” the world’s corruption has echoes of Calvin’s “common grace,” 
which functions to restrain evil from consuming the present world, but bears at least one major difference. 
For Calvin, common grace is not salvific, although it comes from God; for Wesley, there is nothing stopping 
this “communicated grace,” which is transmitted through persons for the sake of others, from being salvific. 
Wesley’s version emphasizes the stewardship of grace, its participatory thrust, its incarnation in our lives, its 
relational transmission, and its moral thrust—that we are charged by God to employ God’s gifts to further 
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ther corresponds with the previous emergent characteristics and with a fundamental belief 
running throughout Wesley’s “Preface” to Primitive Physic: God has provided remedies to 
the maladies of nature within Creation itself,50 including humans who faithfully convey 
God’s grace to others, that people may come to experience grace’s healing and elevating 
effects.
 Finally, the portrait of iconic dignity in Aquinas and Wesley aids us in identify-
ing the substance of this transformation, which is both dynamic and encompassing of 
the entirety of the human experience. Doing so reveals a Wesleyan-Thomistic narrative 
consisting of five “degrees of formation.” First, in-formation denotes God’s initial action 
of investing our nature with the imago Dei, thereby placing a divine form within each and 
every person. God’s work to “in-form” the soul is the formal principle of our iconicity 
and the instantiation of our human capacities. Second, de-formation names our existen-
tial situation vis-à-vis sin, both original and actual. What God has in-formed, we have 
de-formed. We have deprived ourselves of the fullness of the divine form and require a 
radical restoration of relationship. Third, repair is effected through re-formation, which 
amounts to “being made right again” through justification by God’s operative grace. The 
“re-” here affirms the original justice (righteousness) of prelapsarian human nature that 
had been instilled graciously by God at Creation but has subsequently been marred by sin. 
It is important to recall that Wesley and Aquinas both believe that this “stage” or “state” is 
God’s work. As such, Wesley resonates far less with Calvin’s common grace than with Aquinas’s gratia gratis 
data and gratia cooperans.
50 See Wesley’s “Preface” to Primitive Physic, especially §§1-6, in Works 32:110-112. For physical/material 
ailments, God has provided “physic” through the bounty of Creation (e.g., herbs, roots, liquids, elements, 
etc.). For spiritual disease, God has provided us with the Great Physician of Souls, Jesus Christ, in our very 
own flesh and blood. Christ, then, has entrusted us with caring for one another, both body and soul.
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not the fullness of Christian living; rather, it is (for Aquinas) the formal principle of being 
just and (for Wesley) a relative change that makes us acceptable to God. Real change, or the 
formal principle of doing justly, is the fourth degree: trans-formation, sanctification, “actu-
ally becoming holy.”51 Operative pardon generates co-operative power, the actualization 
of the habitus of grace inwardly and outwardly. Genuine holiness and happiness are the 
perfect object of this transformation, which always admits of further development. Fifth, 
the process of transformation is not limited to our material existence. Aquinas and Wesley 
maintain the biblical hope (1 John 3:2) that we shall come to see God face to face in heav-
enly con-formation. This represents the fullest and most-dynamic extent of the human 
ability to participate in God’s very nature (cf. 2 Pet. 1:4). It likewise marks the absolute 
height of human flourishing according to iconic dignity.
 Embodiments of iconic dignity according to this second set of characteristics 
will be informed by a radical welcome to experience and join with God in transform-
ing lives and communities. This guiding principle rightly builds upon the insights and 
embodiments of the first trio of characteristics (participatory, incarnational, relational) to 
articulate a robust vision of inclusive, unabated flourishing made possible through grace. 
As noted above, dynamic, encompassing, and transformative draw most heavily from the 
account of grace presented in Chapters 6 and 7, but it should now also be clear how our 
essential nature (Chapter 3), as predicated upon God’s nature (Chapter 2), is responsively 
attuned to activity and growth (Chapter 4), especially on a divine plane (Chapter 6). That 
51 Note, if re-formation “gets us back to” original justice (i.e., in-formation), then trans-formation exceeds 
that original (capacity for) goodness. In other words, Wesley and Aquinas both subscribe to the felix culpa 
tradition—that the benefit of Christian salvation outweighs the cost of the Fall. The nadir of sin is eclipsed 
by the exceeding apex of sanctity.
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the sketch of universally empowering grace (Chapter 7) should call us to practical expres-
sions of encompassing, dynamic, and transformative flourishing.
 As with the first trio of characteristics, the present set has found positive expres-
sion in the most-recent round of Methodist-Catholic dialogues (Houston 2016), especially 
regarding its account of grace.52 “The grace of Jesus Christ transforms the human nature 
and its condition” to constitute “a new way of living in the world” that is “patterned on 
[Christ’s] earthly life” (§47). Grace is a call to the process of transformation that is holi-
ness—growing by grace in the image of God according to the pattern of Christ (§§64, 
66). At the same time, the process of growth and transformation names the other face 
of iconic dignity’s dynamism: backsliding (§67), the ability to “deteriorate” in grace if we 
do not properly tend to it as stewards. We may rightly ascertain that dynamic transfor-
mation encompasses our graced human actions. Because of the encompassing scope of 
God’s saving love (§48), we are able to participate in God’s salvific work (cf. §55) through 
good works that “iconify” the fruit of holiness (§§78-86; cf. §§65-66, 73-74). As we saw in 
Chapter 6, although Wesley and Aquinas appear to stand at odds regarding merit, their 
trajectories are actually quite similar. Holiness is to be embodied in a virtuous, Christ-like 
life. Commendably, the Houston text attempts this kind of discussion in a section entitled 
“Good Works and Merit” (§§78-86). Houston’s conversation on merit profitably opens the 
door to a deeper conversation afforded by iconic dignity through a direct comparison of 
Wesley and Aquinas.
52 The Call to Holiness (Houston, 2016). Again, references to this text (also referred to as “the Houston 
text”) will be given parenthetically according to numbered paragraph.
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 Incidentally, the most-pressing embodiment of iconic dignity’s dynamic, encom-
passing, and transformative elements happens to be a topic bracketed off from the Houston 
dialogue, namely, “the contemporary interpretation of gender” (§18).53 More precisely, this 
involves human sexuality and LGBTQ inclusion.54 The intersection of LGBTQ inclusion 
and iconic dignity is a profound one that deserves to be studied, developed, and imple-
mented beyond what I have offered here. Iconic dignity and its emergent characteristics 
constructively challenge Christian communities to consider a radical approach to LGBTQ 
inclusion and to the experience of dynamic transformation through inclusive encounters 
and practices. But in order to articulate the embodiment of iconic dignity’s “welcome” to 
LGBTQ persons, we will need a bit of background.
 It seems safe to say that, historically, the Christian church has aligned itself with 
heteronormativity.55 This is not to say that “non-conforming” expressions of gender iden-
tity and sexuality were hitherto unknown in or to the church.56 Rather, it is a recognition 
53 Granted, this “controversial subject among Christians” (§18) lies beyond Houston’s purview (grace 
and holiness). Yet, given the text’s embodied theological anthropology (§§23-25), its prefatory meditation on 
welcome and hospitality in the story of Jesus and Zacchaeus (Luke 19:1-10), and the prolific upturn in con-
temporary cultural conversations regarding LGBTQ identity and issues—one might desire either a greater 
interaction with the subject from Houston or an indication to return to the subject in future dialogue.
54 In light of the following discussion, it is necessary here to insert a personal note. I write as a married, 
heterosexual, cisgender male with a young daughter. This means I inescapably carry the implicit baggage of 
privileged heteronormativity regardless of my own personal advocacy for LGBTQ persons.
55 It would be equally fair to say that, historically, the Christian church has been more patriarchal than 
not. This is certainly true with respect to authority and leadership, if not also with respect to a supervening 
dis-ease regarding the physical body—especially of women. Although this is not my explicit focus in the 
present section, it should be understood that what follows is just as true and pertinent for confronting patri-
archy and sexism as it is for combating LGBTQ exclusion.
56 “Non-conforming” is a bit of a misnomer and can carry with it a evaluative predetermination that can 
erode the identity, expression, and agency of LGBTQ persons. I use this language—cautiously—because of 
its prevalence in public discourse and always with this agential caveat.
357
of Christianity’s historical “closeting” of sexual identity and expression in light of a signif-
icant shift in contemporary awareness, conversation, and openness towards those in the 
LGBTQ community.57 (The fact that it is now possible to speak openly and intelligibly of 
“the LGBTQ community” is evidence itself of a significant shift of perspectives on sexual-
ity.) Christian communities and denominations today can no longer evade key questions 
of inclusion—whether, whom, and/or how to embrace the LGBTQ community. As the 
Houston text correctly notes (§18), such questions are not without controversy.
 This is especially true in light of the fact that (United) Methodism and (Roman) 
Catholicism represent two major ecclesial bodies whose official positions on homosexu-
ality have engendered exclusion of the LGBTQ community.58 Granted, both communions 
affirm the sacred worth and dignity of all persons and implore their members to accept 
homosexuals and reject discrimination and bullying towards them.59 However, (United) 
Methodism declares the “practice of homosexuality” to be “incompatible with Christian 
57 It would be a gross oversight not to mention the ways in which this “closeting” has played into sexual 
abuses in the church. Although recent social attention has been given to Catholic clergy and sexual abuse, 
the problems are not limited by denomination or ordination. This is not to offer an apologia for the bla-
tant abuses committed by Catholic priests (which continue to come to light ), but is instead a disquieting 
reminder of the magnitude, complexity, and ubiquity of the problem of the disconnect between the Chris-
tian church and sexuality.
58 Denominational language has tended to favor the more-sterile idioms of “homosexuality” (Cathol-
icism, Methodism) and “gay and lesbian” (Methodism) to the broader “LBGTQ” in their doctrinal, disci-
plinary, and catechetical texts. Also, from the first days of his papacy, speculation has abounded whether 
or not Pope Francis might mark a shift in tone (if not in practice and doctrine) toward homosexual priests. 
Returning to Rome from his first foreign trip (to Brazil, July 2013), Francis infamously responded to a report-
er’s question with the rhetorical “If someone is gay and he searches for the Lord and has good will, who am 
I to judge?” See Rachel Donadio, “On Gay Priests, Pope Francis Asks, ‘Who Am I to Judge?’” New York 
Times, July 29, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/world/europe/pope-francis-gay-priests.html.
59 For the official United Methodist position, see Discipline (2016), ¶161G and R, and ¶162J. For the offi-
cial Roman Catholic position, see Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: United States 
Catholic Conference, 2000), §2358; cf. §§2331-2336. Hereafter, this text will be cited simply as CCC §(number).
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teaching,”60 while (Roman) Catholicism asserts that “homosexual acts” are “acts of grave 
depravity” that the “tradition has always declared” as “intrinsically disordered” and “con-
trary to natural law.”61 Furthermore, both communions have effectively barred self-pro-
fessing practicing homosexuals from ordained ministry.62 In short, each tradition tacitly 
embraces that hollow proverb, “love the sinner—hate the sin.”63
 Setting aside the logical inconsistencies, questionable scriptural exegesis, and 
duplicitous doctrinal doublespeak, the current position officially maintained by (United) 
Methodism and (Roman) Catholicism fundamentally fails to uphold the principle and 
perspective of iconic dignity that each tradition purports to profess. The United Method-
ist Discipline clearly states that “sexuality is God’s good gift to all persons,” which carries 
with it the call to “responsible stewardship.”64 In language that has since been removed, 
60 Discipline (2016), ¶161G.
61 CCC §2357.
62 Denominational terminology is extremely nuanced—and litigated—on this topic:
• The Discipline (2016) states that, whereas “the practice of homosexuality is incompatible with 
Christian teaching,” therefore “self-avowed practicing homosexuals are not to be certified as candidates, 
ordained as ministers, or appointed to serve in The United Methodist Church” (¶304.3, which references 
eleven Judicial Council Decisions!). The Discipline (2016) continues by prohibiting the performance of 
“homosexual unions” by United Methodist ministers or within United Methodist churches (¶341.6). All of 
these are chargeable offenses against United Methodist ministers (¶2702.1).
• Drawing on CCC §§2357-2359, a 2005 Instruction by the Congregation for Catholic Education clearly 
stated that “the Church…cannot admit to the seminary or to holy orders those who practice homosexuality, 
present deep-seated homosexual tendencies or support the so-called ‘gay culture’” (§2). See “Instruction 
Concerning the Criteria for the Discernment of Vocations with regard to Persons with Homosexual Tenden-
cies in view of their Admission to the Seminary and to Holy Orders,” Congregation for Catholic Education, 
Vatican, November 4, 2005, accessed November 10, 2018, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congrega-
tions/ccatheduc/documents/rc_con_ccatheduc_doc_20051104_istruzione_en.html. Pope Benedict XVI 
approved the Instruction and ordered its publication on August 21, 2005.
63 The exact provenance of this commonplace dictum is unclear, but a similar sentiment may be found 
in Augustine as cum dilectione hominum et odio vitiorum (“with love for humanity and hatred of sins”).
64 Discipline (2016), ¶161G. This sentiment is expressed as far back as Discipline (1972), ¶72C, which was 
the first genuinely composite Discipline of the newly-formed (1968) United Methodist Church.
359
the 1972 United Methodist Discipline went so far as to assert that “persons may be fully 
human only when that gift [of human sexuality] is acknowledged and affirmed by them-
selves, the church, and society.”65 The Catholic Catechism is a bit more ambiguous. While 
affirming that “sexuality affects all aspects of the human person…especially…affectivity,”66 
it reserves the language of “gift” for chastity. Chastity is then defined as “the successful 
integration of sexuality within the person,”67 which would seem to include the “sexual 
identity” that each person is called to “acknowledge and accept.”68
 The impasse is, of course, when an individual acknowledges and affirms one’s own 
sexual identity but that person’s church does not. More precisely, if the church attempts to 
parse sexual identity and orientation from sexual activity, it undercuts the very premise of 
human sexuality, i.e., our essential affective moral psychology. As we discussed in Chapter 
4, one facet of our iconicity is our “reflect-ability” of God through our responsive, dynamic 
affections. This affective moral psychology is an indispensable aspect of human nature; its 
personal embodiment is critical in shaping the identity of each individual. Sexuality, then, 
is an element of that affective, volitional gift.69
65 Discipline (1972), ¶72C. The contemporary parallel line, in Discipline (2016), ¶161G, is as follows: 
“sexual relations are affirmed only with the covenant of monogamous, heterosexual marriage.” Notice that 
the clause is given in the passive voice without an agent! Sadly, this calls to mind the earlier observation 
about “nonconforming” language and implicit concepts of personal agency.
66 CCC §2332, emphasis original.
67 CCC §2337. “All the baptized are called to chastity” (CCC §2348). Chastity within marriage entails the 
gift of fecundity and children (CCC §§2366-2379). Since the promulgation of the English version of the Cat-
echism in 1994, a dozen or so statements from the Vatican have addressed God’s “gift of [human] sexuality,” 
but the exact phrase is nowhere to be found in the Catechism itself.
68 CCC §2333, emphasis original.
69 Bear in mind the language frequently used to discuss sexuality: inclination, tendency, orientation, 
attraction, desire. These are all descriptors of an affective moral psychology as well.
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 Recall that, within this affective moral psychology, a habitus or temper is a durable 
disposition ordered to action. “It belongs to every habitus to have an ordering to action in 
some way,” says Aquinas; thus, “every habitus that is of some power as a subject primar-
ily indicates an ordering to action.”70 Likewise, Wesley affirms that from “every Chris-
tian grace, every holy and happy temper…springs uniform holiness of conversation [i.e., 
action].”71 Our affective moral-psychological structure bespeaks activity in the same way 
that “God’s good gift” bespeaks stewardship.72 Consider Jesus’ parable of the talents (Matt. 
25:14-30). The master gives to each servant a number of talents. The first two servants 
engage and invest and steward those talents, bringing back the profits of the master’s gift. 
But the third servant buries his talent—he “closets the gift”—which greatly vexes the 
master. The gift of something good carries with it a responsibility to tend it, to use it, 
to employ it—not to bury it away. If sexuality is a good gift of God, and integral to our 
humanity, then it cannot be buried or closeted. Doing so erects a practical-theological 
glass ceiling, truncating the theological anthropology of the LGBTQ community. It is, in 
a word, dehumanizing.
70 Aquinas, ST I-II.49.3. This is my own translation of convenit omni habitui aliquo modo habere ordinem 
ad actum…omnis habitus qui est alicuius potentiae ut subiecti, principaliter importat ordinem ad actum.
71 John Wesley, A Letter to the Rev. Mr. Baily of Cork, III.1, in Works 9:309. Here, as elsewhere, “conver-
sation” is taken in a broad sense to mean “all that one does,” similar to the triad “every thought, word, and 
work.” This open letter, dated June 8, 1750, is Wesley’s response to two open letters published by Baily and 
addressed to Wesley from the end of May 1750.
72 See Discipline (2016), ¶161G, where this principle is applied to the gift of human sexuality. Stewardship 
actually informs the entirety of the United Methodist “Social Principles,” in Discipline (2016), ¶¶160-166, 
including its general “Preamble” (an unnumbered paragraph immediately preceding ¶160). The Discipline’s 
primary texts that address human sexuality are contained within these “Social Principles.”
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 Of course, it may be objected that the only “good” expression of sexuality is within 
“heterosexual, monogamous marriage,”73 with any deviation from that norm being a 
“grave depravity”74 and “incompatible with Christian teaching.”75 The logic here is that 
a good capacity can be used for bad—which is absolutely true. We frequently use our 
God-given faculties to effect malum, and there are plenty of examples of humans using the 
gift of sexuality maliciously, selfishly, and abusively.76 Methodists and Catholics rightly 
condemn these corruptions of human sexuality, but they wrongly include homosexuality 
on this list—and, by implication, the sexualities of the LGBTQ community at large. How, 
then, does “LGBTQ sexuality” differ from these categorical abuses of human sexuality?77
 The litmus test is the theological perspective of iconic dignity and the character-
istic capacities of human nature to which it points. On the one hand, human sexuality 
reflects its divine origin when it affirms and fosters our iconic dignity and its fundamental 
faculties—through relationality, mutuality, affection, equity, consent, and free choice. 
On the other hand, human sexuality denigrates its divine origin when it occludes those 
faculties by depriving another of their iconic dignity—through violence, coercion, per-
petration, force, victimization, and depriving another of volitional agency. All this is true 
73 See Discipline (2016), ¶161G.
74 See CCC §2357.
75 See Discipline (2016), ¶161G.
76 A short list would include rape, molestation, pedophilia, incest, genital mutilation, sexual abuse and 
harassment.
77 The phrase “LGBTQ sexuality” is another terminological misnomer and is not to be understood as a 
flattening or singularization of the manifold expressions of sexuality within the LGBTQ community. I use it 
here—in “scare-quotes”—partly as a straw man and partly to demonstrate a linguistic inadequacy.
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regardless of sexual orientation, identity, or expression because the evaluative goodness of 
sexuality sprouts from the iconic dignity of human nature, not vice versa. Thus, the qualifi-
ers we attach to “sexuality” are but the personal embodiments of sexuality within human 
nature. The relevant descriptor of our sexuality, which bears the iconic dignity of all divine 
gifts, is not homosexual, heterosexual, lesbian, gay, bisexual, asexual, transgender, or cisgen-
der, but human. The non-heterosexuality of a sexual act is not of itself a moral qualifier, 
just as the heterosexuality of a sexual act does not render the act “good.” What is true for 
any expression of our human nature also holds true for our sexuality: to reflect the Divine 
is doxological and iconic, but to distort it is blasphemous and idolatrous.
 Therefore, iconic dignity calls us to embody dynamic, encompassing, and trans-
formative inclusion of LGBTQ persons within (United) Methodism and (Roman) Cathol-
icism.78 The goal is threefold: (1) broadly, to make the churches more inclusive for their 
congregants and ministers; (2) focally, to remove exclusionary language from the denom-
inations’ officially-stated doctrinal and disciplinary positions, thereby allowing LGBTQ 
persons to be(come) ministers without having to closet themselves; and (3) inferentially, 
to assist in opening the door to non-male clergy in the Roman Catholic Church.79 Among 
the means of embodying this triplex goal, the top priority is including LGBTQ persons in 
denominational conversations regarding human sexuality. As with many forms of struc-
tural oppression, the oppressed are rarely given a voice in decision-making processes. Such 
78 Although I speak here with reference to the denominational inheritors of Wesley and Aquinas, the 
gist of the argument could be contextualized for other social, cultural, and ecclesial settings. However, that 
task lies beyond the scope of the present study.
79 This final issue is all the more pressing given a growing shortage of Catholic priests. It would be 
inconsistent with the trajectory of iconic dignity to argue for the admission of LGBTQ persons to the Cath-
olic priesthood without also advocating for the same right for women. It is highly doubtful that the Catholic 
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has been the case within Methodism and Catholicism towards the LGBTQ community.80 
Needless to say, absence interrupts relationship, which is the sustaining context of true 
transformation. If the churches continue to exclude LGBTQ persons from contributing to 
denominational dialogue on human sexuality, the respective churches ineluctably impede 
transformation, stifle personal dynamism, and circumscribe any encompassing reach.
 Further means of embodying the welcoming inclusivity of iconic dignity towards 
the LGBTQ community will involve allying with current Methodist and Catholic LGBTQ 
advocates. Within United Methodism, the foremost advocacy group is the Reconciling 
Ministries Network (RMN), which works toward full inclusion and participation in the 
United Methodist Church.81 Congregations, campus ministries, small groups/classes, 
and individuals can be added to this network of reconciling communities, which aims at 
magisterium would admit both women and LGBTQ persons to the priesthood in a single move, and it is 
unfruitful to speculate which group could be admitted first (if at all). In any event, iconic dignity provides 
a constructive, inclusive theological perspective able to champion the diversification of the Catholic priest-
hood in a number of ways.
80 The very hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church—epitomized by the Curia and its Congregations, 
Tribunals, commissions, and other departments—precludes the involvement of those who have been ostra-
cized by the magisterium. Thus, where Catholic teaching (magisterium) takes a fairly anti-LGBTQ stance, 
the hierarchy (Curia) ensures the resilience of that stance.
Since its formation in 1968, the United Methodist Church has rather consistently closed off avenues for 
including LGBTQ persons and advocates. In 1972, the UMC added to its Discipline the statement regarding 
the incompatibility of homosexuality with Christian teaching. In 1976, it prevented the funding of LGBTQ 
support groups with church money. In 1984, after years of trying, it successfully barred openly LGBTQ per-
sons from clerical candidacy, ordination, or appointment. In 1988, a “Committee to Study Homosexuality” 
was created to draft a report for the 1992 General Conference; the idea was that committee membership 
would be as inclusive as possible, but no LGBTQ persons were allowed to join.
Although matters have been improving slowly for the past two decades, it is unclear whether this has 
more to do with broader socio-cultural shifts than with denominational development.
81 The Reconciling Ministries Network developed out of the lesser-known group Affirmation (United 
Methodists for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Concerns) in the early 1980s—during the time 
when the UMC was adding to its Discipline the line excluding LGBTQ persons from its ordained ministry. 
Affirmation still advocates for LGBTQ concerns both within the United Methodist Church and worldwide, 
but RMN is certainly the more-familiar group of the two.
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“the healing and transformation of animosity [i.e., toward LGBTQ persons] into honest 
relationships that respect all God’s children.”82 More advocacy groups exist within Cathol-
icism, including national support groups for parents of LGBTQ children,83 inclusive 
diocesan, parish, and campus-level pastoral care for LGBTQ individuals and couples,84 
and organizations working to promote justice and reconciliation.85 Notable among these 
groups is DignityUSA, which, in addition to education and advocacy, also features multi-
ple geographic chapters that gather weekly for liturgical worship and fellowship.86 How-
ever, most of these DignityUSA communities do not worship in Catholic spaces due to the 
position of the Roman Catholic magisterium.
 This points to a larger issue: neither ecclesial body has officially sanctioned these 
pro-LGBTQ organizations. The United Methodist Discipline explicitly prohibits any 
denominational funds from being given to “any gay caucus or group,” whether as a global 
denomination or as a geographic Annual Conference.87 The ramification is that a group 
like RMN is not “officially United Methodist,” i.e., an organization provisioned by the Dis-
cipline and the United Methodist administrative order. The same applies to the Roman 
82 “Who We Are: Guiding Principles,” Reconciling Ministries Network, accessed August 27, 2018, 
https://rmnetwork.org/who-we-are/mission/.
83 For example, see Fortunate Families, “Home,” Fortunate Families, Inc., accessed August 27, 2018, 
http://www.fortunatefamilies.com.
84 For example, see the Catholic Association for Lesbian and Gay Ministry (formerly the National Asso-
ciation of Catholic Diocesan Lesbian and Gay Ministries), whose internet presence is not well established 
beyond social media profiles.
85 For example, see New Ways Ministry, “Home,” News Ways Ministry, accessed November 10, 2018, 
http://www.newwaysministry.org.
86 DignityUSA, “Home,” DignityUSA, accessed November 10, 2018, http://www.dignityusa.org.
87 See Discipline (2016), ¶¶613.19, 806.9.
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Catholic groups mentioned above: since they do not adhere to the official magisterium, 
Rome does not recognize them as “Catholic” ministries or organizations. The only minis-
try to LGBTQ persons approved by the Roman Catholic Church is Courage International, 
which fully adheres to the official magisterium.88
 Extant pro-LGBTQ advocacy groups are indeed a solid step toward embodying 
iconic dignity but they are far from fully-fledged. Without official denominational backing, 
the programs are simply incapable of spreading throughout their respective global com-
munions. This significant impediment makes collaborative work among local Methodist 
and Catholic advocacy groups all the more important. Accordingly, the practical embod-
iment of iconic dignity’s transformational welcome must develop from the participatory, 
incarnational, and relational characteristics from the first trio. Ecumenical collaboration 
then provides dynamic occasions for transforming local communities through encompass-
ing relationships that transcend boundaries like denomination, gender, and sexual identity.
C. Loving
 The final emergent characteristic of iconic dignity serves as a capstone to all the 
foregoing—at once informing, suffusing, and consummating the other six characteristics. 
All the preceding is the practical embodiment of this final characteristic. Without it, iconic 
88 Courage International, “Home,” Courage International, last updated September 15, 2018, https://
couragerc.org/. Courage’s goal is chastity (as per the Catechism) and it offers pastoral support to help those 
“who experience same-sex attractions” to maintain this commitment to abstinence. However, Courage’s 
implicit 12-step model suggests an approach to homosexuality that likens it to a disease or addiction—
something from which a participant is “in recovery.” For the status of the organization, see “Programs For 
Individuals,” Courage International, last updated September 15, 2018, accessed November 10, 2018, https://
couragerc.org/for-individuals/. Under “About,” it reads: “On November 28, 2016, Courage International, 
received canonical status in the Roman Catholic Church as a diocesan clerical public association of the faith-
ful, making it the only canonically-approved apostolate of its kind.”
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dignity is nothing, gives nothing, and echoes brassily for nothing (see 1 Cor. 13:1-3). But 
with this characteristic, iconic dignity retains the essence, the spirit, and the life of all 
virtue and holiness—“every holy and heavenly temper in one”—which gives form, nour-
ishment, and direction to every virtue and every virtuous act.89 What Wesley and Aquinas 
make abundantly clear is that the principal characteristic of iconic dignity, its sine qua non 
as a theological perspective, is that it is loving. But what does loving mean?
 On the one hand, the lovingness of iconic dignity is the embodied culmination of 
participation, incarnation, relation, dynamism, encompassment, and transformation. It is 
the virtuous means and end to true beatitude—holiness and happiness in fellowship with 
God. It is the unmerited nature of grace that freely and favorably invests in us a capacity 
for loving reciprocity—with God, neighbor, self, and world. It is the essence of God’s 
nature and the outline of God’s image within ours. To say that iconic dignity emerges as a 
loving theological perspective is, in essence, repetitively redundant. On the other hand, 
loving is more than the sum of its parts. To wit, lovingness means three things for Wesley 
and Aquinas—and for us: (1) love is participial, active, and action-oriented; (2) love is 
virtuous, interior, and exterior; and (3) love is generative, creative, and furthering. Let us 
investigate these three in turn.
 First, to characterize iconic dignity’s lovingness as participial is to embrace its ori-
entation to action.90 For Wesley and Aquinas, love is neither idle nor passive, but instead 
89 See John Wesley, Sermon 17, “The Circumcision of the Heart,” I.11, in Works 1:407; Sermon 90, “An 
Israelite Indeed,” II.11, in Works 3:289; and Sermon 22, “Sermon on the Mount, Discourse II,” II.2, in Works 
1:495. See also Aquinas, ST II-II.23.7-8.
90 In linguistics, a participle is a word formed from a verb but used as an adjective (i.e., a verbal adjec-
tive), whereas a gerund is formed from a verb and used as a noun (i.e., a verbal noun). The nuance here is 
that, as a participle, loving is descriptive and active, not prescriptive or static.
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represents the active heart of God. Loving amounts to laboring or operating for God (as 
icons) and with God (our dignity).91 By imitating Christ and obeying his commands, we 
become God’s “collaborators” and “cooperators.”92 Loving, active obedience signifies
a religion of love and joy and peace, having its seat in the heart, in the inmost 
soul, but ever showing itself by its fruits, continually springing forth not only in all 
innocence—for ‘love worketh no ill to his neighbour’—but likewise in every kind 
of beneficence, in spreading virtue and happiness all around it.93
As Aquinas explains, love draws together our interior dispositions with our exterior actions. 
By uniting affective benevolence and practical beneficence, we communicate charity’s 
friendship (amicitia), care (amare/dilectio), joy (gaudium), peace (pax), mercy (misericordia), 
goods (beneficentia/dare eleemosynam), fraternity (fraternitas), and wisdom (sapientia).94 
In Wesley’s idiom, holy living and loving balances works of piety with works of mercy, 
holiness of heart with holiness of life, inward religion with outward.95
 Second, to characterize iconic dignity’s lovingness as virtuous is to extend the par-
ticipial interplay of action and being to the affectional moral psychology at the heart of 
91 Wesley is especially keen to this notion, which is heavily supported by scripture. See Philippians 2:12-
13, Galatians 5:6, 1 Thessalonians 1:3—all of which deeply inform Wesley’s theology and practice.
92 See, for example, Wesley, Sermon 18, “The Marks of the New Birth,” III.5 and IV.1, in Works 1:427, 
428; and Sermon 29, “Sermon on the Mount, IX,” §6, in Works 1:635-636. See Aquinas, ST I.93.4; and ST 
I-II.108.4 ad 3.
93 Wesley, An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion (1743), §4, in Works 11:46.
94 These represent a handful of virtuous topics and acts that Aquinas addresses in the “Treatise on 
Charity” (ST II-II.23-46). As with his treatments of other virtues, Aquinas first presents an overview (q. 23), 
with an eye to its subject, object, and ordering (qq. 24-26), before turning to its numerous actions (both 
virtuous and vicious). In other words, Aquinas begins with the action of loving in general (q. 27), discusses 
its interior/dispositional (qq. 28-30) and exterior/practical (qq. 31-33) effects, opposing vices (qq.34-43), its 
precepts (q. 44), and its respective gift (qq. 45-46).
95 See Wesley, Sermon 43, “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” III.5, 9-10, in Works 2:164, 166; Advice to 
the People Called Methodists (1745), §2, in Works 9:123; and An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion 
(1743), §§49, 52, 67, 97-99, in Works 11:63-65, 73, 88-89.
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iconic dignity’s theological anthropology. Love is the ever-ascending zenith of the theo-
logical virtues and the only one that endures in our heavenly state.96 It is the fountain-
head, the mother, the form, the spring, the shape, the director, the orientation, and the 
essence of every virtue. Love orients acts of virtue to their greatest good—God—and, by 
participation in God’s essential loving-goodness, makes us holy and righteous.97 Love is 
fulfillment, not only of the law (cf. Rom. 13:10), but also of our iconic humanity:
This love we believe to be the medicine of life, the never-failing remedy, for all the 
evils of a disordered world, for all the miseries and vices of men. Wherever this is, 
there are virtue and happiness, going hand in hand. There is humbleness of mind, 
gentleness, longsuffering, the whole image of God, and at the same time a ‘peace 
that passeth all understanding’, and ‘joy unspeakable and full of glory’.98
In this elegant symbiosis, love is prismatic of all the other virtues: it is the preeminent 
virtue toward which faith and hope point, and it is the refracting lens through which all 
the cardinal virtues are properly envisaged.99
96 Since God is Love, and since love is unitive, the virtue of love aims at immediate, unitive fellowship 
with the Trinitarian God. Faith, which perfects our earthly intellect, is no longer needed in the immediate 
presence of God, for loving God is knowing God. Similarly, hope, which perfects our earthly will (regarding 
distant goods), is no longer needed in the immediate presence and fellowship of God.
97 See, for example, Wesley, Sermon 22, “Sermon on the Mount, Discourse II,” II.2, in Works 1:495: 
“Righteousness is the image of God, the mind which was in Christ Jesus. It is every holy and heavenly 
temper in one; springing from as well as terminating in the love of God as our Father and Redeemer, and the 
love of all men for his sake.” As Outler notes (495n42), Wesley’s interpretation of righteousness as holiness 
(i.e., perfect love) sets Wesley off from his theological predecessors, who were more inclined to speak of an 
inherent or imparted righteousness distinct from an imputed or forensic righteousness.
98 Wesley, An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion (1743), §3, in Works 11:45-46.
99 In Chapter 6, we noted the centrality of the “Treatise on Grace” within Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, 
bridging the moral psychology of the Prima Secundae with the theological ethics of the Secunda Secundae. 
In a parallel manner, the Secunda Secundae itself is structured in such a way that the questions on love 
(qq. 23-46) are the orientation of the preceding questions on faith (qq. 1-16) and hope (qq. 17-22) and the 
orienting principle for the subsequent questions on the cardinal virtues, viz., prudence (qq. 47-56), justice 
(qq. 57-122), fortitude (qq. 123-140), and temperance (qq. 141-170).
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 Third, to characterize iconic dignity’s lovingness as generative is to recognize its 
self-effusive creative power that continually seeks new, furthering expressions. God did 
not create the world out of necessity or contingency; rather, God has created all things 
out of self-giving, self-sharing love—including humans, who uniquely bear the imprint of 
God’s own creativity. True human generativity is a response to and a reflection of God’s 
paradigmatic creative love. Iconic dignity thus witnesses to our capacity for further—and 
furthering—creation. As a “capstone characteristic” of iconic dignity, loving is embodied 
when its supporting characteristics are aligned and actualized.
3. Desired Outcomes and Summary Findings
 In drawing this dissertation to a close, it is helpful to review what has been covered 
and how this relates to the desired outcomes of the study. The Introduction outlined the 
basic thesis of iconic dignity as a theological trajectory emerging from the constructive 
comparison of Wesley and Aquinas on nature, grace, and virtue. After a detailed discus-
sion of the project’s methodology, methods, and practices, the Introduction outlined three 
specific desired outcomes: (1) to present iconic dignity as a transformational theological 
perspective; (2) to propose a fresh hermeneutic for Wesleyan theological studies; and 
(3) to provide a potential resource for ongoing Methodist-Catholic ecumenical dialogue. 
Together, it was argued, these outcomes should ultimately attest to the explanatory power 
of iconic dignity as a theological perspective. Following the historical-contextual sketches 
of Aquinas and Wesley at the close of the Introduction, Chapter 1 then unpacked the 
terms, logic, history, and dynamics of icon and dignity in greater detail. This revealed the 
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distinctively scriptural and Patristic undertones that resonate throughout the theologies 
of Wesley and Aquinas, as well as the integrated dynamics at the heart of iconic dignity. 
Cumulatively, the Introduction and Chapter 1 sought to frame the ensuing theological 
exchange with an eye toward comprehension and nuance.
 Chapter 2 began the comparison between Wesley and Aquinas on nature by fram-
ing the general contours of their shared theological anthropology. Here we encountered 
a commonly-held theological anthropology of humans as embodiments of the imago Dei. 
Chapter 3 then investigated the particular contours of the imago Dei in terms of the char-
acteristic human faculties of intellect and will, with a volitional liberty drawing from both 
and establishing our moral capacity. We found Wesley and Aquinas to be of one mind and 
one heart: the intellect is a rational, cognitive capacity that operates discursively from the 
data transmitted by our senses, and the will is an affective (rational) appetite for good that 
animates our operations and disposes us to certain ways of being and doing. In all, the 
resulting theological anthropology was best described as holistic.
 Next, Chapter 4 sought the effects of this anthropology for human actions. While 
actions flow from our steady dispositions, they also contribute to shaping those disposi-
tions. What begins as reactive passions and responsive affections become shaped through 
intentional acts into inclinations and tendencies, durable dispositions, and finally habitus 
and tempers. We then applied this common framework to the issue of evil and sin (both 
original and actual), where we continued to observe Wesley and Aquinas’s striking resem-
blances—but not unanimity. To conclude Chapter 4, we rejected a Wesleyan doctrine 
of total depravity as inconsistent with Wesley’s theological purview and as indebted to 
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Aquinas’s insights that no thing can be absolutely evil or depraved. On the basis of iconic 
dignity, we argued for an account of the postlapsarian deprivation of human righteous-
ness vis-à-vis original sin over against one of (total) human depravity. A short Chapter 5 
then excursively expanded the topic of “nature” to the non-human realm, where Wesley’s 
strong ecological stewardship was brought to bear on Aquinas’s eschatological disregard 
for the material world and its underlying anthropocentrism.
 Chapter 6 shifted from nature to grace within Wesley’s and Aquinas’s theologies. 
This began with a comparison of the general nature of grace, which revealed tremendous 
consensus between the two theologians. Grace’s free, loving favor pardons and empow-
ers humans (Wesley), thereby healing and elevating us (Aquinas) to participate in God’s 
essential goodness. Although their typologies of grace appeared at first to be quite differ-
ent, Wesley and Aquinas’s common concerns for balancing operation and cooperation, 
being and doing, and human response to divine initiative again revealed them to be cut 
from common cloth. Along the way, we took stock of different constellations of Wesley’s 
doctrine of grace and the developments within Aquinas’s own doctrine of grace in terms 
of auxilium/motus. However, in attempting to align the two schemes of grace, we noted 
a key dissimilarity: whereas Wesley emphatically stresses the universality of God’s preve-
nient grace to reject the doctrines of predestination and reprobation, Aquinas, by retaining 
these doctrines in their Augustinian guise, precludes an equivalently universal category of 
grace. This disparity became the focus of the short Chapter 7, in which Wesley’s doctrine 
of grace sought out Thomistic evidence for universally-available grace. The perspective of 
iconic dignity prompted that quest and, by returning again to a comparison of Wesley and 
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Aquinas as theological practitioners, suggested preaching as a practical manifestation of 
universal grace.
 Finally, the foregoing sections of this Conclusion have illustrated the explanatory 
power, significance, emergent characteristics, and practical embodiments of iconic dig-
nity. In so doing, it has also illustrated the viability of iconic dignity as a truly transforma-
tive theological perspective. Iconic dignity wields critical, comparative, constructive, and 
consequential explanatory power and is characteristically participatory, incarnational, 
relational, dynamic, encompassing, transformative, and loving. Iconic dignity also seeks 
present embodiment in ecological stewardship, ecumenical and interreligious dialogue, 
LGBTQ inclusion and hospitality, and reconsideration of certain doctrinal stances. How-
ever, given its trajectory and fecundity, it has become clear that the possible actualizations 
of iconic dignity are, in the final assessment, inestimable.
 That said, in returning to the desired outcomes of this study, the first goal—to 
develop and present iconic dignity as a transformational theological perspective—has 
successfully been met. Iconic dignity is indeed a prolific theological hermeneutic, capable 
of transforming theological traditions, communities of practice, relationships, and indi-
viduals. We have also witnessed its abundant explanatory power and versatility in navigat-
ing the theologies of Wesley and Aquinas while providing key insights for contemporary 
theology and practice. This has been especially evident in the foregoing sections of the 
Conclusion, which offered the opportunity to step back in order to bring the entire picture 
of iconic dignity into proper focus.
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 Next, the considerable fruit borne in the comparative dialogue between Wesley 
and Aquinas means that the second desired outcome has also been met—to propose a 
fresh hermeneutic for Wesleyan theological studies. Hopefully, this study has sufficiently 
demonstrated that a Thomistic approach to Wesley not only can be done, it also should be 
done—and should continue to be done! We have seen how the nexus of nature, grace, and 
virtue—iconic dignity—can provide a fresh theological scheme with doctrinal subtlety 
for interpreting Wesley anew and with staying pertinence. However, over the course of 
researching and conducting this project, it has become clear to me that a corollary of the 
second desired outcome could (and should) have been to propose a fresh hermeneutic for 
Thomistic theological studies, too. Such a mutually-constructive outcome is, indeed, the 
goal of any truly comparative theological exchange. It is my desire that Thomistic theolog-
ical studies will find in this approach contributions by Wesley and by iconic dignity for the 
task of interpreting the Common Doctor in word and in deed.
 Lastly, given the trajectory of the most-recent Methodist-Catholic dialogues 
(including Houston 2016), it seems very probable that a comparative theological dialogue 
between Wesley and Aquinas can be a resource for future ecumenical work—in other 
words, the goal of the third desired outcome. Not only does a comparison of Wesley and 
Aquinas easily transfer to an ecumenical context, it further embodies the mutual “exchange 
of gifts” that characterizes true ecumenical dialogue.100 Furthermore, the 2016 Houston 
100 The phrase “exchange of gifts” comes from St. John Paul II’s 1995 encyclical letter Ut Unum Sint 
(§28), which is heavily referenced in the “Preface” of the Methodist-Catholic dialogue The Grace Given You 
in Christ (Seoul, 2006). It should be noted that, while “Methodists” and “Catholics” are broader categories 
than “Wesleyans” and “Thomists,” these two theological titans have had incomparable influence on their 
respective traditions, thus making a comparative dialogue between these two figures far more profitable to 
a broader denominational dialogue than would otherwise appear.
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text provides numerous indicators that iconic dignity has much to offer the ongoing dia-
logue.101 Houston’s general structure follows the contours of iconic dignity,102 and the text 
evinces an unparalleled embrace of human dignity as a recurring anthropological theme.103 
Iconic dignity also provides helpful supplements to the Houston text at key places where 
doctrinal differences between Methodists and Catholics create dialogical difficulties: the 
relationship of Mary and grace,104 the subject of merit,105 and the discussion of kinds of 
grace.106
101 The timing of the composition of the present study and the Methodist-Catholic dialogues that 
resulted in the 2016 Houston text was such that neither project could benefit from the work of the other.
102 For example, Houston begins its discussion of grace and holiness with theological anthropology and 
the imago Dei (§§14-25). Relationality (§§17-22) is the leading anthropological motif, followed by embodi-
ment (§§23-25) and a defense of material goodness (§§29-30; cf. §48). Houston also seems to arrive at some 
of the same doctrinal conclusions as iconic dignity, including the eschewal of total depravity (§30) and the 
affirmation of the universality of “enabling/preventing grace” (§§48, 54). But note, Houston draws on the 
Council of Trent (Session VI, c. 5) instead of Aquinas to affirm this universality.
103 As noted above, dignity appears 13 times throughout the Houston text, eclipsing the 10 references 
from all other dialogues combined (most of which come from The Denver Report).
104 Catholic Marian devotion has consistently been a sticky wicket for Methodists and is treated at some 
length in the Houston text (§§127-131). However, an earlier paragraph illustrating “enabling grace” with the 
example of Mary misses a key opportunity to note Wesley’s fundamental agreement with the paragraph’s 
point (§57). In Sermon 63, “The General Spread of the Gospel,” §11, in Works 2:489, Wesley himself offers 
the example of Mary as the exemplary case of a person being assisted by God’s grace without force. Iconic 
dignity provides an integral viewpoint and language for recognizing the interplay of human nature and the 
dynamics of grace. Iconic dignity also resonates with the British Methodist/Catholic dialogue on Mary (cited 
in Houston §57), which suggests that “Mary can be said to be a sign or icon of ‘grace alone’ (sola gratia).”
105 A Wesley-Aquinas dialogue (like the one here) could very much assist the Methodist-Catholic 
conversation on merit (Houston §§80-83). §80 begs the question of what is being merited, including the 
interrelatedness of merit and sanctifying/co-operant grace. §81 points to the need of Aquinas’s insights that 
“merit” is co-operant grace in action, since co-operant habitual grace is the principle of meritorious acts 
that always stands in need of actualization (auxilium). Without calling it such, §82 essentially draws upon 
Aquinas’s notion of gratia gratis data: the idea that we “might aid the sanctification of others” (§82) is the 
essence of Aquinas’s “freely-given grace.” However, §83 exceeds Aquinas’s own scope of gratia gratis data. 
A more-Thomistic angle would “soften” the substance of §83—especially in terms of the “treasury of merit” 
and “indulgences”—while highlighting for Methodists the possibility of our graced lives functioning “pre-
veniently for others.”
106 The layout of Houston’s chapter on the kinds of grace (§§53-67) follows the “doctrines/degrees 
model” of interpreting Wesley’s doctrine of grace. This is not “wrong,” of course, and the dialogue is to 
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 In all, this study has fulfilled its desired outcomes while maintaining an internal 
theological coherence with enduring explanatory power. To reiterate what was articu-
lated in the Introduction and corroborated thereafter, Wesley and Aquinas are theologi-
cally similar enough to converse but different enough to contribute to that conversation. 
As a genuinely comparative and constructive theological perspective, iconic dignity truly 
transposes Wesley and Aquinas for contemporary theology and practice without attenuat-
ing their voices or compromising their central concerns. At the same time, iconic dignity 
is sufficiently adroit at fostering new expressions and manifestations that attend to the 
contexts and circumstances of various communities—all of which is for the sake of having 
life and having it most abundantly (cf. John 10:10).
4. Circling Back: Nature, Grace, and Virtue
 In the end, an icon is necessarily limited. It “is” not what it represents. It always 
points beyond itself, beyond its representative aspect, beyond its unique focus. And, 
although timeless, an icon must be experienced within time. We are, after all, temporal 
creatures whose gazes must at some point leave the icon. Hopefully we do so having been 
changed, seeing the once-familiar anew, to return later, to behold another facet, to dig into 
the diversity of different (not independent) discoveries. Such is the nature of the present 
study. The end of the dissertation does not signify the end of iconic dignity. Rather, it now 
be commended for avoiding the structural limitations imposed on soteriology by this “doctrines/degrees 
model.” Having said that, a constructive comparison of Wesley’s and Aquinas’s typologies of grace (as in 
Chapter 6, above) further avoids the complications that correspond with this “doctrines/degrees model” of 
Wesleyan grace.
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circles back to nature, grace, and virtue to point beyond itself to further theological com-
parison between Wesley and Aquinas—and to further manifestations of iconic dignity.
 At the outset of the Introduction, we discussed how iconic dignity emerges from 
the interplay of nature, grace, and virtue amidst a comparison of Wesley and Aquinas. 
And, as we have witnessed, that correlation has yielded a bumper crop too plentiful to be 
contained within a single volume. Here, we have explored Nature (Part I) with consider-
able fullness, which has established our real and present need for God’s grace and how 
that grace answers to the contours of nature while also transforming them. Grace (Part II) 
has as its foundation Nature: the two go together. But grace extends far beyond Nature, 
and it is for this reason that further comparison on grace in Wesley and Aquinas will be 
necessary in future work. Practically speaking, future work on grace (Part II) will develop 
and carry “The Nature of Grace” in two directions: “The Way of Grace” (soteriology) 
and “The Means of Grace” (sacraments/sacramentals) in Wesley and Aquinas. Much of 
that comparative analysis will be found to have been prefigured in this dissertation. In 
short, the substructure for future work in grace is already in place; what remains is the 
“super-structural” development of soteriology and sacrament(al)s.
 Virtue (Part III) presents a slightly different scenario. Virtue exists at the intersec-
tion of nature and grace as the substantive actualization of gracious habitus/tempers.107 
Virtue also builds upon grace and nature by implementing their categories, language, 
dynamics, and outcomes. Consequently, a comparative analysis of virtue in Wesley and 
107 The given description applies to the theological virtues (faith, hope, love/charity), which is the lim-
ited scope of Part III (Virtue). This is not meant to rule out a comparison of the cardinal moral virtues 
(prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude) in Wesley and Aquinas, as suggested below.
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Aquinas cannot adequately proceed until the structural integrity of its foundation—
nature and grace—is secure. Like the further comparison on grace mentioned above, 
future work on virtue will develop in two directions: “The Nature of Virtue” and “The 
Theological Virtues” for Wesley and Aquinas. The former corresponds to the moral psy-
chology presented in Part I (nature) and the shape of grace developed in Part II (grace). 
The latter then describes and compares the theological virtues in Wesley and Aquinas 
with an eye toward grace’s end and means.
 This sketch amounts to a personal research agenda and is consistent with the tra-
jectory of iconic dignity in the theological comparison of Wesley and Aquinas. But by no 
means does it enclose iconic dignity as a viable and transformative theological perspective. 
There is still much that can be done beyond the scope of this study, both immediately and 
proximately. For example, areas for further research may include a comparison of Wesley 
and Aquinas on the cardinal moral virtues (prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude) or 
on the shape and implications of their “implied” ecclesiologies.108 Likewise, iconic dignity 
may prompt additional questions and reflections on expanding the notion of “sociality” 
with respect to nature and sin, grace and salvation, and virtue and ethics.109 
108 By this I mean that both Aquinas and Wesley operate within “given” ecclesiological structures and 
norms—which they more or less took for granted. As such, neither writes a “proper” or “standalone” 
De Ecclesia. Still, both evince a “deep ecclesiology” that invariably affects their respective ecclesial tradi-
tions—in Wesley’s case, the formation of a new denomination. For more on this subject and how it might be 
approached, see Gregory P. Van Buskirk, “Ecclesiology in Absentia? Moral-Theological Reflections on the 
‘Deep Ecclesiology’ of Wesley and Aquinas” (paper presented at the annual Wesleyan Theological Society 
meeting, Asbury Theological Seminary, Wilmore, Kentucky, March 3-4, 2017).
109 For example, the concept of “social sin”—structural, institutional, and/or sociocultural malum 
that has become engrained in modern social systems—simply did not exist in Aquinas’s era and was only 
beginning to develop by the end of Wesley’s. (Consider, for example, the mature Wesley’s increasingly-firm 
advocacy against the perils of slavery, war, and oppressive economic structures.) However, we live with a 
consistent consciousness of the dehumanizing tendencies of our social institutions, and it is well within the 
purview of iconic dignity to analyze and attenuate these structures of social sin. And, per the structure of 
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 Earlier I mentioned that greater attention could have been given from the outset 
to how this study contributes more explicitly to Thomistic studies.110 Along similar lines, 
a primary avenue for developing iconic dignity still further is to expand its hermeneu-
tical capacities into other theological (and religious) traditions. Iconic dignity aims at 
being a theological perspective informed by—not bound to—Wesley and Aquinas, which 
prompts a number of questions for reflection. Does iconic dignity “work” with other theo-
logical traditions or theologians? If not, what might this say about iconic dignity, and would 
it lead to confrontation or competition of theological traditions and perspectives? Can it move 
from bilateral to multilateral comparison? If so, would it run the risk of forming a “Wesley-
an-Thomist clique” unintentionally fostered by the present study? What about other religious 
or faith traditions—what can an explicitly Christian theological hermeneutic offer? 
 As a matter of course, these questions (let alone their answers!) lie beyond the 
scope of what I can address on my own. Each question points to the necessity of iconic 
dignity existing in and developing through further embodiment and dialogue. Each is a 
call to discover those liminal places and relationships where life flourishes and grace pre-
vails. Iconic dignity reminds us that there is always more work to be done. God has indeed 
fashioned us in such a way to be ever driven for what lies beyond our nature, yet ever 
dependent for attaining it in virtue of God’s grace.
iconic dignity, it is suggested that such alleviation look to social possibilities for grace, salvation, virtue, and 
ethics that are compatible with the portrait of human nature presented in Part I.
110 The concession lies partly with my own Wesleyan background and partly with the all-too-frequent 
diminutive posture of Wesleyans towards “theological titans” such as Aquinas. Even though I do not sub-
scribe to this mental posture, it has likely slipped in on occasion.
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